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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christian Alberto Sanchez,	)	No. CV 16-746-TUC-LAB
	)	
Petitioner,	)	<b>ORDER</b>
	)	
vs.	)	
	)	
Charles L. Ryan; et al.,	)	
	)	
Respondents.	)	
	)	

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Pending before the court is the petitioner’s “Motion to Request Additional Documents and Relevant Evidence from Trial Record,” filed on May 25, 2017. (Doc. 20)

Also pending is the petitioner’s “Motion to Request Full California Records of Alleged Crimes Used in State’s Notice of Intent to Use Specific Instances of Conduct (Rule 404),” also filed on May 25, 2017. (Doc. 21)

Also pending is the petitioner’s “Motion to Request Full California Records of Alleged Crimes Used in State’s Notice of Intent to Use Specific Instances of Conduct (Rule 404) and Motion for Hearing,” filed on June 23, 2017. (Doc. 30)

The petitioner, Christian Alberto Sanchez, does not show “good cause” to conduct discovery; his motions will be denied.

Background

Sanchez was convicted after a jury trial of “one count of molestation of a child, three counts of sexual abuse of a minor under fifteen, and one count of sexual conduct with a minor

1 under fifteen.” (Doc. 14, pp, 3-4) The trial court sentenced Sanchez to an aggregate term of  
2 imprisonment of thirty-seven years. (Doc. 14, p. 4)

3 At trial, the state introduced evidence that Sanchez sexually abused R.H., the daughter  
4 of Sanchez’s girlfriend, Shauna Fabian. (Doc. 1, p. 8); (Doc. 18-6, p. 3) The state also  
5 introduced “other-act” evidence pursuant to Ariz.R.Evid. 404(c) that Sanchez previously had  
6 sexually abused E.R., the daughter of Sanchez’s ex-wife, Valerie Villa. (Doc. 1, p. 8); (Doc.  
7 14, p. 5); (Doc. 16, p. 41)

8 On November 28, 2016, Sanchez filed in this court the pending petition for writ of  
9 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1) He claims (1) trial counsel was  
10 ineffective because (a) Valerie Villa should have been called as a witness at the other-acts  
11 hearing, (b) Garardo Belford, Sanchez’s brother, should have been called to testify that E.R.  
12 made “ludicrous” allegations against him, (c) Danelle Barnett should have been called to  
13 testify about Villa’s unsavory character and her animosity toward Sanchez, and (d) Paul  
14 Simpson, forensic psychologist, should have been called to rebut testimony offered by the  
15 state’s expert, Wendy Dutton. (Doc. 1) He further claims (2) his rights to “due process of law”  
16 and “a fair trial” pursuant to “Amendments 5, 6, and 14 of the U.S. Constitution” were violated  
17 when the court admitted “other-act” evidence and testimony from the state’s expert, Wendy  
18 Dutton. (Doc. 1, p. 46)

19 The respondents filed an answer in which they argue that Sanchez’s due process/fair trial  
20 claim is procedurally defaulted while his ineffective assistance claim should be denied on the  
21 merits. (Doc. 13) Sanchez filed a reply on May 25, 2017. (Doc. 22) On the same day, he filed  
22 two of the pending motions for discovery. (Doc. 20); (Doc. 21) He filed his third discovery  
23 motion on June 23, 2017. (Doc. 30)

## 24 25 Discussion

26 Unlike a party to a normal civil action, a habeas petitioner “is not entitled to discovery  
27 as a matter of ordinary course.” *Bracy v. Gramley*, 520 U.S. 899, 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 1796-97  
28 (1997). Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases permits discovery “only in the

1 discretion of the court and for good cause shown.” *Rich v. Calderon*, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9<sup>th</sup>  
2 Cir.1999), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 1092. “A ‘good cause’ analysis requires the reviewing court  
3 to identify the ‘essential elements’ of the underlying substantive claim, and determine whether  
4 petitioner’s allegations, if proven, would satisfy those elements and show the violation of a  
5 constitutional right.” *Williams v. Hall*, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (D. Or. 2009) (citing *Bracy*,  
6 520 U.S. at 904, 117 S.Ct. at 1797).

7 Since *Bracy* was decided, the Supreme Court has held in *Pinholster* that a federal court  
8 analyzing a properly exhausted habeas claim is limited to the record that was before the state  
9 court when the claim was originally denied. See *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct.  
10 1388 (2011). The holding in *Pinholster* is an additional hurdle the petitioner must overcome  
11 if he is to establish “good cause” for habeas discovery.

12 In his first motion, Doc. 20, Sanchez asks for a CD player and a special program that will  
13 allow him to listen to “several CD discs which allegedly contain interviews of witnesses in this  
14 case.” (Doc. 20, pp. 1-2) Apparently, Sanchez has in his possession CDs (compact discs) that  
15 appear on the trial Exhibit List and are labeled Exhibit J-1 and Exhibit 1A. (Doc. 26-1, pp. 3,  
16 4); (Doc. 29, p. 4) (citing respondents’ attachment 1) Exhibit J-1 is identified only as “C.D.  
17 in plastic case.” (Doc. 26-1, p. 3) The accompanying notation states “admitted for purposes  
18 of the record only NOT TO GO TO THE JURY.” *Id.* Exhibit 1A is identified as “C.D. in white  
19 paper sleeve.” (Doc. 26-1, p. 4)

20 Apart from Sanchez’s unsupported allegations, there is no indication as to what those  
21 discs contain. Accordingly, there is no way of knowing if they have any relevance to the two  
22 claims that Sanchez raises in his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court will not authorize  
23 discovery that is nothing more than a “fishing expedition.” *Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for*  
24 *the N. Dist. of California*, 98 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996). The fact that they might have  
25 been available to the trial court during Sanchez’s jury trial is not enough to establish relevancy  
26 here.

27 Sanchez also asks for a “copy of recorded phone conversation in which Defendant  
28 allegedly stated he was going back to San Diego as stated in Moore’s Testimony.” (Doc. 20,

1 p. 2) (citing RT 7-6-10, p. 34, l. 22-23) Sanchez asserts in conclusory fashion that “this  
2 evidence is relevant for this case.” *Id.*

3 The court has examined the motion transcript at the place indicated by Sanchez. In the  
4 transcript, Deputy Moore described how he first made contact with Shauna Fabian, who had  
5 reported that Sanchez had “inappropriately touched” her daughter. (Doc. 18-1, p. 17)  
6 Apparently, when Moore contacted her, she was talking on the telephone with Sanchez. She  
7 told Moore that Sanchez was “in a cab headed back downtown [to the Greyhound station].”  
8 (Doc. 18-1, p. 18); (R.T. , p. 34, l. 22-23) Moore activated a digital recording device to record  
9 the phone call, which had been put on the speaker phone. Moore did not recall whether or not  
10 *he* heard Sanchez say he was in a cab on his way to the Greyhound station. *Id.*, (Doc. 18-1, pp.  
11 18-19) Sanchez was subsequently found in downtown Tucson near the Hotel Congress. *Id.*,  
12 p. 20; R.T. 37

13 Sanchez does not explain why this recording would be relevant to the claims in his  
14 petition. He may be arguing that if the recording does not support Shauna Fabian’s assertion  
15 that Sanchez said he was on his way to the Bus Station, then this is evidence that Fabian is a  
16 liar, and his counsel should have used this information to impeach her credibility. And this  
17 recording, therefore, could be evidence that counsel was ineffective. This court, however, is  
18 limited to evaluating the state court’s decision on the ineffectiveness issue in light of the  
19 evidence presented to it originally. This court cannot evaluate counsel’s performance *de novo*  
20 based on evidence that was not given to the state court when the issue was exhausted. *See*  
21 *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011). Accordingly, this recording is not  
22 relevant to the pending petition.


23 In the other pending motions, Doc. 21 and Doc. 30, Sanchez moves for permission to  
24 discover the California records pertaining to the abuse allegations made by E.R., some of which  
25 were introduced at trial as other-act evidence pursuant to Ariz.R.Evid. 404(c). (Doc. 1, p. 8);  
26 (Doc. 14, p. 5); (Doc. 16, p. 41) Sanchez alleges that the California authorities investigated  
27 those allegations and were about “to dismiss those false allegations” but the Arizona authorities  
28 requested that they refrain from dismissing those allegations until after the trial. (Doc. 30, p.

1 7) Apparently, Sanchez believes he was denied “evidence that [was] in the hands of the  
2 government” and this denial constitutes a *Brady* violation. (Doc. 30, pp. 7, 10); *see Brady v.*  
3 *Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).

4 Sanchez, however, does not raise a *Brady* claim in his pending petition for writ of habeas  
5 corpus. Accordingly, the evidence he seeks is not relevant. Without a showing of relevance,  
6 Sanchez cannot show “good cause.” He therefore is not entitled to discovery or an evidentiary  
7 hearing. *See also U. S. ex rel. Nunes v. Nelson*, 467 F.2d 1380, 1380 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1972)  
8 (“Appellant is not entitled to a discovery order to aid in the preparation of some future habeas  
9 corpus petition.”).

10 IT IS ORDERED that Sanchez’s motions for discovery and an evidentiary hearing are  
11 DENIED. (Doc. 20); (Doc. 21); (Doc. 30) He has not shown “good cause” as required by Rule  
12 6(a) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under § 2254.

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14 DATED this 5<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2017.

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18 Leslie A. Bowman  
19 United States Magistrate Judge  
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