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10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
11	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
12	PERFECT 10, INC., a California	CASE NO. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx)	
13	corporation,	[Consolidated with Case No. CV 05-4753 AHM (SHx)]	
14	Plaintiff,	GOOGLE INC.'S EVIDENTIARY	
15	VS.	OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF DAVID	
16	GOOGLE INC., a corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,	O'CONNOR IN OPPOSITION TO GOOGLE'S THREE MOTIONS	
17	Defendants.	FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE DMCA SAFE HARBOR FOR ITS	
18		WEB AND IMAGE SEARCH, BLOGGER SERVICE, AND	
19	AND COUNTERCLAIM	CACHING FEATURE	
20	PERFECT 10, INC., a California corporation,	Hon. A. Howard Matz	
21	Plaintiff,	Date: None Set (taken under submission) Time: None Set	
22	VS.	Time: None Set Place: Courtroom 14	
23		Discovery Cut-off: None Set	
24	AMAZON.COM, INC., a corporation; A9.COM, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,	Pre-trial Conference: None Set Trial Date: None Set	
25	Defendants.		
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Google hereby submits the following objections to the Declaration of David O'Connor, Submitted in Opposition to Google Inc.'s Motions for Summary Judgment Re: DMCA Safe Harbor for its Web and Image Search, Blogger Service, and Caching Feature. The O'Connor Declaration is objectionable for several reasons, and should be disregarded in its entirety.

I. THE O'CONNOR DECLARATION SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE P10 FAILED TO DISCLOSE MR. O'CONNOR IN ITS RULE 26(A) DISCLOSURES.

The O'Connor Declaration should be disregarded in its entirety because, although this case has been pending for close to five years, P10 never disclosed Mr. O'Connor in its Rule 26 Initial Disclosures or its interrogatory responses as a person having knowledge of facts relevant to this case. A party cannot rely on evidence at summary judgment that the party failed to provide during discovery. Wolk v. Green, 2008 WL 298757, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co., Ltd. v. ACIIntern., Inc., 2008 WL 53665, *1 (D. Kan. 2008). P10's failure to disclose Mr. O'Connor as a witness deprived Google of the opportunity to depose him prior to P10's submission of his self-serving declaration, which is demonstrably false in several respects. For example, the O'Connor Declaration mischaracterizes the facts with respect to Google's processing of his DMCA notices and his responses thereto (see Rebuttal Declaration of Shantal Poovala in Support of Google's Motions for Summary Judgment Re Entitlement to Safe Harbor Under the

On April 10, 2008, Google propounded an interrogatory asking P10 to "State all facts which support YOUR contention, if YOU so contend, that GOOGLE has not adopted and reasonably implemented a policy for termination in the appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders who are repeat infringers, as described in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(I)(A), and IDENTIFY all PERSONS with knowledge of such facts and all DOCUMENTS that REFER OR RELATE TO such (footnote continued)

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DMCA, ¶ 20), which facts Google would have established had it had the opportunity to depose Mr. O'Connor. The O'Connor Declaration should be stricken in its entirety. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 33, 37; *see also Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory* 2008 WL 53665, *1 (D. Kan. 2008) (granting motion to strike summary judgment affidavit because witness identity and testimony not properly disclosed during discovery).

II. O'CONNOR WAS NOT DISCLOSED AS AN EXPERT AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THE NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS.

Moreover, just as P10 failed to disclose O'Connor as a person having knowledge of the facts relevant to the case, so too did the company fail to disclose O'Connor as a potential expert witness. Instead, P10 has sprung O'Connor's declaration upon Google, without first allowing Google a fair opportunity to depose O'Connor. For the reasons discussed, *supra*, O'Connor's late-in-the-game declaration should be stricken in its entirety. In addition, at no point does O'Connor tie his qualifications and purported expertise, which involve working on electrical systems and doing work for the United States law enforcement, to Google's search engine or services. *See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) ("[requirement of fit] goes primarily to relevance," and an expert's testimony must "aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute."); *see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999) (expert must have specialized knowledge). As O'Connor appears to lack the necessary qualifications to testify as to Google's search engine or services, again, his testimony should be stricken.

III. THE O'CONNOR DECLARATION IS A SIDESHOW AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED AS SUCH.

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facts." Interrogatory No. 12. P10 did not list Mr. O'Connor in its May 26, 2008 response, nor in its May 29, 2009 updated response.

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Ultimately, P10's attempt to create a "case within a case" should be rejected. This suit is not about whether Google processed the DMCA notices of O'Connor—it is about P10's DMCA notices. These declarations are a sideshow and should be disregarded as such. *Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co.*, 108 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court exclusion of evidence that threatened a "trial within a trial"); *Jefferson v. Vickers, Inc.*, 102 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).

IV. VARIOUS PORTIONS OF O'CONNOR DECLARATION ARE INADMISSIBLE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.

Even were the Court to consider the O'Connor Declaration, portions of it are inadmissible and should be disregarded. Evidence submitted to the Court on motion practice must meet all requirements for admissibility of evidence if offered at the time of trial. Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Services, Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 1988); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Telstar Const. Co., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923 (D. Ariz. 2003). See also Fed. R. Evid. 101 (Rules of Evidence apply to all proceedings in the courts of the United States); Fed. R. Evid. 1101 (listing exceptions to Rule 101). Such evidence must be relevant to the claims and defenses of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 401; 403; McCormick v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 2007 WL 38400, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 2007). Testimonial evidence must be based on the personal knowledge of the witness offering the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Testimony requiring scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may be given only by an expert witness with the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and opinion testimony is not permitted of a lay person. Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702; see also U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1331 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (unqualified expert opinions inadmissible at summary judgment). The O'Connor Declaration fails to meet one or more of these criteria, as set forth below.

1		Proffered Evidence	Google's Objection
2	1.	O'Connor Decl., at ¶ 3 ("In my	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701,
3		opinion, I have sufficient expertise in	702
4		computer science and the Internet to	The statements are irrelevant,
5		determine whether the various	argumentative, speculative, lack
6		portions of notices attached as	foundation, constitute improper legal
7		Exhibit 1 would provide a search	opinion, and constitute improper
8		engine such as Google with enough	opinion testimony. Mr. O'Connor has
9		information to locate the infringing	never been disclosed by P10 as an
10		image(s) or link(s).")	expert in this case, nor does he appear
11			to have the necessary expertise to
12			provide such expert testimony. See
13			Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
14			509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); Kumho Tire
15			Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-
16			48 (1999).
17	2.	O'Connor Decl., at ¶ 4	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701,
18			<u>702</u>
19			The statements are irrelevant,
20			argumentative, mischaracterize the
21			document, speculative, lack foundation,
22			are not within the witness's personal
23			knowledge, constitute improper legal
24			opinion, and are improper opinion
25			testimony. Mr. O'Connor has never
26			been disclosed by P10 as an expert in
27			this case, nor does he appear to have
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1			the necessary expertise to provide such
2			expert testimony. See Daubert v.
3			Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
4			579, 591 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.
5			Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48
6			(1999).
7	3.	O'Connor Decl., at ¶ 5	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701,
8			<u>702</u>
9			The statements are irrelevant,
10			argumentative, mischaracterize the
11			document, speculative, lack foundation,
12			are not within the witness's personal
13			knowledge, constitute improper legal
14			opinion, and are improper opinion
15			testimony. Mr. O'Connor has never
16			been disclosed by P10 as an expert in
17			this case, nor does he appear to have
18			the necessary expertise to provide such
19			expert testimony. See Daubert v.
20			Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
21			579, 591 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.
22			Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48
23			(1999).
24	4.	O'Connor Decl., at ¶ 6 ("The URLs	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701,
25		on the left side of page 11 of Exhibit	<u>702</u>
26		1 appear to be web page URLs with	The statements are irrelevant,
27		the starting http:// and www.	argumentative, mischaracterize the
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removed. If that is the case, Google can use those URLs (by either putting them into Google's search box, or by searching its index for URLs that contain those URLs), to locate the associated web pages. It can then prevent either its Image Search or its Web Search results from directly linking to those web pages.")

document, speculative, lack foundation, are not within the witness's personal knowledge, and are improper opinion testimony. Mr. O'Connor has never been disclosed by P10 as an expert in this case, nor does he appear to have the necessary expertise to provide such expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999).

5. **O'Connor Decl., at ¶ 6** ("Google can do this without any of the other information shown in the middle and right hand columns of page 11.")

Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701, 702

The statements are irrelevant, argumentative, mischaracterize the document, speculative, lack foundation, are not within the witness's personal knowledge, and are improper opinion testimony. Mr. O'Connor has never been disclosed by P10 as an expert in this case, nor does he appear to have the necessary expertise to provide such expert testimony. See Daubert v.

Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48

1			(1999).	
2	6.	O'Connor Decl., at ¶ 6 ("I know	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701,	
3		this not only because of my	<u>702</u>	
4		knowledge regarding how search	The statements are irrelevant,	
5		engines operate, but also because I	argumentative, mischaracterize the	
6		am able to do that myself by	document, speculative, lack foundation,	
7		removing the starting http:// and or	are not within the witness's personal	
8		www. from a URL I obtained from	knowledge, and are improper opinion	
9		Google's Web Search results, and	testimony. Mr. O'Connor has never	
10		then putting it into Google's Web	been disclosed by P10 as an expert in	
11		Search box.")	this case, nor does he appear to have	
12			the necessary expertise to provide such	
13			expert testimony. See Daubert v.	
14			Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.	
15			579, 591 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.	
16			Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48	
17			(1999).	
18	7.	O'Connor Decl., Exh. 1	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403, 602, 901	
19			The evidence is irrelevant and is not	
20			properly authenticated.	
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22	DATED: September 8, 2009 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER &			
23		HEDGES, LLP		
24	By_ Rechel Henrick Lassobian			
25		By Micha	ael Zeller	
26		Rachel Herrick Kassabian		
27		Attor	neys for Defendant GOOGLE INC.	
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