Perfect 10 Inc v. Google Inc et al

Doc. 842

Google submits the following objections to the Reply Declaration of Jeffrey Mausner ("Mausner Reply Declaration"), submitted in support of Perfect 10's ("P10") Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Google Inc. ("Second PI Motion"). The Mausner Reply Declaration is objectionable for several reasons, and should be disregarded or accorded little or no weight in the determination of Perfect 10's Second PI Motion.

I. THE PORTIONS OF THE MAUSNER REPLY DECLARATION CONTAINING NEW EVIDENCE THAT IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO GOOGLE'S OPPOSITION PAPERS SHOULD BE STRICKEN.

The Mausner Reply Declaration contains a significant amount of evidence that (1) was not included in P10's moving papers, and (2) is not responsive to the arguments and authorities in Google's Opposition to P10's Second PI Motion. For example, the Mausner Reply Declaration includes testimony and documents regarding:

- The *Viacom v. YouTube* litigation (¶ 2 and Ex. Q);
- P10's unfounded allegations of discovery misconduct by Google (which allegations previously have been rejected by Judge Hillman) (¶ 2);
- P10's improper demand to re-depose Google witness Shantal Rands Poovala (¶ 6); and
- Additional alleged copyright registration materials located on a hard drive attached as an exhibit to the Zada Reply Declaration (¶ 3).

This newly-submitted evidence should be disregarded. The Court's April 25, 2007 Scheduling and Case Management Order ("Case Management Order") clearly informs P10 of the consequences of including such new evidence in its reply papers: "Reply papers shall be limited to argument and/or authorities responsive to the opposition papers. The Court will ignore new matter that was improperly introduced." Case Management Order at 4:20-22; see also Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The district court need not consider arguments raised

for the first time in a reply brief."). Because Google has no opportunity to fully and fairly respond to this new evidence, Google would be prejudiced were the Court to consider it. Accordingly, the Court should disregard P10's new evidence introduced for the first time in the Mausner Reply Declaration. Alternatively, should the Court elect to consider P10's new reply evidence, Google respectfully requests the opportunity to file a sur-reply memorandum to address it.

II. THE PORTIONS OF THE MAUSNER REPLY DECLARATION CONTAINING LEGAL ARGUMENT (AS OPPOSED TO EVIDENCE) SHOULD BE STRICKEN.

The purpose of a declaration is to submit evidence; it is improper to use a declaration to present legal argument from an attorney. See, e.g., Silver v. Executive Car Leasing Long-Term Disability Plan, 466 F.3d 727, 731 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court's exclusion of a declaration from plaintiff's counsel because it "contains legal argument that was not appropriate for a declaration, as well as analysis of complex [facts] as to which [plaintiff's] attorney would not have been competent to testify"); Lira v. Cate, 2010 WL 727979, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010) (striking portions of declaration containing legal argument).

Here, the Mausner Reply Declaration consists largely of legal argument, not actual evidence. For example, Mausner purports to "declare" that:

- "Google's motions for summary judgment cannot be decided until Google produces all of the relevant documents. In the meantime, a preliminary injunction should be in place to stop Google from contributing to infringement of Perfect 10's copyrighted images." (Mausner Reply Decl. at 4:14-5:3);
- "Google's submission of all these pleadings in opposing the PI Motion violates Local Rule 11-6, which states that memoranda of points and authorities in connection with a motion may not exceed 25 pages. Accordingly, Perfect 10 requests that the Court disregard or strike the eight additional briefs that Google has submitted, along with Google's three undisputed statements of facts

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and other supporting documents. ... Perfect 10 believes it is improper for Google to submit pleadings relating to other matters in opposition to this motion" (Mausner Reply Decl. at 6:25-7:12).

See also Mausner Reply Decl. at 6:1-17; 7:23-8:4.

Such legal argument is inappropriate for submission within an attorney's declaration, and may only be made in P10's memorandum, which is already 25 pages long. All such legal argument in the Mausner Reply Declaration should be stricken. See Silver, 466 F.3d at 731 n.2; L.R. 11-6 ("No memorandum of points and authorities, pre-trial brief, trial brief, or post-trial brief shall exceed 25 pages").

III. PORTIONS OF THE MAUSNER REPLY DECLARATION ARE INADMISSIBLE AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.

The Mausner Reply Declaration should be disregarded for purposes of Perfect 10's Second PI Motion because it is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to evidence submitted to the Court on motion practice. Fed. R. Evid. 101 (Rules of Evidence apply to all proceedings in the courts of the United States); Fed. R. Evid. 1101 (listing exceptions to Rule 101). While courts have some discretion to consider inadmissible evidence when a preliminary injunction is urgently needed to prevent irreparable harm before a full resolution on the merits is possible, courts routinely decline to consider, or afford any weight to, such inadmissible evidence in appropriate circumstances. See Beijing Tong Ren Tang (USA) Corp. v. TRT USA Corp., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2009 WL 5108580, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) (upholding evidentiary objections and denying preliminary injunction); U.S. v. Guess, 2004 WL 3314940, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2004) ("conditional inferences, innuendo, and even strong suspicions do not satisfy [the movant's] burden"); Kitsap Physicians Service v. Washington Dental Service, 671 F.Supp. 1267, 1269 (W.D. Wa. 1987) (refusing to consider affidavits "that would have been inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence" and denying preliminary injunction). Because P10 has had nearly six years to obtain

evidence regarding its Second PI Motion, it is particularly appropriate to hold P10's evidence to the usual standards of admissibility for motion practice.

Such evidence must be relevant to the claims and defenses of the case. <u>Fed. R. Evid.</u> 401; 403; <u>Beijing Tong Ren Tang</u>, 2009 WL 5108580, at *3 (striking irrelevant evidence). Testimonial evidence must be based on the personal knowledge of the witness offering the evidence. <u>Fed. R. Evid.</u> 602. Testimony requiring scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may be given only by an expert witness with the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and opinion testimony is not permitted of a lay person. <u>Fed. R. Evid.</u> 701, 702. The Mausner Reply Declaration fails to meet one or more of these criteria, as set forth below.

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2	1.	Mausner Reply Decl., ¶ 2 and	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701, 702,
3		Exh. Q	801-804, 1002, Case Management Order at
↓			<u>4:20-22</u>
5			The statements and exhibit are
5			argumentative, irrelevant, speculative, lack
7			foundation, do not appear to be based on
3			the witness's personal knowledge, and
•			constitute improper lay opinion testimony
)			and inadmissible hearsay. Mausner's
			personal commentary regarding a news
2			article, Viacom's partial summary judgment
3			motion in the Viacom v. YouTube case, and
1			selected emails submitted with the Viacom
5			summary judgment motion is
5			argumentative and irrelevant. Mausner's
7			personal opinions regarding Google's

alleged discovery practices and intimation that P10 may seek to revisit issues from motions P10 has previously lost before Judge Hillman in this case are irrelevant to P10's Second PI Motion. Further. P10's Second PI Motion was not based on alleged discovery violations by Google, nor was it based on the Viacom v. YouTube case, and such new evidence and claims raised for the first time on reply should be disregarded. Mausner's personal opinion that Google's DMCA Motions "cannot be decided" until Google produces additional documents is irrelevant because, among other things, it is flatly contradicted by P10's representations and conduct in this case, including P10's declination to file a Rule 56(f) motion in opposition to Google's DMCA Motions. See Docket Nos. 495, 497, 498.

The news article is inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant.

The Viacom partial summary judgment motion is inadmissible hearsay, argumentative, speculative, lacking in foundation, and whatever miniscule probative value it might have here is

outweighed by its prejudicial nature. It also is irrelevant for numerous reasons, including because the *Viacom* case involves different parties, different operative facts, and a Google service (YouTube) which is not at issue in P10's suit against Google.

Mausner Reply Decl., ¶ 3 and Ex. 9 to the Declaration of Zada in Support of Perfect 10's 2nd Preliminary Injunction Motion [Dkt. No. 790] ("Zada Decl.") and Exh. 86 to the Reply Declaration of Zada in Support of Perfect 10's 2nd Preliminary Injunction Motion [Dkt. No. 826] ("Zada Reply Decl.").

<u>Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, Case</u> <u>Management Order at 4:20-22</u>

The statements regarding the Copyright Registration Certificates alleged to be located on the hard drive previously submitted as Ex. 9 to the Zada Declaration are irrelevant and lack foundation. Neither this declaration nor the Zada Declaration identify the specific location of such documents on the hard drive, and the statements do not provide a basis for Mausner's personal knowledge regarding the previously undisclosed contents of the exhibit to another witness's declaration. Furthermore, the registration certificates allegedly enclosed on the referenced exhibits to the Zada Declaration and the Zada Reply Declaration are irrelevant because they have not been connected to any specific infringements alleged by P10.

1			Mausner's belated identification of
2			materials submitted by other declarants
3			also violates this Court's Case Management
4			Order.
5	3.	Mausner Reply Decl., ¶ 4	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701,
6			1002
7			The statements are argumentative (for
8			example, what Mausner personally thinks
9			is "absolutely outrageous" does not
10			advance this case or assist the Court in any
11			way). The statements are also speculative,
12			irrelevant, and improper opinion testimony.
13			For example, Mausner's personal opinions
14			(including those regarding the alleged
15			similarity of the "Adobe style notices,")
16			and Mausner's personal beliefs and
17			opinions regarding Google's DMCA
18			procedures for forwarding DMCA notices
19			to Chilling Effects have no bearing on
20			P10's probability of success on its
21			copyright claims. These statements also
22			lack foundation because Mausner identifies
23			no basis of his alleged knowledge
24			regarding Google's actions. These
25			statements also violate the Best Evidence
26			Rule, because the referenced DMCA
27			Notices themselves are the best evidence of
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1			their contents. Mausner's personal opinion
2			that a DMCA notice consisting of an entire
3			hard drive or DVD (like P10's December
4			2005 and 2007 DMCA notices) is the same
5			type of notice as a single emailed PDF file
6			(like P10's late 2009 DMCA notices) is not
7			the best evidence of the contents or format
8			of those notices.
9	4.	Mausner Reply Decl., at ¶ 5	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701
10			The statements are argumentative,
11			irrelevant, and improper opinion testimony.
12			Mausner's personal opinions (and his
13			description of the "opinions" of his
14			corporate client P10) regarding the
15			propriety of Google's submitted exhibits,
16			and his personal interpretation of Local
17			Rule 11-6, have no bearing on P10's
18			probability of success on its claims.
19	5.	Mausner Reply Decl., at ¶ 6	Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 602, 701, 702,
20		and Ex. S. ("Although Perfect	1001, Case Management Order at 4:20-22
21		10 took a Rule 30(b)(6)	The statements are irrelevant,
22		deposition in which Ms. Poovala	argumentative, mischaracterize the
23		testified for approximately 3	documents, and constitute improper
24		hours in 2008, before Ms.	opinion testimony. Mausner's
25		Poovala submitted these two	argumentative allegations regarding P10's
26		declarations, Perfect 10 has been	improper attempts to re-depose a Google
27		trying unsuccessfully to take Ms.	witness whom it has already deposed,
28		<u> </u>	I.

deposition Poovala's since October 2009. Perfect 10 has continuously met-and-conferred with Google regarding this issue for months. avail. to no Submitted under seal as Exhibit S are true and correct copies of correspondence between Perfect 10's attorneys (Valerie Kincaid and me) and Google's attorneys regarding this issue. As set forth in Exhibit S, Google still will not provide a deposition date or produce Ms. Poovala's documents, after five months of meeting and conferring.")

Shantal Rands Poovala, have no bearing on P10's probability of success on its claims.

Further, P10's Second PI Motion was not based on alleged discovery violations by Google, and such new evidence and claims raised for the first time on reply should be disregarded.

Additionally, multiple emails reproduced within Exhibit S may not accurately reflect the contents of the original data, as they reference messages included "below" that may have been repositioned or not included within the exhibit. See Ex. S at 3, 11, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.

DATED: March 31, 2010

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