EXHIBIT J

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
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3	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
4	WESTERN DIVISION		
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7	GOOD MORNING TO YOU) PRODUCTIONS, CORP.,)		
8))		
9	PLAINTIFF,) CV 13-4460-GHK(MRWX)		
10	v.) LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA) JULY 25, 2014		
11	WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC.,)		
12) (9:34 A.M. TO 10:56 A.M.)		
13	DEFENDANT.)		
14))		
15	HEADING		
16	HEARING		
17	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. WILNER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE		
18	APPEARANCES: SEE NEXT PAGE		
19	COURT REPORTER: RECORDED; COURT SMART		
20	COURTROOM DEPUTY: VERONICA MC KAMIE		
21	TRANSCRIBER: DOROTHY BABYKIN		
22	COURTHOUSE SERVICES 1218 VALEBROOK PLACE		
23	GLENDORA, CALIFORNIA 91740 (626) 963-0566		
24			
25	PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING; TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE.		

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:	WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP BY: MARK C. RIFKIN
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10	FOR THE DEFENDANT:	BY: MELINDA E. LEMOINE
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CV 13-4460-GHK (MRWX)

JULY 25, 2014

PROCEEDINGS: HEARING RE DISCOVERY

I N D E X

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; FRIDAY, JULY 25, 2014; 9:34 A.M. 1 2 THE CLERK: MICHAEL R. WILNER, UNITED STATES 3 MAGISTRATE JUDGE, PRESIDING. THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, EVERYBODY. 4 5 THE CLERK: CV 13-4460-GHK(MRWX), GOOD MORNING TO YOU PRODUCTIONS CORPORATION VERSUS WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, 6 7 INCORPORATED. COUNSEL, PLEASE STATE YOUR APPEARANCES. 8 9 MR. RIFKIN: MARK RIFKIN AND BETSY MANIFOLD FOR THE 10 PLAINTIFFS, YOUR HONOR. 11 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. RIFKIN. 12 MS. LEMOINE: AND MELINDA LEMOINE AND ADAM KAPLAN 13 FOR DEFENDANT WARNER/CHAPPELL, YOUR HONOR. 14 THE COURT: AND MR. KAPLAN. 15 ALL RIGHT. AS I AM OBVIOUSLY GOING TO SAY, GOOD MORNING TO YOU. 16 17 (LAUGHTER.) 18 MS. LEMOINE: GOOD MORNING. 19 MR. RIFKIN: GOOD MORNING. THE COURT: THAT'S THE JOKE -- THAT'S THE JOKE THAT 20 NEVER STOPS BEING FUNNY. 21 ALL RIGHT. WE ARE ON FOR A DISCOVERY MOTION IN A 22 23 COPYRIGHT ACTION INVOLVING THE RIGHTS TO "HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO

I WILL NOTE THAT SEVERAL OF THE EXTERNS WHO ARE

YOU."

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WORKING FOR ME THIS SUMMER ARE PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM AS IS A REPORTER FROM -- WAS IT LAW 360?

THE REPORTER: THAT'S RIGHT.

THE COURT: YOU'RE WELCOME.

AND AS A RESULT WHAT I WANTED TO LET THE PARTIES

KNOW IS THAT ALTHOUGH ASPECTS OF YOUR FILINGS WERE PROPERLY

FILED UNDER SEAL BECAUSE THERE ARE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

ISSUES HERE, I THINK THAT WE CAN HAVE OUR DISCUSSION HERE

TODAY WITHOUT MAKING SUBSTANTIVE REFERENCE TO PRIVILEGED -
OR PUTATIVELY PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS. IF WE GET INTO AN AREA

WHERE IT SEEMS A LITTLE MORE DODGEY, YOU KNOW, LET ME KNOW

AND WE'LL TALK ABOUT IT. BUT I DON'T SEE ANY REASON THAT WE

CAN'T HAVE OUR DISCUSSION HERE TODAY.

ALL RIGHT. SO, I REVIEWED A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF MATERIAL OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. I'M NOT GOING TO RECITE IT ALL. I THINK -- I THINK I HAVE A HANDLE ON WHAT WAS FILED. BUT THERE WAS THE JOINT STIPULATION THAT CAME IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO WITH SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND SUPPORTING DECLARATIONS.

THERE WAS A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF BOTH FROM WARNER AS WELL AS FROM THE PLAINTIFFS WITH SOME ADDITIONAL MATERIALS.

I ALSO DID REVIEW, BUT JUST KIND OF LIGHTLY, THE
UNDERLYING COUDERT LETTERS THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE. I
DON'T FEEL THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THOSE LETTERS ARE REALLY
NECESSARY FOR OUR DISCUSSION PURPOSES HERE, ALTHOUGH THE

TRANSMITTAL LETTER FROM SUMMY -- AND WE'LL GET TO THAT -- TO

ASCAP'S GENERAL COUNSEL MAY BE OF RELEVANCE. THERE MAY BE A

POTENTIAL PRIVILEGE ISSUE THERE, BUT WE CAN SORT OF DANCE

MR. RIFKIN: AND, YOUR HONOR, THAT IS THE ONE AREA WHERE I THINK YOUR CAVEAT MAY REQUIRE SOME CLARIFICATION.

BECAUSE I DO THINK IT'S --

THE COURT: THAT'S FINE.

MR. RIFKIN: -- IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFICS OF THAT LETTER. SO, EXCEPT FOR THE COVER LETTER, AS YOU NOTED, I AGREE --

THE COURT: OKAY.

AROUND.

MR. RIFKIN: -- WITH YOUR HONOR THAT WE DON'T NEED TO TALK ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COUDERT LETTERS, BUT I THINK MRS. SENGSTACK'S LETTER --

THE COURT: YES.

MR. RIFKIN: -- IS DIFFERENT.

THE COURT: I THINK IT IS, AND WE CAN DEFINITELY -- WE CAN DEFINITELY GET THAT.

I MEAN, YOU KNOW, SORT OF THE HEADLINE I WANTED TO START WITH IS I THOUGHT YOU FOLKS DID A NICE JOB. I UNDERSTAND SORT OF THE ISSUES GOING ON IN THE LITIGATION, SOME OF THE TIME PRESSURES, EITHER COURT IMPOSED, SELF-IMPOSED, WHATEVER, BUT YOU DID A LOT OF NICE WORK IN A SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME. AND THAT'S ON BOTH SIDES. AND I SAY

THAT NOT ALWAYS SEEING THAT IN FEDERAL COURT.

THIS IS A DISCOVERY MOTION. RULE 37 REQUIRES THE COURT TO AWARD FEES TO THE WINNING PARTY IN DISCOVERY,

UNLESS I MAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE FINDING THAT BOTH SIDES -- OR

THAT THE LOSING SIDE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED IN THE

POSITION THAT THEY TOOK. AND I CAN FRANKLY SAY THAT BOTH

SIDES WERE SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED, AND I DON'T SEE THAT I'M

GOING TO BE AWARDING FEES HERE.

WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO IS GIVE YOU MY TENTATIVE

THOUGHTS. OKAY. I'VE GOT YOUR -- I'VE GOT YOUR PAPERS. I

READ THEM. I SPENT A LOT OF TIME WITH THEM.

YOU CAN HAVE A SEAT.

MR. RIFKIN: THANK YOU.

MS. LEMOINE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: AND WHEN THE TIME COMES TO HEAR FROM YOU YOU CAN GO TO THE LECTERN.

AND I HAVE SOME PRETTY STRONG THOUGHTS HERE AS A RESULT OF WHAT YOU PUT IN FRONT OF ME, THE FACTS THAT YOU'VE BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP, THE LAW THAT YOU HAVE REFERRED ME TO.

AND, SO, LET ME GIVE YOU, YOU KNOW, A PRETTY

THOUGHT-OUT TENTATIVE. I'M HAPPY TO HEAR FROM YOU. IT MAY

MAKE SENSE FOR MAYBE US TO TAKE A BREAK SO YOU CAN ORGANIZE

YOUR THOUGHTS AND I CAN GET A DRINK OF WATER.

BUT I WANT TO DEAL WITH THIS. I THINK THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO GET A WRITTEN DECISION TO YOU TODAY OR TOMORROW.

IF THERE IS GOING TO BE A DESIRE TO APPEAL MY

DECISION, WE CAN TALK ABOUT THE MECHANICS OF IT. IF YOU

THINK THAT I AM CLEARLY WRONG ON THE FACTS OR THE LAW, OR

WHATEVER THE GOVERNING STANDARD IS, YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY

ENTITLED TO AND INVITED TO APPEAL THIS MATTER TO CHIEF JUDGE

KING WHO IS YOUR DISTRICT JUDGE IN THIS MATTER.

YOU WILL BE ABLE TO VERY PROMPTLY GET THIS

TRANSCRIPT. I HOPE I'LL BE ABLE TO GET YOU A WRITTEN

DECISION. HOWEVER, THE REASON I WANTED TO EXPEDITE THIS

HEARING, EVEN THOUGH YOU FOLKS HAD ALREADY WANTED TO EXPEDITE

IT, BUT EVEN FURTHER BECAUSE I'M OUT OF TOWN BEGINNING THIS

WEEKEND AND THEN THROUGH NEXT WEEK.

I DON'T WANT MY PERSONAL SCHEDULE TO HANDICAP THE PARTIES IN IMPORTANT LITIGATION. BUT I THINK YOU'LL HAVE THE ABILITY TO TAKE ME UP -- IF YOU WANT TO. IF YOU CAN LIVE WITH THIS, YOU CAN LIVE WITH THIS. I'M NOT DEMANDING YOU APPEAL ME. I DON'T THINK I EVER DO THAT. BUT, YOU KNOW, I RECOGNIZE THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DO THAT, AND I WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE MECHANICS, IF NECESSARY. BUT LET'S SEE WHERE WE GO.

BUT LET ME GIVE YOU A RECITATION OF WHAT I

UNDERSTAND TO BE THE RELEVANT FACTS HERE. YOU FOLKS SPENT A

FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME ON SOME ISSUES THAT I DON'T THINK ARE

REALLY, REALLY GERMANE TO THE DISPUTE. I KNOW THAT LAWYERS

IN LITIGATION LIKE TO KNOCK ABOUT HE SAID, SHE SAID, THIS

HAPPENED, THAT HAPPENED. THAT'S FANTASTIC. A LOT OF TIMES FROM THE JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE IT'S JUST BUZZ, BUZZ, BUZZ.

BUT I THINK -- I THINK I WAS ABLE TO PULL OUT THE KEY COMPONENTS OF WHAT'S GOING ON HERE. AND THIS IS, AS I SAID, A COPYRIGHT CASE INVOLVING THE OWNERSHIP OF A COPYRIGHT OR COPYRIGHTS TO THE "HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU" SONG.

AT SOME POINT IN TIME THOSE RIGHTS WERE OWNED BY A COMPANY CALLED SUMMY-BIRCHARD, S-U-M-M-Y, DASH, B-I-R-C-H-A-R-D. AND THE SUMMY COMPANY, AS I'LL CALL IT, AT SOME POINT IN 1976 AND 1978 RECEIVED COMMUNICATIONS FROM A LAWYER AT COUDERT BROTHERS, C-O-U-D-E-R-T, A NEW YORK CITY LAW FIRM. AND THOSE ARE THE LETTERS AT EXHIBITS B AND C TO MR. RIFKIN'S DECLARATION.

AND I THINK IT'S PRETTY CLEAR THAT THE PARTIES

AGREED -- I BELIEVE MS. MANIFOLD ACKNOWLEDGED IN OUR PREVIOUS

DISCUSSION -- DON'T WORRY, I'M NOT GOING TO SANDBAG YOU WITH

THIS -- BUT THAT WHEN THE COUDERT LAW FIRM PROVIDED

INFORMATION TO SUMMY IN CONNECTION WITH THE COPYRIGHT OR

COPYRIGHTS AT ISSUE HERE, I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY DISPUTE

THAT THAT COMMUNICATION WAS PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT

PRIVILEGE. IT WAS A COMMUNICATION BETWEEN A LAWYER AND A

CLIENT IN A PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL CONTEXT. IT RELATED

TO LEGAL ADVICE. AND I THINK AT THE OUTSET WE HAD AN

ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THE 1976 AND 1978 LETTERS FROM THE LAW

FIRM TO SUMMY ARE PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.

MR. RIFKIN IS SORT OF SHAKING HIS HEAD SIDE TO SIDE. WE'LL COME BACK TO THAT.

THERE IS ALSO NO DISPUTE THAT SUMMY SENT THOSE

COUDERT LETTERS TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO I UNDERSTAND TO BE THE

GENERAL COUNSEL AT THE TIME OF ASCAP, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF

-- AND I NEVER GET IT RIGHT -- COMPOSERS AND SOME OTHER

PEOPLE. BUT THE ACRONYM IS ASCAP. THAT WAS A LETTER SENT IN

1979 FROM SUMMY TO ASCAP TRANSMITTING THE COUDERT LETTERS.

AND THERE IS A VERY BRIEF COVER LETTER FROM AN EXECUTIVE AT SUMMY BASICALLY EXPLAINING -- AND I DON'T WANT TO CAUSE A PRIVILEGE ISSUE HERE, BUT JUST SAYING, HERE'S MATERIAL HAVING TO DO WITH THE CLAIM OF RIGHTS REGARDING THE SONG. OKAY. AND IT DOESN'T SAY TOO MUCH MORE BEYOND THAT AS WE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED. AND THAT'S ABOUT IT.

WE GET FAST FORWARDED TO 2014 AND WE GET TO THE ISSUE OF HOW THIS CAME UP. I KNOW THERE'S A LOT OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES HERE. I KNOW THE PARTIES WENT BACK AND FORTH ON SOME OF THESE ISSUES.

THE PLAINTIFFS SERVED A SUBPOENA ON ASCAP. ASCAP
PRODUCED THE COUDERT LETTERS AND, I PRESUME, THE SUMMY LETTER
TO THE PLAINTIFFS IN RESPONSE TO A SUBPOENA. IT'S MY
ASSUMPTION THAT WAS WITHOUT CONSULTING WARNER, WHO IS THE
SUCCESSOR TO SUMMY. WARNER FOUND OUT ABOUT IT -- I WAS GOING
TO SAY SOMETHING A LITTLE FLIPPANT, BUT I'M NOW NOT GOING TO
BECAUSE WE'RE ON THE RECORD HERE -- ASSERTED ITS PRIVILEGE

AND REQUESTED ESSENTIALLY A CLAW-BACK.

AND WHETHER IT WAS UNDER RULE 26(B)(5) OR FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502, WARNER CONTENDED THAT THE MATERIALS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRODUCED BECAUSE OF THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE. AND PLAINTIFFS — AND I WOULD — I'M PREPARED TO FIND THAT THE REQUESTS FROM WARNER SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE RULES. I'M ALSO PREPARED TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF'S ACTIONS TO SEQUESTER THE MATERIALS AND BRING THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH 26(B)(5) AS WELL.

I KNOW YOU HAVE ISSUES ABOUT TIMING AND HOW LONG IT TOOK ONE SIDE TO DO SOMETHING AND ONE SIDE TO DO THE OTHER.

FRANKLY, GIVEN WHAT'S BEEN GOING ON, I FIND THAT BOTH PARTIES ACTED REASONABLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE RULE.

I ALSO AM PREPARED AS WE HAD DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY

-- I'M PREPARED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE ISSUE IS NOT REALLY

WHETHER ASCAP'S PRODUCTION -- AND I BELIEVE IT WAS

INADVERTENT OR MAYBE NOT FULLY INFORMED -- DOESN'T SERVE TO

HAVE WAIVED WHATEVER PRIVILEGE IS IN EXISTENCE HERE. THAT

IS, I DON'T THINK I HAVE A BASIS TO SAY THAT THE 2014

PRODUCTION BY ASCAP IS SUFFICIENT TO HAVE CAUSED A WAIVER OF

WHATEVER PRIVILEGE IS HERE.

I THINK THE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE PRIVILEGE HAD BEEN WAIVED BACK IN 1979 WHEN THE MATERIALS GOT INTO ASCAP'S FILES. I FIND THAT IF SOMEONE RUMMAGES THROUGH THE FILES IN

2014 AND TURNS SOMETHING OVER, YOU KNOW, THERE'S PROBLEMS,
THERE'S ISSUES. BUT, YOU KNOW, PRIVILEGE ISSUES ARE
SIGNIFICANT.

AND, SO, WE HAD SPENT TIME ON PREVIOUS PHONE CALLS TALKING ABOUT WHAT I NEED TO KNOW IN ORDER TO MAKE A DETERMINATION ABOUT WHAT I TAKE TO BE THE ISSUE, THIS 1979 TRANSFER FROM SUMMY TO ASCAP.

AND I THINK THAT THERE ARE TWO ISSUES OF REAL

INTEREST TO ME THAT I THINK ARE DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUE OF

WHETHER THERE WAS A PRIVILEGE OR WHETHER THAT PRIVILEGE WAS

WAIVED. AND THAT HAS TO DO WITH THE NATURE OF THE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUMMY, SLASH, WARNER ON THE ONE SIDE AND

ASCAP ON THE OTHER AND THE PURPOSE FOR SUMMY TRANSMITTING THE

COUDERT MATERIALS TO ASCAP.

AND I WILL SAY THAT I THINK I HAVE A PRETTY GOOD HANDLE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WARNER OR SUMMY AS THE PUTATIVE RIGHTHOLDER AND ASCAP. I THINK I KNOW WHAT THAT RELATIONSHIP IS. IT'S PRETTY CLEAR. IT'S ALMOST COMMON KNOWLEDGE.

I DON'T THINK THAT THERE IS QUITE AS MUCH DIRECT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF TRANSMITTING THE COUDERT MATERIALS TO ASCAP. AND, YOU KNOW, PART OF THAT IS JUST THE MIST OF TIME. IT'S SOMETHING THAT OCCURRED 30-SOME-ODD YEARS AGO. AND I DON'T HAVE ANY DIRECT MATERIAL FROM EITHER MS.

SENGSTRACK --

MR. RIFKIN: SENGSTACK -- S-E-N-G- --

THE COURT: -- SENGSTACK, S-E-N-G-S-T-A-C-K, AND THE PERSON AT ASCAP. THAT'S JUST 30-SOME-ODD YEARS AGO.

BUT I HAVE THE LETTER ITSELF, AND I THINK -- I
THINK WE CAN INTUITIVELY FIGURE OUT WHAT'S GOING ON HERE.

AND LET ME BE CLEAR. IT IS WARNER'S BURDEN TO
ESTABLISH THAT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE EXISTS AND
APPLIES, AND THAT IT HASN'T BEEN WAIVED. THAT IS THE BURDEN
OF THE PARTY ASSERTING THE PRIVILEGE.

AND I AM OBLIGED TO CONSIDER A PRIVILEGE CLAIM

CLOSELY AND NARROWLY BECAUSE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE,

AS WITH ANY OTHER PRIVILEGE, PREVENTS THE FULL AND FAIR

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. IT'S A WAY TO RESIST DISCOVERY.

AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM FAVORS DISCOVERY, FAVORS PRETRIAL OF

CASES AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. AND, SO, A CLAIM OF

PRIVILEGE OBSTRUCTS THAT AND MAY OBSTRUCT IT PROPERLY, BUT ON

THAT BASIS IT HAS TO BE DONE NARROWLY AND WITH

SUBSTANTIATION.

SO, MY TWO BIG ISSUES ARE THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RIGHTHOLDER AND ASCAP AND THEN THE PURPOSE OF TRANSMITTING THIS MATERIAL TO ASCAP.

SO, MY FIRST AREA OF INQUIRY IS WHAT IS ASCAP. AND I FOUND CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION IN THE MATERIALS, PRIMARILY MR. REIMER'S DECLARATION WHICH WAS -- MR. REIMER IS A LAWYER AT ASCAP, AND HE SUBMITTED A DECLARATION. AS I UNDERSTAND

IT, IT WAS IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK TO QUASH SOME DEPOSITIONS.

AGAIN, YOU ALL WENT CRAZY ON SOME OF THIS STUFF.

THAT'S FINE. I'M NOT CRITICAL. DOING YOUR STUFF. DOING IT

AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL.

MR. REIMER GAVE A DECLARATION. HE'S AN IN-HOUSE LAWYER AT ASCAP, AND HE GAVE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF WHAT ASCAP IS.

THERE WAS ALSO INFORMATION IN THE DEPOSITION OF MR. BLEITZ, B-L-E-I-T-Z, WHO I UNDERSTAND TO BE EXECUTIVE AT WARNER WHO HAS INTERACTION WITH ASCAP.

AND, THEN, THERE WERE SOME OTHER MATERIALS PROVIDED BY THE DEFENSE. THERE'S AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN WARNER AND ASCAP THAT SETS OUT WHAT ASCAP DOES.

AND MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT ASCAP IS A MEMBERSHIP
ASSOCIATION OF SONG WRITERS AND OTHERS WHO OWN MUSICAL
COPYRIGHTS. AND AT THE REQUEST OF THOSE MEMBERS, ASCAP CAN
LICENSE THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE COMPONENT OF THE COPYRIGHT FOR
SONGS, FOR THINGS SUCH AS RADIO BROADCASTS AND LIVE
PERFORMANCES.

WHAT ASCAP DOES IS IT COLLECTS FEES FROM

PERFORMANCES OR PERFORMERS WHERE THERE'S A LICENSE TO PERFORM

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL AND DISTRIBUTES THOSE FEES TO THE RIGHTS

HOLDERS.

ASCAP MAKES CLEAR IN MR. REIMER'S DECLARATION THAT

IT DOES NOT OWN COPYRIGHTS ON BEHALF OF ITS MEMBERS. AND IT DOES NOT KEEP THE FEES THAT ARE DERIVED FROM THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCES -- ALTHOUGH IT IS COMPENSATED. AND I KNOW THERE WAS AN AMBIGUITY IN MR. REIMER'S DECLARATION, AND I TAKE IT TO BE AN AMBIGUITY BECAUSE HE SAYS WE DON'T GET PAID FROM THE BUT THEN HE SAYS WE GET PAID ESSENTIALLY FROM THE FEE. FEE. AND I THINK -- I THINK THERE'S AN AMBIGUITY HERE. AND I UNDERSTAND WHY BOTH PARTIES READ IT VERY CLOSELY. BUT MY UNDERSTANDING FROM OTHER ASPECTS OF THE DECLARATION IS THAT ASCAP GETS PAID ITS EXPENSES OR SOME PREDETERMINED FEE OR PERCENTAGE FROM THE LICENSES -- FROM THE FEES IT DERIVES FROM LICENSES. AND I KNOW THAT THERE'S AN UNBELIEVABLY COMPLEX STRUCTURE WHERE THEY TAKE IN MONEY FROM BROAD LICENSES AND PAY IT OUT TO HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PERFORMERS. I HAVE FRIENDS WHO ARE PERFORMERS. I'M NOT GOING TO INJECT MY PERSONAL STUFF, BUT THERE'S ALL KINDS OF STUFF ABOUT RESIDUALS, ROYALTIES, LICENSES. BUT THAT'S WHAT ASCAP DOES.

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ASCAP ISSUES LICENSES TO BARS AND RADIO STATIONS

AND COLLECTS MONEY AS A PERFORMING RIGHTS ORGANIZATION ON

BEHALF OF ITS MEMBERS. IT'S OWNED BY ITS MEMBERS. AND ONE

OF THE OTHER THINGS THAT IT DOES IS IT POLICES RIGHTS FOR ITS

MEMBERS. THE STRUCTURE OF COLLECTING FEES HAS TO DO WITH

WHERE'S THERE'S BEEN A LICENSE NEGOTIATED WITH A BAR OR A

RADIO STATION. BUT IF THERE IS A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE OF A

COPYRIGHTED WORK THAT DOES NOT -- WHERE THE PERFORMER DOES

NOT HAVE PERMISSION AND THERE'S A CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT,

ASCAP IS ENTITLED AND HAS BEEN HIRED TO PURSUE THOSE

INFRINGERS ON BEHALF OF THE RIGHTS OWNER.

AND THAT'S WHAT MR. BLIETZ TESTIFIED ABOUT. HE

SAID THAT ASCAP AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT -- AND HE WAS VAGUE ABOUT

IT -- NOT ALL THE WAY TO BRIGHT ON IT. BUT HE UNDERSTOOD

THAT ASCAP CAN SUE PEOPLE ON BEHALF OF WARNER FOR

INFRINGEMENT OF WARNER'S RIGHTS.

AND THAT'S CERTAINLY CLEAR FROM THE WRITTEN

AGREEMENT THAT I REVIEWED, WHICH WAS EXHIBIT D TO MR. KLAUS'S

DECLARATION, THAT ASCAP HAS THE RIGHT TO SUE IN A COPYRIGHT

ACTION ON BEHALF OF ITS RIGHTS OWNER. AND THAT'S -- THAT -
THAT MAKES SENSE TO ME BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT COPYRIGHT IS.

COPYRIGHT IS A PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.

AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GETS USED THROUGH LICENSES. AND IT

GETS EXPLOITED BY PEOPLE WHO OWN THOSE RIGHTS. AND THOSE

RIGHTS REGULARLY GET WIELDED AGAINST PEOPLE WHO USE PROTECTED

MATERIAL WITHOUT PERMISSION BECAUSE THEY DON'T OWN THE

RIGHT. COPYRIGHT IS A PRECONDITION TO LITIGATION. AND

THAT'S WHY IT WAS IN OUR CONSTITUTION IN 1787. I'M TALKING

TO COPYRIGHT LAWYERS LIKE THEY DON'T KNOW THAT. OF COURSE

THEY KNOW THAT.

AND WHERE THAT LEADS IS THAT IN ORDER TO ASSERT A

COPYRIGHT CLAIM ONE MUST DEMONSTRATE OWNERSHIP. THAT'S AN

ELEMENT OF A CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT. I AM THE PARTY

PLAINTIFF. I OWN THIS RIGHT. YOU, THE INFRINGING DEFENDANT,
DO NOT. YOU DON'T OWN IT OR YOU DON'T HAVE PERMISSION TO USE
MY RIGHT.

AND, SO, NOW, WE GET TO THE ISSUE OF THE

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SUMMY AND ASCAP. ASCAP WAS HIRED TO

ADMINISTER SUMMY'S RIGHTS. I PRESUME -- ALTHOUGH, CERTAINLY,

WARNER WAS DOWN THE ROAD. AND ASSUMING THAT RELATIONSHIP,

ASCAP WAS ENTITLED TO AND REQUESTED TO POLICE THE RIGHTS FOR

SUMMY'S COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL.

AND, SO, WE GET TO THE ISSUE AS TO -- ABOUT SUMMY SENDING THE COUDERT MATERIALS TO ASCAP. AND THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER AND THE SUPPORTING MATERIALS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR -- NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. BUT I THINK CIRCUMSTANTIALLY IT'S PRETTY APPARENT TO ME THAT IF ASCAP WERE TO NEGOTIATE LICENSES OR SUE ALLEGED INFRINGERS ON BEHALF OF SUMMY BASED ON SUMMY'S COPYRIGHT IN THE "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" SONG, IF ASCAP WERE TO DO THOSE THINGS AS PART OF ITS AGREEMENT, THEN, ASCAP WAS ENTITLED TO KNOW, AND WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVE IN A COURT, THAT ITS RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS IT DERIVED FROM SUMMY WERE LEGITIMATE.

AND IT MAKES SENSE TO ME THAT IF SUMMY HAD

INFORMATION, AND IF IT WAS PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, REGARDING

ITS OWN OWNERSHIP IN THE "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" SONGS, THAT

PROVIDING THAT INFORMATION TO ITS LICENSING AGENT IN ADVANCE

OF SOME DISPUTE, THAT MAKES SENSE TO ME.

NOW, I WILL NOTE THAT SUMMY DID NOT HAVE TO PROVIDE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION IN ORDER TO DO THAT. SUMMY COULD HAVE CHOSEN TO DO SOMETHING THAT REGULARLY OCCURS IN THE SECURITIES CONTEXT. I DON'T KNOW IF IT OCCURS IN THE COPYRIGHT CONTEXT, BUT I KNOW IT OCCURS IN THE SECURITIES CONTEXT, WHICH IS SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF A 10(B)(5) LETTER OR A COMFORT LETTER.

SUMMY COULD HAVE SAID, OR SUMMY COULD HAVE HAD ITS

COUDERT BROTHERS LAWYERS, JUST SAY WE OWN THIS COPYRIGHT.

WE'LL BACK YOU UP. WE'LL PROVIDE INFORMATION AT A LATER

DATE, OR YOU'RE ENTITLED TO RELY ON OUR CLAIM TO AVOID

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS OR CLAIMS OF -- THAT WE'RE

ACTING ULTRA VIRES.

IT HAPPENS EVERY DAY OF THE WEEK IN THE SECURITIES

CONTEXT. A BOND ISSUER OR THE BOND ISSUER'S LAWYER WILL

ISSUE A LETTER TO AN UNDERWRITER SAYING THESE BONDS ARE

PROPER. THEY WERE LAWFULLY ISSUED. WE'RE NOT GIVING YOU

PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, BUT WE'RE GIVING YOU AN OPINION THAT

YOU CAN RELY ON.

BUT THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN HERE. AND SUMMY CHOSE TO GIVE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE COUDERT FOLKS

ABOUT -- ABOUT THE NATURE OF ITS OWNERSHIP AND ITS CLAIMS AND THE STATUS OF THINGS.

AND, SO, ONE OF THE ARGUMENTS THAT WARNER ASSERTS
HERE IS THAT ASCAP IS ACTUALLY WITHIN THE PRIVILEGE

RELATIONSHIP -- THAT THE RELATIONSHIP THAT SUMMY HAD WITH ITS LAWYER AT COUDERT WAS IN A SENSE EXTENDED TO THE LAWYER AT ASCAP.

WE THEN ALSO GET INTO ISSUES OF THE COMMON INTEREST EXCEPTION TO THE WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.

AND I WILL TELL YOU THAT I'VE SORT OF STRUGGLED IN WHAT MY APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK IS HERE BECAUSE I KIND OF SEE TWO CLAIMS FROM WARNER.

I SEE WARNER SAYING THAT THE DISCLOSURE TO -- TO

ASCAP IN 1979 WAS NOT A WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE AT ALL. AND

THERE IS A RELIANCE ON THE SCHWARTZ CASE AND THE UNITED

STATES VERSUS ASCAP CASE, BOTH DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS FROM

THE FEDERAL COURT IN NEW YORK, WHICH HAS REAL FAMILIARITY

WITH ASCAP. AND THERE WAS A REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT A LOT

OF ASCAP LITIGATION BY VIRTUE OF CONSENT DECREES, I THINK -
YES, I READ YOUR PAPERS, FOLKS. I READ -- I READ

-- I READ YOUR PAPERS, FOLKS.

-- THAT THE NEW YORK COURTS HAVE REAL FAMILIARITY WITH ASCAP.

AND THERE IS -- THERE ARE SOME PRETTY CLEAR

STATEMENTS IN THOSE DECISIONS THAT AN UNINCORPORATED

ASSOCIATION LIKE ASCAP AND THE ASSOCIATION'S LAWYER DOES HAVE
AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS MEMBERS. NOW, THAT
LAW HAS EVOLVED AND CHANGED OVER THE YEARS. BUT WHERE THERE
IS A SHOWING THAT A MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATION IS SEEKING

LEGAL ADVICE FROM THE LAWYER FOR THE ASSOCIATION, THAT THE PRIVILEGE EXTENDS TO THAT RELATIONSHIP. THAT'S KIND ONE OF THE ARGUMENTS THAT I HEARD FROM -- FROM WARNER.

AND THEN IN THE ALTERNATIVE -- AND I DON'T THINK

THAT THEY'RE EXCLUSIVE -- THE ARGUMENT IS THAT, WELL, IF THE

TRANSMITTAL OF THIS INFORMATION TO ASCAP OR ASCAP'S GENERAL

COUNSEL WAS BASICALLY BRINGING IN A THIRD PARTY TO THE

RELATIONSHIP, SOMEONE OUTSIDE OF THE DIRECT ATTORNEY-CLIENT

RELATIONSHIP, THAT COULD BE A WAIVER. BUT THERE IS AN

EXCEPTION TO THE WAIVER. AND THAT'S THE COMMON INTEREST

CLAIM.

AND THE LAW IS CLEAR. AND I READ WITH GREAT

INTEREST THE NIDEC CASE, N-I-D-E-C, AS WELL AS THE POTATO

CASE. I'M JUST GOING TO CALL IT THE POTATO CASE AS WELL AS

-- I THINK IT WAS THE LOVE CASE FROM JUDGE RYU UP IN THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT, WHICH IS THAT WHERE THERE IS A

COMMUNICATION MADE TO ANOTHER PARTY IN THE COURSE OF A MATTER

OF COMMON INTEREST, AND THE COMMUNICATION IS DESIGNED TO

FURTHER THAT EFFORT, THAT WILL NOT BE A WAIVER OF THE

PRIVILEGE.

AND THERE'S SOME REAL FACTUAL ANALYSIS THAT HAS TO OCCUR HERE BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE DOES NOT EXTEND TO COMMUNICATIONS THAT ARE BUSINESS ORIENTED OR HAVING TO DO WITH BUSINESS STRATEGY. PARTIES HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE AS JUDGE RYU WROTE, "COOPERATION INFORMING A COMMON LEGAL STRATEGY."

AND THE COMMUNICATION HAS TO ADVANCE THAT LEGAL STRATEGY.

SO, IN THE CASE OF THE POTATO LITIGATION THERE WAS SOME COOPERATIVE POTATO MARKETING GROUP. AND THERE WERE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL LAW SO THAT SOMETHING INVOLVING POTATOES DOESN'T BREAK THE LAW.

AND THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE POTATO CASE -- HEY,

NOT COINCIDENTALLY, UP IN IDAHO -- CONCLUDED THAT THE

TRANSACTIONS THERE WERE JUST STRAIGHT BUSINESS DEALS. THIS

HAD TO DO WITH MARKETING POTATOES, AND THAT WHATEVER LEGAL

ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED WERE REALLY TANGENTIAL TO THE

COMMUNICATIONS.

SO, WHERE I AM IS THIS. I THINK I NEED TO KNOW -AND I NEED TO DETERMINE AS BEST I CAN WHAT WAS THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUMMY AND ASCAP AND WHY WAS THIS
MATERIAL CONVEYED FROM SUMMY TO ASCAP.

AND I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY AFTER SORT OF BRIEFLY REVIEWING THE UNDERLYING COUDERT MATERIALS -- LIKE I SAID, I DIDN'T GO LINE BY LINE BECAUSE I DON'T THINK IT'S RELEVANT, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE'S AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THE PRIVILEGE APPLIES THERE. BUT THE ISSUE IS WHY WOULD SUMMY WANT TO TRANSMIT THAT INFORMATION TO ASCAP. WHAT'S THE POINT.

AND I THINK -- I THINK IT IS FAIR TO CONCLUDE THAT

THE POINT WAS BECAUSE DOWN THE ROAD ASCAP MIGHT BE LITIGATING

THOSE COPYRIGHTS -- LICENSING OR LITIGATING THOSE COPYRIGHTS

ON BEHALF OF SUMMY. AND I DON'T THINK THAT'S MAGIC. I DON'T

THINK THAT'S UNANTICIPATED. THAT'S WHAT ASCAP DOES. THAT'S WHY PEOPLE HIRE ASCAP TO ADMINISTER THESE RIGHTS BECAUSE AN INDIVIDUAL COMPANY CAN'T GO TO EVERY RADIO STATION AND EVERY BAR AND POLICE THE RIGHTS.

AND GIVEN THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME MURKINESS REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE COPYRIGHT TO THE "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" SONGS, BACK THEN AND TODAY, THAT'S WHY YOU FOLKS ARE HERE IN 2014. BECAUSE THERE ARE LEGITIMATE DISPUTES AS SET FORTH IN THE COMPLAINT ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE RIGHTS AND WHETHER THEY WERE EXPIRED, WHETHER THE SONG IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. PROBABLY EVEN MORE.

I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT SOME OF THOSE ISSUES EXISTED IN 1976, 1978 AND IN 1979 WHEN THIS INFORMATION WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF ASCAP -- NOT IN ANTICIPATION OF OR IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED LAWSUIT. I DON'T THINK THE RECORD SHOWS THAT AT ALL. BUT COULD IT HAVE BEEN COMING DOWN THE PIKE. AND WAS THERE A NEED TO FORMULATE A COMMON LEGAL STRATEGY, WHICH IS THE LANGUAGE IN THE POTATO CASE.

THE EVIDENCE IS THIN BECAUSE WE'RE TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING HISTORICAL, BUT I THINK IT'S A FAIR INFERENCE. I THINK IT'S A FAIR INFERENCE.

I WAS -- I WAS TRYING TO READ THIS VERY NARROWLY.

THAT'S MY OBLIGATION AND IT'S -- THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE QUITE

PROPERLY SOUGHT TO PURSUE A CLAIM THAT THIS PRIVILEGE WAS

WAIVED AND THAT THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY.

AND I READ EVERYTHING CLOSELY AND NARROWLY AS I'M OBLIGED TO

DO.

ONE THING THAT I COULD NOT GET ON BOARD WITH,

THOUGH, WAS --

AND I'M HAPPY TO HEAR FROM YOU ON THIS. I HAVEN'T

-- THIS IS A TENTATIVE, AND I WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU FOLKS.

BECAUSE IF I DON'T HAVE IT RIGHT, I DON'T WANT TO DO IT.

BUT WHEN YOU FOLKS SAID ON THE PLAINTIFF'S SIDE

THAT MS. STENGSTACK -- SENGSTACK GRATUITOUSLY TURNED OVER

THIS MATERIAL TO ASCAP, GRATUITOUSLY, IMPLYING NO PURPOSE,

IMPLYING THAT IT WAS SORT OF A RANDOM EVENT, IMPLYING THAT

THERE WAS NO -- NO MERIT OR NO LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS, I

JUST RESPECTFULLY WASN'T CONVINCED.

I THINK THE FACT THAT A PUBLISHING HOUSE THAT HAD

GONE OUT TO WHAT AT THE TIME WAS, YOU KNOW, ONE OF AMERICA'S

PREMIER LAW FIRMS TO GET SOME PRETTY DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE

EXISTENCE AND STATUS OF ITS COPYRIGHT CLAIM, AND THEN

PROVIDED THAT TO NOT A FUNCTIONARY AT ASCAP, NOT SOME

LOW-LEVEL EXECUTIVE OR OFFICE MANAGER OR ANYTHING, BUT THE

GENERAL COUNSEL OF AMERICA'S BIGGEST -- OR SECOND BUSINESS.

THEY CAN FIGHT ABOUT THAT -- YOU KNOW, A MAJOR LICENSING

FIRM, THAT FELT LIKE IT WASN'T GRATUITOUS. THAT FELT LIKE

THERE WAS A REAL ISSUE ON WHICH ONE OR BOTH PARTIES NEEDED

GUIDANCE, AND THIS COMMUNICATION SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DONE

WITH THE INTENTION OF ADVANCING A COMMON LEGAL STRATEGY,
EXPLOITATION OF THIS RIGHT, AND BEING DONE AT QUITE A HIGH
LEVEL.

I'M PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SCHWARTZ AND ASCAP CASES'

STATEMENT THAT BY VIRTUE OF THE NATURE OF WHAT ASCAP IS, THIS ASSOCIATION, THAT IS OWNED BY AND OPERATES ON BEHALF OF ITS MEMBERS. I THINK WARNER OWNS ONE-FIVE HUNDRED THOUSANDTH OF WHATEVER THIS SAYS -- YOU KNOW, THERE'S PRETTY COMPELLING LAW THAT SAYS THAT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE MEMBERS AND THAT ORGANIZATION'S LAWYER CAN BE PRIVILEGED, ASSUMING THEY DEMONSTRATE THESE ADDITIONAL FACTS THAT IT WAS FOR OBTAINING LEGAL ADVICE. AND THAT'S WHERE I THINK THE MORE RECENT ASCAP CASE DID NARROW THE ORIGINAL SCHWARTZ STATEMENT, AND I'M PREPARED TO GO WITH THE MORE NARROW FORMULATION IN THE U.S. VERSUS ASCAP DECISION.

I THINK -- I THINK THEY'RE THERE. I THINK THIS IS A PROTECTED COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE.

AS TO THE ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT THAT IF THE COMMUNICATION, IF THE TRANSMITTAL WAIVED THE PRIVILEGE, BUT TO RESCUE THE PRIVILEGE, WE'D EXAMINE THE COMMON INTEREST EXCEPTION, WHICH ALSO HAS TO BE CONSTRUED NARROWLY.

AND BOTH SIDES DID A NICE JOB RESEARCHING THIS, AND I KNOW THAT THERE ARE CASES ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS ISSUE. AND THE <u>POTATO</u> CASE AND THE <u>NIDEC</u> CASE AND THERE'S A FEDERAL

CIRCUIT CASE HAVING TO DO WITH PATENT LAW. I LOOKED AT THEM.

I JUST FIND THAT THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT IS AN INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHT. AND THE NATURE OF WHAT ASCAP WAS HERE TO DO,

NOT TO DEVELOP THE PRODUCT. THERE WASN'T A MERGER OF TWO

COMPETING BUSINESSES. THERE WASN'T AN EVALUATION OF THE

VALIDITY OF THE "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" COPYRIGHT IN ORDER TO VALUE

SUMMY FOR SOME TRANSACTION, WHICH IS WHAT I UNDERSTAND SOME

OF THE CASES HAVE GONE OFF ON.

MY TAKE WAS THAT THIS WAS SUMMY HIRING AN OUTSIDE

PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF ASSERTING SUMMY'S OWN RIGHTS. AND IN

ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY DO THAT, CHOSE TO CONVEY PRIVILEGED

INFORMATION WITH THE UNSTATED, BUT PRETTY APPARENT,

EXPECTATION THAT THE MATERIAL WOULD STAY WITHIN THE

PRIVILEGE. AND THAT THERE WAS AN INTENDED -- THERE WAS

LITIGATION ANTICIPATED BECAUSE PEOPLE FIGHT IN FEDERAL COURT

ALL THE TIME ABOUT COPYRIGHT.

AND THE SPECIFIC TRANSACTION AT ISSUE HERE, THE SPECIFIC COMMUNICATION AND THE UNDERLYING MATERIAL RELATING TO THE VALIDITY OF THE RIGHT OF THE COPYRIGHT I THINK DOES FALL WITHIN THE COMMON INTEREST EXCEPTION TO THE WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS SET FORTH IN THE CASES CITED TO ME.

SO, THAT'S TENTATIVELY WHERE I AM BASED ON A VERY
THOROUGH REVIEW OF SOME VERY GOOD PAPERS FROM BOTH SIDES.

I'M NOT JUST COMPLIMENTING YOU BECAUSE I LIKE TO DISARM. I'M

COMPLIMENTING YOU BECAUSE YOU DID A GOOD JOB. AND BOTH SIDES KNOW THIS STUFF VERY, VERY WELL.

BUT I THINK THAT BASED ON WHAT I HAVE HERE I DO NOT HAVE A BASIS FOR OVERRULING THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE AS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFFS.

I KNOW YOU'VE ASKED FOR OTHER RELIEF, AND I'M NOT ENTIRELY SURE I SEE HOW IT PLAYS IN.

SO, WHAT MAY MAKE SENSE TO DO IS EITHER HEAR FROM
YOU RIGHT NOW IF YOU WANT CLARIFICATION OF MY THOUGHTS. IF
YOU WANT TO TAKE A FEW MINUTES AND TALK TO YOUR COLLEAGUES
AND FIGURE OUT WHAT YOU WANT TO DO SO WE CAN DO THIS IN AN
ORDERLY WAY, I'M FINE WITH THAT AS WELL.

GOT A PREFERENCE? MR. RIFKIN LEAPING TO HIS FEET.

MR. RIFKIN: WELL, YOUR HONOR, IT MAKES NO
DIFFERENCE TO ME. I'M PREPARED TO TRY TO ADDRESS SOME OF
YOUR CONCERNS NOW. IT'S OUR MOTION. ALTHOUGH IT IS THE
DEFENDANT'S BURDEN, IT'S OUR MOTION. SO, I WOULD EXPECT THAT
WE WOULD ADDRESS YOUR HONOR FIRST IN ANY EVENT. BUT IN LIGHT
OF YOUR HONOR'S TENTATIVE IT CERTAINLY MAKES SENSE FOR US --

THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT.

MR. RIFKIN: -- TO DO THAT. AND I'M PREPARED TO PROCEED NOW.

BUT YOU SAID ORIGINALLY THAT YOU THOUGHT MAYBE YOU MIGHT WANT TO TAKE A BREAK. SO, BEFORE I JUMP RIGHT IN -THE COURT: OH, NO, I'M READY. I'M READY.

MR. RIFKIN: YOU'RE READY TO GO? 1 2 THE COURT: -- CLEAR YOUR CALENDARS. CANCEL YOUR 3 DINNER PLANS. 4 (LAUGHTER.) 5 MR. RIFKIN: OKAY. NOT TO -- NOT TO -- NOT TO MAKE A JOKE ABOUT ONE OF THE CASES WE BRIEFED, BUT THIS IS THE BIG 6 7 LEAGUES. 8 THE COURT: AND YOU'VE GOT YOUR MLB STUFF AS WELL. 9 MR. RIFKIN: THERE YOU GO. THERE YOU GO. 10 THE COURT: BUT YOU SUCCESSFULLY CONVINCED ME IT 11 WAS SUCH A BRIEF DECISION THAT IT --12 MR. RIFKIN: YES. 13 THE COURT: IT DIDN'T WARRANT THE HIGHEST RELIANCE. BUT GO AHEAD. YOU HAVE THE FIELD IN FRONT OF YOU. 14 15 MR. RIFKIN: AND, YOUR HONOR, I DO -- I SINCERELY APPRECIATE THE TENTATIVE RULING. I DON'T GET TO PRACTICE 16 17 HERE ALL THAT FREQUENTLY AND WHEN I DO I LIKE HOW SOME OF THE 18 COURTS IN THIS DISTRICT ADOPT THE STATE COURT PRACTICE OF 19 ISSUING TENTATIVE DECISIONS. IT MAKES -- IT MAKES IT MUCH 20 EASIER FOR US TO FOCUS IN ON THE ISSUES THAT ARE REALLY GERMANE, WHICH IS WHAT I'D LIKE TO TRY TO DO NOW. 21 22 THE COURT: I THINK YOU'LL HEAR THE FEDERAL JUDGES

SAY THAT THE STATE COURTS HAVE ADOPTED OURS.

MR. RIFKIN: OKAY. IT MAY VERY WELL BE THAT WAY.

25 (LAUGHTER.)

23

MR. RIFKIN: IT MAY VERY WELL BE THAT WAY.

THE COURT: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION IS ONE OF OUR FAVORITES.

MR. RIFKIN: FAIR ENOUGH. FAIR ENOUGH.

THE COURT: GO AHEAD.

MR. RIFKIN: SO, I THINK YOUR HONOR HAS CORRECTLY SUMMARIZED THE ISSUES. AND I DO WANT TO MAKE A COUPLE OF VERY BRIEF INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

AND, FIRST, WE DID NOT INTEND TO ARGUE -- AND IF WE DIDN'T MAKE IT CLEAR ENOUGH, LET ME TRY TO DO THAT NOW. WE DID NOT INTEND TO ARGUE THAT WHEN MR. REIMER PRODUCED THE DOCUMENTS TO US IN 2014 THAT THAT WAS A WAIVER.

INSTEAD WHAT WE THOUGHT WE TRIED TO EXPLAIN -- AND

I'LL TRY TO EMPHASIZE THIS A LITTLE BIT MORE NOW -- IS THAT

WHEN HE DID THAT, THAT SHOWED HOW ASCAP REGARDED THOSE

DOCUMENTS.

THE COURT: THEY DID NOT REGARD IT AS CONFIDENTIAL.

MR. RIFKIN: AS PRIVILEGED. THEY DIDN'T BELIEVE -IN OTHER WORDS -- AND I WILL TELL YOU, AND THIS IS ON THE
RECORD IN MR. REIMER'S DEPOSITION. MR. REIMER CALLED ME --

THE COURT: DO I HAVE THAT?

MR. RIFKIN: YOU DO. YOU HAVE BOTH TRANSCRIPTS.

THERE WAS A -- AND THEY WERE SUBMITTED. THE FIRST ONE WAS

SUBMITTED WITH OUR JOINT STIPULATION. THAT'S A TRANSCRIPT OF

MR. REIMER'S DEPOSITION TAKEN ON JULY 11TH. THAT WAS THE

SUBJECT OF ASCAP'S MOTION TO QUASH. 1 2 THE COURT: WHERE? 3 MR. RIFKIN: THEY DIDN'T WANT MR. REIMER TO 4 TESTIFY. 5 THE COURT: WHERE? (PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL CONFERRING.) 6 7 THE COURT: BECAUSE I FOUND BLEITZ --8 (PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL CONFERRING.) 9 THE COURT: I FOUND BLEITZ AND I FOUND MARCOTUILLO. 10 MR. RIFKIN: YES, THERE'S TWO TRANSCRIPTS. AND, 11 YOUR HONOR, THEY WERE DONE AT TWO DIFFERENT TIMES. SO, 12 THAT'S WHY THEY WERE SUBMITTED SEPARATELY. 13 THE SECOND ONE -- MS. MANIFOLD JUST HANDED ME THE SECOND ONE. MR. REIMER WAS DEPOSED ON JULY 11. 14 15 WHAT HAPPENED WAS THIS. ASCAP ORIGINALLY --THE COURT: WELL, HANG ON. 16 17 WHAT IS THE DOCUMENT NUMBER? 18 MR. RIFKIN: OKAY. 19 THE COURT: BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE I HAVE IT. 20 MS. MANIFOLD: HERE'S THE SUPPLEMENTAL ONE. MR. RIFKIN: OKAY. I'M REFERRING NOW TO DOCUMENT 21 22 126-1. AND IT'S EXHIBIT 14 OF THAT. THAT'S THE SUPPLEMENTAL 23 DECLARATION THAT MS. MANIFOLD SUBMITTED TOGETHER WITH OUR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON THE 22ND. AND THAT'S THE RESUMPTION OF 24

MR. REIMER'S DEPOSITION ON JULY 21ST.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHAT HAPPENED WAS I 1 2 RECEIVED AN EXHIBIT 17 --3 MR. RIFKIN: NO. THE COURT: -- WHICH SHOWED UP SUPPLEMENTALLY. 4 5 (PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL CONFERRING.) THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I NEED TO TAKE A LOOK AT 6 7 THAT BECAUSE, YOU KNOW, YOU RUN A RISK WHEN YOU ASK FOR 8 UNDER-SEAL FILING OF THINGS BECAUSE IT DOESN'T COME THROUGH 9 THE COURT'S NORMAL PRACTICES. AND I DON'T KNOW THAT YOU 10 FOLKS --11 MS. MANIFOLD: MR. REIMER'S DEPOSITION WAS NOT 12 FILED UNDER SEAL, I DON'T BELIEVE. 13 MR. RIFKIN: NO. MS. MANIFOLD: IT WAS -- IT WAS --14 15 MR. RIFKIN: IT HASN'T BEEN DESIGNATED CONFIDENTIAL. AND THERE WAS NO REQUEST ON THE RECORD THAT 16 17 THEY BE GIVEN TIME TO DO THAT. SO, PURSUANT TO OUR STIPULATED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER, THAT'S A PUBLIC DOCUMENT. 18 19 AND THERE'S TWO -- THERE'S TWO TRANSCRIPTS. HE WAS 20 -- HE WAS -- WHAT HAPPENED WAS AFTER WE SUBPOENAED ASCAP TO 21 PROVIDE --22 THE COURT: CAN YOU STAND BY FOR ONE SECOND. 23 MR. RIFKIN: SURE. 24 (PAUSE IN PROCEEDINGS.) THE COURT: WELL, 126 IS BOTH A SEALED AND 25

- 1 UNDER-SEAL DOCUMENT BECAUSE IT WAS REDACTED. AND, SO -2 OKAY. I SEE WHAT HAPPENED.
 3 ALL RIGHT. I WILL TAKE A LOOK AT IT BEFORE --
 - MR. RIFKIN: OKAY. AND THIS IS -- THIS IS DOCUMENT NUMBER 126-3. IT'S EXHIBIT 14 TO THAT SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION. AND IT'S THE TRANSCRIPT FROM THE SECOND DAY OF MR. REIMER'S DEPOSITION.

YOUR HONOR MAY RECALL WHAT HAPPENED WAS ASCAP
ORIGINALLY --

THE COURT: RESISTED --

MR. RIFKIN: -- MOVED TO QUASH THE DEPOSITION --

THE COURT: RESISTED.

MR. RIFKIN: THEY -- THEY CONSENTED TO THE

DEPOSITION. AND AFTER 39 MINUTES OF DEPOSITION THE FIRST

TIME, THEY REPEATEDLY INSTRUCTED MR. REIMER NOT TO ANSWER

QUESTIONS. WE FILED A MOTION TO COMPEL. THEY AGAIN

ULTIMATELY CONSENTED TO ALLOW HIM TO COME BACK. HE CAME BACK

ON THE 25TH OF JULY. AND THAT'S EXHIBIT 14, WHICH IS DOCKET

NUMBER 126-3.

THE COURT: IT'S ON MY MONITOR RIGHT NOW.

MR. RIFKIN: OKAY. AND IF YOU TURN TO PAGE 84 OF
THE TRANSCRIPT, WHICH I THINK IS PAGE 21 OF 25 OF THE EXHIBIT
--

THE COURT: GOT IT.

MR. RIFKIN: -- HE WAS ASKED IF -- HE, IN FACT, TOLD

ME BEFORE HE PRODUCED THE DOCUMENTS. HE CALLED ME. HE SAID
WE'RE PRODUCING ABOUT 500 PAGES OF DOCUMENTS. AND HE SAID
YOU WILL FIND AMONG THEM THE TWO DOCUMENTS YOU WILL FIND
EXTREMELY INTERESTING.

THE COURT: OKAY. SO, HE --

MR. RIFKIN: THEY'RE A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE COPYRIGHT.

THE COURT: WE'VE GOT SOME GOOD STUFF FOR YOU.

MR. RIFKIN: THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID.

THE COURT: YES.

MR. RIFKIN: AND, SO, WHAT -- WHAT WE WANTED THE
COURT TO UNDERSTAND IS MR. REIMER WAS COMPLETELY AWARE OF
WHAT HE WAS PRODUCING. HE KNEW IT WAS IN THE DOCUMENTS. HE
PRODUCED THEM DELIBERATELY. AND IT'S OUR VIEW THAT THAT
REFLECTS HIS JUDGMENT THAT THEY WERE NOT PRIVILEGED. IF HE
THOUGHT THEY WERE PRIVILEGED, HE WOULD NOT HAVE PRODUCED THEM
TO US. THERE WASN'T ANYTHING ACCIDENTAL ABOUT HIS
PRODUCTION. HE MAY NOW REGRET HAVING PRODUCED THEM BECAUSE
WARNER HAS SAID THAT THEY REGARD THEM AS PRIVILEGED.

THE COURT: RIGHT.

MR. RIFKIN: BUT WE THINK THAT ASCAP'S

UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE DOCUMENTS IS PERHAPS AS IMPORTANT AS

WHAT WE'RE NOW TRYING TO SURMISE FROM THE TRANSMITTAL.

AND IT JUST SO HAPPENS THAT MR. REIMER IS THE ONLY
PERSON WHO WAS AROUND AT THE TIME. HE'S BEEN AN EMPLOYEE OF

ASCAP IN THEIR LEGAL DEPARTMENT SINCE 1971. HE WAS ACTUALLY THERE WHEN THESE DOCUMENTS WERE SENT BY SUMMY-BIRCHARD, BY MRS. SENGSTACK TO BERNIE CORMAN, WHO WAS GENERAL COUNSEL --

THE COURT: UH-HUM.

MR. RIFKIN: -- OF ASCAP.

NOW, HE DIDN'T SAY HE WAS AWARE OF THE DOCUMENTS AT THE TIME. BUT HE WAS CERTAINLY AWARE OF THEM IN 2014. AND HE CERTAINLY --

THE COURT: BECAUSE HE PRODUCED THEM IN RESPONSE --

MR. RIFKIN: -- DIDN'T REGARD THEM --

THE COURT: -- TO YOUR SUBPOENA.

MR. RIFKIN: CORRECT.

THE COURT: GOT IT.

MR. RIFKIN: AND HE CERTAINLY DIDN'T REGARD THEM AS PRIVILEGED WHEN HE PRODUCED THEM IN 2014.

AND WE THINK THAT SHOULD BEAR ON THE COURT'S

ATTEMPT TO TRY TO RECONSTRUCT THE PURPOSE FOR THE

COMMUNICATION FROM MRS. SENGSTACK IN 1979. AND THAT IS, YOUR

HONOR -- WE THINK THAT IS THE NUB OF THE ISSUE. BECAUSE WHEN

YOU DO STRIP IT ALL AWAY, WE DO AGREE WITH MOST OF WHAT THE

COURT HAS SAID, THAT REALLY THIS RELATES TO THE PURPOSE FOR

THE COMMUNICATION. EVEN THE SCHWARTZ CASE THAT THE

DEFENDANT'S CITE FOR THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL

FOR A TRADE ASSOCIATION THAT REPRESENTS A HALF A MILLION

MEMBERS NOW AND OVER A HUNDRED THOUSAND MEMBERS AT THE TIME

IS ALSO THE LAWYER FOR EVERY ONE OF THEM. EVEN THAT CASE

SAYS THAT IT ONLY SERVES AS A MEMBER TO THE EXTENT THAT -
IT'S ONLY SERVES AS COUNSEL FOR THE MEMBER TO THE EXTENT THAT

THE MEMBER IS SEEKING LEGAL ADVICE.

THE COURT: UH-HUH.

MR. RIFKIN: SO, WHETHER YOU -- WHETHER YOU LOOK AT THIS UNDER THE RUBRIC OF DID BERNIE CORMAN, ASCAP'S GENERAL COUNSEL, REPRESENT SUMMY IN 1979, THE QUESTION IS WAS SUMMY ASKING FOR MR. CORMAN'S LEGAL ADVICE.

AND WE SUBMIT THAT THE DEFENDANTS CAN'T POSSIBLY SUSTAIN THAT BURDEN IN LIGHT OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS. AND THE PRINCIPAL UNDISPUTED FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

NUMBER ONE, THE LETTER THAT MRS. SENGSTACK WROTE TO MR. CORMAN IN 1979 DIDN'T ASK FOR LEGAL ADVICE, DIDN'T SOLICIT LEGAL ADVICE, DIDN'T IDENTIFY THE COUDERT LETTERS AS PRIVILEGED, DIDN'T ASSERT THAT THEY WERE TO BE PRIVILEGED, DIDN'T REFER TO ANY ACTUAL, CONTEMPLATED, ANTICIPATED OR ANY OTHER LITIGATION, DIDN'T MENTION ANY COMMON LEGAL ENTERPRISE BETWEEN THEM.

AND AS IMPORTANT, THERE IS NO RESPONSE, ZERO, NONE, FROM ASCAP THAT ASCAP EVER PROVIDED LEGAL ADVICE, EVER RENDERED LEGAL ADVICE TO SUMMY-BIRCHARD, EVER USED THOSE DOCUMENTS IN ANY WAY TO FURTHER THE INTERESTS OF SUMMY-BIRCHARD. ZERO. NOTHING. NOT A SINGLE THING.

ASCAP HAS NOT EVER SOUGHT TO ENFORCE A COPYRIGHT TO

"HAPPY BIRTHDAY," NOT IN THE 40 YEARS SINCE THAT LETTER WAS SENT AND NOT IN THE 40 YEARS BEFORE IT WAS SENT. IT HAS NEVER HAPPENED.

THE COURT: HOW IS THAT RELEVANT?

MR. RIFKIN: BECAUSE I THINK THE SUGGESTION THAT
WHAT HAPPENED IN 1979 WAS PERHAPS BECAUSE THERE MIGHT BE A
TIME WHEN ASCAP MIGHT BE CALLED UPON TO ENFORCE A COPYRIGHT
TO "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" -- MAYBE -- I THINK JUST FLIES IN THE
FACE OF NOT ONLY THE PARTICULAR FACTS OF THE LETTER, THAT IS,
MRS. SENGSTACK'S LETTER TO MR. CORMAN, BUT ALSO THE 80-YEAR
HISTORY SINCE THE TIME THE SONG WAS -- AND I'LL LOOSELY SAY
THIS -- COPYRIGHTED IN 1935 --

THE COURT: YOU'RE NOT WAIVING ANYTHING BY --

MR. RIFKIN: -- TO TODAY.

THE COURT: DON'T WORRY ABOUT THAT.

MR. RIFKIN: AND WE DO DISAGREE WITH WHETHER THERE WAS A COPYRIGHT OR NOT.

YOUR HONOR, INTERESTINGLY YOU SAID, AND I MADE A
NOTE OF THIS, YOUR HONOR SAID, AT THE TIME IN 1979 MRS.

SENGSTACK OR SUMMY-BIRCHARD COULD HAVE SENT, FOR EXAMPLE, A
COMFORT LETTER -- MAYBE FROM COUDERT OR FROM SOMEBODY ELSE,
MAYBE FROM THEIR OWN IN-HOUSE COUNSEL IF THEY HAD SOMEONE
LIKE THAT -- ASSERTING THAT THE COPYRIGHT WAS PROTECTED.

AND YOUR HONOR KNOWS FROM SOME OF THE CASES THAT
WE'VE CITED TO YOU THAT THERE ARE INSTANCES WHERE ASCAP GETS

INTO A DISPUTE BETWEEN MEMBERS. AND IN THAT CASE ASCAP SAYS, LOOK, WE DON'T KNOW WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO WHAT SONG. WE REALLY DON'T KNOW. WE CAN'T DECIDE THAT. WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS WE WANT YOU TO INDEMNIFY US IN THE EVENT IT TURNS OUT THAT YOU'RE WRONG. AND ASCAP CERTAINLY COULD HAVE SOUGHT THAT INDEMNIFICATION FROM SUMMY.

BUT ONE OF THE THINGS THAT I WROTE DOWN THAT I
THOUGHT WAS REALLY VERY INTERESTING IS ASCAP COULD HAVE -I'M SORRY, SUMMY COULD HAVE SENT A COPY OF THE COPYRIGHT. I
MEAN, WHAT BETTER PROOF WOULD THERE BE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A
COPYRIGHT IN A SONG THAN THE COPYRIGHT.

THEY DIDN'T DO THAT. WE THINK THAT'S RELEVANT. IT

CERTAINLY SUGGESTS TO US -- AND, AGAIN, PUT IN THE CONTEXT OF

THE FACT THAT MRS. SENGSTACK WROTE TO MR. CORMAN THREE YEARS

AFTER SHE GOT THE DETAIL ANALYSIS. THE LONG, LENGTHY LETTER

FROM COUDERT WAS 1976. THE SUBSEQUENT LETTER, THE 1978

LETTER WAS A FOLLOW-UP LETTER.

BUT THERE'S NO INDICATION THAT IN THAT INTERVENING
THREE-YEAR PERIOD OF TIME ASCAP WAS INVOLVED AT ALL IN THE
DISPUTE OVER THE COPYRIGHT TO "HAPPY BIRTHDAY." THIS IS A
DISPUTE THAT HAS BEEN SIMMERING FOR YEARS.

THE COURT: BUT THERE WAS -- THERE IS --

MR. RIFKIN: COUDERT'S LETTER DIDN'T COME OUT OF THE BLUE.

THE COURT: EXCUSE ME. THERE IS A REFERENCE IN MS.

SENGSTACK'S -- STENGSTACK'S, SORRY.

MR. RIFKIN: SENGSTACK.

THE COURT: SENGSTACK.

THERE IS A REFERENCE IN HER LETTER TO A PRIOR DISCUSSION WITH THE LAWYER.

SO, YOU ENTIRELY HAVE ME ON SORT OF THE PROFORMA

NATURE OF WHAT THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER SAYS. YOU'RE

ABSOLUTELY RIGHT. IT DOES NOT HAVE THINGS THAT WOULD PERHAPS

MORE CONCLUSIVELY DEMONSTRATE AN INTENTION TO ASSERT A

PRIVILEGE OR A REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE. YOU'RE ABSOLUTELY

RIGHT.

MR. RIFKIN: SURE.

THE COURT: AND THAT DOES WEIGH -- THAT DOES WEIGH

AGAINST WARNER. I AM COMPLETELY ON BOARD.

I'M A LITTLE -- AND I DON'T MEAN TO CUT YOU OFF,
BUT I THINK, AGAIN, IT'S KIND OF FAIR TO HAVE A DIALOGUE.

I'M NOT PARTICULARLY SWAYED BY THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO

LITIGATION AFTERWARDS. I GO TO MY LAWYER TODAY. AND I SAY I

THINK I'M GOING TO BE SUED, AND THE LAWYER SAYS LET'S TALK.

AND WE HAVE A DISCUSSION. AND THEN AFTERWARDS I'M NOT SUED.

THAT DOESN'T MEAN YEARS FROM NOW SOMEONE IS GOING TO SAY,

WELL, BACK WHEN YOU TALKED WITH YOUR LAWYER YOUR PRIVILEGE

DOESN'T APPLY. THE QUESTION IS AT THE TIME DID I HAVE A

REASON TO BELIEVE THAT I NEEDED ADVICE.

AND I'M A LITTLE -- I'M A LITTLE TROUBLED BY

EX-POST EXPLANATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

MR. RIFKIN: I UNDERSTAND THAT. AND I DON'T -- I

DON'T -- I DON'T THINK IN THIS CASE -- I DON'T THINK YOU

WOULD -- YOU WOULD NEED TO LOOK ONLY AT THE FUTURE. IN OTHER

WORDS, ONLY LOOK FROM 1979 TO THE PRESENT, THOSE 40 YEARS.

BUT I THINK YOU NEED TO PUT THOSE 40 YEARS IN THE SCALE WHEN

YOU LOOK BACK AT THE 40 YEARS BEFORE IT. BECAUSE IN THE 40

YEARS BEFORE IT, THERE WAS NEVER A LAWSUIT FILED UNDER THE

COPYRIGHT -- NEVER, EVER, EVER.

THERE'S NEVER BEEN -- I JUST WANT THE COURT TO

UNDERSTAND. IN THE 80 YEARS SINCE THE SONG "HAPPY BIRTHDAY

TO YOU" WAS PURPORTEDLY COPYRIGHTED, NOT A SINGLE OWNER -
AND IT HAS PASSED THROUGH MANY HANDS -- NOT A SINGLE OWNER

HAS EVER SUED ANYONE FOR INFRINGING ANY COPYRIGHT TO THE SONG

"HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU."

IN THE FIVE INSTANCES -- AND THIS IS I THINK

IMPORTANT -- IN THE FIVE INSTANCES WHEN THERE HAVE BEEN

INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS OVER PUBLIC PERFORMANCES OF THE SONG

"HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU" WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE

SO-CALLED OWNER, IN EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THOSE INSTANCES THE

ONLY COPYRIGHT THAT WAS EVER ASSERTED WAS THE 1893 COPYRIGHT

TO A PREDECESSOR SONG "GOOD MORNING TO ALL." ALL FIVE OF

THOSE CASES WERE -- I'M SORRY, FOUR OF THOSE FIVE CASES WERE

COMMENCED AFTER THE OWNER PURPORTEDLY FILED A COPYRIGHT TO

"HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU."

AND IN ALL FOUR OF THOSE CASES FILED AFTER THE

COPYRIGHT WAS FILED THEY DID NOT RELY ON THE COPYRIGHT TO

"HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU" AS ONE MIGHT SUSPECT, BUT THEY

RELIED ON THE COPYRIGHT TO A -- A THEN 60-YEAR-OLD SONG,

"GOOD MORNING TO ALL." I THINK THAT'S INCREDIBLY

INFORMATIVE. AND I THINK IT SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE COURT THAT

THERE HAS NEVER BEEN AN INSTANCE WHEN ANYONE WAS EVER GOING

TO SUE UNDER THIS COPYRIGHT. IT HASN'T HAPPENED EVER. NOT

ONCE EVER HAS ANYONE EVER SUED ANYONE FOR INFRINGING THE

COPYRIGHT TO THE SONG "HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU," WHICH AS YOUR

HONOR KNOWS IS THE SUBJECT OF THE COUDERT LETTERS.

SO, I THINK TO SURMISE AS THE DEFENDANTS REALLY
HAVE TO -- I THINK TO SURMISE THAT THERE WAS SOME RISK THAT
THERE MIGHT BE SOME DAY SOME LITIGATION THAT ASCAP MIGHT BE
ASKED TO BRING ON BEHALF OF SUMMY-BIRCHARD IN 1979 REALLY
STRETCHES THE TRUTH. AND I DON'T MEAN THAT THE DEFENDANTS
ARE STRETCHING THE TRUTH. WHAT I MEAN IS IT STRETCHES WHAT
WE KNOW THE FACTS TO BE.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. RIFKIN: I'M NOT SUGGESTING THAT THEY'RE
DISTORTING THE FACTS AT ALL. FAR BE IT FROM ME TO SAY THAT.
WHAT I AM SAYING, THOUGH, IS THEY ARE ASKING YOU TO MAKE AN
ENORMOUS LEAP FROM WHAT WE ALL KNOW THE REAL HARD FACTS ARE
TO CONCLUDE FROM A COVER LETTER THAT DOESN'T ASK FOR LEGAL
ADVICE, DOESN'T SOLICIT LEGAL ADVICE, ISN'T IN RESPONSE TO A

COMMUNICATION REQUESTING INFORMATION FOR THE PROVISION OF

LEGAL ADVICE, ISN'T MET WITH LEGAL ADVICE, DOESN'T RESULT IN

ANY LEGAL ACTION OR ANY LEGAL ADVICE BEING TAKEN. I THINK

THAT'S PRETTY POWERFUL EVIDENCE THAT THERE REALLY WASN'T MUCH

OF A RISK HERE.

BUT IN ADDITION TO THAT, EVEN IF WE WERE GOING TO
PUT ALL THOSE FACTS ASIDE, WE HAVE A CASE LIKE THE TERRA NOVA
CASE THAT WE DISCUSSED IN OUR BRIEF WHERE THE COURT SAYS IN
THE BANK OF AMERICA VERSUS TERRA NOVA CASE IT'S NOT ENOUGH
THAT YOU'RE TRYING TO STRUCTURE A COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP IN
A WAY THAT AVOIDS SOME FUTURE LITIGATION. AND MAYBE YOU
MIGHT SAY HERE THAT ASCAP HAD AN INTEREST IN KNOWING THAT IF
ASCAP WAS COLLECTING FEES ON THE COPYRIGHT TO "HAPPY
BIRTHDAY," ASCAP MIGHT HAVE AN INTEREST IN THAT.

BUT THE MERE FACT THAT THE PARTIES ARE TRYING TO STRUCTURE A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP IN A, QUOTE, LEGAL WAY IS NOT THE KIND OF LEGAL INTEREST THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT WHEN WE LOOK AT THIS QUESTION OF THE COMMON INTEREST. AND WE CITED THAT CASE. WE DISCUSSED IT AT LENGTH IN OUR BRIEF.

IT'S THE BANK OF AMERICA VERSUS TERRA NOVA FROM THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IN 2002.

I THINK THE ANSWER IS REALLY LOOK AT WHAT -- LOOK
AT WHAT ASCAP HAS SAID OVER THE YEARS. MR. REIMER SAYS THEY
DON'T HAVE ANY INTEREST IN THE COPYRIGHT. MR. REIMER SAYS
THEY DON'T HAVE ANY INTEREST IN THE ROYALTIES. THEY DO

COLLECT A FEE FOR THE SERVICE THEY PROVIDE, BUT IT'S -- IT'S

NOT AN INTEREST IN EITHER OF THE PROPERTY -- THAT IS, THE

COPYRIGHTS OR THE ROYALTIES DERIVED FROM THEM. IT'S JUST A

FEE FOR THE SERVICES THEY RENDER. WHEN -- AND WE'VE CITED A

COUPLE OF CASES.

WE CITE -- I CALL IT THE <u>SPRINGSTEIN</u> CASE BECAUSE I CAN'T REMEMBER THE PERFORMER -- OCASEK. HE MAY BE MORE FAMOUS THAN I'M GIVING HIM CREDIT FOR. BUT SPRINGSTEIN WAS ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN THAT CASE. THEY SUED A BAR OWNER FOR PERFORMING THEIR RIGHTS. AND THE BAR OWNER TRIED TO JOIN ASCAP IN THE LITIGATION. AND ASCAP MOVED TO BE DISMISSED. THEY MOVED TO HAVE THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT DISMISSED.

AND THEIR ARGUMENT THERE WAS WE DON'T HAVE ANY
INTEREST IN THESE COPYRIGHTS. WE DON'T WANT TO BE A PARTY TO
THIS LITIGATION. WE DON'T NEED TO BE A PARTY TO THIS
LITIGATION. YOU SHOULDN'T JOIN US. YOU DON'T HAVE A CLAIM
AGAINST US, A CLAIM AGAINST US. WE ARE STRANGERS TO THIS.
AND, SO, THAT'S WHAT THE COURT DID. THE COURT LET ASCAP OUT
ON ASCAP'S MOTION.

AND I THINK THAT THOSE CASES -- THERE WAS ANOTHER CASE, THE DOORS CASE -- ALMOST EXACTLY THE SAME FACTS, ONE DECIDED IN 1987 AND THE OTHER DECIDED IN 1992.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, DON'T SHORT FORM
THEM.

THE SPRINGSTEIN CASE WAS WHICH ONE?

MR. RIFKIN: I'M SORRY. THE SPRINGSTEIN CASE IS --1 2 IS OCASEK, O-C-A-S-E-K. IT'S THE WYOMING CASE THAT'S DECIDED 3 IN 1987. AND IT WAS A -- IT WAS AN ACTION --THE COURT: WHERE IS THAT -- WHERE IS THAT CITED IN 4 5 YOUR BRIEF? MR. RIFKIN: YOUR HONOR, IT'S IN THE REPLY. 6 7 THE COURT: AHH. 8 MR. RIFKIN: OKAY. THAT WAS RECENTLY FILED. 9 OBVIOUSLY, YOU PROBABLY HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO READ THE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF THAT WE FILED --10 11 THE COURT: OH, I DID. 12 MR. RIFKIN: -- ON THE 22ND. 13 THE COURT: I DID. I DID. I READ 14 EVERYTHING. 15 MR. RIFKIN: UH-HUM. IT'S -- IT APPEARS ON PAGE 9 OF OUR BRIEF, YOUR 16 17 HONOR, OF OUR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF. IT'S OCASEK VERSUS 18 HEGGLUND. THE COURT: YES. 19 MR. RIFKIN: HEGGLUND WAS A BAR OWNER. AND --20 THE COURT: GOT IT. GOT IT. 21 22 MR. RIFKIN: -- WHAT THE COURT SAID --23 INTERESTINGLY, THERE WAS TWO THINGS. IT SAYS, FIRST OF ALL, 24 ASCAP IS NOT -- IN THE STRICTEST SENSE, IT IS NOT A LICENSING

AGENT OF ANY OF THE MEMBERS BECAUSE -- AND I THOUGHT THIS WAS

VERY INTERESTING -- BECAUSE THE LICENSES THAT ASCAP ISSUES

ARE LICENSES IN ASCAP'S OWN NAME TO THE USERS OF THE MUSIC.

SO, IN THIS CASE IT WAS A BAR. BUT IT COULD BE A RADIO

STATION. IT COULD BE A HOTEL LOBBY. IT COULD BE AN AIRPORT,

WHATEVER.

SO, THE COURT SAYS IT'S NOT REALLY AN AGENT BECAUSE
IT DOESN'T ISSUE LICENSES IN THE NAME OF THE PRINCIPAL, THAT
IS, THE OWNERS OF THE MUSIC. AND IT SAYS EVEN IF IT WAS AN
AGENT, IT STILL HAS NO INTEREST IN THE COPYRIGHTS OR THE
VALIDITY OF THE COPYRIGHTS.

AGAIN, MR. REIMER TESTIFIED ON THE 22ND OF JULY.
THE COURT: UH-HUM.

MR. RIFKIN: I ASKED HIM IF ASCAP HAS EVER BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF ANY COPYRIGHT. AND HE LOOKED AT ME. AND HE SAID, WELL, NO, OF COURSE NOT. WHY WOULD WE BE. WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN THAT. THAT'S FOR THE —— THAT'S FOR THE MEMBERS TO WORRY ABOUT.

SO, WHEN WE HAVE ALL OF THE RELEVANT FACTS I THINK
IN THE BASKET IN FRONT OF US, AND WE LOOK AND WE SAY, WELL,
WHAT IS THERE ABOUT THIS LETTER FROM MRS. SENGSTACK THAT
MAKES US THINK THAT SHE WAS REQUESTING LEGAL ADVICE OR
THOUGHT THAT BERNIE CORMAN WAS HER LAWYER.

AND WE LOOK AT SOME OF THE FACTORS THE COURTS HAVE

CONSIDERED RELEVANT. IT JUST -- THERE'S NOT ENOUGH HERE FOR

THE DEFENDANTS TO MEET THEIR BURDEN IN LIGHT OF WHAT ARE

REALLY OVERWHELMING HISTORICAL FACTS THAT ASCAP HASN'T HAD

ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" COPYRIGHT. I THINK

THE FAR MORE PLAUSIBLE CONCLUSION FROM THIS IS THAT MRS.

SENGSTACK HAD A CASUAL CONVERSATION WITH BERNIE CORMAN AND

MENTIONED THAT SHE HAD THIS ANALYSIS DONE.

AS YOUR HONOR KNOWS, THE "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" COPYRIGHT

HAS BEEN SOMETHING OF A DISPUTE IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS --

THE COURT: WELL, I THOUGHT YOU WERE GOING TO USE A BETTER WORD THAN THAT. OKAY.

MR. RIFKIN: NO. I'VE REFRAINED FROM DOING SO,
YOUR HONOR. BUT YOU CAN IMAGINE A MORE COLORFUL WORD FOR
DISPUTE.

THE COURT: HAVE --

MR. RIFKIN: IT'S BEEN SOMETHING OF A DISPUTE --

THE COURT: HAVE AT IT.

MR. RIFKIN: -- IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS FOR DECADES.

AND I THINK IT'S FAR MORE PLAUSIBLE THAT MRS.

18 SENGSTACK SIMPLY SENT IT TO MR. CORMAN AS A COURTESY.

THERE'S NOTHING -- AND, AGAIN, THIS IS -- AS YOUR HONOR SAID

20 AT THE VERY BEGINNING, THIS IS THE DEFENDANT'S BURDEN TO

CONVINCE THE COURT THAT SUMMY-BIRCHARD REGARDED ASCAP AS ITS

22 LAWYER OR WAS COMMUNICATING INVOLVING A COMMON LEGAL

23 ENTERPRISE.

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AND WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS THAT
WE REALLY KNOW EXISTED, AND YOU COMPARE IT TO THE PAUCITY OF

EVIDENCE THAT SUGGESTS THE CONTRARY -- UNLIKE ALL THE OTHER

CASES WHERE -- AND I AGREE THAT THEY'RE MORE TEMPORALLY

RELATED TO THE TIME IN QUESTION -- WHERE THERE ARE AFFIDAVITS

OR DECLARATIONS OR EVEN TESTIMONY FROM PARTICIPANTS IN THE

MEETINGS WHO SAY, YES, ALL THE LAWYERS WERE THERE; YES, WE

TALKED WITH ONE ANOTHER; YES, THERE WERE MANY CLIENTS THERE

FROM DIFFERENT COMPANIES.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OBVIOUSLY SUGGEST SOME EITHER

ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP OR SOME EXPECTATION THAT THERE

WAS THIS COMMON LEGAL ENTERPRISE THAT THE PARTIES SHARED EVEN

THOUGH THEY'RE STRANGERS TO ONE ANOTHER OTHERWISE.

BUT -- BUT THAT JUST DOESN'T EXIST HERE GIVEN THE RELATIONSHIP THAT ASCAP HAS DESCRIBED FOR ITSELF. AND, SO, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN ASCAP IN THE -- ONE OF THE RATE PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT IN THE PANDORA MATTER, WHEN ASCAP SAYS THAT THE PRODUCERS -- THAT ASCAP HAS SOME INTEREST IN THE SONGS, THE PRODUCERS JUMP IN. AND THEY WRITE A LETTER TO THE COURT. AND THEY SAY, TO BE CLEAR, OUR CLIENTS, THE MUSIC PRODUCERS, NOT ASCAP, ARE THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS OF THE SONGS IN QUESTION, POSSESSED OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 106 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT WHICH INCLUDE THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO PUBLICLY PERFORM THE SONGS OR TO AUTHORIZE OTHERS TO DO SO.

THIS WAS -- AND I'M NOW QUOTING FROM THE IN RE

PANDORA MEDIA CASE. THIS IS THE --

THE COURT: AND YOU HAVE THE SAME STATEMENT IN HIS

DECLARATION IN --

MR. RIFKIN: THE EXACT SAME STATEMENT --

THE COURT: YES.

MR. RIFKIN: -- IN THE DECLARATION. AND, FRANKLY, IN HIS DEPOSITION TESTIMONY ON JULY 22ND.

YOU KNOW, I -- WE ARE STRUGGLING BECAUSE WE ARE LOOKING BACK 40-SOME-ODD YEARS. AND WE'RE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT MRS. SENGSTACK THOUGHT WHEN SHE DID WHAT SHE DID.

AND I THINK HERE --

THE COURT: AND I PRESUME SHE'S NOT IN A POSITION
TO TESTIFY.

MR. RIFKIN: I -- NOT THAT I'M AWARE OF, YOUR
13 HONOR.

THE COURT: OKAY. THAT'S FINE.

MR. RIFKIN: I DON'T BELIEVE THAT IS THE CASE AT ALL.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. RIFKIN: WHAT -- WHEN WE LOOK AT WHAT SHE DID,
WHICH IS TO SEND A LETTER THREE YEARS LATER THAT WAS DONE BY
HER OWN COUNSEL TO AN ORGANIZATION THAT HAS AT BEST A
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS MEMBERS, AND WE LOOK AT
WHAT HAPPENED IN THE 40 YEARS BEFORE THAT AND THE 40 YEARS
AFTER THAT, AND WE LOOK AT WHAT ASCAP SAYS IS THE LIMITED
ROLE IT HAS AND WHETHER IT HAS ANY INTEREST IN THE
COPYRIGHTS, WHETHER IT HAS PARTICIPATED IN ANY OTHER --

FORGET "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" -- WHETHER IT HAS PARTICIPATED IN ANY
OTHER LITIGATION INVOLVING THE VALIDITY OF ANY OTHER
COPYRIGHTS.

I THINK IT'S A STRETCH TO SAY THAT -- THAT ASCAP

AND SUMMY-BIRCHARD SHARED A COMMON LEGAL INTEREST OR WERE

INVOLVED IN A COMMON LEGAL ENTERPRISE CONCERNING "HAPPY

BIRTHDAY TO YOU." WHAT THEY WERE WERE BUSINESS PARTNERS.

AND YOUR HONOR IS CORRECT. WE'VE CITED A NUMBER OF CASES, INCLUDING THE NIDEC CASE, THAT SAYS A BUSINESS INTEREST ISN'T SUFFICIENT. IT HAS TO BE AN INTEREST IN A LEGAL MATTER.

AND THE MERE POSSIBILITY -- THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY

THAT SOMEHOW HISTORY WOULD CHANGE ITSELF AFTER 40 YEARS. AND

ALL OF A SUDDEN ASCAP WOULD FOR SOME STRANGE REASON FIND

ITSELF IN LITIGATION INVOLVING THE VALIDITY OF THE COPYRIGHT

TO "HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO YOU" WHEN IT HAS NEVER LITIGATED THE

VALIDITY OF A COPYRIGHT TO ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL SONG EVER -
NOT BEFORE. NOT SINCE. I THINK THAT'S JUST -- GOES TOO FAR

GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE BURDEN IS ON THE DEFENDANTS.

IF THE BURDEN WERE OURS, WE WOULD HAVE A MUCH
DIFFERENT ARGUMENT AND FRANKLY A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT
ARGUMENT. WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE
IN NOW.

BUT SINCE THE BURDEN IS ON THEM, THEY NEED TO COME FORWARD WITH SOMETHING MORE THAN JUST SUPPOSITION OR A MERE

POSSIBILITY, WHICH IS REALLY ALL THEY CAN OFFER THAT FRANKLY FLIES IN THE FACE OF WHAT WE ALL KNOW TO BE THE HISTORICAL FACTS.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. RIFKIN: SO, FOR THOSE REASONS, I THINK IN LIGHT OF EVERYTHING YOUR HONOR SAID, I WOULD URGE YOU TO CONSIDER ALL THOSE FACTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK THAT I THINK YOUR HONOR DOES UNDERSTAND.

MRS. SENGSTACK HAD TO THINK THAT MR. CORMAN WAS HER LAWYER, EVEN THOUGH THERE'S NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS EVER HER LAWYER BEFORE. THERE'S NO INDICATION THAT SHE SOUGHT LEGAL ADVICE FROM HIM. THERE'S NO INDICATION HE PROVIDED LEGAL ADVICE TO HER -- AND BY HER I MEAN OBVIOUSLY SUMMY-BIRCHARD.

THE COURT: I'M WITH YOU. I'M WITH YOU.

MR. RIFKIN: SUMMY-BIRCHARD HAD ITS OWN COUNSEL,
COUDERT BROTHERS.

THE COURT: YEP.

MR. RIFKIN: WHICH OVER THE COURSE OF TWO YEARS

RENDERED EXHAUSTIVE LEGAL ADVICE ON THE ISSUE. THERE'S NO -
THERE'S NOTHING IN THE RECORD THAT SAYS THAT MRS. SENGSTACK

TOLD MR. CORMAN KEEP THIS CONFIDENTIAL. IN 2014 MR. REIMER

PRODUCED THE DOCUMENT --

THE COURT: SO, DO YOU -- DO YOU HAVE -- OKAY. SO,
YOU MAKE A VERY WELL-ARTICULATED EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THOSE

THINGS DID NOT OCCUR.

MR. RIFKIN: RIGHT.

THE COURT: DO YOU WANT TO GIVE ME SOMETHING TO

HANG ON TO AS TO WHY SHE DID PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT SHE

PAID A HECK OF A LOT OF MONEY FOR FROM COUDERT, WHY SHE WOULD

HAVE BEEN IN THE POSITION TO GIVE THIS TO ASCAP. WHY?

MR. RIFKIN: I THINK THEY HAPPENED TO BUMP INTO

EACH OTHER. AND I THINK THEY PROBABLY TALKED ABOUT THE SONG

BECAUSE PEOPLE IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS TALK ABOUT THE SONG A

LOT. IT IS -- AS I'VE TRIED TO BE KIND TO SAY IT IS A MATTER

OF SOME NOTORIETY --

THE COURT: I'VE SUNG IT MYSELF.

(LAUGHTER.)

MR. RIFKIN: WITHIN THE MUSIC BUSINESS, IT IS -YOUR HONOR, YOU KNOW, NOT A MONTH GOES BY THAT I DON'T HEAR
SOME HUMOROUS REFERENCE TO IT. I THINK THE LAST TIME I SAW
IT WAS NOT A FEW WEEKS AGO ON THE COLBERT SHOW WHEN HE SANG
"HAPPY BIRTHDAY" TO HAPPY BIRTHDAY ON HAPPY BIRTHDAY'S HAPPY
BIRTHDAY. AND HE COULDN'T SING THE SONG.

 $\hbox{ IT IS $--$ IT IS TRULY A MATTER OF SOME ATTENTION IN } \\ \hbox{ THE INDUSTRY.}$

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. RIFKIN: I THINK IT IS --

THE COURT: OKAY. SO --

25 MR. RIFKIN: IT IS -- IT WAS SUMMY'S BIGGEST

PROPERTY BY FAR. IF CORMAN HAPPENED TO BUMP INTO ARLENE

SENGSTACK ANYWHERE -- AND SINCE THEY WERE BOTH IN THE MUSIC

BUSINESS, IT'S LIKELY THAT THEY DID -- IT'S ALSO LIKELY THAT

THE TOPIC OF "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" CAME UP. IT'S LIKE THE OLD

JOKE ABOUT TWO FLIES. IF YOU SEE TWO FLIES FLYING AROUND

TOGETHER YOU KNOW WHAT THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT. MAYBE THAT'S A

FARM JOKE, BUT YOU'LL FORGIVE ME. MY WIFE IS A HORSE RIDER.

SO, I SPEND SOME TIMES ON HORSE FARMS.

(LAUGHTER.)

MR. RIFKIN: I THINK IF THEY BUMPED INTO ONE

ANOTHER --

THE COURT: OKAY. I MEAN, YOU KNOW, YOU SAID IT
WAS GRATUITOUS. I COULDN'T --

MR. RIFKIN: I THINK IT WAS GRATUITOUS.

THE COURT: I COULDN'T PLAUSIBLY IMAGINE HOW

SOMEONE WOULD GRATUITOUSLY SAY, HEY, WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE

WHAT MY LAWYER SAYS ABOUT THIS SONG. AND YOU'VE GIVEN ME --

MR. RIFKIN: I --

THE COURT: LOOK, IT'S SPECULATION. I GOT IT.

MR. RIFKIN: IT DIDN'T COME OUT OF THE BLUE.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. RIFKIN: I THINK --

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. RIFKIN: I THINK THERE'S A CONTEXT TO IT. I
THINK THE CONTEXT IS -- AGAIN, AS I SAY, ALL THE HISTORICAL

WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A UNIQUE SONG. I MEAN, IT IS "HAPPY BIRTHDAY." AND IT WAS SUMMY'S BIGGEST PROPERTY. AND I THINK IT'S ENTIRELY LIKELY THAT CORMAN SAID SOMETHING TO SENGSTACK ABOUT IT. AND SENGSTACK SAYS, YOU KNOW, HERE'S A COUPLE OF LETTERS WE GOT FROM -- FROM OUR LAWYER THREE YEARS AGO.

THE COURT: GOT IT.

MR. RIFKIN: THERE'S NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SUBSTANTIATE ANYTHING ELSE OTHER THAN THAT. AND I THINK THAT'S FAR MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORICAL FACTS THAN ANY CONTRARY SUPPOSITION.

THE COURT: AND THAT IS ORAL ADVOCACY. I GOT IT.

MR. RIFKIN: OKAY.

THE COURT: WELL DONE --

MR. RIFKIN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: WELL DONE. THANK YOU.

MR. RIFKIN: THANK YOU.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. LEMOINE:

MS. LEMOINE: YES, YOUR HONOR. THANK YOU.

SO, YOUR HONOR, I WANT TO JUST START BY ADDRESSING THE POINT ABOUT THAT MR. RIFKIN MADE, THE POINT ABOUT THIS NOTION THAT ASCAP HAS NEVER BEEN INVOLVED IN THE VALIDITY OF THE COPYRIGHT HERE.

24 THE COPYRIGHT HERE.

THE COURT: MICROPHONE DOWN --

MS. LEMOINE: OF COURSE.

THE COURT: -- SO WE CAN HEAR WHAT YOU SAY.

MS. LEMOINE: AS YOUR HONOR POINTED OUT, ASCAP IS CHARGED WITH ENFORCING OUR PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS, SUMMY'S PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS. IT HAS, AS MR. REIMER TESTIFIED, FILED THOUSANDS OF INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS. ALL RIGHT. HE COULDN'T SAY WHETHER ANY INVOLVED "HAPPY BIRTHDAY," BUT HE SAID THEY FILED THOUSANDS OF INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS.

AS YOUR HONOR POINTED OUT, AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT

THE COURT: AND THAT'S -- AND THAT'S DISTINCT FROM ACTIONS REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF A COPYRIGHT.

MS. LEMOINE: WELL, AS YOUR HONOR POINTED OUT, IN ORDER TO FILE THOSE ACTIONS YOU'D HAVE TO OWN THE COPYRIGHT.

AND YOU'D HAVE TO HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT IN ORDER TO OWN IT.

SO, WE SAY IT'S SUBSUMED WITHIN THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.

THE VALIDITY -- WHEN HE TESTIFIED AS TO THE

VALIDITY OF THE COPYRIGHT, I THINK WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS AN

ACTION LIKE THIS ONE IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS ARE SEEKING A

DECLARATORY RELIEF CLAIM ABOUT WHETHER IT'S VALID OR NOT. I

THINK HE HAD THIS ONE IN MIND, BUT I DON'T KNOW. WE'D HAVE

TO ASK MR. REIMER.

BUT HE DID SAY THAT THEY MAKE -- I MEAN, WE
UNDERSTAND, AND YOUR HONOR ARTICULATED IT VERY CLEARLY, THE
NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASCAP AND SUMMY. ASCAP

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EXISTS TO ENFORCE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS. THE UNITED
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    STATES SUPREME COURT SAID THAT. THAT'S HOW IT WAS FORMED IN
 3
    1914.
               THE COURT: DO I HAVE A COPY OF THE CONTRACT
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 5
    BETWEEN SUMMY AND ASCAP? I KNOW I HAVE THE WARNER AGREEMENT.
               MS. LEMOINE: I CAN SUBMIT THAT. I THINK THAT WE
 6
 7
     SUBMITTED IT.
 8
               MR. KAPLAN: YES.
9
               MS. LEMOINE: MR. KAPLAN WILL HELP ME AND TELL ME
    WHAT EXHIBIT IT IS.
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11
               THE COURT: YES, HE WILL.
12
              MS. LEMOINE: WE DID SUBMIT THAT, YOUR HONOR, FROM
13
    1975.
14
               MR. KAPLAN: EXHIBIT C OF THE KLAUS DECLARATION.
15
               MS. LEMOINE: IT'S EXHIBIT C TO MR. KLAUS'S
    DECLARATION, YOUR HONOR.
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17
               THE COURT: STAND BY.
18
               (PAUSE IN PROCEEDINGS.)
19
               THE COURT: OH, OKAY. I HAD SPENT TIME WITH
    EXHIBIT D, WHICH WAS THE WARNER.
20
              C IS THE?
21
22
               MS. LEMOINE: THEY'RE THE SAME, YOUR HONOR.
23
               THE COURT: OH, I SEE. OKAY.
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MS. LEMOINE: SO --

THE COURT: THERE ARE JUST SO MANY COPIES OF

24

DEPOSITION NOTICES AND LAWYER SNITAGRAMS THAT FRANKLY I WENT BUZZING PAST, BUT --

BY THE WAY, JUST TO BE VERY CLEAR, THE ADDITIONAL
CASES THAT YOU REFERENCE, WHICH I'M FAMILIAR WITH, AND I WANT
TO GO BACK AND TAKE A LOOK AT AS WELL AS THE FULL DEPOSITION
THAT I MAY HAVE NOT TAKEN A LOOK AT. I WILL SEE ALL OF IT.
AND I ASSURE YOU I'LL TAKE IT UNDER CONSIDERATION BEFORE I
MAKE A DECISION.

MS. LEMOINE: WELL, LET ME JUST -- A LITTLE BIT

ABOUT THOSE TWO CASES, YOUR HONOR, SINCE YOU BROUGHT THEM UP.

I MEAN, IN THOSE CASES, WHICH ARE WITHIN THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, AS YOUR HONOR RECOGNIZED, IS A

COURT THAT'S VERY FAMILIAR WITH ASCAP. THE QUESTION WAS

WHETHER THE DEFENDANT BAR OWNER COULD IMPLEAD ASCAP AS A

NECESSARY PARTY. IT WAS NOT ABOUT WHETHER ASCAP WAS A

LICENSING AGENT. IT WAS ABOUT WHETHER ASCAP WAS A NECESSARY

PARTY. BOTH OF THOSE CASES WHICH BOTH INVOLVED -- ONE IS

SPRINGSTEIN; THE OTHER IS OCASEK, DOORS MUSIC, I THINK. NO.

I THINK THAT'S THE -- SPRINGSTEIN OCASEK IS THE CASE THAT MR.

RIFKIN CITED.

THE COURT: WHICH IS CONFUSING BECAUSE RICK OCASEK WAS THE LEAD SINGER FOR THE CARS.

MS. LEMOINE: YOU'RE RIGHT. YOU'RE RIGHT. THAT'S REALLY EMBARRASSING. WE NEED TO --

THE COURT: IS HE A CLIENT?

MS. LEMOINE: OF MINE?

THE COURT: YES.

MS. LEMOINE: NO.

THE COURT: OH, OKAY.

MS. LEMOINE: SO --

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO, I MEAN -- SO, YOU'RE

GOING TO DISTINGUISH THESE CASES BECAUSE THEY DON'T DEAL WITH

THE EXISTENCE OF --

MS. LEMOINE: NO.

THE COURT: -- ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.

MS. LEMOINE: THEY DO NOT. THEY DEAL WITH THE -SORT OF A QUESTION OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, WHETHER
THEY'RE A NECESSARY PARTY AND HAVE TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY
INFRINGEMENT ACTION.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. LEMOINE: I WANT TO TALK BRIEFLY ABOUT -- YOU KNOW, MR. RIFKIN SAID A FEW TIMES THAT IT'S OUR BURDEN. AND THAT'S TRUE. IT'S OUR BURDEN. BUT I THINK YOUR HONOR HAS IT EXACTLY RIGHT WHEN YOU LOOK AT WHAT IS THE MORE PROBABLE CONCLUSION TO DRAW BASED ON THE PARTIES' RELATIONSHIP. AND THAT'S FRANKLY THE STANDARD. YOU KNOW, IS IT MORE LIKELY THAT MS. SENGSTACK JUST BUMPED INTO MR. CORMAN AND THOUGHT, HEY, LET ME SEND YOU THIS OR THAT SHE SENT IT GRATUITOUSLY.

THE INFERENCE THAT YOUR HONOR HAS DRAWN MORE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE UNDERSTAND ABOUT THEIR RELATIONSHIP, WITH WHAT THE -THE FACT THAT HE IS THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF ASCAP, THE FACT
THAT SHE SAYS HERE'S THE ANALYSIS --

THE COURT: WAIT. WAIT.

MS. LEMOINE: -- ABOUT OUR CLAIM.

THE COURT: WOULDN'T THE PROPER FORMULATION BE WHETHER WARNER HAS ESTABLISHED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT IT'S MORE LIKELY THAN NOT --

MS. LEMOINE: CORRECT.

THE COURT: -- THAT THAT RELATIONSHIP OCCURRED.

MS. LEMOINE: THAT IS -- THAT IS CORRECT.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. LEMOINE: AND IN LIGHT OF THE RECORD EVIDENCE
THAT -- ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASCAP AND SUMMY,
ASCAP'S RESPONSIBILITY AS THE LICENSING AGENT, ASCAP'S ROLE
IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS, IN ENFORCING, IN POLICING THE
COPYRIGHT, IT'S MUCH MORE PLAUSIBLE -- WE THINK THE ONLY
PLAUSIBLE CONCLUSION, FRANKLY, IS THAT SHE SENT THIS FOR ONE
OF THOSE PURPOSES, FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN JUST AN FYI.

AND I THINK, YOU KNOW, PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT IT WAS GRATUITOUS, YOU KNOW, NOW IS JUST -- IT CAN'T BE SUSTAINED.

NOW, WHETHER SHE DID THIS TO OBTAIN LEGAL ADVICE, WHICH I THINK IS A FAIR INFERENCE, AND WHETHER SHE DID IT

BECAUSE THEY HAD A COMMON INTEREST IN THE LEGAL QUESTION,
WHICH I THINK THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THEY DID, EITHER ARE A
BASIS FOR YOUR HONOR TO UPHOLD THE PRIVILEGE IN THIS
INSTANCE.

THE COURT: AND WHAT'S -- WHAT'S THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CONCLUSION THAT MS. SENGSTACK -- HEY, I FINALLY GOT IT -- WAS SEEKING LEGAL ADVICE --

MS. LEMOINE: WELL, I THINK THE --

THE COURT: -- AS OPPOSED TO PROVIDING INFORMATION IN ANTICIPATION OF COMMON LITIGATION. LET'S DISTINGUISH THE TWO, IF POSSIBLE.

MS. LEMOINE: SURE. I THINK WE LOOK AT THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. LEMOINE: EITHER -- EITHER INTERPRETATION I
THINK IS POSSIBLE, THAT SHE SENT IT FOR THE PURPOSE OF
OBTAINING HER OWN ASSOCIATION-RELATED LEGAL ADVICE. DID SHE
HAVE SOME QUESTION FOR HIM ABOUT WHETHER ASCAP COULD LICENSE
THE WORK, OR DID SHE SEND IT BECAUSE ASCAP ITSELF HAD A
QUESTION AND ASCAP HAD A CONCERN AND ANTICIPATED FUTURE
CLAIMS LIKE THE ONE THAT MR. RIFKIN HAS BROUGHT HERE. THAT
IS VERY POSSIBLE. BOTH ARE EQUALLY PLAUSIBLE AND MORE
PLAUSIBLE WE SAY THAN THE CONTENTION THAT IT WAS JUST BECAUSE
THEY BUMPED INTO EACH OTHER ON THE STREET.

YOU KNOW, IF YOU LOOK AT THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER

ITSELF, FIRST YOU LOOK AT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SUMMY AND ASCAP WHERE YOU SEE THAT THEIR ROLE IS AS FIRST IN 1(A) IS TO ENFORCE --

THE COURT: UH-HUM.

MS. LEMOINE: -- THE COPYRIGHT. IF YOU UNDERSTAND
WHAT THE BASIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP IS, IF YOU LOOK AT THE
ARTICLES OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR ASCAP, THEIR PURPOSE IS. IF
YOU LOOK AT THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER SHE SAYS, HERE'S AN
ANALYSIS ABOUT OUR CLAIM, THE RIGHTS AND THE WORK AS
DISCUSSED. THEY HAD A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION. THE ONLY REAL
LOGICAL CONCLUSION IS THAT SHE DID THAT FOR ONE OF THE
PURPOSES THAT ASCAP SERVES AS A BUSINESS. SHE SENT IT TO THE
GENERAL COUNSEL FOR A REASON.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. LEMOINE: AND, YOUR HONOR --

THE COURT: I GOT IT.

MS. LEMOINE: OKAY. IF -- DOES YOUR HONOR HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS FOR THE PARTIES?

THE COURT: I WOULD ASK -- NOT OF YOU.

I WOULD ASK -- WELL, I GUESS MY QUESTION FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IS YOU WERE FORMALLY ASKING THE COURT TO OVERRULE THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE. AND THEN YOU WANTED SOMETHING ELSE.

MR. RIFKIN: WELL --

THE COURT: AND I WASN'T ENTIRELY SURE WHAT ELSE YOU WANTED.

MR. RIFKIN: -- WE DID. ALTHOUGH, I THINK IT BECAME 1 2 MOOT. 3 THE COURT: OKAY. MR. RIFKIN: WHAT WE HAD ASKED FOR WAS SOME 4 5 ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY, BUT THEN IN THE INTERIM ASCAP AGREED TO 6 ALLOW MR. -- ASCAP AGREED TO ALLOW MR. REIMER TO COME BACK 7 AND ANSWER SOME MORE QUESTIONS. HE DID. AND THE DEFENDANTS 8 AGREED TO PRODUCE ANOTHER WITNESS. THEY DID. SO, OUR 9 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY REALLY BECAME MOOT. 10 I THINK THE RECORD --11 THE COURT: OKAY. 12 MR. RIFKIN: -- FACTUALLY IS AS COMPLETE AS IT'S 13 EVER GOING TO BE. 14 THE COURT: OKAY. OH, NO, AND THAT CLARIFICATION 15 HELPS. BECAUSE WE HAD A VERY HURRIED CALL A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO WHEN I WAS IN A HOTEL LOBBY. AND --16 17 MR. RIFKIN: I RECALL IT. 18 THE COURT: -- I DIDN'T MEAN TO BE CURT WITH YOU ALL, BUT THINGS WERE GOING. AND I WAS OUT OF TOWN. AND --19 20 OKAY. SO, THAT -- THAT MAKES SENSE. THE GIST OF THE 21 22 REQUESTED RELIEF IS TO DEAL WITH THE ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. RIFKIN: AT THIS POINT THAT'S CORRECT.

GOT IT.

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MS. LEMOINE: IF I COULD JUST -- ONE MORE POINT IF I COULD MAKE, YOUR HONOR.

MR. RIFKIN IS MUCH TALLER THAN I AM.

THE COURT: HE IS.

MS. LEMOINE: MR. REIMER'S TRANSCRIPT IS ATTACHED

-- PORTIONS OF IT ARE ATTACHED TO EXHIBIT A TO THE

DECLARATION I SUBMITTED WITH OUR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF.

HE TESTIFIED CONSISTENT WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT ASCAP'S ROLE IS.

HE -- I JUST WANT TO ADDRESS JUST BRIEFLY THIS

NOTION THAT THIS LETTER HAD TO CONTAIN AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE

TO LEGAL ADVICE AND THINK ABOUT -- YOU KNOW, THE PASSAGE OF

TIME AND THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT AS YOUR HONOR POINTED OUT,

AND THAT, YOU KNOW, WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO DO HERE IS MAKE

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THIS ENCOUNTER ON THE STREET.

BUT HAVING AN EXPLICIT REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE SOMETHING SAYING I AM ASKING FOR LEGAL ADVICE, OR I AM SENDING THIS TO YOU AND PURSUANT TO OUR COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE WOULD JUST BE CONTRARY TO THE POLICY UNDERLYING THE COPYRIGHT ACT, WHICH GRANTS THESE COPYRIGHTS FOR A PERIOD OF TERMS OF SEVERAL DECADES. SO, I WOULD ALSO SUBMIT THAT TO YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. LEMOINE: ALL RIGHT.

MR. RIFKIN: YOUR HONOR, THE ONLY OTHER THING I'LL

ADD IS WHILE WE HAVE THE LETTER FROM MRS. SENGSTACK --1 2 THE COURT: YES. MR. RIFKIN: -- OPEN, SHE SAYS AT THE VERY BOTTOM 3 WHEN SHE SENDS -- SHE REFERS TO BOTH THE LONG ANALYSIS, THE 4 1976 ANALYSIS AND THEN THE SHORT --5 THE COURT: UH-HUM. 6 7 MR. RIFKIN: -- 1978 ANALYSIS. AND IN REFERRING TO 8 THE FOLLOW-UP LETTER SHE SAYS --

THE COURT: "IT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST."

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MR. RIFKIN: -- "IT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST."

SHE DOESN'T SAY IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. SHE DOESN'T SAY IT MIGHT BE USEFUL. YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE USE OF IT. SHE SAYS IT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST.

THE COURT: YOU KNOW, THIS IS -- THIS IS -- THIS IS LIKE THE BEST PART OF IT. IT'S SMART PEOPLE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT SMART PEOPLE WERE DOING. I MEAN, THERE'S THINGS HERE FOR BOTH SIDES. AND YOU'VE BOTH DONE A FINE JOB. I MEAN, WE COULD TALK ABOUT HOW IT'S ON THE FIRM'S LETTERHEAD AS OPPOSED TO A PERSONAL STATIONARY. WE COULD TALK ABOUT HOW SHE ADDRESSES HIM BY HIS FIRST NAME --

MR. RIFKIN: BERNIE --

THE COURT: -- RATHER THAN HIS FORMAL TITLE. YOU KNOW, THERE'S -- THERE'S STUFF FOR BOTH HERE.

MR. RIFKIN: THERE'S GRIST FOR BOTH MILLS. AND YOU ULTIMATELY HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY HAVE GROUND UP ENOUGH

TO --

THE COURT: THE JOKE IS THAT'S WHY I GET THE BIG BUCKS.

MR. RIFKIN: -- TO --

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HERE'S WHAT'S GOING TO
HAPPEN. I AM GOING TO CLEAR MY AFTERNOON BECAUSE OF THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ISSUE FOR BOTH PARTIES. I AM GOING TO
TAKE AN ADDITIONAL LOOK AT YOUR MATERIALS, PARTICULARLY THE
ONES THAT WERE HIGHLIGHTED HERE TODAY, WHICH IS HELPFUL IN
FOCUSING ON WHAT I NEED TO DO.

I WILL TRY AND GET OUT A DECISION. YOU MAY FEEL CONFIDENT THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT MY -- I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE UP MY FINAL MIND. BUT IF I -- IF I -- IF I STICK WITH WHAT MY TENTATIVE IS GOING TO BE, YOU CAN APPROPRIATELY REFER TO BOTH THE STATEMENTS YOU HEARD HERE TODAY AS WELL AS THE WRITTEN DECISION, WHICH IS KIND OF MY CUSTOM. IT WON'T BE -- IT WON'T BE A ONE-PAGER, BUT, YOU KNOW, I'M GOING TO MAYBE SHORTHAND SOME OF THE THINGS THAT I'VE SAID HERE.

IF THERE IS A DESIRE TO TAKE THIS TO CHIEF JUDGE
KING ON APPEAL, NO PROBLEM WITH ME. BUT HE IS GOING TO DEFER
TO SOME OF THESE FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS.

BUT BOTH SIDES WOULD BE WELL SERVED IF THERE IS

GOING TO BE ADDITIONAL PROCEEDINGS HERE TO FOCUS ON THOSE

ISSUES AS OPPOSED TO SOME OF THE OTHER THINGS THAT CAUSE THIS

STACK OF PAPER TO BE SEVERAL INCHES HIGH. BUT I WILL TRY AND

1 GET THAT OUT TODAY. 2 MS. LEMOINE: COULD I GIVE YOU ONE CITE, YOUR 3 HONOR, BEFORE WE WALK OUT OF THE ROOM. THE COURT: HEY, WHY NOT. 4 5 MS. LEMOINE: SO, MR. KAPLAN JUST POINTED THIS OUT TO ME. IN THE DISTRICT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, THERE'S 6 7 A PRESUMPTION THAT COMMUNICATIONS TO OUTSIDE COUNSEL OR THE 8 GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE COMPANY ARE PRIMARILY RELATED TO LEGAL 9 ADVICE. 10 BOCA INVESTORING PARTNERSHIP --THE COURT: I'M SORRY. YOU'RE CITING SOMETHING NOW 11 12 THAT YOU DIDN'T CITE IN THE TWO PREVIOUS BRIEFS? 13 MS. LEMOINE: I THINK WE DID. DIDN'T WE? 14 15 MR. KAPLAN: NO. MS. LEMOINE: OKAY. IF WE DIDN'T, THEN, I'M GOING 16 17 TO SIT DOWN. 18 THE COURT: YES. YES, YOU ARE. 19 MS. MANIFOLD: THANK YOU, SIR. 20 THE COURT: UNLESS -- UNLESS YOU WANT ADDITIONAL 21 BRIEFING --

MS. LEMOINE: NO. PLEASE GOD, NO. I DON'T THINK

MS. LEMOINE: NO --

THE COURT: -- AND -- YES.

25 ANY OF US WANT THAT.

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1	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. OR RULE 37 TO COME BACK
2	INTO PLAY.
3	ANYTHING ELSE FOR YOU FOLKS?
4	MR. RIFKIN: NONE, YOUR HONOR.
5	THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME, AS ALWAYS.
6	THE COURT: NOT AT ALL.
7	THANK YOU VERY MUCH
8	MS. LEMOINE: THANK YOU.
9	THE COURT: FOR A VERY HIGH-LEVEL HIGH-LEVEL
10	WORK ON THIS.
11	THE CLERK: COURT IS ADJOURNED.
12	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 10:56 A.M.)
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I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING OF THE

PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

/S/ DOROTHY BABYKIN 7/30/14

FEDERALLY CERTIFIED TRANSCRIBER DATED

DOROTHY BABYKIN

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