
1 DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK PLAINTIFF PRO SE 4265 MARINA CITY DRIVE, SUITE 407W MARINA DEL REY, CA 90292 TELEPHONE: (310) 867-1289 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK, Plaintiff. VS. 10 RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R. 11 MORENO, JOYCE L. KENNARD, 12 KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR, MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R. BAXTER, 13 CAROL A. CORRIGAN, SUPREME 14 COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD 15 F. MILES, STATE BAR COURT, **BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE** 16 BAR OF CALIFORNIA, JOANN M. 17 REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. 18 STOVITZ, PATRICE E. McELROY, 19 RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN. 20 BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G. 21 HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE, HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI, 22 CANADY, FALK & RABKIN, 23 SCOTT DREXEL, A. HOWARD MATZ, GARY A. FEESS, R. GARY KLAUSNER,) 24 MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU, VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREY) 25 B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG,) 26 and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, Defendants. 27 28

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CASE NCV10 5820 SVW

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND EQUITABLE/DECLARATORY RELIEF. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

- 1. DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW (CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, TITLE 42 U.S.C. **SECTION 1983)**
- 2. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
- 3. FRAUD

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMPCAINT



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8/5/2010 1:49:36 PM Receipt #: 143690 Cashier: KPAGE [LA 1-1] Paid by: DANIEL D. DYDZAK 2:CV10-05820 2010-086900 5 - Civil Filing Fee(1) Amount: \$60.00 2:CV10-05820 2010-510000 11 - Special Fund F/F(1) Amount: \$190.00 2:CV10-05820 2010-086400 Filing Fee - Special(1)

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2010-086400 Filing Fee - Special(1) Amount: \$100.00 Cash Payment: 350.00 COMES NOW Plaintiff Pro Se, DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK, an individual, and alleges as follows:

PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS

- 1. Plaintiff, DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK ("DYDZAK"), is, and at all times herein mentioned was, an adult over eighteen years old and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, State of California.
- 2. At all times relevant hereto, until on or about May 12, 2010, DYDZAK was a licensed California attorney and member of the State Bar of California. He actively practiced law in the State of California, in both state and federal courts, for over two decades.
- 3. On or about August 10, 2008, DYDZAK received written notice in the mail that he was placed on inactive status by unlawful, biased, fraudulent and unconstitutional Decision of the California State Bar Court dated August 5, 2008 and effective August 8, 2008. Said Decision recommending the

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draconian, unlawful and uncalled for measure of disbarment against DYDZAK was written by State Bar Judge, Defendant DONALD F. MILES ("MILES").

- 4. Thereafter, DYDZAK appealed the Decision and filed other post-trial motions in the Review Department of Defendant STATE BAR COURT. In particular, DYDZAK discovered that there were valid and legitimate legal and factual grounds to disqualify State Bar Judge MILES in his matter and set aside MILES' Decision. Notwithstanding same, on or about December 3, 2010, the Review Department, in an Opinion and Order on Review by Defendants, Review Judges, JOANN REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL and JUDITH EPSTEIN, unlawfully, unconstitutionally and wrongfully supported MILES' Decision, recommending DYDZAK's disbarment to the California Supreme Court.
- 5. DYDZAK timely filed a Petition for Writ of Review in the California Supreme Court on numerous legal, constitutional and factual grounds, challenging the unlawful and wrongful recommendation of disbarment. On or about May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court of California summarily, unlawfully,

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illegally, unconstitutionally and against DYDZAK's civil rights denied the Petition, without sufficient and detailed explanation. Said Supreme Court further ordered that DYDZAK be disbarred, removed from the roll of attorneys in the State of California, and pay vague, unconstitutional and unsubstantiated disciplinary costs in excess of \$ 15,000. Contrary to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the California Constitution, and other applicable law, DYDZAK was not provided oral argument and written decision on the merits by the highest court in California. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the aforesaid disbarment Order became effective on or about June 11, 2010. As a proximate, direct and legal result of the unlawful actions of the Supreme Court of California, as herein alleged, the aforesaid disbarment Order of the Supreme Court of California was and is, unquestionably, void, voidable, illegal, unconstitutional and against DYDZAK's civil rights.

6. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA ("BAR"), is, and at

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all times herein mentioned was, a public corporation, with two offices in the City of San Francisco and City of Los Angeles, State of California, and responsible for administratively supervising all attorneys licensed in the State of California.

- 7. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA ("BOARD"), is, and at all times herein mentioned was, an entity comprised of individuals who manage, operate, supervise and otherwise direct all activities of Defendant BAR, with two offices in the City of San Francisco and City of Los Angeles, State of California.
- 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant STATE BAR COURT ("COURT") is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a public corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California. Upon information and belief, said COURT is, and was at all times relevant hereto, set up to oversee disciplinary matters involving attorneys licensed in the State of California, with a Hearing Department and Review Department in Los Angeles

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and San Francisco, California.

- Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon 9. alleges, that Defendants JOANN M. REMKE, RONALD W. STOVITZ, PATRICE E. MCELROY, DONALD F. MILES, RICHARD A. PLATEL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN and CATHERINE D. PURCELL, are, and at all times herein mentioned were, residents of the State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the aforementioned individual Defendants are, and at all times herein mentioned were, members and judges of Defendant COURT and/or the Review Department thereof and acting or purportedly acting with the authorization, permission and consent of Defendants COURT, BAR, BOARD, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and the other individual named Defendants, and acting in concert with the said Defendants, and each of them, to commit the unlawful activity and conduct alleged herein.
- Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon 10. alleges, that the individual Defendants referenced and named herein are, and were at all times herein mentioned, agents,

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employees and/or officers of Defendant BAR, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, or the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

- 11. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a governmental entity or public corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California.
- 12. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants, RONALD M. GEORGE ("GEORGE"), CARLOS R. MORENO ("MORENO"), JOYCE L. KENNARD ("KENNARD"), KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR ("WERDEGAR"), MING W. CHIN ("CHIN"), MARVIN R. BAXTER ("BAXTER") and CAROL A. CORRIGAN ("CORRIGAN") [hereinafter collectively "CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES"], are, and were at all times herein mentioned, justices and members of the current Supreme Court of California. On or about May 12, 2010, Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, made the illegal, unconscionable and unconstitutional Order to disbar DYDZAK, as herein alleged and described.
 - 13. Defendant GEORGE is shortly retiring as Chief Justice

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of Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, to a large extent under a cloud of misconduct and ethical and judicial violations, due to his wrongful and unlawful actions towards DYDZAK and for other reasons, as hereinafter alleged. Said Defendant GEORGE, in his blatant and unfair cover-up of the misconduct of State Bar Judge MILES and other State Bar officials and State Bar Court judges, has conspired with the other Defendants, MORENO, KENNARD, WERDEGAR, CHIN, BAXTER and CORRIGAN, to deprive DYDZAK of his civil and constitutional rights and earn a living practicing law, to DYDZAK's extreme prejudice.

- 14. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, are, and were at all times herein mentioned, residents of the City and County of San Francisco, State of California.
- 15. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, are acting, and at all times herein mentioned were acting, with the authorization, permission and consent of Defendants BAR, BOARD, and the other Defendants herein in doing the unlawful,

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unconstitutional and wrongful acts herein alleged.

- 16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants, BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, and SEAN M. SELEGUE (collectively "HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS"), are, and were at all times herein mentioned, attorneys duly licensed by the State Bar of California to practice law in said state.
- 17. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants, HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS, are, and were at all times herein mentioned, residents of the City and County of San Francisco.
- 18. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant, HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK & RABKIN ("HOWARD, RICE"), is, and at all times herein mentioned was, an establishment law firm, with numerous Fortune 500 clients, with its head office in the City of San Francisco, State of California.
- 19. Plaintiff is unaware of the exact legal status or capacity of HOWARD, RICE, whether it is a professional corporation, limited partnership, an association or other such

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legal entity. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint to set forth such exact legal status or capacity of HOWARD, RICE when same is ascertained, before or at time of trial

- 20. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants, A. HOWARD MATZ, GARY A. FEESS, R. GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU, VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS and ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, are, and at all times herein mentioned were, United States Judges or Magistrates for the United States District Court of the Central District of California.
- 21. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant SCOTT DREXEL is, and was at all times herein mentioned, former Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that said Defendant is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a resident of the County of San Francisco, State of California.
- 22. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and

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therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names.

Plaintiff will amend this Complaint in order to allege their true names and capacities when same are ascertained.

- 23. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that Plaintiff's damages herein alleged were proximately caused by their conduct.
- 24. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that at all times herein mentioned each of the Defendants was the agent, servant and employee of each of the remaining Defendants, and, in doing the acts hereinafter alleged, was acting within the purpose, course and scope of such agency, service and employment, and with the permission and consent of each of the other Defendants.
- 25. DYDZAK was admitted to the practice of law in the State of California on December 17, 1985. In or about August, 2006 and January, 2007, the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel ("OCTC") filed Notices of Disciplinary Charges against DYDZAK

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and DYDZAK filed appropriate responses to same.

- 26. DYDZAK believed and found out that the alleged charges were politically motivated, because he had filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court on behalf of clients a major lawsuit against a former State Bar President and establishment lawyer, one Alan Rothenberg. Mr. Rothenberg had political connections with Defendants BAR, BOARD and COURT and knew Defendant DREXEL, the then Chief Trial Counsel, and other members of the Board of Governors. The filing of the NDC charges coincided with DYDZAK's litigating and attempting to settle the case involving Mr. Rothenberg. Rothenberg indeed threatened DYDZAK at the time of his deposition in said litigation that he was "going to get him," referring to his connections with Defendants BAR, BOARD and COURT.
- 27. DYDZAK is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant DREXEl, maliciously, unethically, unprofessionally and in conspiracy with Rothenberg, communicated in person and telephonically with said attorney between in or about August, 2006, and continuing throughout 2007 and 2008,

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about pursuing disciplinary charges against DYDZAK, despite the lack of merit to said charges and the weakness of the disciplinary allegations against DYDZAK.

- 28. In so doing, Defendant DREXEL, to enrich himself, preserve his employment and be influential in the state bar hierarchy, was improperly currying favor with politically connected, establishment attorneys, such as Rothenberg. Such attorneys are well known to contribute monies to the Foundation of the State Bar of California and are and were on the Judicial Council headed by Defendant George as Chief Justice. Rothenberg was previously associated with high-powered L.A. law firms, Latham, Watkins and Manat, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney.
- 29. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant DREXEL's contract of employment as Chief Trial Counsel was several months ago not renewed, in large measure because said Defendant abused his position and was shown through his office to unfairly target practicing attorneys, mostly sole practitioners, on even the most trivial of matters.
 - 30. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

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alleges, that Defendant GEORGE, as a former long-time prosecutor with a conservative, pro-government bent, turned a blind eye to any misconduct by Defendant DREXEL because he met with DREXEL weekly to discuss the administration of the courts in California and state bar matters. Defendant DREXEL was, at all relevant times hereto, either a member of Defendant BOARD and the Judicial Council or closely aligned and involved with and influential in affecting its decisions. Defendant DREXEL's agenda was to increase the size and importance of the bloated, fiscally irresponsible State Bar bureaucracy and his office of enforcement, no matter what ill treatment was meted out to practicing attorneys.

- 31. DYDZAK contested the alleged disciplinary charges, which he believed did not have merit, were politically motivated and were defensible. Moreover, during Defendant DREXEL's tenure as Chief Trial Counsel, Defendant DREXEL and other state bar attorneys earned reputations as being unfair, unethical and targeting sole practitioners and Plaintiff's attorneys.
 - 32. One of the State Bar attorneys assigned to DYDZAK's

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disciplinary proceedings, ELI MORTGENSTERN, even advised and admitted to DYDZAK that his hands were tied to resolve the disciplinary matter involving DYDZAK, because he had marching orders to seek disbarment against DYDZAK, no matter how meritless, insubstantial or untenable any client complaint against DYDZAK was.

- 33. On or about August 5, 2008, Defendant DONALD F. MILES, the State Bar hearing judge in Los Angeles, issued an unfair, unlawful and draconian Decision recommending that DYDZAK be disbarred and placing him on inactive status as of August 8, 2008. Defendant MILES took over 200 days to render said decision, making it improbable to conclude that DYDZAK posed a serious, immediate risk of harm to the public after DYDZAK had practiced law more than twenty years with distinction in the State of California.
- 34. Shortly after this decision was filed, DYDZAK discovered that Defendant MILES has, and had at all times herein mentioned, an actual bias, prejudice or conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, because DYDZAK was suing on behalf of

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his prior client, SHANEL STASZ, in Los Angeles Superior Court MILES' former partner and long-time friend of 17 or more years, Defendant BERNARD A. BURK, a partner/director with Defendant HOWARD, RICE as well as defendants such as Charles Schwab and Charles Schwab & Co., long-time clients of said law firm. Prior to his inactive status, DYDZAK was attorney of record for STASZ in LASC Case Nos. BC383161 and BC383162, which litigation involved major HOWARD, RICE clients and exposed said law firm and its partner, Defendant BURK, to major liability.

35. In August and September, 2008, accordingly, DYDZAK filed various motions to disqualify Defendant MILES and set aside the State Bar decision. Defendant MILES unethically, unlawfully and improperly ruled on his own disqualification and would not disqualify himself, unlawfully striking the motion from the record. Defendant REMKE, as the presiding judge, improperly delayed ruling, violating DYDZAK's due process and civil rights, and then transferred the disqualification matter to Defendant McELROY. Defendant McELROY, who was the original judge in the proceedings and should not have ruled because of

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this conflict of interest or the appearance of same, denied the disqualification motion, without any written reasoning or oral argument. Such unethical and wrongful action was done to protect Defendant MILES, at the expense of DYDZAK's legal career and professional standing.

- 36. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant McELROY, presently the supervising judge of Defendant COURT, is in another disciplinary case presently under investigation and scrutiny for taking a bribe and spoliation of evidence.
- 37. Not surprisingly, given the developing legal storm and cover-up to "protect the troops at any cost," Defendant Judges REMKE, STOVITZ and EPSTEIN of the Review Department summarily denied DYDZAK's Petition for Review, focusing primarily on the issue of MILES' disqualification, on or about September 25, 2008. Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, unfairly, wrongfully and unethically aiding in the cover-up, denied DYDZAK's interlocutory Petition For Review on or about November 12, 2008, concerning the disqualification of Defendant MILES.

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This denial Order patently showed that Defendants, SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA and CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, were not interested in upholding the Rule of Law, but instead favored the illegal and biased actions of state bar court judges who they helped appoint and personally knew. Said Order also showed said Defendants cared not one iota about the individual civil and constitutional rights of "politically" targeted and unfairly maligned sole practitioners, such as Plaintiff DYDZAK.

38. During the time-frame of the fall of 2008, Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, including Defendant GEORGE, were well aware that a case involving Defendant HOWARD, RICE, which Defendant SELEGUE was arguing, was before said Court for argument and ruling, to wit, Schatz v. Allan Matkins Leek Gamble Mallory, LLP. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the ruling in said litigation was reached on January 26, 2009. In derogation and violation of their ethical duties and responsibilities, and raising an undeniable conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, including Defendant GEORGE, failed to reveal at any time to DYDZAK that their consideration of this

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case would or reasonably could prejudice their review and adjudication of his interlocutory writ in or about November, 2008. DYDZAK was making serious allegations about the misconduct of Defendants HOWARD, RICE, BURK and MILES, yet Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, with bias, illegally and unfairly chose to hear Schatz on the merits and provide written decision and oral argument, while flushing DYDZAK's aforesaid interlocutory writ into the judicial toilet. Denial of said writ sacrificed DYDZAK's legal rights and ability to earn a living, placed him in destitute state, ruined his reputation, and jeopardized his marriage.

39. In the fall of 2008, and at all other times relevant thereto, San Francisco-based Defendant HOWARD, RICE bragged in its marketing that several cases it handles or has worked on are routinely before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA Defendant HOWARD, RICE has, and had at all relevant times hereto, a politically correct status and reputation for clients as an influential, establishment law firm which could be called upon to represent their legal interests before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA and Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

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JUSTICES. It is clear from the illegal cover-up for Defendant MILES, a former clerk with Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, that the latter and the justices thereof favor judges and big, well-connected law firms over Plaintiff's attorneys, small law firms and sole practitioners.

- 40. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant HOWARD, RICE regularly makes monetary contributions to the California State Bar Foundation and that certain of its partners/directors have been or are appointed members of the Judicial Council headed by Defendant GEORGE. Furthermore, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that in the Bay area Defendants, HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS, and other attorneys employed by Defendant HOWARD, RICE are so socially and in legal circles intimately connected to Defendant GEORGE and the other Associate Justices of Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, that this interaction clearly affected, influenced and prejudiced the latter's review of DYDZAK's disciplinary case.
 - 41. In his state bar court case, DYDZAK filed subsequent,

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numerous and bonafide motions in the Review Department of Defendant COURT and approximately five interlocutory petitions for review before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. These included but were not limited to the issue of disqualifying Defendant MILES and the Review Judges and setting aside his decision of August 5, 2008, as void or voidable due to bias, prejudice or conflict of interest, or the appearance of same. The Supreme Court denied the Writs summarily, not ruling on the merits. The Review Judges, in particular, Defendants REMKE, PURCELL and EPSTEIN, continued to wrongfully and unethically rule on their own disqualification and strike key pleadings and evidence from the state bar record. They willfully perjured themselves by falsely claiming they did not know about being formally investigated by the Judicial Performance Committee of the State of California (which investigation was ongoing at that time), being served with motions, and being sued in federal court by Plaintiff, a case which was dismissed without prejudice on or about January 26, 2010 by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on procedural grounds. A subsequently refiled lawsuit is

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now pending before the Ninth Circuit.

- In or about October, 2008, DYDZAK found out that two partners/directors with Defendant HOWARD, RICE, Defendants HAUSMAN and SELEGUE, had illegally gained access to Defendant MILES' tainted bar decision and attached it with a sworn and dated Declaration as an Exhibit in one of the Staz LASC cases on or about September 27, 2008. Said attorneys never duly and properly paid for or ordered same from the Clerk's Office of Defendant COURT. Since said decision was not posted on the internet until January or February, 2009, this "smoking gun" factor proved that Defendant MILES and/or agents/employees of Defendant COURT had impermissibly and unlawfully communicated with Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and other HOWARD, RICE personnel and lawyers about DYDZAK's bar disciplinary proceeding. This evidenced an actual bias, prejudice and/or conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, by Defendant MILES, mandating his disqualification and the setting aside and reversing of his decision dated August 5, 2008.
 - 43. To date, despite demand therefor from DYDZAK, neither

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Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN nor HOWARD RICE have produced credible evidence that they, or any of them, properly received a copy of MILES' decision lawfully. Plaintiff is informed and believes. and thereon alleges, that Defendant MILES in or about July, August and September, 2008, had improper telephonic communications with Defendants BURK, SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and other HOWARD, RICE personnel concerning and affecting DYDZAK's disciplinary case and the disqualification issues of Defendant MILES thereto. Defendant MILES has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to produce his telephonic records during this time frame which would prove he did communicate with the aforesaid individuals.

44. On or about December 3, 2009, the Review Department of Defendant COURT, despite a flagrant and disturbing pattern of numerous acts of bias, prejudice and conflict of interest (or the appearance of same), and numerous constitutional and civil rights violations by Defendants MILES, REMKE, PURCELL, STOVITZ, EPSTEIN, McELROY and ARMENDARIZ and the other Defendants, as herein alleged, affirmed and modified Defendant MILES' tainted,

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biased and unlawful decision by issuing an Opinion and Order on Review recommending DYDZAK's disbarment. Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL had no jurisdiction to issue such an Opinion and Order On Review on the aforesaid date since there was a Writ pending before the California Supreme Court.

- 45. On or about January 25, 2010, Charles Nettles, a deputy court clerk with Defendant COURT, and Michelle Cramton, a State Bar Administrator, were directed by Defendants REMKE, PURCELL and EPSTEIN of the Review Department to transmit its unfair, unlawful, and biased recommended decision of disbarment to the California Supreme Court. Upon information and belief, on or about January 27, 2010, Mr. Nettles and Ms. Cramton unlawfully and unconstitutionally served notice of said Transmittal of State Bar Court Recommendation, despite the fact that the Review Judges should have disqualified themselves and DYDZAK had not duly exhausted his post-decision remedies before petitioning Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
- 46. On or about January 27, 2010, Defendant BAR, by and through the Office of Chief Trial Counsel, and Mr. Nettles

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also served by mail a certificate of costs in DYDZAK's state bar disciplinary case, Case No. 04-0-14383, 06-0-10960. This included an unconscionable, unlawful, vague, unconstitutional and excessive "base charge" assessment and other alleged costs totaling \$ 15,209.31 which are being sought against DYDZAK. The base assessment in question evidences that Defendants COURT, BAR and BOARD and Defendant JUDGES and employees/agents have a biased incentive and agenda to prosecute attorneys such as Plaintiff to reap an unjust windfall for themselves and perpetuate the Bar bureaucracy. In DYDZAK's disciplinary matter, the Defendant Judges could and cannot be fair and impartial when there is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a clear-cut economic incentive for them to discipline attorneys.

47. At all times relevant hereto, and continuing to the present, a series of internet articles at the Leslie Brodie blog and other easily accessible world-wide web sources have exposed numerous instances of misconduct and unfortunate judicial corruption by State Bar Court Judges. For instance, former State Bar Judge, Defendant STOVITZ, continued to make rulings as a

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Judge Pro Tem when he had no judicial mandate to do so from the Supreme Court of California. In another matter, Review Judge EPSTEIN used her influence to obtain a favorable disciplinary resolution for a former associate of her defunct law firm.

48. Community activist and actor, PERRY F. CARAVELLO, has lodged a formal complaint on or about July 26, 2010, with the Committee on Judicial Performance of the State of California concerning misconduct by Defendant GEORGE. For instance, CARAVELLO alleges that Defendant GEORGE flagrantly and unethically received illegal payments from Los Angeles County of approximately \$ 30,000 per annum while he was a Los Angeles Superior Court Judge and did not report such payments on required Form 700. Defendant GEORGE continued to turn a blind eye to said illegal payments when he was appointed to the Supreme Court of California. Such actions resulted in California taxpayers being defrauded of more than \$ 300 million dollars over a twenty-year period. This situation has been documented in the well-known case of incarcerated Richard Fine, a disbarred attorney who exposed said bribery and corruption and claims he

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is being politically persecuted for his stance.

- 49. Defendants MATZ, FEESS, KLAUSNER, MORROW, PHILLIPS, WU, COLLINS and ROSENBERG, beginning November 25, 2008, and continuing to the present, violated DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights by conspiring, individually and in concert, to protect the Defendant Judges of the State Bar Court and Review Department, as well as certain bar officials and agents, from liability and a finding that DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights were violated, as herein alleged. Said federal judges and magistrate engaged, without limitation, in the following unlawful and wrongful conduct:
- (i) In federal lawsuits, DYDZAK v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al. (CV 08-7765-VAP-AGR), DYDZAK v. REMKE et al. (CV 10-828-UA (AGR)), and DYDZAK v. REMKE et al. (CV 10-1297- AHM(AGRx)) not allowing DYDZAK to prosecute said cases, conduct discovery, grant appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief, and obtain a waiver of the filing fee due to DYDZAK's indigent status in order to protect the State Bar and State Bar Court Defendants named herein, particularly state judges and state officials;
 - (ii) Falsely claiming that the cases were barred by the

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doctrines of federal abstention and quasi-judicial and judicial immunity, in order to protect the State Bar and State Bar Court Defendants named herein, particularly state judges and state officials;

- (iii) Unilaterally taking the case of DYDZAK v. REMKE et al. (CV 10-1297) from fair and principled United States District Judge, PERCY ANDERSON, who discharged an OSC and properly ruled that the case was not barred by res judicata and presented triable issues not barred by federal abstention;
- (iv) Unilaterally and illegally not allowing principled and fair U.S. District Judge PERCY ANDERSON to issue appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief to DYDZAK by "politically" reassigning Case No. CV 10-1297, by senior judge Defendant FEESS, to U.S. District Judge, Defendant MATZ and Defendant-Magistrate ROSENBERG. The latters' proven track record and biased modus operandi are, and have been at all times herein mentioned, to rule against DYDZAK, no matter what the facts and evidentiary record are, to ensure that he was disbarred to protect the illegal actions and conduct of Defendants herein.
 - (v) Defendant COLLINS, as chief judge of the United States

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District Court for the Central District of California, repeatedly condoning the pattern of misconduct and violation of DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights engaged in by certain federal judges in her judicial district, notably Defendants PHILLIPS and ROSENBERG; further denying access by DYDZAK to the Central District Court by illegally denying him a waiver of a filing fee despite his clearly indigent status on bogus, deliberately misstated legal grounds.

(vi) Violating DYDZAK's due process and equal protection rights guaranteed by the $5^{\rm th}$ and $14^{\rm TH}$ Amendments, and other applicable law, so that DYDZAK could not have his day in court, a trial on the merits, thereby depriving DYDZAK of practicing law and unfairly and illegally leading to his disbarment at present.

(vii) Denying DYDZAK oral argument, a trial on the merits and appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief, because of their bias, inability and reluctance to rule against any judge in the California judiciary and uphold the Rule of Law.

(viii) Striking key pleadings from the record, issuing certain rulings without jurisdiction, not disqualifying

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themselves despite a showing of bias or appearance of same, and deliberately misstating the evidentiary record, rulings and pleadings.

- (ix) Intentionally delaying and making adverse rulings and not allowing DYDZAK a waiver of the filing fee for Case No. CV 10-828-UA (AGR) to retaliate against DYDZAK for exposing the bias and prejudice of Defendants ROSENBERG and PHILLIPS before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and Associate Justice Stephen Breyer of the United States Supreme Court.
- (x) Chief United States District Judge, Defendant COLLINS, willfully and intentionally condoning the unlawful actions of certain Judges of the United States Central District as well as the named Defendants, by on February 11, 2010: (a) falsely ruling in Case No. CV 10-828-UA (AGR) that the case failed to state a claim for relief and that judges and clerks enjoyed immunity; (b) refusing a waiver of the filing fee despite DYDZAK's indigent status against his due process rights.
- (xi) Chief United States District Judge Defendant COLLINS willfully and intentionally trying to intimidate DYDZAK by

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having an U.S. Marshall contact him telephonically in or about March, 2010. Said Marshall at COLLINS' insistence falsely claimed that DYDZAK had allegedly mistreated federal court staff when he had not. DYDZAK had instead simply exercised his First Amendment Right of Expression when politely talking to said staff.

(xii) The aforesaid federal judges except on one occasion violating the California and U.S. Constitutions, and DYDZAK's civil rights, by repeatedly not allowing DYDZAK to make an evidentiary record through oral argument. So the politics of the sensitive subject matter of this litigation can be hidden from the press and public at large, DYDZAK has been refused without justification oral argument for any dispositive motion before any U.S. District Judge, against his constitutional and civil rights.

50. Beginning on or about August 5, 2008, and continuing to the present, the State Bar and State Bar Judge Defendants, and each of them, violated DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights, including but not limited to a fair trial and post-trial

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proceedings, by the following, without limitation:

- (i) Defendant MILES and then the Review Judges not setting aside Defendant MILES' decision of August 5, 2008, contrary to the $5^{\rm th}$ and $14^{\rm th}$ Amendments and other applicable law, since same is void and/or voidable due to bias, prejudice, conflict of interest or the appearance of same;
- (ii) Not providing DYDZAK a fair trial and post-trial proceedings as guaranteed by the $5^{\rm th}$ and $14^{\rm th}$ Amendments and other applicable law;
- (iii) Not disqualifying Defendant MILES due to his actual prejudice, bias and conflict of interest against DYDZAK or the appearance of same;
- (iv) Improperly upholding Defendant MILES' ruling on his
 own disqualification;
- (v) Defendant MILES willfully perjuring himself as a judicial officer in violation of the Canons of Ethics, falsely claiming in his decision that he was not served with disqualification pleadings when he was as required by statute;
- (vi) Not reinstating DYDZAK to active status retroactively as a licensed attorney, knowing that his

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constitutional and civil rights have been violated;

- (vii) Placing DYDZAK on inactive status without a proper
 hearing against his civil, constitutional and due process
 rights;
- (viii) Defendant REMKE improperly ruling as part of the Review Panel even though she was the presiding judge and had an actual or inherent bias, prejudice or conflict of interest or the appearance of same;
- (ix) Defendant COURT conspiring among its individual Judges to not disqualify Defendant MILES for political reasons, in order to uphold the purported integrity and reputation of the State Bar Court and the Review Department, when Defendant COURT and its individual judges knew that it was unlawful, unconscionable and against DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights to do so;
- (x) Defendant BAR and BOARD improperly, "politically" and unlawfully pursuing disciplinary charges against Plaintiff during the time DYDZAK was suing for prior clients former State Bar President, Alan Rothenberg, and the latter's Century City

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DYDZAK's professional work primarily as a Plaintiff's attorney.

(xiv) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and writing a biased decision against DYDZAK when this judge knew or was aware that DYDZAK represented Shanel Stasz in two pending LASC lawsuits, which exposed his long-time friend and prior partner, Bernard Burk, former law firm, HOWARD, RICE, as well as prominent clients such as Charles Schwab & Co., Charles Schwab and the Hugo Quakenbush Trust and Estate to major multimillion dollar liability.

(xv) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and writing a biased decision against DYDZAK when a sworn Declaration from Sean Selegue, Esq. dated September 26, 2008, provides irrefutable evidence of contacts and communications of attorneys SELEGUE and HAUSMAN obtaining key pleadings from Defendant COURT without ordering or paying for same. Defendant SELEGUE had physical possession of the Miles' decision dated August 5, 2008, many months before it was posted on the internet and did not order or pay for same. Defendants SELEGUE and HAUSMAN were intimately familiar with DYDZAK's disciplinary proceedings,

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which shows that this information was provided to them by Defendant MILES and agents/employees of Defendant COURT under his control or supervision.

(xvi) Defendant MILES having an actual conflict of interest, prejudice or bias, or the appearance of same, and improperly, unethically and unlawfully ruling on his own disqualification. The Motion for Disqualification in question was filed on August 15, 2008. Judge MILES illegally ruled on his own disqualification on August 20, 2008, in derogation of his duties and responsibilities as a judicial officer.

(xvii) Defendant MILES' very act of ruling on his own disqualification and unlawfully and unethically striking DYDZAK's meritorious disqualification motion from the record shows he had and has an actual bias, prejudice or conflict of interest, or the appearance of same. Such conduct violated DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights as well as Section 106(e)(4) of the State Bar Rules of Procedure, C.C.P. Section 170.1(a)(6) and Canon 3C(1) of California's judicial ethics.

(xviii) Presiding and Review Judge REMKE and Supervising Judge McELROY unconstitutionally and unlawfully taking more than

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two weeks (until September 5, 2008) to act on the disqualification issue of Defendant MILES.

(xix) Defendant McELROY violating her judicial duties and unethically and unlawfully acting in ruling on the Reconsideration Motion concerning Judge MILES' disqualification and the striking of his disqualification motion. Defendant McELROY had an actual and inherent conflict of interest, prejudice and bias, or the appearance of same, because (1) she was specifically requested in writing not to rule on same because she was the original trial judge; and (2) she was the original trial judge who transferred the case to Judge MILES, and as such had preconceived conceptions and ideas about DYDZAK and the MILES' decision which would not allow her to be impartial and unbiased.

(xx) On or about September 25, 2008, Review Department Judges ruling en banc on the disqualification of Defendant MILES, summarily denying same. This action was biased, violated DYDZAK's civil rights and was unconstitutional for a number of reasons: (1) There was an unnecessary and improper 40-day delay

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against due process; (2) The Review Department did not require the State Bar of California to brief the disqualification issue; (3) DYDZAK was not afforded oral argument; (4) The Review Department did not issue a sufficiently detailed decision to explain itself; (5) Presiding Judge REMKE should not have been a member of the Review Department, because of her inherent and actual conflict of interest and bias, or the appearance of same, being both the Presiding Judge and the Review Judge. (6) Judge REMKE should not have ruled on behalf of the Review Department, because of her extensive involvement in the disqualification matter at the hearing department stage.

(xxi) The Review Petition for Interlocutory Relief re the Disqualification of Defendant MILES was impermissibly intercepted and reviewed by Supervising Judge McELROY and this delayed the filing thereof.

(xxii) Judge MILES perjured himself in a court pleading denying the disqualification and striking the disqualification motion by falsely claiming that he was not served with disqualification pleadings, even though his clerks have always accepted all disqualification pleadings for him per statutory



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requirements and as attested to by Anthony Rogell in sworn Declarations which are part of the record.

(xxiii) The Notice of Disciplinary Charges involving DYDZAK did not properly notify him in writing that he could be placed on inactive status with no Order to Show Cause hearing, a violation of his civil rights and procedural and substantive due process.

(xxiv) DYDZAK was denied his right to a fair trial and in post-trial proceedings concerning the disqualification of Defendant MILES and the reversing or setting aside of MILES' decision dated August 5, 2008. Actual bias and the facts surrounding such disqualification mandated recusal of State Bar Judge MILES. The Stasz litigation, the timing of Defendant MILES' decision, his relationship with Bernard Burk, his law firm and their clients, Judge MILES' dishonesty re service and ruling on and striking his own disqualification more than met the state and federal law standard for disqualification.

(xxv) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and setting aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK, despite knowing about Stasz' litigation (LASC Case Nos. BC383161 and

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BC383162) whereby: (1) his long-time friend and former partner, Bernard Burk, was being sued for millions of dollars in damages and implicating HOWARD, RICE in major malfeasance and corruption; and (2) both cases involving the Estate and/or Trust of Hugo Quakenbush, the latter being the late co-founder of Charles Schwab & Co. and one of the law firm's, Burk's and MILES' long-time clients. MILES' decision was reached on August 5, 2008, during the period of service on Burk.

(xxvi) DYDZAK being denied procedural and substantive due process and equal protection contrary to his civil rights and the $5^{\rm th}$ and $14^{\rm th}$ Amendments by being put on inactive status by Defendants MILE(and COURT without a hearing or OSC.

(xxvii) Defendant MILES not disclosing at any time prior to his decision of August 5, 2008, his professional relationship and friendship with attorney Bernard Burk.

(xxviii) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and setting aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK, despite being aware of the STASZ litigation prior to DYDZAK's inactive status and that Bernard Burk, Esq. was displeased STASZ

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was pursuing legal claims against Burk and HOWARD, RICE clients.

(xxix) Upon receiving the original disqualification motion, Defendant MILES improperly did not give that motion to another State Bar Judge to rule upon as required by state bar rules of procedure, the canons of ethics and other applicable law.

(xxx) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and setting aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK, despite being a party to a federal lawsuit involving Plaintiff and the subject of a formal investigation of which he is and was aware.

(xxxi) Defendant MILES falsely and perjurously claiming that he was not duly served with disqualification pleadings when Anthony Rogell has provided sworn and dated Declarations that service was effectuated on said judge or his clerk, as required by statute, with regard to all such pleadings.

(xxxii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL have refused to disqualify themselves in DYDZAK's disciplinary case despite being formally investigated and being parties and sued in a federal lawsuit involving Plaintiff.

(xxxiii) Defendant MILES showing his bias by leaving out

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key evidence and exculpatory factors in his decision of August 5, 2008 against DYDZAK, including failing to properly grant a dispositive motion to dismiss the LaFlamme count in the Notice of Disciplinary Charges.

(xxxiv) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL have perjured themselves by falsely claiming they were unaware of being sued in federal court, formally investigated, and served with disqualification and other motions in DYDZAK's disciplinary case.

(XXXV) Defendant MILES and agents and employees of Defendant COURT having unlawful and improper communications and contacts with HOWARD, RICE attorneys, Sean Selegue, Kenneth Hausman and Bernard Burk, concerning DYDZAK's disciplinary case.

(xxxvi) Defendant MILES and agents and employees of
Defendant COURT unlawfully and improperly providing information
and pleadings to HOWARD RICE attorneys, Sean Selegue, Kenneth
Hausman and Bernard Burk, concerning DYDZAK's disciplinary case.

(xxxvii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL unlawfully striking key motions, including disqualification motions, from the record in DYDZAK's

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disciplinary case, showing actual bias, prejudice and conflict of interest, or the appearance of same.

(xxxviii) At all relevant times, Defendant ARMENDARIZ wrongfully and unethically refusing to disqualify herself in DYDZAK' disciplinary case, and further wrongfully and unethically striking the disqualification motion concerning herself from the record in DYDZAK's disciplinary case.

(xxxix) On or about February 9, 2009, Defendants and State Bar Review Judges REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL wrongfully "hiding" an Order denying their disqualification in duplicity and conspiracy with Case Administrator, ROSALIE RUIZ. The subject Order was filed on February 9, 2009, but not properly served on DYDZAK. Plaintiff was deliberately left off the service list. The Order with the doctored proof of service was sent to DYDZAK's former counsel, Edward Lear, but not DYDZAK. Only when DYDZAK filed a request for a ruling did he finally obtain the Order with two proofs of service affixed thereto.

(xxxx) At all relevant times, the Review Judges improperly, unlawfully and deliberately did not rule on a second extension request by DYDZAK to pay for the reporter's transcript while

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subject to disqualification review by the California Supreme Court. They further unlawfully refused to disqualify themselves or refer the matter to the California Supreme Court or Judicial Council.

(xxxxi) In taking the actions herein described, DYDZAK's civil rights were violated as well as the $5^{\rm th}$ and $14^{\rm th}$ Amendments as well as Article 1, Section 7(a) of the Constitution of the State of California.

(xxxxii) In taking the actions herein described and not disqualifying themselves due to their actual bias, prejudice, conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, Defendants MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE, STOVITZ, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL violated DYDZAK's civil rights.

(xxxxiii) In delaying ruling numerous times on DYDZAK's motions, as herein alleged, Plaintiff's civil rights were violated as well as Rule 1013 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar Court.

(xxxxiv) In not deciding and adjudicating matters fairly, correctly and efficiently, Defendants MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE, STOVITZ, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL violate DYDZAK's civil

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rights as well as Rule 1015 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar Court.

(xxxxv) In acting unfairly and unlawfully, as herein 6 described, Defendants MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE, STOVITZ, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL did not perform the duties of their office 8 impartially and diligently. Such conduct violated DYDZAK's civil rights and Canon 3 of the California Code of Judicial Ethics.

The unlawful actions of Defendants MILES, (xxxxvi) ARMENDARIZ, REMKE, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL, in ruling on their own disqualification and not reinstating DYDZAK, have affected his career, standing in his former profession, his ability to earn a living, his former clients' cases, upcoming court proceedings and appearances, and contributed substantially to the demise of his marriage, now ending in divorce.

(xxxxvii) The unlawful non-service of the February 9, 2009 Order for over a month violated DYDZAK's civil rights, due process and equal protection, and constituted judicial politics, nfairness and bias towards DYDZAK.

(xxxxviii) Placing DYDZAK on inactive status before all ppellate remedies were pursued, and without an Order to Show

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Cause hearing, violated DYDZAK's civil rights as well as <u>Business</u> and <u>Professions Code</u>, Sections 6077©(4) and 6083.

(xxxxix) DYDZAK was unconscionably, unlawfully and unconstitutionally assessed \$ 15,209.31 for alleged costs of prosecution in his disciplinary case. Such assessment demonstrates that Defendants COURT, BAR, BOARD, and the Defendant Judges, as well as Defendant Bar officials, employees and agents, have a predisposed economic incentive and bias to pursue disciplinary proceedings against attorneys such as DYDZAK, particularly sole practitioners and Plaintiff's attorneys, because of their pro-government political slant, desire to raise revenue for Defendant BAR, COURT and BOARD, and perpetuate a bloated Bar bureaucracy.

(xxxxx) In inordinately delaying ruling on motions involving his disciplinary case, DYDZAK's civil rights were violated as well as his due process right to reasonable and speedy adjudication contrary to the $5^{\rm th}$, $6^{\rm th}$ and $14^{\rm th}$ Amendments.

(xxxxxi) At all relevant times, Defendant RUIZ engaged in preparing, dating and signing fraudulent proofs of service on behalf of Defendants COURT, REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL, in order

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that DYDZAK would not receive pleadings timely and to prejudice his rights.

(xxxxxii) Defendants, COURT, REMKE, PURCELL and EPSTEIN, unlawfully and against procedural and substantive due process, held oral argument in DYDZAK's disciplinary case when they had no jurisdiction to do so, by virtue of their being pending Writs to the California Supreme Court and their being subject to disqualification.

(xxxxxiii) At all relevant times, CHARLENE FOSTER, an employee of Defendant BAR, in conspiracy and duplicity with BAR attorney, Danielle Lee, Esq. perjured herself on a proof of service, so that DYDZAK would be prejudiced in his receipt of opposition papers filed in his prior federal lawsuit.

(xxxxxiv) In or about December, 2009, and January, 2010, and on other previous occasions, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL struck major motions and evidence from the record in DYDZAK's disciplinary case, as well as improperly and unlawfully ruled on their own disqualification, showing their outright bias and hostility towards DYDZAK.

(xxxxxv) The pattern of delaying ruling by Defendants

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MILES, REMKE, EPSTEIN, PURCELL, STOVITZ and McELROY, violated DYDZAK's civil rights and to be reinstated as an active member of the State Bar of California so that he could earn a living.

(xxxxxvi) The Orders and decisions of Defendants COURT, MILES, REMKE, EPSTEIN, PURCELL, STOVITZ and McELROY, demonstrate bias, prejudice and conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, to such an extent that they are void or voidable and violate DYDZAK's constitutional and civil rights.

Act violate DYDZAK's constitutional rights, and are unconstitutional on their face, insofar as the Presiding Judge has adjudicatory functions over both the Hearing Department and Review Department. As Presiding Judge, Defendant REMKE received pleadings, papers, letters and other authority at the Hearing Department stage concerning the disqualification of Judge MILES. It was consequently improper and unlawful for her to be a member of the Review Department in ruling against DYDZAK. Defendant REMKE had an actual prejudice, conflict of interest or bias, or the appearance of same, as a direct, proximate and legal result thereof.

COMPLAIN

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(xxxxxviii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL unlawfully issued Orders and the Opinion on Review and Order on December 3, 2009, when they had no jurisdiction to do so as Writs were pending before the California Supreme Court and had not been adjudicated.

51. In summarily disbarring DYDZAK, without written decision on the merits and not affording DYDZAK oral argument and briefing, Defendants SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA and CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES violated DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights, including but not limited to violating the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions. Furthermore, in not disclosing their relationship with HOWARD RICE and SELEGUE, and not respecting the Rule of Law towards DYDZAK, said Defendants, and each of them, unlawfully covered up for the corruption of the California Judiciary and certain State Bar Court and Review Judges, particularly the misconduct and malfeasance of Defendant MILES, as hereinbefore alleged.

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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW) (AGAINST ALL NAMED DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN HOWARD, RICE, BURK, SELEGUE AND HAUSMAN)

- 52. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates, as though fully set forth herein, the preceding Preliminary Allegations and Paragraphs of the Complaint, including Paragraphs 1 through 51, inclusive.
- 53. This is an action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law brought pursuant to the recodification Section 1979 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971, Title 42 United States Code, Section 1983, for remedies for Defendants' deprivation of Plaintiff's civil rights. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks all legal and equitable relief to which he may be entitled, including, but not limited to compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs, prejudgment interest, and injunctive relief against the aforementioned Defendants and each of them.
 - 54. Defendants, and each of them, have engaged in the

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unlawful and wrongful conduct and acts herein alleged, and thereby violated his civil rights.

- 55. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was, and now is, a resident of Los Angeles County, State of California.
- 56. At all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, acted under color of their authority as such in doing all the things herein mentioned and taking the actions herein alleged.
- 57. In taking the actions herein alleged, Defendants acted, and continue to act, under color of and pursuant to the laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of the State of California, the State Bar of California, and the the State Bar Court and pursuant to the official policies and practices of said Defendants.
- 58. By reason of the aforesaid conduct of Defendants and each of them, Plaintiff was deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured to him by the Constitution of the United States and laws enacted thereunder in that the unlawful, wrongful and oppressive conduct herein alleged amounted to an

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proof at or before trial.

- 61. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the Defendants' actions and conduct, Plaintiff has also incurred special damages and medical expenses, in an amount according to proof at or before trial.
- 62. The above-recited actions of Defendants, and each of them, in depriving Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected rights were done with evil motive and intent, maliciously and with reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of exemplary or punitive damages, according to proof.
- 63. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants will continue in their unlawful conduct, unless and until restrained by the Court. If Defendants are not restrained, as specified below, Plaintiff will sustain immediate and irreparable injury, loss, and damage in that Plaintiff will continue to experience and suffer from the fear of additional, unwarranted scrutiny and will continue to suffer humiliation and indignity, as well as great physical and mental

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pain and suffering, resulting from Defendants' ongoing deprivation of his rights, including but not limited to his right to practice law as an active member of the State Bar of California.

- 64. Plaintiff has duly exhausted state law remedies available to him prior to filing suit, including approximately five Writs of Review to the California Supreme Court which were denied without prejudice and without a hearing on the merits.
- 65. Therefore, Plaintiff requests the following injunctive relief, equitable relief, declaratory relief and other legal relief against Defendants and each of them, to wit:
- 1. That it is adjudged and decreed that DYDZAK's constitutional rights and civil rights were violated, and continue to be violated, by Defendants, and each of them, as herein alleged, particularly due to the failure by Defendant MILES, Defendant COURT and the individual Defendant Judges of the State Bar Court and Review Department to disqualify Defendant MILES and set aside his decision of August 5, 2008;
 - 2. That the decision of August 5, 2008, by Defendant

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government misconduct, bias, prejudice and conflict of interest or the appearance of same, by Defendants and each of them.

- 5. That the Order entered on or about May 12, 2010, or any other Order by Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA and Defendants CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUDGES, disbarring DYDZAK from the practice of law in California, imposing disciplinary costs, and striking his name from the roll of attorneys be set aside, stricken or reversed based upon violation of DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights, and based upon DYDZAK's showing of unclean hands, judicial misconduct, government misconduct, bias, prejudice and conflict of interest or the appearance of same, by Defendants and each of them.
- 6. That DYDZAK be restored to active status forthwith and retroactively as of August 5, 2008, as a member of the State Bar of California due to the aforesaid wrongful and unlawful conduct and violation of his civil and constitutional rights;
- . That the State Bar Court and Review Department, and any of the named Defendant Judges of said Court and Review

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Department, be prevented, disqualified and enjoined from ruling on any legal matters involving the discipline of DYDZAK retroactively, presently and in the future due to their past and ongoing civil and constitutional rights violations towards him;

- 7. That this Court issue appropriate injunctive relief in the form of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction or Permanent Injunction, or whatever similar equitable relief it believes is appropriate and legal to protect Plaintiff's civil, legal and constitutional rights;
- 8. That this Honorable Court appoint an independent federal judge or other appropriate body outside the State Bar Court and Review Department to adjudicate, hear, settle and resolve any disciplinary matters involving DYDZAK due to the past and ongoing violation of his civil and constitutional rights by Defendants and each of them.
- 9. That the entire Chief Trial Counsel's Office and Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of California, including but not limited to Eli Mortgenstern, Scott Drexel, Augustus Hernandez, Janet Hunt, Victoria Malloy, and Danielle

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Lee, be enjoined and disqualified from being involved in any disciplinary matters involving DYDZAK because of their past and ongoing violation of DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights and clear bias, prejudice, conflict of interest and animosity towards him, without foundation.

- 10. That there be a declaration that Plaintiff's right to a fair trial and post-trial proceedings were violated along with other civil, legal and constitutional rights by Defendants and each of them.
- 11. That Defendants MATZ, FEESS, KLAUSNER, MORROW, WU, PHILLIPS, ROSENBERG and COLLINS be enjoined from hearing and adjudicating any issue and aspect of the within action due to their bias, prejudice, and conflict of interest, or the appearance of same.
- 12. That DYDZAK be granted appropriate declaratory relief, in order to protect his civil and constitutional rights and remedy the unlawful actions and conduct alleged herein, and allow him to practice law forthwith in the State of California.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

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(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS) (AGAINST DEFENDANTS BURK, SELEGUE AND HAUSMAN)

- 66. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates by reference herein Paragraphs 1 through 65, inclusive, of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
- 67. On August 8, 2008, and at all other relevant times hereto, there existed an economic relationship between DYDZAK and SHANEL STASZ by virtue of their attorney-client agreement whereby DYDZAK agreed to represent STASZ in her LASC litigation, as hereinbefore alleged and described. STASZ agreed that DYDZAK would receive as attorney's fees 1/3 of any gross recovery, either by judgment or settlement, in her LASC litigation.
- 68. At all times herein mentioned, and continuing to the present, DYDZAK has enjoyed cordial relations with Ms. Stasz, and previously represented her in a number of legal matters while licensed as an attorney. In the past, he has benefited financially from representing Ms. Stasz and received

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professional fees.

- 69. On or about August 8, 2008, and at all times relevant hereto, Defendants HOWARD, RICE, HAUSMAN, SELEGUE and BURK were well aware of the existence of the economic relationship between DYDZAK and Ms. Stasz. Attorney Burk knew that DYDZAK represented STASZ on a number of legal matters and communicated with DYDZAK on legal issues involving STASZ in or about July, 2008.
- 70. In unlawfully communicating with Defendant MILES, and agents and employees of Defendant COURT, about DYDZAK's disciplinary proceedings, and in improperly and illegally gaining access to the MILES' decision directly through contacting MILES, or his agents and employees thereof, Defendants BURK, HAUSMAN and SELEGUE, individually and on behalf of Defendant HOWARD RICE, persuaded and influenced MILES to put DYDZAK on inactive status and recommend his disbarment. This unlawful conduct was done, so that HOWARD RICE clients and Defendant BURK's legal interests could be protected from major liability and expense.
- 71. As a direct, legal and proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has sustained general pain and suffering, severe

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emotional distress and anguish, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of good will and reputation, incurred substantial loans which has been unable to repay to date, and further incurred considerable storage and moving costs, all to his general damage, according to proof at or before trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(FRAUD)

(AGAINST DEFENDANT SELEGUE)

- 72. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates, as though fully set forth herein, Paragraphs 1 through 71, inclusive, of the Complaint.
- 73. In a sworn Declaration dated September 26, 2010, in the STASZ litigation against Defendant BURK, submitted in connection with a Motion to Quash Service, Defendant SELEGUE falsely represented under oath that he obtained access to the MILES' decision by traveling to Los Angeles, California, to obtain same.
 - 74. This representation was in fact false, fraudulent and

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DYDZAK V. GEORGE

misleading. The true facts were that Defendant SELEGUE willfully perjured himself on this point and thereby committed a felony; never traveled to Los Angeles to obtain the MILES' decision; unlawfully and illegally obtained MILES' Decision directly from MILES and/or an agent or employee of Defendant COURT; tortiously interfered with the attorney-client relationship between DYDZAK and STASZ by illegally and unethically communicating with Defendant MILES; conspired with Defendant MILES and other members of his law firm to destroy DYDZAK's ability to practice law and represent STASZ in her LASC cases; influenced and persuaded MILES in conspiracy with Defendants HAUSMAN and BURK to have DYDZAK disbarred; had not properly ordered nor paid for MILES' Decision dated August 5, 2008, affecting DYDZAK; intended by his dishonest and fraudulent Declaration to gain a tactical advantage in litigation against STASZ; and intended to maliciously and permanently injure DYDZAK's career, reputation and livelihood by the aforesaid actions and by virtue of his fraudulent and dishonest Declaration.

75. Had DYDZAK known the foregoing on or about September

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DYDZAK V. GEORGE

26, 2008, or before said date, and had he further known about the misconduct of Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and BURK, on or before September 26, 2008, as herein alleged, he would have advised STASZ to immediately report. SELEGUE and HOWARD, RICE to the State Bar of California for ethical and professional violations, including but not limited to Defendant SELEGUE committing perjury, a felony and crime of moral turpitude.

DYDZAK further would have moved before Defendant MILES made his fraudulent and unethical Decision against him for an Order disqualifying Defendant MILES from making a decision due to the jurist's prejudice, bias and conflict of interest or the appearance of same.

- 76. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the fraud perpetrated by Defendant SELEGUE, and the aforementioned false representation, Plaintiff has suffered general damages, in an amount not yet ascertained. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend the Complaint in order to set forth such amount when it is determined, according to proof.
 - 77. In taking the actions herein alleged, and making the

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DYDZAK V. GEORGE

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misrepresentation herein described, Defendant SELEGUE acted maliciously, oppressively, and fraudulently, in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to an award of exemplary or punitive damages, according to proof.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as follows: ON FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

- 1. For general damages in the amount of \$ 10,000,000;
- 2. For special damages and medical expenses, according to proof;
 - 3. For punitive damages, according to proof;
 - 4. For injunctive relief as set forth herein;
- 5. For reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1988(b);
 - 6. For costs of suit incurred herein;
- 7. For a dismissal of any alleged disciplinary charges against DYDZAK due to the violation of his civil, legal, equitable and constitutional rights;
- 8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the premises;

COMPLAINT

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

- 9. Setting aside and declaring void or voidable Defendant MILES' unlawful, unconstitutional, biased, and illegal State Bar Decision dated August 5, 2008 against DYDZAK, and any other unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal rulings, orders, opinions and decisions of the State Bar Court and Review Department referenced herein and pertaining thereto;
- 10. Setting aside and declaring void or voidable the unlawful, biased, unconstitutional, and illegal Opinion On Review and Order filed December 3, 2009, by Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL against DYDZAK, and any other unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal rulings, orders, opinions and decisions of the State Bar Court and Review Department referenced herein and pertaining thereto;
- 11. Enjoining, setting aside and declaring void or voidable the transmittal of the State Bar Court Recommendation, Imposition of Costs, and Proposed Order to the California Supreme Court against DYDZAK, as alleged herein;
- 12. Setting aside and declaring void or voidable the unlawful, biased, unconstitutional, and illegal Order of the



DYDZAK V. GEORGE

Supreme Court of California entered on or about May 12, 2010, disbarring DYDZAK, assessing unlawful and vague disciplinary costs, and illegally removing him from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice law in the State of California.

- 13. For any injunctive relief as allowed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 57, 65, and other appropriate Rules therein as well as 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 et seq.;
- 14. For appropriate declaratory relief and judgment by virtue of 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 et seq.

ON SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

- 1. For general damages, according to proof;
- 2. For costs of suit incurred herein;
- 3. For such other and further relief as ordered by this Honorable Court and warranted in the premises.

ON THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

- 1. For general damages, according to proof;
- 2. For punitive damages, according to proof;
- 3. For costs of suit incurred herein;

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

4. For such other and further relief as ordered by this Honorable Court and warranted in the premises.

Dated: August 4, 2010

DANIEL D. DYDZAK

Plaintiff Pro Se

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY

This case has been a discovery Magistrate Judg	assigned to District Judge Stephen te is	V. Wilson and the assigned		
The case number on all do	ocuments filed with the Court shou	ald read as follows:		
	CV10- 5820 SVW			
	der 05-07 of the United States Distressistates Judge has been designated			
All discovery related motions	should be noticed on the calendar	of the Magistrate Judge		
	NOTICE TO COUNSEL			
A copy of this notice must be served w filed, a copy of this notice must be served.	vith the summons and complaint on all de evved on all plaintiffs).	fendants (if a removal action is		
Subsequent documents must be filed a	at the following location:			
[X] Western Division 312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-8 Los Angeles, CA 90012	Southern Division 411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053 Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516	Eastern Division 3470 Twelfth St., Rm. 134 Riverside, CA 92501		
Failure to file at the proper location will result in your documents being returned to you.				

	Filed 08/05/10 Page 67 of 75 Page ID #:67
Name & Address: DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK	
Plaintiff Pro Se	
4265 Marina City Drive, Suite 407W	
Marina del Rey, CA 90292	10FICEUSEONLY
	E. Espainis to
UNITED STATI CENTRAL DISTR	ES DISTRICT COURT RICT OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK,	CASE NUMBER
PLAINTIFF(V.	CV10 5820 5 (1/4)
RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R. MORENO,	
JOYCE L. KENNARD, [ATTACHMENT A]	SUMMONS
DEFENDANT(S	
[ATTACHMENTA]	ARLOS R. MORENO, IOYCEL KENNARD,
A lawsuit has been filed against you.	
☐ counterclaim ☐ cross-claim or a motion under Pule	12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer
	Clerk, U.S. District Court
Dated: 8-5- ()	By: CHRIS-SAWYER
	Deputy Clerk
	(Seed of the Court)
[Use 60 days if the defendant is the United States or a United State 60 days by Rule 12(a)(3)].	is agency, or is an officer or employee of the United States. Allowed
CV-01A (12/07) SUMM	MONS
· · · ·	

1 ATTACHMENT A 2 KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR, MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R. BAXTER, CAROL A. 3 CORRIGAN, SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD F. MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 5 JOANN M. REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVITZ, 7 PATRICE E. McELROY, RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN, BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE, HOWARD, RICE, 9 NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK & RABKIN, SCOTT DREXEL, A. HOWARD MATZ, GARY A. 10 FEESS, R. GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU, VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through 11 12 10, Inclusive, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CV-127 (09-09) PLEADING PAGE FOR A SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1	Filed 08/05/10	Page 69 of 75	Page ID #:69
Name & Address: DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK Plaintiff Pro Se 4265 Marina City Drive, Suite 407W Marina del Rey, CA 90292			
UNITED STATES CENTRAL DISTRIC	DISTRICT COL	URT RNIA	
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK,	CASE NUMBER		
PLAINTIFF(S) V.	CV10	5820*	SVU
RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R. MORENO,			
JOYCE L. KENNARD, [ATTACHMENT A]		SUMMONS	
DEFENDANT(S).			
A lawsuit has been filed against you. Within 60 days after service of this summon must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached 2 conterclaim □ cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 or motion must be served on the plaintiff's attorney, 200 for motion must be served on the plaintiff's attorney, 200 for motion with the court.	omplaint [] of the Federal R NECTROPY	amende	ed complaint dure. The answer , whose address is
Dated: $8-5-0$	Clerk, U.S. Di	CHRIS MWYER Deputy Clerk Leaf of the Court)	
Use 60 days if the defendant is the United States or a United States of days by Rule 12(a)(3)].	agency, or is an offic	er or employee of the l	Inited States. Allowed
V-01A (12/07) SUMMO	ONS .		

ATTACHMENT A KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR, MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R. BAXTER, CAROL A. CORRIGAN, SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD F. MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, JOANN M. REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVITZ, PATRICE E. McELROY, RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN, BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE, HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK & RABKIN, SCOTT DREXEL, A. HOWARD MATZ, GARY A. FEESS, R. GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU, VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, CV-127 (09-09) PLEADING PAGE FOR A SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENT

Case 2:10-cv_05820-SVW Document 1 Filed 08/05/10 Page 71 of 75 Page ID #:71 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL COVER SHEET

I (a) PLAINTIFFS (Check box if you are representing yourself 10) DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK				DEFENDANTS RONALD M. GEORG [ATTACHMENT A]	GE, CAR	LOS R. MORENO), JOYCE L. KEN	NARD,	<u> </u>
(b) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number. If you are re yourself, provide same.) DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK, PLAINTIFF PRO SE,4265 MARINA DRIVE, SUITE 407W, MARINA DEL REY, CA 90292			ľ	Attorneys (If Known) DANIELLE A. LEE, E 180 HOWARD STREE	T, SAN	FRANCISCO, CA	94105		
TELEPHONE: (310) 86	57-1289	2		TELEPHONE: (415) 5	38-2339	, , , , , ,			
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTI	ON (Place an X in one box only.	.)	III. CITIZENS	SHIP OF PRINCIPAL PA	DEFER				
			(Place an)	in one box for plaintiff ar	d one for	- For Diversity Ca defendant.)	ises Only		
☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	Government Not a Pa	S. arty)	Citizen of This	Citizen of This State PTF DEF			or Principal Place	PTF □ 4	DEF
☐ 2 U.S. Government Defenda	☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant ☐ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)		Citizen of Anoth	_	12 🗆 2		nd Principal Place	: □5	□ 5
IV. ORIGIN (Place an X in c	one box only)		Citizen or Subje	ct of a Foreign Country	3 □3	Foreign Nation	<u> </u>	□6	□6
/	ved from		openea			Dis	strict Jud	eal to D ge from gistrate.	
CLASS ACTION under F.R.		Yes □		only if demanded in comp					
		1	■ M	IONEY DEMANDED IN	COMPL	AINT: \$ 10,000,	000		
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION	te the U.S. Civil Statute under w I, TITLE 42 U.S.C. SECTION 19	mich you a 983; FRAU	re filing and write JD: INTENTION	e a brief statement of cause	Do not	cite jurisdictional	statutes unless div	ersity.)	
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Pla	ce an X in one box only.)		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	THE HATER ERENCE WI	TH ECO.	NOMIC RELATIC	ONS		
OTHER STATUTES	CONTRACT		TORTS	TORTS		DD1000 ITTD	T		
☐ 400 State Reapportionment ☐ 410 Antitrust	□ 110 Insurance		SONAL INJURY	PERSONAL		PRISONER PETITIONS	LAB □ 710 Fair Lal		dordo
☐ 430 Banks and Banking	☐ 120 Marine ☐ 130 Miller Act	□ 310 □ 315	Airplane Airplane Product	PROPERTY ☐ 370 Other Fraud	□ 510	Motions to	Act		luarus
1450 Commerce/ICC	☐ 140 Negotiable Instrument	1	Liability	☐ 370 Outer Fraug	٥	Vacate Sentence Habeas Corpus			
Rates/etc. ☐ 460 Deportation	☐ 150 Recovery of		Assault, Libel & Slander	☐ 380 Other Personal	□ 530	General	Relation ☐ 730 Labor/N		
☐ 470 Racketeer Influenced	Overpayment & Enforcement of		Fed. Employers'	Property Damag	e □ 535	Death Penalty	Reporti		
and Corrupt	Judgment		Liability	☐ 385 Property Damag Product Liabilit		Mandamus/	Disclose		
Organizations	☐ 151 Medicare Act	□ 340		BANKRUPTCY	' I	Other Civil Rights	□ 740 Railway	Labor A	Act
3 480 Consumer Credit 3 490 Cable/Sat TV	☐ 152 Recovery of Defaulted		Marine Product Liability	☐ 422 Appeal 28 USC	□ 555	Prison Condition	☐ 790 Other La Litigation		
3 810 Selective Service	Student Loan (Excl.		Motor Vehicle	158		ORFEITURE /	□ 791 Empl. R	et. Inc	
850 Securities/Commodities/	Veterans)	□ 355 □	Motor Vehicle	☐ 423 Withdrawal 28		PENALTY	Security	Act	
Exchange	Overpayment of	17260	Product Liability	USC 157 CIVIL RIGHTS		Agriculture	PROPERTY	RIGHT	rs
875 Customer Challenge 12	Veteran's Benefits		Other Personal	□ 441 Voting	020	Other Food & Drug	☐ 820 Copyright ☐ 830 Patent	nts	
USC 3410	☐ 160 Stockholders' Suits		Personal Injury-	☐ 442 Employment	□ 625	Drug Related	□ 840 Tradema	rk	
1 890 Other Statutory Actions 1 891 Agricultural Act	☐ 190 Other Contract ☐ 195 Contract Product		Med Malpractice	☐ 443 Housing/Acco-		Seizure of	SOCIAL SE	CURIT	Y
892 Economic Stabilization	Liability		Personal Injury- Product Liability	mmodations ☐ 444 Welfare	1	Property 21 USC	□ 861 HIA (139	95ff)	
Act	☐ 196 Franchise		Asbestos Personal		□ 630	881 Liquor Laws	□ 862 Black Lu		3)
893 Environmental Matters	REAL PROPERTY	1	njury Product	Disabilities -		R.R. & Truck	□ 863 D(WC/D (405(g))	ı W W	
1894 Energy Allocation Act 1895 Freedom of Info. Act	☐ 210 Land Condemnation		iability	Employment		Airline Regs	□ 864 SSID Tit	le XVI	
1900 Appeal of Fee Determi-	□ 220 Foreclosure□ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment		MIGRATION Valuation	☐ 446 American with		Occupational	□ 865 RSI (405	(g))	
nation Under Equal	☐ 240 Torts to Land		Application	Disabilities - Other	E 400	Safety /Health	FEDERAL TA	X SUL	ΓS
Access to Justice	☐ 245 Tort Product Liability	□ 463 H	labeas Corpus-	■ 440 Other Civil	□ 690	Otner	□ 870 Taxes (U		ntiff
950 Constitutionality of State Statutes	☐ 290 All Other Real Property	□ 465 C	Alien Detainee Other Immigration Actions	Rights		}	or Defend ☐ 871 IRS-Third USC 760	l Party 2	26
		<u> </u>		<u> </u>					

CV-71 (05/08)

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1 Filed 08/05/10 Page 72 of 75 Page ID #:72 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL COVER SHEET

VIII(a). IDENTICAL CASES: H If yes, list case number(s):	las this action been	previously filed in this court	and dismissed, remanded or closed? ▼No □ Yes		
VIII(b). RELATED CASES: Ha If yes, list case number(s): <u>CV-08</u>	ave any cases been B-7765-VAP-AGI	previously filed in this court (R; CV 10-1297-PA and A)	that are related to the present case? □ No		
□ B □ C	Arise from the sa Call for determin. For other reasons	me or closely related transact ation of the same or substanti would entail substantial dupl	tions, happenings, or events; or ially related or similar questions of law and fact; or lication of labor if heard by different judges; or ht, and one of the factors identified above in a, b or c also is present.		
IX. VENUE: (When completing the					
(a) List the County in this District	; California County	outside of this District: State	e if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named plaintiff resides. If this box is checked, go to item (b).		
County in this District:*			California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country		
Plaintiff DANIEL DAVID DY	DZAK		Los Angeles County, State of California		
	California County its agencies or emp	outside of this District; State loyees is a named defendant.	if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named defendant resides. If this box is checked, go to item (c).		
County in this District:*			California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country		
Defendant RONALD M. GEO Defendant CARLOS R. MORE			San Francisco County, State of California		
Defendant JOYCE L. KENNAH		For Other Defendants	San Francisco County, State of California San Francisco County, State of California		
(c) List the County in this District; California County outside of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH claim arose. Note: In land condemnation cases, use the location of the tract of land involved. County in this District:* California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country outside of this District; State, if othe					
* Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernar Note: In land condemnation cases, us	rdino, Riverside, V	entura, Santa Barbara, or set iract of land involved			
X. SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY (OR PRO PER	Del Du	Date Auglin 5, 2010		
Notice to Counsel/Parties: The or other papers as required by law but is used by the Clerk of the Co-	ourt for the purpose	of statistics, venue and initiat	rmation contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings e of the United States in September 1974, is required pursuant to Local Rule 3-1 is not filed ting the civil docket sheet. (For more detailed instructions, see separate instructions sheet.)		
Nature of Suit Code					
Nature of Suit Code	Abbreviation	Substantive Statement of	f Cause of Action		
861	HIA	All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended. Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the program. (42 U.S.C. 1935FF(b))			
862	BL	All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. (30 U.S.C. 923)			
863	DIWC	All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended; plus all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))			
863	DIWW	All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))			
864	SSID	All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security Act, as amended.			

CV-71 (05/08)

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RSI

U.S.C. (g))

All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42

ATTACHMENT A KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR, MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R. BAXTER, CAROL A. CORRIGAN, SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD F. MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, JOANN M. REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVITZ, 7 PATRICE E. McELROY, RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN, 8 BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE, HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK & RABKIN, SCOTT DREXEL, A. HOWARD MATZ, GARY A. FEESS, R. GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU, VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive.

PLEADING PAGE FOR A SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENT

CV-127 (09-09)

ATTACHMENT FOR OTHER DEFENDANTS

3	Defendant KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR	San Francisco County, State of California
4	Defendant MING W. CHIN	San Francisco County, State of California
5	Defendant MARVIN R. BAXTER	San Francisco County, State of California
6	Defendant CAROL A. CORRIGAN	San Francisco County, State of California
7	Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA	San Francisco County, State of California
8	Defendant STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA	San Francisco County, State of California
9	Defendant DONALD F. MILES	Los Angeles County, State of California
10	Defendant STATE BAR COURT	Los Angeles County, State of California
11	Defendant BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF	
12	STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA	San Francisco County, State of California
13	Defendant JOANN M. REMKE	Los Angeles County, State of California
14	Defendant CATHERINE D. PURCELL	Los Angeles County, State of California
15	Defendant JUDITH EPSTEIN	Los Angeles County, State of California
16	Defendant RONALD W. STOVITZ	Los Angeles County, State of California
17	Defendant PATRICE E. McELROY	Los Angeles County, State of California
18	Defendant RICHARD A. PLATEL	Los Angeles County, State of California
19	Defendant LUCY ARMENDARIZ	Los Angeles County, State of California
20	Defendant RICHARD A. HONN	Los Angeles County, State of California
21	Defendant BERNARD A. BURK	San Francisco County, State of California
22	Defendant KENNETH G. HAUSMAN	San Francisco County, State of California
23	Defendant SEAN A. SELEGUE	San Francisco County, State of California
24	Defendant HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI	San Francisco County, State of California
25	CANADY, FALK & RABKIN	·
26	Defendant SCOTT DREXEL	San Francisco County, State of California
27		,,

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ATTACHMENT FOR OTHER DEFENDANTS (Page 2)

1 2 3 Defendant A. HOWARD MATZ Los Angeles County, State of California 4 Defendant GARY A. FEESS Los Angeles County, State of California Defendant R. GARY KLAUSNER 5 Los Angeles Count County, State of California 6 Defendant MARGARET M. MORROW Los Angeles County, State of California 7 Defendant GEORGE H. WU Los Angeles County, State of California 8 Defendant VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS Riverside County, State of California 9 Defendant AUDREY B. COLLINS Los Angeles County, State of California Defendant ALICIA G. ROSENBERG Los Angeles County, State of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28