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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

Lonzell J. Threats,  
Petitioner,  
v.  
J.T. Shartle, Warden  
Respondent.

No. 17-542-TUC-JAS (BGM)  
**ORDER**

**DISCUSSION**

Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation issued by United States Magistrate Judge Macdonald. The Report and Recommendation recommends denying Petitioner’s habeas petition. Petitioner filed objections and the Government filed a response to those objections.<sup>1</sup>

As a threshold matter, as to any new evidence, arguments, and issues that were not timely and properly raised before United States Magistrate Judge Macdonald, the Court exercises its discretion to not consider those matters and considers them waived. *United States v. Howell*, 231 F.3d 615, 621-623 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence presented for the first time in a party's objection to a magistrate judge's recommendation . . . [I]n making a decision on whether to consider newly offered evidence, the district court must . . . exercise its discretion . . . [I]n providing for a *de novo* determination rather than *de novo* hearing, Congress intended to permit

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<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise noted by the Court, internal quotes and citations have been omitted when citing authority throughout this Order.

1 whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to  
2 place on a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations . . . The magistrate  
3 judge system was designed to alleviate the workload of district courts . . . To require a  
4 district court to consider evidence not previously presented to the magistrate judge would  
5 effectively nullify the magistrate judge's consideration of the matter and would not help to  
6 relieve the workload of the district court. Systemic efficiencies would be frustrated and the  
7 magistrate judge's role reduced to that of a mere dress rehearsal if a party were allowed to  
8 feint and weave at the initial hearing, and save its knockout punch for the second round . .  
9 . Equally important, requiring the district court to hear evidence not previously presented  
10 to the magistrate judge might encourage sandbagging. [I]t would be fundamentally unfair  
11 to permit a litigant to set its case in motion before the magistrate, wait to see which way  
12 the wind was blowing, and—having received an unfavorable recommendation—shift gears  
13 before the district judge.”); *United States v. Reyna-Tapia*, 328 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
14 2003) (“Finally, it merits re-emphasis that the underlying purpose of the Federal  
15 Magistrates Act is to improve the effective administration of justice.”).<sup>2</sup>

16 As to the objections filed by Petitioner, the Court has conducted a *de novo* review  
17 of the record. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“Within fourteen days after being served with  
18 [the Report and Recommendation], any party may serve and file written objections to such  
19 proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court  
20 shall make a *de novo* determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed  
21 findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept,  
22 reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the  
23 magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to  
24 the magistrate judge with instructions.”).

25 In addition to reviewing the Report and Recommendation and any objections and  
26 responsive briefing thereto, the Court’s *de novo* review of the record includes review of the

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27 <sup>2</sup> Assuming, *arguendo*, that such matters were not subject to waiver, the Court (in the  
28 alternative) has nonetheless conducted a *de novo* review, and upon review of the record  
and authority herein, rejects these issues and adopts the Report and Recommendation in its  
entirety.

1 record and authority before United States Magistrate Judge Macdonald which led to the  
2 Report and Recommendation in this case.

3       Upon *de novo* review of the record and authority herein, the Court finds Petitioner’s  
4 objections to be without merit, rejects those objections, and adopts United States  
5 Magistrate Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. *See, e.g.,*  
6 *United States v. Rodriguez*, 888 F.2d 519, 522 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989) (“Rodriguez is entitled by  
7 statute to *de novo* review of the subject. Under *Raddatz* [447 U.S. 667 (1980)] the court  
8 may provide this on the record compiled by the magistrate. Rodriguez treats adoption of  
9 the magistrate's report as a sign that he has not received his due. Yet we see no reason to  
10 infer abdication from adoption. On occasion this court affirms a judgment on the basis of  
11 the district court's opinion. Affirming by adoption does not imply that we have neglected  
12 our duties; it means, rather, that after independent review we came to the same conclusions  
13 as the district judge for the reasons that judge gave, rendering further explanation otiose.  
14 When the district judge, after reviewing the record in the light of the objections to the  
15 report, reaches the magistrate's conclusions for the magistrate's reasons, it makes sense to  
16 adopt the report, sparing everyone another round of paper.”); *Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle*  
17 *Independent School Dist. No. 42 of Stephens County, Okl.*, 8 F.3d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1993)  
18 (“*De novo* review is statutorily and constitutionally required when written objections to a  
19 magistrate's report are timely filed with the district court . . . The district court's duty in this  
20 regard is satisfied only by considering the actual testimony [or other relevant evidence in  
21 the record], and not by merely reviewing the magistrate's report and recommendations . . .  
22 On the other hand, we presume the district court knew of these requirements, so the express  
23 references to *de novo* review in its order must be taken to mean it properly considered the  
24 pertinent portions of the record, absent some clear indication otherwise . . . Plaintiff  
25 contends . . . the district court's [terse] order indicates the exercise of less than *de novo*  
26 review . . . [However,] brevity does not warrant look[ing] behind a district court's express  
27 statement that it engaged in a *de novo* review of the record.”); *Murphy v. International*  
28 *Business Machines Corp.*, 23 F.3d 719, 722 (2nd Cir. 1994) (“We . . . reject Murphy's

1 procedural challenges to the granting of summary judgment . . . Murphy's contention that  
2 the district judge did not properly consider her objections to the magistrate judge's report .  
3 . . lacks merit. The judge's brief order mentioned that objections had been made and  
4 overruled. We do not construe the brevity of the order as an indication that the objections  
5 were not given due consideration, especially in light of the correctness of that report and  
6 the evident lack of merit in Murphy's objections.”); *Gonzales-Perez v. Harper*, 241 F.3d  
7 633 (8th Cir. 2001) (“When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's report and  
8 recommendation, the district court is required to make a *de novo* review of the record  
9 related to the objections, which requires more than merely reviewing the report and  
10 recommendation . . . This court presumes that the district court properly performs its review  
11 and will affirm the district court's approval of the magistrate's recommendation absent  
12 evidence to the contrary . . . The burden is on the challenger to make a *prima facie* case  
13 that *de novo* review was not had.”); *Brunig v. Clark*, 560 F.3d 292, 295 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009)  
14 (“Brunig also claims that the district court judge did not review the magistrate's report *de*  
15 *novo* . . . There is no evidence that the district court did not conduct a *de novo* review.  
16 Without any evidence to the contrary . . . we will not assume that the district court did not  
17 conduct the proper review.”).<sup>3</sup>


18 <sup>3</sup> See also *Pinkston v. Madry*, 440 F.3d 879, 893-894 (7th Cir. 2006) (the district court's  
19 assurance, in a written order, that the court has complied with the *de novo* review  
20 requirements of the statute in reviewing the magistrate judge's proposed findings and  
21 recommendation is sufficient, in all but the most extraordinary of cases, to resist assault on  
22 appeal; emphasizing that “[i]t is clear that Pinkston's argument in this regard is nothing  
23 more than a collateral attack on the magistrate's reasoning, masquerading as an assault on  
24 the district court's entirely acceptable decision to adopt the magistrate's opinion . . .”);  
25 *Garcia v. City of Albuquerque*, 232 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The district court's order  
26 is terse . . . However, neither 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) nor Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) requires the  
27 district court to make any specific findings; the district court must merely conduct a *de*  
28 *novo* review of the record . . . It is common practice among district judges . . . to [issue a  
terse order stating that it conducted a *de novo* review as to objections] . . . and adopt the  
magistrate judges' recommended dispositions when they find that magistrate judges have  
dealt with the issues fully and accurately and that they could add little of value to that  
analysis. We cannot interpret the district court's [terse] statement as establishing that it  
failed to perform the required *de novo* review . . . We hold that although the district court's  
decision is terse, this is insufficient to demonstrate that the court failed to review the  
magistrate's recommendation *de novo*.”); *Goffman v. Gross*, 59 F.3d 668, 671 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
1995) (“The district court is required to conduct a *de novo* determination of those portions  
of the magistrate judge's report and recommendations to which objections have been filed.  
But this *de novo* determination is not the same as a *de novo* hearing . . . [I]f following a  
review of the record the district court is satisfied with the magistrate judge's findings and

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

- 3 (1) United States Magistrate Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation (Doc.  
4 37) is accepted and adopted in its entirety.  
5 (2) Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a  
6 Person in Federal Custody is denied.  
7 (3) This case is dismissed with prejudice.  
8 (4) The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the file in this case.

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10 Dated this 25th day of June, 2021.

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14 Honorable James A. Soto  
15 United States District Judge  
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28 recommendations it may in its discretion treat those findings and recommendations as its own.”).