
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As of today, there are several unresolved dispositive (or partially dispositive)
 motions pending before the court including the following:

4 Motion to Dismiss re First Amended Complaint Defendants 110 8	
	8/6/10
	8/23/10
6 Motion for Summary Judgment Defendants 40 5	5/24/10

8 In an effort to keep this case alive longer, Plaintiffs have also filed two additional
9 motions including a Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #116)
10 and a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #118 & #127). Defendants have filed separate
11 briefs opposing those motions.

However, it is important for the court to note that with respect to Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #110), that motion is entirely unopposed as to the first and second causes of action (for RICO/wire fraud and RICO conspiracy) in the First Amended Complaint. Specifically, on August 16, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Non-Opposition (Doc. #115) explaining that they did not oppose the Motion to Dismiss to the extent it seeks dismissal of the first two claims in the FAC.

18 Other than that notice, Plaintiffs have not filed any substantive opposition to 19 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the extent it seeks the dismissal of any other claims in 20 the FAC. This is important because the Motion to Dismiss was not limited to only 21 Plaintiffs' RICO claims. Rather, in addition to the first and second claims, the motion 22 also expressly seeks the dismissal of the third (unfair business practices), eleventh 23 ("deceit" under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709–10) and twelfth (fraud) causes of action in the 24 FAC. Rather than offering any substantive defense as to the third, eleventh and twelfth 25 causes of action, Plaintiffs' Notice of Non-Opposition simply suggests that Plaintiffs 26 should not have to oppose the Motion to Dismiss as to any non-RICO claims because the 27 court previously ordered that the case "remains bifurcated as to the RICO Causes of 28 Action only ..... Notice of Non-Opposition, Doc. #115, at 2:14–15.

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Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. If the court's order bifurcating the case as to the RICO claims was actually intended to also mean that neither party may take any action with respect to advancing or disputing any other claims, then Plaintiffs clearly violated that order by filing a First Amended Complaint which includes several new state law claims and allegations (such as the third, eleventh and twelfth causes of action in the FAC) which this court never granted Plaintiffs leave to bring. On the other hand, if Plaintiffs were acting consistently with the court's intent when they amended their Complaint to include non-RICO claims, then it is surely appropriate for Defendants to dispute those claims with a motion under Rule 9(b) or Rule 12(b)(6), as they have done.

Apparently, Plaintiffs' position is that they should be permitted to take any and every conceivable action to attack and disparage Defendants, yet Defendants have no right to respond or to present any arguments in their defense. This is not the law. As such and because Plaintiffs have filed no substantive opposition to any of the arguments in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, that motion should be considered unopposed and should be granted in its entirety. If the motion is granted, the remaining claims in this case (with dismissed claims shown as strikethrough) will be as follows:

FAC Claim #	Cause of Action
1	RICO Wire Fraud (Dismissal Unopposed)
2	RICO Conspiracy (Dismissal Unopposed)
3	Unfair Business Practices; Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200
4	Common Law Defamation
5	Defamation Per Se
6	False Light
7	Intentional Interference w/ Prospective Economic Relations
8	Negligent Interference w/ Prospective Economic Relations
9	Negligent Interference w/ Economic Relations
10	Injunction
11	Deceit Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709-10
12	Fraud — Cal. Civ. Code § 1572

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Defendants note that in this posture, there will be no federal claims remaining in the case and, as such, no basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Given the anticipated absence of federal claims, Plaintiffs' Notice of Non-Opposition suggests that Plaintiffs will move to remand the case: "WHEREAS, Plaintiffs will also promptly move to remand this action to California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles for determination of the remaining claims, which all arise under state law ....." Doc. #115 at 3:1–3.

8 Shortly before this notice was filed, Plaintiffs' counsel briefly attempted to meet 9 and confer about the possibility of moving to remand the case once the federal claims 10 were dismissed. Notably, this would be the <u>second</u> such motion—on March 29, 2010 11 Plaintiffs brought an initial Motion to Remand (Doc. #12) which was withdrawn a few 12 days later on April 7, 2010 (Doc. #17). Despite this and despite suggesting that another 13 Motion to Remand was forthcoming, it appears that Plaintiffs have, once again, 14 abandoned their efforts to seek remand of the case.

15 On this point and as was previously explained in their opposition (Doc. #14) to 16 Plaintiffs' first Motion to Remand, even if all federal claims are dismissed from this case, 17 remand would be improper because the court still has diversity jurisdiction under 28 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In that context, discretionary remand is not available under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) because "[T]he exercise of diversity jurisdiction is not discretionary." Brockman 19 v. Merabank, 40 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing Carnegie-20 21 Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 356, 108 S.Ct. 614, 622, 98 L.Ed. 720 (1988)). 22 Because diversity jurisdiction exists here even in the absence of any federal claims, an 23 order remanding this case would be clearly erroneous and reversible on appeal. See Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversing district 24 25 court's remand order after all federal claims were withdrawn because diversity 26 jurisdiction existed over state-law claims and in such a case, "The district court had no 27 discretion to remand these claims to state court.")

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The same is true here. Even in the absence of any federal claims, the parties are citizens of different states and the amount at issue is alleged to exceed \$75,000. For that reason, diversity jurisdiction exists and the case cannot be remanded to state court. Instead, an on-the-merits adjudication must be reached in this court.

As such, Defendants believe that reaching the appropriate disposition of this case is very simple. First, the court should grant Defendants' unopposed Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #110) leaving only the handful of remaining state-law claims. Second, as for the remaining claims, each of these claims are barred by the Communications Decency Act for the reasons set forth in Defendants' fully-briefed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #40). Because the court only granted that motion to the extent it addressed Plaintiffs' extortion claims and did not resolve the balance of the motion, the court should now do so by granting the remainder of the motion in its entirety. This would produce a final, on-the-merits adjudication of all remaining claims in this case and it would be the only factually and legally appropriate disposition of this case.

DATED this  $\frac{7^{\text{th}}}{2}$  day of September, 2010.

## JABURG & WILK, P.C.

<u>/s Maria Crimi Speth</u> Maria Crimi Speth Attorneys for Defendants

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