

1 absence of a timely objection, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear
2 error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
3 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes (1983); *see also United States v. Reyna–Tapia*, 328
4 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

5 **II. Background**

6 The factual background in this case is thoroughly detailed in Magistrate Judge
7 Bowman’s R & R. This Court fully incorporates by reference the Summary of the Case
8 and Discussion sections of the R & R into this Order. Strouse, who is currently
9 incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Tucson, Arizona,
10 challenges three separate disciplinary proceedings that occurred while he was an inmate
11 at the FCI in Petersburg, Virginia.

12 **III. Discussion**

13 In his objections to the R & R, Strouse does not raise new issues. Rather, he
14 reargues the grounds considered and rejected by Magistrate Judge Bowman. Specifically,
15 Strouse argues that he did not receive sufficient due process safeguards during his
16 disciplinary proceedings because: (1) prison staff did not recuse themselves from his
17 hearing even though they were named defendants in a pending law suit that Strouse
18 initiated and (2) he attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies.

19 With respect to the first claim, prison staff are not required to recuse themselves
20 from a disciplinary hearing solely because they are a named defendant in a pending
21 lawsuit filed by the Petitioner. “Requiring each staff member who is the subject of a
22 separate lawsuit to disqualify [themselves] from sitting in judgment of that inmate would
23 heavily tax the working capacity of the prison staff.” *Redding v. Fairman*, 717 F.2d 1105,
24 1113 (7th Cir. 1983). “If every named defendant in a prisoners’ rights lawsuit must be
25 disqualified from sitting on the [disciplinary] Committee, such a litigation strategy would
26 vest too much control in a prisoner to determine the Committee make-up.” *Id.* As
27 Magistrate Judge Bowman notes, Strouse’s bare allegation is insufficient to establish a
28 due process violation without specific evidence demonstrating that the Disciplinary

1 Hearing Officer was actually biased. Further, it is sufficient for due process purposes that
2 the disciplinary hearing decisions were based on “some evidence.” *Superintendent v. Hill*,
3 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Here, there is sufficient evidence that due process was
4 satisfied.

5 Strouse’s second claim also fails. Strouse admits that he failed to exhaust his
6 administrative remedies and did not attempt to file a late appeal pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§
7 542.14(b), 542.15(a).

8 Accordingly,

9 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Magistrate Judge Bowman’s Report and
10 Recommendation is **adopted**. Petitioner Strouse’s third amended petition is **denied**. Doc.
11 32.

12 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Petitioner Strouse’s objections are **overruled**.
13 Doc. 33.

14 Dated this 21st day of March, 2016.

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20 Raner C. Collins
21 Chief United States District Judge
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