

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS  
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

IRMA MARIE NEITZEL

PLAINTIFF

vs.

Civil No. 6:17-cv-06072

NANCY A. BERRYHILL

DEFENDANT

Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

Irma Marie Neitzel (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and a period of disability under Title II of the Act.

The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 7.<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

**1. Background:**

Plaintiff protectively filed her disability application on September 20, 2011. (Tr. 14). In this application, Plaintiff alleges she is disabled due to nerve damage to her right arm and hand. (Tr. 135). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of September 14, 2011. (Tr. 14). This application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 45-46).

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her application, and this hearing

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<sup>1</sup> The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. \_\_\_\_” The transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.”

request was granted. (Tr. 26-44). An administrative hearing was held on October 25, 2012 in Hot Springs, Arkansas. (Tr. 26-44). At this administrative hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by Hans Pullen. *Id.* Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Elizabeth Clem testified at this hearing. *Id.*

On January 23, 2013, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision on Plaintiff’s disability application. (Tr. 11-21). In this decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of Act through June 30, 2016. (Tr. 16, Finding 1). The ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since September 14, 2011, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 16, Finding 2). The ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: status post fracture of the right humerus and joint dysfunction. (Tr. 16, Finding 3). The ALJ, however, also determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 16-17, Finding 4).

In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her RFC. (Tr. 17-19, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined they were not entirely credible. *Id.* Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC for the following:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she is to have no rapid, repetitive, flexion or extension of the hands.

*Id.* The ALJ determined Plaintiff was fifty-four (54) years old, which is defined as a “person closely approaching advanced age” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d). (Tr. 20, Finding 7). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had at least a high school education and was able to communicate in English.

(Tr. 20, Finding 8).

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work ("PRW") and determined Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her PRW. (Tr. 20, Finding 6). The ALJ did, however, determine Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 20-21, Finding 10). Specifically, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform semi-skilled, light work such as work as a personal care assistant with 3,400 such jobs in Arkansas and 350,000 such jobs in the United States. *Id.* Accordingly, based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from September 14, 2011 through the date of the ALJ's decision or through January 23, 2013. (Tr. 21, Finding 11).

Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council's review the ALJ's unfavorable disability determination. (Tr. 1-4). On March 12, 2014, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's disability determination. *Id.* On August 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on August 18, 2017. ECF No. 7. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 12-13. This case is now ready for decision.

**2. Applicable Law:**

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); *Ramirez v. Barnhart*, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. *See Johnson v. Apfel*, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have

supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. *See Haley v. Massanari*, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. *See Young v. Apfel*, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. *See Cox v. Apfel*, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. *See Cox*, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is reached. *See* 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

**3. Discussion:**

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff alleges her case should be reversed and remanded for the following reasons: (A) the ALJ erred by failing to develop the record; and (B) the ALJ erred by concluding she retained the capacity to only perform light work. ECF No. 12 at 1-17. In response, Defendant argues there is no basis for reversal in this case. ECF No. 12. Upon review, the Court finds the ALJ has not supplied a sufficient basis for assessing Plaintiff's RFC and discounting Plaintiff's subjective complaints. Thus, the Court will only consider Plaintiff's second argument for reversal.

In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five factors from *Polaski v. Heckler*, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.<sup>2</sup> *See Shultz v. Astrue*, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. *See Polaski*, 739 at 1322.

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<sup>2</sup> Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: (1) "treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms" and (2) "any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.)." However, under *Polaski* and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. *See Shultz v. Astrue*, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant's subjective complaints of pain. *See id.* The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant's subjective complaints. *See Lowe v. Apfel*, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff's subjective complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ's credibility determination is entitled to deference. *See id.*; *Cox v. Barnhart*, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints "solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]." *Polaski*, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant's complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the *Polaski* factors. *See Baker v. Apfel*, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity. *See Thomas v. Sullivan*, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with the requirements of *Polaski*. Instead, the ALJ based her credibility determination upon her finding that Plaintiff's subjective complaints were not supported by her medical records. (Tr. 17-19). The ALJ briefly summarized Plaintiff's medical records and then discounted her subjective complaints because they were not supported by the objective medical evidence:

In sum, the above *residual functional capacity assessment is supported by a comprehensive assessment of the medical record* from multiple medical sources that

have given the undersigned a full picture of the claimant's residual functional capacity. The record reflects the claimant's longitudinal history, both negative and positive progress notes, and a comprehensive summary of her treatment. *Additionally, the claimant's credibility has been taken into account and weighed against the medical opinion.* In that respect, while the claimant has suffered some injuries there are no injuries that exclude her from working at the level prescribed in the residual functional capacity above. The undersigned has considered the claimant's impairments and included them in the residual functional capacity.

(Tr. 19) (emphasis added). Such a finding was improper. *See Polaski*, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding a claimant's subjective complaints cannot be discounted "solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]").

**4. Conclusion:**

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.

**ENTERED this 13th day of June 2018.**

/s/ Barry A. Bryant  
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT  
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE