submitted in support of Parker's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion")].

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2) A reasonable jury could not find that any product manufactured or supplied by Parker was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's alleged injury, as there was an absence of evidence that plaintiff worked with or around any Parker product, or otherwise inhaled asbestos-containing dust from any Parker product.

**Evidence:** Deposition of Paul Olds, taken on January 16, 2013, at pp. 364:1-11, 371:3-12, and 379:1-381:10; Plaintiff's Initial Disclosures, p. 1; Plaintiff's First Amended Initial Disclosures, p. 1; Response to Parker's Interrogatories, Response No. 9 (Exhibits "7," "2," and "3" and "6" respectively to the Declaration of Mathew Groseclose submitted in support of Parker's Motion).

3) Plaintiff did not show, by deposition testimony or affidavit, that he possessed, or could reasonably obtain, evidence sufficient to justify his opposition.

**Evidence:** Deposition of Paul Olds, taken on January 16, 2013, at pp. 364:1-11, 371:3-12, and 379:1-381:10; Declaration of Robert Green ¶¶ 14-15.

Based on the foregoing Uncontroverted Facts, the Court now makes its Conclusions of Law.

A fundamental element of any claim for negligence or products liability is causation. *Setliff v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Company*, 32 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1525, 1533 (1988).

The threshold issue in establishing causation between a manufacturer's product and an alleged work place injury is exposure. *Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co.*, 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 874 (1978).

An injured party must establish that he or she was actually exposed to a defendant's product in order to maintain an action against that party. *Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co.*, 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 874 (1978); *Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.*, 16 Cal. 4<sup>th</sup> 953, 976 (1997).

Once exposure is established, an injured party must prove that the exposure was a substantial factor in producing the alleged injury. *Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Company*, 31 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1409, 1426-1427 (1995).

Because a reasonable jury cannot find that Parker manufactured, supplied or distributed an asbestos-containing product to which plaintiff was exposed, plaintiff cannot prove the fundamental element of causation for all of his claims, and Parker is therefore entitled to summary judgment in its favor. *Harris v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.*, 102 F.3d 1429, 1432 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); *Benshoof v. National Gypsum Co.*, 978 F.2d 475, 477 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992).

Because plaintiff did not show, by deposition testimony or affidavit, that he possessed, or could reasonably obtain, evidence sufficient to justify his opposition, a continuance of the Motion is not warranted.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Parker in accordance with these Conclusions of Law.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Dated: Oct. 24, 2013

HON. MANUEL REAL