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9  
 10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
 11 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
 12 **WESTERN DIVISION – LOS ANGELES**

13 JACKSON BROWNE, an individual  
 14  
 Plaintiff,

15 vs.

16 JOHN MCCAIN, an individual; THE  
 17 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL  
 COMMITTEE, a non-profit political  
 18 organization; THE OHIO REPUBLICAN  
 PARTY; a non-profit political  
 19 organization,

20 Defendants.

CASE NO. CV08-05334 RGK (Ex)

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS  
 AND AUTHORITIES IN  
 SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT THE  
 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN  
 COMMITTEE'S SPECIAL  
 MOTION TO STRIKE UNDER  
 C.C.P. § 425.16**

Hearing  
 Date: December 8, 2008  
 Time: 9:00 a.m.  
 Place: Courtroom 850  
 Judge: Hon. R. Gary Klausner

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Political speech is the cornerstone of American democracy and political  
4 campaigns are the focus and fountain of society’s political discourse. Campaign  
5 messages by political parties and other political speakers educate and inform the public  
6 and stimulate debate about the most important topics in a democracy: those who seek  
7 to govern and the policies they will pursue. For these reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court  
8 has made clear that political speech, including campaign-related and generated speech,  
9 receives the highest level of protection under the First Amendment. In the hierarchy of  
10 protected speech, political speech stands at the pinnacle.

11 In this action, Jackson Browne (“Browne”) takes aim at such political speech by  
12 suing over a video (the “Political Video”) produced and disseminated by the Ohio  
13 Republican Party (“ORP”) about the energy plans espoused by Senator Barack Obama  
14 (“Obama”) and Senator John McCain (“McCain”).<sup>1</sup> This Political Video commented  
15 on Obama’s statement that substantial energy savings could be met through proper tire  
16 inflation and used a snippet of Browne’s song *Running On Empty* (the “Song”) –  
17 including only nine seconds of Browne’s voice from the Song – to criticize Obama as  
18 “running on empty” when it comes to energy policy. Use of that phrase in the debate  
19 about energy policy is nothing new: it was a staple of political discourse long before  
20 the Political Video.

21 Browne’s effort to punish those who engage in such political speech is precisely  
22 the kind of action California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 (the “Statute”) was  
23 designed to stop. Browne’s California common law right of publicity claim is subject  
24 to dismissal under the Statute because the speech that is the basis for that claim  
25 concerns matters of the utmost public interest: the policies of the candidates running  
26 for the President of the United States. Thus, Browne’s right of publicity claim is within

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>1</sup> McCain has been sued only in his personal, individual capacity.

1 the purview of the first prong of the Statute, which shifts the burden to Browne to  
2 prove there is a probability he will prevail on the merits of his claim. Because Browne  
3 cannot meet that burden, his right of publicity claim must be stricken.

4 **II. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

5 Browne is a “world-renowned singer and songwriter” known for his “politically  
6 and socially charged songs.” Docket No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 14. In 1977, he  
7 released an album entitled *Running on Empty*, which contained the Song of the same  
8 name. Over the years, Browne has purportedly supported various Democratic and  
9 liberal causes and publicly supported Obama’s presidential campaign. Compl. ¶ 15.

10 This lawsuit stems from Browne’s objection to use of portions of the Song in a  
11 political message created to comment on Obama’s campaign and energy policy.

12 Throughout the 2008 election campaign, the ORP utilized web videos primarily  
13 to generate news coverage in Ohio about the candidates and issues in the campaign.  
14 See Declaration of John McClelland (“McClelland Decl.”) concurrently-filed in  
15 connection with Defendant ORP’s Motion to Dismiss, ¶ 5. The purpose of these web  
16 videos was to generate media attention on important political issues; they were not  
17 used as a fundraising tool or to solicit contributions. *Id.* Beginning on or about July 25,  
18 2008, in preparation for Obama’s scheduled visit to Ohio during the week of August 4,  
19 2008, the ORP created a web video to criticize and comment on Obama’s energy  
20 strategy. This Political Video is referenced in paragraph 2 of the Complaint.

21 The Political Video is one minute and twenty seconds long. It starts with clips  
22 from local Ohio television news broadcasts in which reporters discuss the “pain at the  
23 pump,” *i.e.*, high gasoline prices. One reporter asks “How do you bring down the price  
24 of gas here in northeast Ohio and across the U.S.A.?” and the Political Video then cuts  
25 to a clip of Obama saying at a rally “making sure your tires are properly inflated.” The  
26 sound of a needle being dragged across a record is then heard as the screen flashes the  
27 word “What!?!” The Political Video then shows information about McCain’s energy  
28 plans and clips of McCain speaking at a political rally in which he states that low-

1 income Americans are bearing the brunt of a failed energy policy. The Political Video  
2 then shows a screen that poses the question: “What’s that Obama plan again?” At this  
3 point, 50 seconds into the Political Video, music (but no lyrics) from the Song is first  
4 heard in the background. The Political Video then shows Obama stating that “we can  
5 save all the oil they’re talking about getting off drilling if everyone was just inflating  
6 their tires.” Senator Hillary Clinton is then shown saying (at a press conference during  
7 a time when she was also a candidate for the President of the United States), “Shame  
8 on you, Barack Obama.” A picture of Obama then appears next to the caption “Barack  
9 Obama: No Solutions” and the words “No Solutions” change to the words “Not Ready  
10 to Lead.” This screen with the picture and words appears at 1:11 into the Political  
11 Video, and at this point the sound of Browne singing the lyrics “running on empty”  
12 along with a few other words that bracket that phrase in the Song can be heard. The  
13 Political Video ends with a screen stating as follows: “Paid for by the Ohio  
14 Republican Party. [www.ohiogop.org](http://www.ohiogop.org). Not authorized by any candidate or candidate  
15 committee.” Thus, Browne’s voice (*i.e.*, Browne singing the Song) is heard for **nine**  
16 seconds at the end of the Political Video. McClelland Decl., ¶ 10.

17 Obama’s suggestion about proper tire inflation is used in the Political Video to  
18 convey the message that Obama’s energy strategy was no strategy at all, *i.e.*, that it  
19 was “empty” of substance. The ORP communications staffer who created the Political  
20 Video believed that referencing the lyric “running on empty” helped convey this  
21 message, which was particularly relevant during a time of rising gasoline prices and  
22 heightened concern about dependency on foreign oil. McClelland Decl., ¶ 9.

23 Well before the creation of the Political Video, the phrase “running on empty”  
24 had become part of the common political vernacular in discussing energy policy. *See*  
25 Declaration of Lincoln D. Bandlow (“Bandlow Decl.”) concurrently-filed in  
26 connection with Defendant McCain’s Motion to Strike Under C.C.P. § 425.16, ¶ 2, Ex.  
27 5. Indeed, politicians from both sides of the aisle regularly used the phrase to describe  
28 the oppositions’ energy policies:



- 1 • On June 11, 2008, Democratic Senator Klobuchar said at a press  
2 conference that Republicans were “running on empty” with “the same old  
3 ideas” about energy policy. Bandlow Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 6.
- 4 • On June 16, 2008, Republican Senator Inhofe published an article in  
5 HUMAN EVENTS titled “Dems Running On Empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 4,  
6 Ex. 7.
- 7 • On June 17, 2008, the Senate Republican Policy Committee issued a  
8 policy statement titled “Running On Empty: Why the Democrats’ Energy  
9 Bill Won’t Lower Prices at the Pump.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 8.
- 10 • On June 30, 2008, President Bush publicly remarked that Democrats were  
11 against measures that would “lower prices at the pump” and thus “[y]ou  
12 might say, when it comes to energy policy, the Democrats in Congress are  
13 running on empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 9.
- 14 • On July 31, 2008, a Colorado Democrat commented in a press release that  
15 McCain lacked “an energy plan for the future of our country” and “his  
16 campaign is running on empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 10.

17 Moreover, for years prior to the Political Video, journalists and commentators  
18 had utilized the phrase “running on empty” to discuss energy policy and issues:

- 19 • A January 31, 2002 article by U.S. PIRG about subsidies to energy  
20 industries was titled “Running On Empty: How Environmentally Harmful  
21 Energy Subsidies Siphon Billions From Taxpayers.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 8,  
22 Ex. 11.
- 23 • A March 12, 2005 article in the NEW YORK TIMES about skyrocketing  
24 costs of energy was titled “Running On Empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 9, Ex.  
25 12.

- 1 • An April 2006 article by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas about rising  
2 oil prices and oil depletion was titled “Running on Empty? How  
3 Economic Freedom Affects Oil Supplies.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 13.
- 4 • A July 3, 2006 article from IN THESE TIMES about rising gasoline prices  
5 was titled “Running On Empty: The United States’ real problem with oil  
6 and energy policy goes beyond the rising prices.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 11,  
7 Ex. 14.
- 8 • A June 27, 2007 article in MOTHER JONES about passage of a Senate  
9 energy bill was titled “Running On Empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 15.
- 10 • A March 22, 2007 article in INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY about energy  
11 policy was titled “Running On Empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. 16.
- 12 • A March 23, 2008 article from REAL CLEAR POLITICS about Democrats  
13 blaming the rise in oil prices on the war in Iraq was titled “Running On  
14 Empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 14, Ex. 17.
- 15 • An April 24, 2008 article in THE NATION about oil reserves was titled  
16 “Running On Empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 15, Ex. 18.
- 17 • An April 27, 2008 article in THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS about gasoline  
18 supply was titled “Denver Running On Empty.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 16, Ex.  
19 19.
- 20 • A June 23, 2008 article in the WEEKLY STANDARD was titled “Running on  
21 Empty: Democratic energy policies ignore reality.” Bandlow Decl., ¶ 17,  
22 Ex. 20.

23 Thus, the cliché “running on empty” has long been used as a metaphor for a lack  
24 of substance, ideas or solutions, particularly in the arena of energy policy. The  
25 Political Video was simply one of many such examples.

1 On August 4, 2008, an ORP communications staffer posted the Political Video  
2 to the free YouTube website, using ORP’s account. McClelland Decl., ¶ 12. The ORP  
3 did not pay to have the Political Video run as a political advertisement on any  
4 television station or website and the Political Video did not include any solicitations  
5 for donations. *Id.* at ¶¶ 22-23. On August 6, 2008, promptly after Browne complained,  
6 the ORP removed the Political Video from YouTube and the Political Video has not  
7 been used since that time. *Id.* at ¶ 24.

8 Notwithstanding the fact that the Political Video indicates that it was created  
9 solely by the ORP and was removed from circulation only days after it was posted  
10 (and immediately after Browne’s request that it be taken down from YouTube), on  
11 August 14 Browne filed this action, playing politics of his own by naming not only the  
12 ORP, but the Republican National Committee and McCain as defendants. Browne then  
13 leveraged the attention and notoriety generated by filing an action against a candidate  
14 for President of the United States to enable Browne to hit the “campaign” trail as well  
15 – the campaign to promote Browne and his new album “Time The Conqueror.” Since  
16 filing this action, Browne has appeared on numerous television programs (such as The  
17 Colbert Report and The Tonight Show with Jay Leno) and has given numerous  
18 interviews, discussing this action and his new album. Bandlow Decl., ¶¶ 18-19, Exs.  
19 21-22. Thus, Browne’s conduct evidences an important aspect of First Amendment  
20 jurisprudence: the answer to speech one disagrees with is simply more speech, not  
21 resort to legal action. *Mowles v. Commission of Governmental Ethics and Election*  
22 *Practices*, --- A.2d ---, 2008 Me. LEXIS 165, \*16 (Me. 2008) (the “appropriate cure”  
23 for allegedly misleading political speech is more speech) (citing *Linmark Assocs., Inc.*  
24 *v. Twp. Of Willingboro*, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)). Unfortunately, engaging in such

1 additional speech was not enough for Browne, and so he pursues this action to punish  
2 political speakers. His right of publicity claim cannot withstand a motion to strike.<sup>2</sup>

3  
4 **III. BROWNE’S COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIM MUST  
BE STRICKEN UNDER THE STATUTE**

5 The Statute establishes a special procedure for striking claims, at the very outset  
6 of litigation, that impinge upon rights of free speech:

7  
8 A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in  
9 furtherance of the person’s right of . . . free speech under the United  
10 States or California constitution in connection with a public issue shall be  
11 subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the  
12 plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will  
13 prevail on the claim.

14 C.C.P. § 425.16 (b)(1).<sup>3</sup>

15 The Statute “encourage[s] continued participation in matters of public  
16 significance” by limiting “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the  
17 constitutional rights of freedom of speech.” *Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause,  
18 Inc.*, 29 Cal. 4th 53, 59-60 & n.3 (2002); *Batzel v. Smith*, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir.  
19 2003) (Statute protects defendant from “having to litigate meritless cases aimed at  
20 chilling First Amendment expression”). The Statute is to be construed broadly and a  
21 court may strike “unsubstantiated causes of action arising from protected speech”  
22 without regard to proof of whether plaintiff holds a subjective “intent to chill speech.”  
23 *Equilon*, 29 Cal. 4th at 60.

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24 <sup>2</sup> Moreover, Browne’s copyright infringement, vicarious copyright infringement and  
25 Lanham Act claims also fail, as set forth in the concurrently-filed Motion to Dismiss.

26 <sup>3</sup> Although the Statute is part of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a defendant  
27 may file an anti-SLAPP motion against pendent state law claims asserted in a federal  
28 lawsuit, and the federal court must apply the Statute. *See, e.g., U.S. ex rel Newsham v.  
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc.*, 190 F.3d 963, 970-73 (9th Cir. 1999).

1           The Statute contains no “limiting language” that would restrict its protection to  
2 certain claims. *Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim*, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 642  
3 (1996). “[T]he Legislature did not limit application of the provision[,] . . . recognizing  
4 that all kinds of claims could achieve the objective of a SLAPP suit – to interfere with  
5 and burden the defendant’s exercise of his or her rights.” *Id.* at 652. “[T]he critical  
6 point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance  
7 of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” *City of Cotati v. Cashman*, 29 Cal.  
8 4th 69, 78 (2002). Accordingly, the Statute is not limited to defamation claims, but  
9 applies to privacy and publicity claims arising from conduct in the exercise of free  
10 speech rights. *See, e.g., Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc.*, 34 Cal. 4th 679, 696  
11 (2004) (applying Statute to right of privacy claim); *M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc.*, 89 Cal.  
12 App. 4th 623, 630 (2001) (applying Statute to “misappropriation of identity” claim).

13           In ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, the court must engage in a two-step process.  
14 *Rusheen v. Cohen*, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1056 (2006). First, the court decides whether the  
15 defendant has made a *prima facie* showing that the challenged claim is one arising  
16 from an act in furtherance of the “right of petition or free speech under the United  
17 States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue. *Id.*; *Slauson*  
18 *Partnership v. Ochoa*, 112 Cal. App. 4th 1005, 1019-1020 (2003); *Ingels v. Westwood*  
19 *One Broadcasting Services, Inc.*, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1059 (2005).

20           Once a defendant has made its threshold showing that the plaintiff’s claim arises  
21 from conduct constituting free speech on a public issue, the burden shifts to the  
22 plaintiff to demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on the claim. *Rusheen*,  
23 37 Cal. 4th at 1056; *Equilon*, 29 Cal. 4th at 65. To make such a showing, the plaintiff  
24 “must ‘state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.’” *Wilson v. Parker, Covert*  
25 *& Chidester*, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2002) (citations omitted); *Four Navy Seals v.*  
26 *Associated Press*, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1148 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (same). Thus, a motion  
27

1 under the Statute establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of  
2 the lawsuit using a summary judgment-like procedure. *Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v.*  
3 *Delfino*, 35 Cal. 4th 180, 192 (2005); C.C.P. § 425.16(b)(2) (in ruling on a motion  
4 under the Statute, “the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing  
5 affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based”). The Court  
6 “should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the  
7 motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.”  
8 *Wilson*, 28 Cal. 4th at 821; *Four Navy Seals*, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.

9 Here, Browne’s fourth claim for relief under California’s common law right of  
10 publicity<sup>4</sup> is based on McCain’s speech in connection with issues of public interest.  
11 Therefore, the claim falls within the ambit of the Statute and the burden shifts to  
12 Browne to demonstrate a probability of success on his claim. If this burden cannot be  
13 satisfied, the claim must be stricken. *Equilon*, 29 Cal. 4th at 67; C.C.P. § 425.16(b)(1).  
14 Browne cannot satisfy that burden.

15 **A. The Claim Arises Out Of Political Speech That Is A Matter Of Public**  
16 **Interest And Concern.**

17 The Statute is routinely applied to political speech, in particular speech  
18 involving a political campaign. *Macias v. Hartwell*, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 672 (1997)  
19 (Statute “applies to suits involving statements made during a political campaign”);  
20 *Beilenson v. Sup. Ct.*, 44 Cal. App. 4th 944, 950 (1996) (holding that “[t]here is  
21 nothing in the language of section 425.16 that denies its use by politicians” and thus  
22 Statute applied to a campaign mailer); *Robertson v. Rodriguez*, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347,  
23 352 (1995) (statements made in a campaign mailer in connection with a recall election  
24 are subject to Statute); *Matson v. Dvorak*, 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 547 (1995)

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25 <sup>4</sup> Browne did not sue under California’s right of publicity statute, Civil Code § 3344,  
26 for the obvious reasons that the statute expressly exempts from liability any claim  
27 based on the use of a voice “in any political campaign.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d).

1 (statements made in a political flyer concerning a candidate are subject to Statute).

2 Thus, it is “well settled that section 425.16 applies to actions arising from  
3 statements made in political campaigns by politicians and their supporters.”

4 *Rosenaur v. Scherer*, 88 Cal. App. 4th 260, 273 (2001) (emphasis added).

5 In *Beilenson*, the court specifically noted political speech must be given “wide  
6 latitude” in order to protect the right to free expression:

7  
8 [P]olitical campaigns are one of the most exhilarating phenomena of  
9 our democracy. They bring out the best and the worst in us. They  
10 allow candidates and their supporters to express the most noble, and  
11 lamentably, the most vile sentiments. They can be fractious and unruly,  
12 but what they yield is invaluable: an opportunity to criticize and  
13 comment upon government and the issues of the day.

14 *Id.* at 954-55. Thus, “it is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although  
15 not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions.” *Id.* at 951; quoting  
16 *Bridges v. California*, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941).

17 In this case, there can be no question that Browne’s fourth claim for relief arises  
18 out of speech in connection with a matter of public interest. The claim is based solely  
19 on the contents of the Political Video created in connection with the 2008 Presidential  
20 campaign to comment on the candidates for President of the United States. Compl. ¶ 2  
21 (Political Video “mocks the suggestion of the presumptive Democratic candidate for  
22 President, Senator Barack Obama, that the country can conserve gasoline by keeping  
23 their automobile tires inflated to the proper pressure”) and ¶ 40 (right of publicity  
24 claim is based on “use of Browne’s voice” in the Political Video). Having injected  
25 himself into the public arena through his (constitutionally protected) political  
26 advocacy, Browne cannot now use the courts to silence those who reference this  
27 advocacy to make competing political points. As a New York court recognized thirty  
28 years ago, when a “well-known entertainer” delves into the arena of presidential

1 politics, “it is clearly newsworthy and of public interest.” *Paulsen v. Personality*  
2 *Posters, Inc.*, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507 (N.Y.Sup. 1968).

3 No one can dispute that the candidates and their campaigns for the Presidency  
4 are matters of the utmost public interest affecting the public at large. The Political  
5 Video directly commented on the Presidential candidates and their respective positions  
6 on a key national policy issue: energy and dependence on foreign oil. The Political  
7 Video questioned the substance and seriousness of Obama’s energy plan while touting  
8 the plans of McCain. At the time the Political Video was posted on YouTube, rapidly  
9 rising gas prices and dependence on foreign oil were at the forefront of the campaign  
10 and were topics of great public concern. *See e.g.*, Bandlow Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 5. Thus, the  
11 Political Video addressed issues of tremendous public interest and concern.

12 **B. Browne Cannot Meet His Burden To Demonstrate A Probability He**  
13 **Will Prevail On His Right Of Publicity Claim.**

14 Because the claim arises out of speech relating to a matter of public concern, the  
15 first prong of the Statute is met and the burden shifts to Browne to demonstrate there is  
16 a likelihood he will prevail on the claim. He cannot meet that burden because his claim  
17 fails for a variety of reasons.

18 **1. Browne’s Right Of Publicity Claim Fails Because The Political**  
19 **Video Is Non-Commercial Speech That Relates To A Matter Of**  
20 **Public Interest**

21 Browne’s right of publicity claim must be dismissed because such a claim only  
22 applies to commercial speech – which the Political Video clearly is not. Expressive,  
23 noncommercial speech about matters of public concern is simply not subject to a right  
24 of publicity claim. In California, a plaintiff such as Browne who alleges a common law  
25 claim for right of publicity must “establish a direct connection between the use of [his]  
26 name or likeness and a *commercial* purpose.” *Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox*  
27 *Film Corp.*, 67 Cal. App. 4th 318, 322 (1997). In this context, commercial speech is



1 limited to that which “does no more than propose a commercial transaction” such as  
2 advertisements, endorsements and commercials. *Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.*,  
3 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); *Comedy III Productions, Inc. v.*  
4 *Gary Saderup, Inc.*, 25 Cal. 4th 387, 396 (2001) (Three Stooges drawings on t-shirts  
5 not commercial speech because they were not “advertisements for or endorsement of a  
6 product”). Because a right of publicity claim applies solely to such commercial speech,  
7 an “informative or cultural” use is “immune” from misappropriation liability. *See e.g.*,  
8 *New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc.*, 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir.  
9 1992).

10 Here, the Political Video did not propose a commercial transaction, and it was  
11 not an advertisement for or endorsement of a product. Nor did the Political Video  
12 solicit funds on behalf of any candidate or political cause. Indeed, even if the Political  
13 Video *had* solicited funds for a candidate or cause, the law would still consider it non-  
14 commercial. In *American Family Life Insurance Co. v. Hagan*, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682  
15 (N.D. Ohio 2002), the court noted that speech used during a political campaign,  
16 including speech utilized for the “solicitation of contributions ... is much more than  
17 merely a commercial transaction. ***Indeed, this exchange is properly classified not as a***  
18 ***commercial transaction at all, but completely noncommercial, political speech.***” *Id.*  
19 at 697 (emphasis added) (citing *Fed. Election Com’n v. Colorado Republican Fed.*  
20 *Campaign Comm.*, 533 U.S. 431, 440 (2001) (“Spending for political ends and  
21 contributing to political candidates both fall within the First Amendment’s protection  
22 of speech and political association”)); *Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary*  
23 *Comm., Inc.*, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, \*23-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[e]ven assuming  
24 the [candidate’s] ad ‘commercial.’ If so ... all political campaign speech would also be  
25 ‘commercial speech’ since all political candidates collect contributions”).

1           Indeed, it has been recognized that “[a]n organization cannot effectively  
2 exercise its right to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate unless it is also able  
3 to raise money for its cause.” *Friends of Phil Gramm v. Americans for Phil Gramm In*  
4 *'84*, 587 F. Supp. 769, 774-75 (E.D.Va. 1984). In *Phil Gramm*, an official campaign  
5 committee of a candidate for the United States Senate brought an action against an  
6 independent political action committee to prevent it from using the candidate’s name  
7 in its solicitations. The court rejected the request for a preliminary injunction on the  
8 grounds that it would “unduly interfere with defendants First Amendment right.” *Id.* at  
9 778. The court further found that “the interest in protecting the commercial value of a  
10 person’s name does not apply in this type of case,” because any economic interest a  
11 person may have in their identity “cannot justify restrictions on[] this type of  
12 preeminently political speech.” *Id.* at 776.

13           Not only is a non-commercial use not subject to liability, but a claim under  
14 California’s common law right of publicity is defeated “where the publication or  
15 dissemination of matters is ‘in the public interest.’” *Daly v. Viacom, Inc.*, 238 F. Supp.  
16 2d 1118, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The public interest defense to a right of publicity  
17 claim is a “complete” defense and provides “extra breathing space” even beyond the  
18 First Amendment. *New Kids*, 971 F.2d at 309-10; *Maheu v. CBS, Inc.*, 201 Cal. App.  
19 3d 662, 676-77 (1988) (affirming dismissal on demurrer of right of publicity claims  
20 based on public interest test); *Paulsen*, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 506 (right of publicity claim  
21 by celebrity running mock Presidential campaign barred by public interest exception,  
22 court held that “[t]he scope of the subject matter which may be considered of ‘public  
23 interest’ or newsworthy has been defined in most liberal and far reaching terms”).  
24 Indeed, the California Legislature recognized these First-Amendment-mandated  
25 protections by incorporating them into exemptions to California’s statutory right of  
26 publicity claim. *See* California Civil Code § 3344(d) (exempting claims stemming

1 from use in any “news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political  
2 campaign”); *Cox v. Hatch*, 761 P. 2d 556, 560 (Utah 1988) (court found the use by  
3 Senator Orin Hatch of Utah of a photograph of post office employees without  
4 permission in campaign materials was permissible because “[c]ommunications to  
5 voters by an elected official or candidate for public office which appropriately pertain  
6 to a political campaign are a matter of public interest...[s]uch communications are  
7 essential to the public in choosing governmental officials and...in informing the  
8 public”); *Davis v. Duryea*, 99 Misc. 2d 933, 939, 417 N.Y.S. 2d 624, 628 (1979) (“any  
9 political candidate must be capable of discussing and attempting to document the  
10 validity of a position on a public election without fear of being subjected to a  
11 warrantless suit,” to do otherwise would be “destructive of the essence of the freedom  
12 of positional or ideological exchange which is vital to the existence of a democratic  
13 electoral process”); *Paulsen*, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 505 (“troublesome confrontations with  
14 constitutionally protected areas of speech and press have also caused our courts to  
15 engraft exceptions and restrictions” onto the right of publicity to “avoid any conflict  
16 with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of  
17 public interest”). As addressed below, political speech is afforded the highest  
18 protection under the First Amendment in large part because it is a matter of utmost  
19 public interest and importance.

20       Here, the Political Video and its commentary on the candidates for the  
21 Presidency certainly qualify as a matter of “public interest.” The public interest  
22 inherent in the qualifications, policies and political beliefs of the candidates for the  
23 presidency of the United States is obvious. Moreover, the energy policy of the next  
24 President of the United States will affect every American and an open debate about the  
25 merits of those potential policies is of the utmost importance. Browne’s voice (as he  
26 sings his familiar and cliché line “running on empty”) played an important role in the

1 commentary on those policies. The public’s familiarity with that line was an important  
2 tool to make a complicated message accessible to the public. *Comedy III*, 25 Cal.4th at  
3 397 (when celebrities become “an important part of our public vocabulary,”  
4 appropriating their idiom can have “important uses in uninhibited debate on public  
5 issues”); *Paulsen*, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 509 (noting that entertainers “actively seek[] to  
6 promote and stimulate such public attention to enhance [their] professional standing”).  
7 Use of Browne’s voice in the Political Video to engage in important political speech  
8 certainly qualifies as a matter of public interest. The protection for such speech is  
9 “complete.” *New Kids*, 971 F.2d at 309-10. Browne’s interest in seeking an economic  
10 windfall for the use of his voice is trumped by this non-commercial, public interest  
11 political speech. *Davis*, 99 Misc. 2d at 936 (“privacy rights may not vitiate or abridge  
12 the paramount rights of society to information and necessary free expression in  
13 preparing for the exercise of the electoral franchise”); *Paulsen*, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507-  
14 09 (use of a person’s identity in connection with a matter of public interest “is  
15 constitutionally protected and must supersede any private pecuniary considerations”).  
16 Accordingly, Browne’s fourth claim fails as a matter of law.

17                   2.     **The Political Video Is Subject To Full And Stringent Protection**  
18                   **Under The First Amendment.**

19             “Political expression, in general, and speech uttered during a campaign for  
20 political office, in particular, enjoys the broadest protection of the First Amendment.”  
21 *Geary v. Renne*, 880 F. 2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424  
22 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)). Thus, because political speech is the “primary concern of the First  
23 Amendment,” it is stringently protected. *National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley*,  
24 524 U.S. 569, 597 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). Public discussion and debate on the  
25 qualifications and position of political candidates are integral to the operation of the  
26 system of government established by the United States Constitution. *Buckley*, 424 U.S.

1 at 14 (invalidating provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act limiting certain  
2 campaign expenditures as violating candidates’ and individuals’ rights to freedom of  
3 speech). Political expression serves the public interest by assuring the “unfettered  
4 interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by  
5 the people.” *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).

6 The public interest in the protection of political speech extends to discussion of  
7 candidates for public office and their campaigns. *Mills v. Alabama*, 384 U.S. 214, 218  
8 (1966) (“there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that [First]  
9 Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. . . . of course  
10 includ(ing) discussions of candidates”); *Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy*, 401 U.S. 265, 272  
11 (1971) (“it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and  
12 most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office”);  
13 *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (“[i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability  
14 of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for  
15 the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow  
16 as a nation”). This protection of political speech reflects the “profound national  
17 commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,  
18 and wide-open.” *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);  
19 *Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court for the County of Carson City*, 303 F. 3d  
20 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002) (the public interest is better served by “protecting the core  
21 First Amendment right of political expression”) (citation omitted); *Geary v. Renne*,  
22 880 F. 2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1989) (“any interference with the freedom of a  
23 [political] party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents”)  
24 (quoting *Sweezy v. New Hampshire*, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).

25 The Political Video is easily recognizable as fully protected political expression.  
26 It is an obvious political commentary on the relative strengths of two Presidential  
27

1 candidates' energy plans and whether the candidates are qualified to serve in the  
2 highest office in the country and perhaps the most powerful position in the world.  
3 This is the paradigm for the kind of speech the First Amendment was intended to  
4 protect. Thus, the Political Video is entitled to the full protection of the First  
5 Amendment of the United States Constitution, which bars Browne's claim.

6                   **3. The Transformative Nature Of The Use In The Political Video**  
7                   **Precludes Liability.**

8                   The California Supreme Court has long recognized that the right of publicity  
9 "has not been held to outweigh the value of free expression." *Guglielmi v. Spelling-*  
10 *Goldberg Productions*, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 872 (1979) (Bird, C.J. concurring)<sup>5</sup> (affirming  
11 the dismissal of right of publicity claim at demurrer stage on free speech grounds);  
12 *Daly*, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (dismissing common law right of publicity claim against  
13 expressive work as being barred by the First Amendment). "Any other conclusion,"  
14 warned Chief Justice Bird, "would allow reports and commentaries on the thoughts  
15 and conduct of public and prominent persons to be subject to censorship under the  
16 guise of preventing the dissipation of the publicity value of a person's identity."  
17 *Guglielmi*, 25 Cal.3d at 872; *Comedy III*, 25 Cal. 4th at 403.

18                   Thus, to safeguard free expression, the California Supreme Court devised the  
19 "transformative use" test to determine if a work is shielded against a right of publicity  
20 claim by the First Amendment. *Comedy III*, 25 Cal. 4th at 405; *Winter v. DC Comics*,  
21 30 Cal.4th 881 (2003). Borrowing from the fair use test in copyright law, the Court  
22 held that "when a work contains significant transformative elements," the use is  
23 protected under the First Amendment. *Comedy III*, 25 Cal. 4th at 405. Indeed, such a  
24 transformative work is "not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but

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25  
26 <sup>5</sup> Although a concurring opinion, "Chief Justice Bird's views in *Guglielmi* commanded  
27 the support of the majority of the court." *Comedy III*, 25 Cal. 4th at 396 n.7.

1 it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of  
2 publicity.” *Id.* Under this test, the expressive and transformative use of Browne’s voice  
3 in the Political Video outweighs Browne’s publicity rights.

4 Because the works and expressions of public figures and entertainers such as  
5 Browne “take on public meaning” and become part of our common vernacular, the use  
6 of celebrity indicia and a celebrity’s signature expressions become important “in  
7 uninhibited debate on public issues.” *Comedy III*, 25 Cal. 4th at 397. Speakers,  
8 particularly political speakers, must have liberty to make reference to these celebrity-  
9 infused expression and imagery to express common understanding – just as the  
10 Political Video has done here: using a familiar expression in a familiar song to convey  
11 an important message. That the message was political in nature weighs more heavily in  
12 favor of protecting the speech.

13 Thus, a work that transforms the celebrity’s identity and/or manipulates the  
14 context in which the celebrity’s identity normally appears will be considered  
15 transformative, fully protected under the First Amendment and immune from right of  
16 publicity liability. *Comedy III*, 25 Cal. 4th at 408-409; *Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.*,  
17 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59 (2006) (right of publicity and Lanham Act claims by  
18 celebrity lead singer of group “Deee-Lite” against maker of videogame that allegedly  
19 contained character based on plaintiff barred by First Amendment because of changes  
20 in characteristics and setting were transformative and “added creative elements to  
21 create new expression”); *Comedy III*, 25 Cal. 4th at 408-09 (stating that celebrity  
22 images presented through the use of “distortion and the careful manipulation of  
23 context” that make an “ironic social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity  
24 itself” are entitled to First Amendment protection).

25 The use in the Political Video of nine seconds of Browne’s voice singing the  
26 words “running on empty” was inserting it into an entirely new and different context  
27

1 than the Song *per se*, and is undoubtedly transformative. The combination of the  
2 unexpected use of a rock song combined with a manipulation of the message of the  
3 Song is neither the same traditional use of the Song, nor an acceptable substitute for  
4 the Song's conventional full length version. The Political Video transforms the Song  
5 from an anthem for the rock-and-roll lifestyle into a scathing commentary on Obama's  
6 energy plan. Browne cannot use the courts to block all uses of his voice and image  
7 when used to comment on an important political situation by invoking the right of  
8 publicity. Accordingly, his claim must fail.

9 **IV. CONCLUSION**

10 Although the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment serves a  
11 multitude of important individual and societal purposes, its most safeguarded function  
12 is to serve as a bulwark of self-governance:

13  
14 Our form of democratic government is dependent upon the unfettered  
15 exchange of information. ... The '[p]reservation of free expression is of  
16 particular urgency in the political arena, since it is universally agreed that  
17 a major purpose of the First Amendment is to ensure vigorous,  
uninhibited discussion of governmental affairs.'

18 *Beilenson*, 44 Cal. App. 4th at 956 (citations omitted); *Cox*, 761 P.2d at 558 ("Freedom  
19 of speech is not only the hallmark of a free people, but is, indeed, an essential attribute  
20 of the sovereignty of citizenship"). Our society cannot effectively pursue and achieve  
21 such self-governance without the unfettered right and ability to comment on and  
22 engage in a robust debate about those who seek to govern us. *Friends of Phil Gramm*,  
23 587 F. Supp. at 775 ("Advocacy of particular candidates for public office is essential  
24 to effective self government").

25 It is inevitable (and desirable) in such a debate that celebrities and the phrases  
26 they have infused into our lexicon become fodder for such commentary. Allowing  
27



1 celebrities a civil action veto over this vital area of public discourse is not tolerated by  
2 California’s anti-SLAPP statute or the First Amendment. *Id.* (holding that “SLAPP  
3 lawsuits stifle free speech” and the “threat of a SLAPP action brings a disquieting  
4 stillness to the sound and fury of legitimate political debate” and thus such a lawsuit  
5 “has no place in our courts”).

6 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and in the concurrently-filed  
7 Motion To Dismiss, the RNC respectfully requests that the Court grant the Special  
8 Motion to Strike Under C.C.P. § 425.16 and strike Browne’s fourth claim for common  
9 law misappropriation of right of publicity.<sup>6</sup>

10  
11 DATED: November 17, 2008 KLEIN, O’NEILL & SINGH, LLP

12  
13 By /s/ Howard J. Klein  
14 Howard J. Klein

15 Attorneys for Defendant,  
16 THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL  
17 COMMITTEE  
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23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>6</sup> Moreover, under C.C.P. § 425.16(c), should the RNC prevail on this motion, the  
25 RNC will be entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs and will seek such amounts in  
26 a separately filed motion.  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on November 17, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of the filing to all counsel of record.

/s/ Sang N. Dang  
Sang N. Dang