

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS  
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

RAYMOND HANKINS, JR.

PLAINTIFF

vs.

Civil No. 6:14-cv-06025

CAROLYN COLVIN  
Commissioner, Social Security Administration

DEFENDANT

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

Raymond Hankins, Jr., (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

**1. Background:**

Plaintiff’s application for DIB and SSI were filed on September 28, 2010. (Tr. 11, 121-133). Plaintiff alleged he was disabled due to multiple heart attacks, heart conditions, hepatitis B and C, bursitis, back problems, and diabetes type II. (Tr. 162). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of April 17,

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<sup>1</sup> The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF. No. \_\_\_” The transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

2006 which was later amended to August 1, 2010. (Tr. 11). These applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 11, 55-61, 67-71). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his applications and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 74-75).

Plaintiff's administrative hearing was held on September 4, 2012. (Tr. 27-50). Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel, Shannon Muse Carroll, at this hearing. *Id.* Plaintiff and Vocational Expert ("VE") Mack Welch testified at this hearing. *Id.* At the time of this hearing, Plaintiff was forty-nine (49) years old, which is defined as a "younger person" under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c), and had an eleventh grade education. (Tr. 31).

On November 16, 2012, the ALJ entered a partially favorable decision finding Plaintiff disabled beginning January 28, 2012. (Tr. 11-20). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through March 31, 2012. (Tr. 13, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity ("SGA") since his alleged onset date. (Tr. 13, Finding 2).

The ALJ also determined Plaintiff, prior to January 28, 2012, had the severe impairments of myocardial infarction status/post stents, diabetes mellitus, and back pain. Beginning on January 28, 2012, Plaintiff had the severe impairments of cerebral vascular accident, myocardial infarction status/post stents, diabetes mellitus, and back pain. (Tr. 13). The ALJ then determined Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 ("Listings"). (Tr. 14, Finding 3).

In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints and determined his RFC. (Tr. 14-18). First, the ALJ indicated he evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints and found his claimed limitations were not entirely credible. *Id.* Second, the ALJ determined that prior to January

28, 2012, Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work. (Tr. 14, Finding 4). The ALJ also found that beginning January 28, 2012, Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform less than the full range of sedentary work. (Tr. 17, Finding 5).

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work ("PRW"). (Tr. 18, Finding 6). The ALJ found that since the onset date, Plaintiff was unable to perform his PRW as a stocker or janitor. *Id.* The ALJ also determined that since January 28, 2012, there was no other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 19, Finding 11). Given this, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had been under a disability as defined in the Act beginning January 28, 2012. (Tr. 19, Finding 12).

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council review the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 5). *See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.968. The Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable decision. (Tr. 1-3). On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on March 4, 2014. ECF No. 5. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 12, 13. This case is now ready for decision.

## **2. Applicable Law:**

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); *Ramirez v. Barnhart*, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. *See Johnson v. Apfel*, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have

supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. *See Haley v. Massanari*, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. *See Young v. Apfel*, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. *See Cox v. Apfel*, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to

the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. *See Cox*, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is reached. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

### **3. Discussion:**

Plaintiff brings the present appeal claiming the ALJ erred: (A) by failing to find Plaintiff met a Listing and (B) in failing to present a proper hypothetical to the VE. ECF No. 12, Pgs. 6-12. In response, the Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No. 13.

#### **A. Listings**

The ALJ must determine whether Plaintiff has a severe impairment that significantly limits the physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. A medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments is severe if it significantly limits an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521 and 416.921.

The ALJ found Plaintiff did suffer from impairments considered to be severe within the meaning of the Social Security regulations. These impairments included cerebral vascular accident, myocardial infarction status/post stents, diabetes mellitus, and back pain as of January 28, 2012. (Tr. 13). However, there was no substantial evidence in the record showing Plaintiff's condition was severe enough to meet or equal that of a listed impairment as set forth in the Listing of Impairments. *See* 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that his impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment set out in the Listing of Impairments. *See Sullivan v. Zebley*, 493 U.S. 521, 530-31 (1990). Plaintiff has not met this burden.

Plaintiff argues he meets a Listing under Section 1.02. ECF No. 12, Pgs. 6-9. Defendant

argues Plaintiff has failed to establish he meets this Listing. ECF No. 13, Pgs. 4-7.

To meet Listing 1.02, Plaintiff must have a major dysfunction of a joint with clinical evidence of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis, with either:

- A. Involvement of one major peripheral weight-bearing joint (i.e., hip, knee or ankle), resulting in inability to ambulate effectively, or
- B. Involvement of one major peripheral joint in each upper extremity (i.e., shoulder, elbow, or wrist-hand), resulting in inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively.

An “inability to ambulate effectively” is an extreme limitation of the ability to walk, i.e., an impairment that interferes very seriously with the individual’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. Ineffective ambulation is having insufficient lower extremity functioning to permit independent ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive device(s) that limits the functioning of both upper extremities. *See* 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00B2b(1). To ambulate effectively, individuals must be capable of sustaining a reasonable walking pace over a sufficient distance to be able to carry out activities of daily living, and they must be able to travel without companion assistance to and from a place of employment or school. *See* 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00B2b(2). Examples of ineffective ambulation include, but are not limited to, the inability to walk without the use of a walker, two crutches or two canes, the inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, the inability to use standard public transportation, the inability to carry out routine ambulatory activities, such as shopping and banking, and the inability to climb a few steps at a reasonable pace with the use of a single hand rail. *Id.*

An inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively means an extreme loss of function of both upper extremities; i.e., an impairment(s) that interferes very seriously with the individual's ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. To use their upper

extremities effectively, individuals must be capable of sustaining such functions as reaching, pushing, pulling, grasping, and fingering to be able to carry out activities of daily living. Examples of inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively include, but are not limited to, the inability to prepare a simple meal and feed oneself, the inability to take care of personal hygiene, the inability to sort and handle papers or files, and the inability to place files in a file cabinet at or above waist level. *See* 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.00B2c.

There is no credible evidence showing Plaintiff is prohibited from ambulating effectively with a major peripheral joint in each upper extremity resulting in inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively. Also, it should be noted, when asked to identify the abilities affected by he conditions, Plaintiff did not identify using hands as one of the abilities affected. (Tr. 162).

Additionally, Plaintiff does not have a joint dysfunction that resulted in an inability to ambulate effectively. Plaintiff has failed to establish he is unable to ambulate effectively. Plaintiff has no evidence he has to use a walker, two crutches, or two canes to walk, or that a physician prescribed these items. Also, it should be noted, when asked to identify the abilities affected by his conditions, Plaintiff did not identify any condition that would cause an inability to ambulate effectively. (Tr. 162).

Whether Plaintiff meets a listed impairment is a medical determination and must be established by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(c), 404.1526(b), 416.925(c), 416.926(b). Plaintiff has not met this burden. I find substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments equal to one listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1.

### **B.Questioning of VE**

At Step Five of a disability determination, the SSA has the burden of establishing that a

claimant retains the ability to perform other work in the economy. *See Snead v. Barnhart*, 360 F.3d 838, 836 (8th Cir. 2004). The SSA may meet this burden by either applying the Grids or by relying upon the testimony of a VE. *See Cox v. Astrue*, 495 F.3d 614, 621 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding the SSA's denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence where the VE's testimony was based on a correctly-phrased hypothetical question); *Patrick v. Barnhart*, 323 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding the SSA's denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence where the ALJ applied the Grids).

The SSA may not apply the Grids, and must hear testimony from a VE, where a claimant's RFC is significantly diminished by a nonexertional limitation. *See McGeorge v. Barnhart*, 321 F.3d 766, 768-769 (8th Cir. 2003). If, however, the SSA properly determines a claimant's RFC is not significantly diminished by a nonexertional limitation, then the SSA may rely exclusively upon the Grids and is not required to hear the testimony from a VE. *See McGeorge*, 321 F.3d at 768-769.

In this matter, the ALJ heard testimony from a VE regarding Plaintiff's ability to perform work in the national economy. It is generally accepted that VE testimony, in response to a hypothetical question, is substantial evidence if the hypothetical sets forth the credible impairments with reasonable precision. *See Starr v. Sullivan*, 981 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992). It has further been established the ALJ must only include in the hypothetical those impairments which the ALJ actually finds credible, and not those which he rejects, assuming his findings are supported by substantial evidence. *See Onstad v. Shalala*, 999 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir. 1993).

The ALJ found prior to January 28, 2012, Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work. (Tr. 14, Finding 4). In response to a hypothetical question, the VE testified work existed in the national economy consistent with the RFC found by the ALJ. (Tr. 45-46). The ALJ found a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform.

(Tr. 18-19, Finding 10). Relying on the VE testimony, the ALJ found prior to January 28, 2012, Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Act. (Tr. 19). Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ's hypothetical question was based upon the RFC finding, the hypothetical question was defective and unsupported by the evidence because it did not contain all of his limitations. ECF No. 12, Pg. 9-12.

I find the ALJ's hypothetical question properly set forth those limitations the ALJ found credible and which are supported by the evidence of record. *See Haynes v. Shalala*, 26 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1994); *Rappoport v. Sullivan*, 942 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1991) (ALJ need only include in his hypothetical question those impairments he accepts as true). The VE stated jobs existed in both the national and regional economy for the vocational profile of the Plaintiff. Such testimony, based on a hypothetical question consistent with the record, provided substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision.

#### **4. Conclusion:**

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.

**ENTERED** this 25<sup>th</sup> day of February 2015.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant  
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT  
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE