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8	8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	1 JOSEPH ALLEN TIDWELL,) NO. CV 14-5072-AG(E)	
12	2 Plaintiff,	
13	v. () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF	
14	4 PAUL GALLAGHER,) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
15	5 Defendant.	
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17	7	
18	8 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorabl	.e
19	9 Andrew J. Guilford, United States District Judge, pursuant to	
20	0 28 U.S.C. section 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United Stat	es
21	1 District Court for the Central District of California.	
22	2	
23	3 PROCEEDINGS	
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25	5 Plaintiff, a state prisoner incarcerated at the California	Men′s
26	6 Colony ("CMC"), filed this <u>pro se</u> civil rights action on July 8,	2014,
27	7 alleging that CMC prison doctors assertedly were deliberately	
28	8 indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs in violation of the Eig	Jhth

Amendment. On August 13, 2014, the Court dismissed the Complaint with 1 leave to amend. 2

On September 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint 4 against only one Defendant, Plaintiff's alleged primary care physician 5 Dr. Paul Gallagher. On February 23, 2015, Defendant Gallagher filed a 6 7 motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. On September 7, 2015, the Court issued an "Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint with 8 Leave to Amend." On September 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Second 9 Amended Complaint. 10

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12 On December 14, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. On January 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed an 13 opposition to the motion to dismiss. On May 27, 2016, the Court 14 issued an "Order re Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint." 15 This Order granted the motion to dismiss in part, dismissing without leave 16 17 to amend and with prejudice Plaintiff's official capacity claim for damages and Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference based on 18 19 Defendant's medical decisions regarding what treatments to give Plaintiff. The Court otherwise dismissed the Second Amended Complaint 20 with leave to amend, inter alia deeming sufficient Plaintiff's claim 21 of deliberate indifference based on the alleged delay in the proper 22 diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff's assertedly suspected, serious 23 medical condition after March 5, 2013. 24

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On June 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint, the 26 operative pleading. On July 13, 2016, Defendant filed an Answer. 27 111 28

On March 10, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 1 On the same date, the Court issued a Minute Order inter alia advising 2 Plaintiff of the requirements of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 3 Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1997) 4 (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999). On April 10, 2017, 5 Plaintiff filed a "Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 6 7 Judgment," constituting Plaintiff's Opposition to the Motion ("Opposition"). 8

ALLEGATIONS OF THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

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In the Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), Plaintiff alleges:

On November 22, 1996, a doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with osteomyelitis in his left clavicle (TAC, p. 5). On January 20, 1998, a doctor diagnosed Plaintiff's condition as chronic osteomyelitis, a life-long condition (<u>id.</u>).

On November 8, 2012, Plaintiff saw Defendant Gallagher and explained to Defendant Plaintiff's history of chronic osteomyelitis (<u>id.</u>, "D. Claims" attachment, p. 1). Plaintiff told Gallagher Plaintiff was in great pain from an infection and requested a low bunk chrono and a "no lift" chrono (<u>id.</u>). Defendant denied the requests (<u>id.</u>).

26 On December 4, 2012, Defendant wrote a medical progress 27 note stating that Plaintiff's condition did not require an 28 MRI (<u>id.</u>).

After an emergency visit, another physician requested an MRI for Plaintiff (<u>id.</u>). The MRI was performed on February 11, 2013 and showed a sinonasal cyst and bone spurs (<u>id.</u>).

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On March 5, 2013, Defendant failed to intervene and left Plaintiff in debilitating pain, telling Plaintiff it was not acceptable to seek emergency treatment for Plaintiff's pain (id.). On May 29, 2013, Plaintiff saw Dr. Kowall, an off-site orthopedic surgeon (id.). Dr. Kowall was unable to evaluate Plaintiff because Defendant had not sent Dr. Kowall the MRI results (id.). On June 12, 2013, Plaintiff saw Dr. Kowall again, but once again Dr. Kowall was unable to evaluate Plaintiff because Defendant had not sent the MRI results (id.). In the meantime Plaintiff's pain was worsening and the infection spreading, making it hard for Plaintiff to breathe and to swallow (id.). Plaintiff could not move his arm and had to keep it in a sling for a year (id., pp. 1-2). Osteomyelitis can spread from one bone to another and can even cause death if left unchecked (id.).

After making numerous medical requests, Plaintiff had a biopsy on September 5, 2015 (<u>id.</u>, p. 2). The biopsy showed, as Plaintiff had been telling Defendant all along, that Plaintiff had osteomyelitis and a staph infection (<u>id.</u>). The delays in treatment attributable to Defendant caused Plaintiff unnecessary pain and further injury (<u>id.</u>).

Plaintiff now has a permanent disability because he cannot 1 lift more than 15 pounds (id.). 2 3 Defendant's failure twice to send Dr. Kowall the MRI 4 report contributed to a six-month delay in receiving the 5 bone biopsy and antibiotic treatment for Plaintiff's 6 condition (id.). 7 8 9 DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS 10 Defendant contends the undisputed facts show that: 11 12 Defendant was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's 13 1. 14 serious medical needs because inter alia: (1) there assertedly was no material delay in Plaintiff's treatment; and (2) Defendant did not 15 deliberately fail to send the MRI report in order to impede or delay 16 Plaintiff's medical treatment; rather, Defendant followed proper 17 procedures and any delay was the fault of others; 18 19 Plaintiff cannot base an Eighth Amendment deliberate 20 2. indifference claim on a showing of negligence; and 21 2.2 Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 23 3. 24 25 STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 26 Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the 27 light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there 28

is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 1 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 2 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of offering 3 proof of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 4 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party's 5 burden is met, the party opposing the motion is required to go beyond 6 7 the pleadings and, by the party's own affidavits or by other evidence, designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 8 trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, 9 Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). The party opposing the 10 motion must submit evidence sufficient to establish the elements that 11 12 are essential to that party's case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 13 14 322.

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The Court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the 16 non-moving party and draw reasonable inferences in favor of that 17 party." Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 476 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 18 19 2007). Where different ultimate inferences reasonably can be drawn, 20 summary judgment is inappropriate. Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d at 988. "At the summary judgment stage, 21 the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh 22 conflicting evidence." Porter v. California Dep't of Corrections, 419 23 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 24

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A factual dispute is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. <u>Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.</u>, 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" only if it might
 affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law. <u>Id.</u>

"Evidence may be offered 'to support or dispute a fact' on 4 summary judgment only if it could be presented in an admissible form 5 at trial." Southern California Darts Ass'n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 6 925-26 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036-7 37 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 937 (2004)) (internal 8 9 quotations omitted); see also Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Even the declarations that 10 do contain hearsay are admissible for summary judgment purposes 11 12 because they 'could be presented in an admissible form at trial.'") (citations omitted). Purported evidence which "sets out mere 13 14 speculation for the critical facts, without a showing of foundation in personal knowledge[] for the facts claimed to be at issue" is 15 insufficient. John M. Floyd & Assoc., Inc. v. Tapco Credit Union, 550 16 Fed. App'x 359, 360 (9th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements are 17 insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Comite de Jornaleros de 18 19 Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 950 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1200 (2012). 20 21

EVIDENCE

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24 I. Evidentiary Issues

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Both parties rely on medical records, including medical progress notes authored by Defendant. Defendant has submitted medical records authenticated by the CMC custodian of medical and health records (<u>see</u>

Declaration of Tania Daniel in Support of Defendant's Motion for 1 Summary Judgment). Plaintiff has submitted many of the same records, 2 and several other medical records, without authentication. 3 Defendant has not objected to the lack of authentication of Plaintiff's 4 The Court will consider all of the documentary evidence submissions. 5 submitted by both parties. See Foster v. Statti, 2013 WL 5348098, at 6 7 *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013), adopted, 2014 WL 931830 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2014) (considering unauthenticated prison medical records on 8 9 summary judgment because the documents could be made admissible at trial); Fryman v. Traquina, 2009 WL 113590, at *11 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 10 2009) (overruling foundation objection to prison medical records, 11 12 where "it cannot reasonably be disputed that the records in question are plaintiff's medical records from his prison file," or that "they 13 are created and maintained by prison officials"). 14

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The relevance of some of Plaintiff's evidence is limited or 16 absent. Plaintiff declares that in July and November of 2012, 17 Plaintiff complained to Defendant about pain and swelling due to 18 19 Plaintiff's asserted osteomyelitis (Opposition, Ex. 2). Plaintiff alleges that, on November 8, 2012, Defendant purportedly called 20 Plaintiff a liar and said Defendant thought Plaintiff was faking the 21 pain (id.). Plaintiff alleges that, on March 5, 2013, Defendant told 22 Plaintiff to stop seeking emergency treatment for the pain (id.). 23 In his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff makes 24 25 allegations concerning Defendant's asserted misconduct unrelated to Defendant's alleged failure to send the MRI report and images to Dr. 26 Kowall, including allegations that Defendant refused to treat 27 Plaintiff and disagreed with the advice of a specialist, Dr. Griffin 28

(Opposition, pp. 2, 4-5, 9-10, 13-14). These allegations primarily concern Plaintiff's claim for allegedly inadequate medical treatment which the Court previously dismissed with prejudice. At issue here is only the claim of alleged <u>delay</u> in the proper diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff's condition after March 5, 2013. The above described evidence has little or no relevance to this issue.

8 Plaintiff also purports to rely on Defendant's responses to 9 requests for admissions. However, the responses generally do not 10 provide probative evidence concerning the issues presented here, and 11 the Court cannot consider responses purportedly admitting the 12 genuineness of various documents because Plaintiff has not attached 13 the referenced documents.

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A Court may consider a verified complaint to be an affidavit 15 within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) to the extent that the 16 pleading demonstrates the plaintiff's personal knowledge of factual 17 matters stated therein. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 18 19 (9th Cir. 1995). The Third Amended Complaint is not verified 20 properly, however. The purported verification attached to the Third Amended Complaint states simply: "I Joseph Allen Tidwell declare that 21 the facts are true and correct. June 7 - 16." Under 28 U.S.C. 22 section 1746, a declaration filed in federal court is procedurally 23 24 sufficient if the declaration is signed and subscribed in writing in 25 substantially the following form: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of 26 America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date)." 27 Plaintiff's purported verification fails to state that the declaration 28

is made under penalty of perjury, a fatal defect. See In re World 1 Trade Center Disaster Litigation, 722 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) 2 3 (omission of statement that declaration was made under penalty of perjury fatal; "[i]nclusion of the language 'under penalty of perjury' 4 is an integral requirement of the statute for the very reason that it 5 impresses upon the declarant the specific punishment to which he or 6 7 she is subjected for certifying to false statements"); Nissho-Iwai American Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1306-07 (5th Cir. 1988) 8 (purported affidavit omitting statement that it was made under penalty 9 of perjury and that the contents were true and correct insufficient 10 under section 1746; as drafted, the purported affidavit "allows the 11 12 affiant to circumvent the penalties for perjury"); Kersting v. United 13 States, 865 F. Supp. 669, 676 (D. Haw. 1994) (declaration is 14 sufficient under section 1746 if it "contains the phrase 'under penalty of perjury' and states that the document is true"). 15 Nevertheless, the Court has considered the factual allegations in the 16 17 Third Amended Complaint and in Plaintiff's unsworn Opposition, to the extent it appears Plaintiff could present the factual allegations in 18 19 admissible form at trial. See Southern California Darts Ass'n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d at 925-26. 20

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II. <u>Summary of Undisputed Evidence Concerning Events Underlying</u> Plaintiff's Claim

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This section consists of a chronological summary of the undisputed evidence concerning the events underlying Plaintiff's claim. The Court also will discuss other evidence in the "Discussion" section, <u>infra</u>, to the extent other evidence is also pertinent to the

1 analysis.

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In November of 1996, a doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with 3 osteomyelitis and prescribed antibiotics (Opposition Ex. U). 4 In October of 2012, Plaintiff saw Dr. Griffin, a consulting provider, who 5 recorded that Plaintiff suffered from "[p]ossible chronic 6 7 osteomyelitis," but that this diagnosis was "doubtful" given a normal sedimentation rate and CRP (C-Reactive Protein) (Opposition, Ex. V). 8 Dr. Griffin said X-rays showed only an old fracture (id.). However, 9 Dr. Griffin suggested an MRI due to the chronic nature of the problem 10 and the lack of imaging studies other than an X-ray (id.). 11 Dr. 12 Griffin suggested referral to an orthopedic surgeon if the MRI was abnormal (id.). 13

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On November 8, 2012, Plaintiff saw Defendant for left clavicle 15 pain (Opposition, Ex. W). Defendant recorded Dr. Griffin's comments 16 regarding Griffin's doubtful diagnosis of chronic osteomyelitis 17 despite normal test results, and mentioned the MRI which Dr. Griffin 18 19 "may or may not have ordered" (id.). Defendant declined Plaintiff's request for Tylenol No. 3 for a "15-year-old fracture," denied a low 20 bunk chrono, and said no "intervention" was planned (id.). 21 Defendant stated that he had nothing to offer Plaintiff except Tylenol and 22 nonsteroidals, which Plaintiff declined because he said they did not 23 24 help (id.).

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Sometime in November of 2012, Plaintiff underwent incision and debridement of the left clavicle area and received antibiotics (<u>see</u> Defendant's Ex. K).

On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff saw Defendant to discuss the 1 denial of an MRI (Opposition, Ex. X). Defendant said Plaintiff did 2 3 not meet the criteria for an MRI due to tests showing a normal sedimentation rate, normal C-reactive protein, normal white count and 4 no evidence of "any chronic inflammation per se" (id.). Defendant 5 noted that x-rays had been done (id.). Defendant told Plaintiff that 6 the tests "pretty much ruled out osteomyelitis" and said nothing 7 further needed to be done, although Defendant did change Plaintiff's 8 9 pain medication (id.).

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Sometime in January 2013, Plaintiff received another course of antibiotics (see Defendant's Ex. K).

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On February 11 or 12, 2013 Plaintiff received an MRI, which apparently had been ordered by a Dr. Campbell (Defendant's Exs. A, C). The MRI did not exclude osteomyelitis, but did suggest possible Paget's disease (<u>id.</u>).

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On February 13, 2013, Plaintiff saw Defendant for a followup (Defendant's Ex. B). Defendant did not yet have the MRI report and told Plaintiff that, if Plaintiff had not heard from Defendant by the next Monday, Plaintiff should make an appointment to see Triage (<u>id.</u>). Defendant indicated that he was not going to prescribe narcotics unless the MRI showed an abnormality, in which case an orthopedic referral "probably would be appropriate" (<u>id.</u>).

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27 On February 22, 2013, Plaintiff saw Defendant to discuss the MRI 28 results (Defendant's Ex. C). After reviewing the MRI report,

Defendant recorded that the cause of Plaintiff's pain could not be 1 determined definitively based solely on the MRI results (Defendant's 2 3 Ex. C; Declaration of Paul S. Gallagher in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ["Defendant's Dec."), \P 5). Defendant believed at 4 the time that, although the MRI results did not rule out 5 osteomyelitis, the cause of Plaintiff's pain was likely not 6 7 osteomyelitis (Defendant's Dec., \P 5). After consultation with Dr. Barber, an internist, Defendant ordered a bone scan (Defendant's Ex. 8 9 C). Defendant concluded that the MRI was unlikely to show a possible infection but that a bone scan might identify an infection as the 10 possible cause of Plaintiff's pain (Defendant's Dec., ¶ 5). Defendant 11 12 denied Plaintiff's request for narcotics (Defendant's Ex. C). On the same day, Defendant completed a Physician Request for Services ("RFS") 13 14 form requesting a bone scan (Defendant's Ex. D; Defendant's Dec., ¶ 6). This request was approved on February 25, 2013 (Defendant's Ex. 15 D). 16

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On March 5, 2013, Plaintiff saw Defendant again (TAC, Ex. F; 18 19 Defendant's Ex. E). Defendant explained his assessment of the MRI report, which indicated cystic-type changes (Defendant's Dec., ¶ 7). 20 21 Defendant stated the MRI showed that osteomyelitis could not be ruled out although Defendant believed osteomyelitis "was not likely" (id.). 22 Defendant reported that a bone scan had been ordered and "should be 23 done sometime within the next few weeks to 1 month" (Defendant's Ex. 24 25 E).

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27 On April 3, 2013, Defendant completed another RFS form, again 28 requesting a bone scan (Defendant's Ex. F). This request was approved

on April 4, 2013 (<u>id.</u>). The record does not indicate why the bone
 scan initially requested on February 22, 2013 (and approved on
 February 25, 2013) had not been performed as of April 3, 2013.

The bone scan was performed on April 18, 2013 (Defendant's Ex. G). The bone scan showed "[m]ild increased activity in the medial left clavicle" and stated that "[i]n the right setting this could represent osteomyelitis although is nonspecific [sic]" (<u>id.</u>).

On April 29, 2013, Defendant completed an RFS form requesting consultation with an orthopedist in light of the bone scan results (Defendant's Ex. H; Defendant's Dec., ¶ 9). This request was approved on April 30, 2013 (Defendant's Ex. H).

Around that time, infectious disease specialist Dr. Daniel Park began working on Plaintiff's case in order to assist with the diagnosis of a possible infection (Defendant's Dec., ¶ 11).

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19 On May 29, 2013, Plaintiff had an initial consultation with Dr. Kowall, an orthopedic surgeon (Defendant's Ex. I; Declaration of Mark 20 21 Kowall, M.D., in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ["Kowall Dec."], ¶ 4). Dr. Kowall formed three "preliminary possible 22 diagnoses: (1) left proximal clavicle closed fracture; (2) subsequent 23 24 reported osteomyelitis; and (3) chronic osteomyelitis/sternoclavicular joint infection" (Kowall Dec., \P 4). However, Dr. Kowall recorded 25 that, because no radiology films were available, he could not evaluate 26 Plaintiff properly (Defendant's Ex. I). Dr. Kowall requested that CMC 27 send Plaintiff's MRI images, bone scan images, X-rays and recent 28

1 culture results to Dr. Kowall for review (Defendant's Ex. J; Kowall 2 Dec., ¶ 4). Dr. Kowall also requested an infectious disease 3 consultation with Dr. Park (Kowall Dec., ¶ 4).

5 On June 12, 2013, Dr. Kowall conducted a follow up examination of 6 Plaintiff (Kowall Dec., ¶ 5). By that time, Dr. Kowall had received 7 copies of the MRI report and the bone scan report (<u>id.</u>). Even so, Dr. 8 Kowall made a second request to CMC for the MRI images, bone scan 9 images, X-rays and culture results (<u>id.</u>; Defendant's Ex. J).

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By June 25, 2013, Dr. Kowall had reviewed the bone scan images (Kowall Dec., ¶ 6). Dr. Kowall concluded that the cause of Plaintiff's pain could not be determined definitively from the MRI and bone scan, and that a bone biopsy was appropriate to determine whether the pain was related to a bacterial infection or a non-bacterial orthopedic problem (id.).

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On June 28, 2013, at Defendant's request, Plaintiff saw Dr. Park 18 19 concerning Plaintiff's "Suspected osteomyelitis" (Defendant's Exs. K, L; Defendant's Dec., ¶ 11). Dr. Park noted that the MRI had not 20 excluded a diagnosis of osteomyelitis (Defendant's Ex. K). Dr. Park 21 diagnosed "possible osteomyelitis of the left clavicle" but said that 22 the work-up had been complicated by several courses of antibiotics in 23 the past which could have suppressed infection (id.). However, 24 25 Plaintiff reportedly had been off antibiotics for four to five months and had not suffered any "obvious recurrent infection" (id.). Dr. 26 Park said that the examination that day was "pretty unremarkable" and 27 that the MRI and bone scan were "not strongly supportive of infection" 28

(id.). Dr. Park stated that Plaintiff would be monitored clinically 1 and "we will expedite a work-up for osteomyelitis" (id.). Dr. Park 2 3 recorded that it would be better to get cultures and "perhaps even a bone biopsy" prior to starting antibiotics, and advised Plaintiff not 4 to start a course of antibiotics without consulting Dr. Park (id.). 5 Dr. Park also stated that he would try to discuss the case further 6 7 with Dr. Kowall, who reportedly had given Plaintiff a "thorough examination," but who reportedly had not had access to all of 8 9 Plaintiff's records or the actual imaging studies (id.).

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On July 10, 2013, Plaintiff had a follow up appointment with 11 12 Defendant (Defendant's Ex. L; Defendant's Dec., ¶ 12). Defendant recorded that Dr. Kowall had been "unable to make decisions because of 13 14 lack of information with none of the imaging studies available to him" (Defendant's Ex. L). Dr. Kowall reportedly had made suggestions 15 "which have all been followed up on," one of which had been a 16 consultation with Dr. Park (id.). Defendant recorded that Dr. Park 17 "felt that the possibility of an osteomyelitis was there but the 18 19 likelihood not high" (id.). Defendant recorded that, on July 1, 2013, Plaintiff had presented with a draining wound just below the area of 20 21 swelling and inflamation of the clavicle that was positive for staph, and that Plaintiff had started a two-week course of antibiotics (id.). 22 Defendant said he had asked Dr. Park to see Plaintiff in approximately 23 24 two weeks (id.). Defendant assessed Plaintiff as having possible 25 osteomyelitis and a recurrent staph infection and set a follow up date of July 23, after Plaintiff had finished the course of antibiotics 26 (id.). 27

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The next day, July 11, 2013, Defendant completed a "Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono" specifying that Plaintiff should have a bottom bunk and a left arm sling and stating that Plaintiff had limited use of his left arm and a 15 pound lifting limit (Defendant's Ex. M; Defendant's Dec., ¶ 13).

7 On July 24, 2013, Plaintiff saw Dr. Park, after having finished the course of antibiotics (Defendant's Ex. N). Dr. Park recorded that 8 Plaintiff would have a bone biopsy performed by Dr. Kowall, and that 9 Plaintiff would have to stay off antibiotics so that "optimal 10 cultures" could be obtained from the bone biopsy (id.). On that same 11 12 date, Dr. Park completed an RFS form requesting a bone biopsy, noting that Plaintiff would have to be "off antibiotics" for six weeks prior 13 14 to the procedure and that Dr. Park and Dr. Kowall had agreed on this plan (Defendant's Ex. 0). The request was approved the same day 15 (id.). Dr. Park also told Dr. Kowall that Dr. Park had requested 16 authorization for a bone biopsy but that, because Plaintiff had 17 experienced a recurrence of drainage and was taking antibiotics, the 18 19 biopsy had to wait until Plaintiff was off antibiotics for six weeks (id., ¶ 7). 20

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On August 20, 2013, Plaintiff saw Dr. Park again (Defendant's Ex. P). Dr. Park recorded that the doctors were "waiting for the 6-week timeframe to pass so we can have a bone biopsy that would optimal yield [sic] and we will follow up with Scheduling to ensure this will be done" (<u>id.</u>). The six week waiting period reportedly would expire in two weeks from August 20, 2013 (<u>id.</u>).

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On September 6, 2013, Plaintiff underwent the bone biopsy, which showed a "light growth" of staph which could have been an contaminant, but no Paget's disease (Defendant's Ex. Q; Defendant's Dec., ¶ 14). Plaintiff thereafter was treated "presumptively" with a six-week course of antibiotics to cover the possibility that he suffered from mild osteomyelitis or a staph infection (Defendant's Dec., ¶ 14).

8 On September 11, 2013, Plaintiff saw Dr. Park for a follow up 9 visit (Defendant's Ex. R). Dr. Park recorded that the infection would 10 be treated with high dose oral antibiotics for eight weeks (<u>id.</u>).

12 On September 18, 2013, Dr. Kowall emailed Dr. Park regarding the 13 biopsy (Kowall Dec., ¶ 8). The result of the biopsy was consistent 14 with degenerative subluxation of sternooclavical joint (<u>id.</u>). There 15 was also some bacteria in the specimen, revealing a potential 16 bacterial infection (id.).

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Plaintiff saw Dr. Park again on September 19, 2013 (Defendant's Ex. S). Dr. Park had communicated with Dr. Kowall and the two doctors agreed there was "no indication for orthopedic intervention with debridement" (<u>id.</u>). Dr. Park opined that Plaintiff had "a high likelihood of cure with oral antibiotics" (<u>id.</u>).

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On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff saw Dr. Park again (Defendant's Ex. T). Plaintiff's CRP had normalized and the swelling had resolved, although Plaintiff reported some pain and clicking around the sternoclavicular joint (<u>id.</u>). Dr. Park said he would order an X-ray to make sure there was no dislocation (<u>id.</u>).

Plaintiff saw Defendant again on December 2, 2013 (TAC, Ex. J).
By that time, Plaintiff had finished his full course of antibiotic
therapy (<u>id.</u>). Plaintiff did not have a sling, but complained about
pain and wanted surgery to "clean out" the shoulder area of bone spurs
and other debris (<u>id.</u>). Defendant referred Plaintiff for physical
therapy (id.).

DISCUSSION

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Prison officials can violate the Constitution if they are 10 "deliberately indifferent" to an inmate's serious medical needs. 11 See 12 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To be liable for "deliberate indifference," a 13 14 jail official must "both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 15 must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 16 "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he 17 should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, 18 19 cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Id. at 20 838. Allegations of negligence do not suffice. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 21 2000) (en banc). Thus, inadequate treatment due to accident, mistake, 22 inadvertence, or even gross negligence does not amount to a 23 24 constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06; 25 Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 26 perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . 27 be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 28

1 U.S. at 838.

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Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff's condition presented a 3 serious medical need. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 4 Cir. 1992) ("A 'serious' medical need exists if the failure to treat a 5 prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the 6 7 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'"), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 8 1997) (citation omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1131 (examples 9 of "serious medical needs" include "a medical condition that 10 significantly affects an individual's daily activities," and "the 11 12 existence of chronic and substantial pain"; citation and internal quotations omitted); Conroy v. Avalos, 2010 WL 1268150, at *4 (D. 13 14 Ariz. Mar. 30, 2010) (finding that reasonable jury could conclude osteomyelitis is a "serious medical need"); Osbey v. Health 15 Professionals Ltd., 2009 WL 175041, at *10 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2009) 16 ("Plaintiff's osteomyelitis is clearly a serious medical need."). 17

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19 Prison officials may demonstrate deliberate indifference when they "deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment." 20 Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation 21 omitted). However, negligent delays do not violate the Constitution. 22 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1988) (negligent delays 23 24 in administering pain medication do not violate the Constitution). 25 Furthermore, a deliberate indifference claim based on alleged delay in medical treatment is not cognizable unless the delay caused harm to 26 the plaintiff. See Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 27 1994); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Commissioners, 766 F.2d 28

1 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff must show that Defendant's act or 2 omission caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. <u>See Redman v.</u> 3 <u>County of San Diego</u>, 942 F.2d 1435, 1454 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), 4 <u>cert. denied</u>, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992), <u>abrogated in part on other</u> 5 <u>grounds</u>, <u>Farmer v. Brennan</u>, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); <u>Leer v. Murphy</u>, 844 6 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).

The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff received the MRI on 8 9 February 11, 2013, and that Defendant had the MRI report, at least, by February 22, 2013. On that date, Defendant ordered the bone scan, 10 which Defendant thought would occur within a few weeks to a month. 11 12 When the bone scan apparently did not occur during that time period, 13 Defendant sent another RFS for a bone scan on April 3. As indicated 14 above, the record does not indicate why the bone scan initially requested on February 22 had not been performed as of April 3. 15 Plaintiff has produced no evidence to show that this delay was the 16 17 fault of Defendant.

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19 In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts in conclusory 20 fashion that Defendant purportedly delayed providing the MRI results to Dr. Kowall (see TAC, "D. Claims" attachment, pp. 1-2). 21 In his Opposition, Plaintiff adds allegations that Defendant purportedly also 22 delayed sending "other reports" to Dr. Kowall, including the results 23 24 of the bone scan (Opposition, pp. 3, 6, 8). Because these new 25 allegations, which concern other delays in sending other reports, are not pleaded in the Third Amended Complaint, the Court need not 26 consider the allegations. See Ward v. Clark County, 285 Fed. App'x 27 412, 413 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court did not err in granting 28

summary judgment on claim which plaintiff did not allege in her
pleading but only in her opposition to summary judgment; "[a] party
may not circumvent [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 8's pleading
requirements by asserting a new allegation in response to a motion for
summary judgment"). In any event, as discussed below, Plaintiff has
failed to submit evidence that any alleged delay in sending the bone
scan results to Dr. Kowall caused any harm to Plaintiff.

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Defendant contends he did not intentionally fail to send the MRI 9 report or other documents to Dr. Kowall or prevent the documents from 10 reaching Dr. Kowall. Defendant has submitted the declaration of 11 12 Christine Britton, a CMC Senior Radiologic Technician who assertedly has knowledge of the policies and procedures concerning the processing 13 of RFS forms at CMC (see Declaration of Christine Britton in Support 14 of Motion for Summary Judgment). According to Britton, after an 15 institutional physician issues an RFS, the Utilization Management 16 Department enters the RFS into the computer for review by "Sacramento" 17 (id., \P 5). Upon approval, the RFS is processed for review and 18 19 approval by either the CMC Chief Medical Officer or the Chief Physician and Surgeon (id.). Once approved, the RFS is forwarded to 20 an "offsite handler" for handling and the coordination of logistics 21 necessary to carry out the requested medical service, including 22 arrangement for transportation to an off-site medical provider if 23 24 requested (id., \P 6-7). The "out to medical nurse" reviews the 25 medical record and requests that any of the patient's relevant documents, such as medical records, test results, radiological images 26 and reports be sent to the off-site provider (id., \P 8). 27 The "scheduler" makes that request to the California Department of 28

1 Corrections and Rehabilitation Images and Records Center located in 2 Sacramento or directly to the medical facility or laboratory where the 3 images or documents initially were generated (<u>id.</u>). Thus, Defendant 4 contends that any delay in the provision of the MRI report or other 5 documents to Dr. Kowall was attributable to CMC staff, and not to 6 Defendant.

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Nothing submitted by Plaintiff conflicts with Defendant's 8 9 contention that any delay in the provision of documents to Dr. Kowall was attributable to persons other than Defendant. Plaintiff submitted 10 pages purportedly from a "Patient Health Care Education Policy" of 11 12 California Correctional Health Care Services concerning "Outpatient -Specialty Services" (Opposition, Ex. 1). Plaintiff has marked the 13 14 sections providing that: (1) the primary care physician shall inform a patient of the plan for specialty services including "a general time 15 frame" of expected service delivery; (2) if a speciality service is 16 rescheduled the primary care physician must notify the patient; 17 (3) with exceptions, the primary care physician should review a 18 19 consultant's report of a routine consult within three business days; 20 (4) follow up appointments with the speciality provider may occur according to the indicated time frame only with the approval of the 21 primary care physician unless that physician documents a reason for 22 another time; (5) at the follow up appointment with the primary care 23 24 physician, the physician shall discuss the specialty provider's 25 findings and recommendations and complete an RFS for each service recommended by the specialty provider; (6) for follow up visits 26 requested by the specialist, the primary care physician is responsible 27 to determine the need for such a visit and must document a reason for 28

using an alternative strategy; and (7) the primary care physician 1 shall write orders for follow up with the speciality and diagnostic or 2 3 other testing (Opposition, Ex. 1). None of Plaintiff's evidence controverts Defendant's evidence that: (1) the RFS is forwarded to an 4 off-site handler for coordination of logistics necessary to carry out 5 the requested medical service; (2) an "out to medical nurse" reviews 6 7 the medical record and sends a request to have documents such as medical records, test results and radiological images sent to the off-8 9 site provider; and (3) a "scheduler" makes the actual request to the Sacramento Images and Records Center or to the facility which 10 generated the documents. 11

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Therefore, the uncontroverted facts show that Defendant was not 13 14 responsible for the delay in Dr. Kowall's receipt of the MRI results or other documents, and hence cannot be deemed to have been 15 deliberately indifferent in the manner alleged by Plaintiff. 16 See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d at 1062 (affirming summary judgment for 17 defendant doctors where there was no evidence that either doctor was 18 19 responsible for the failure promptly to perform a CT scan on plaintiff 20 or to schedule diagnostic examinations; rather, the evidence suggested that other prison personnel scheduled surgical treatments and were 21 charged with ensuring that surgeries occurred promptly); see also 22 Wright v. Swingle, 482 Fed. App'x 294, 295 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming 23 24 summary judgment for defendant, where plaintiff "failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants were involved 25 in or had any control over ordering and stocking prescription 26 medication and thus were responsible for its delay") (citations 27 omitted); 28

Furthermore, Defendant has presented uncontradicted evidence that 1 any delay in providing the MRI results to Dr. Kowall did not delay the 2 3 biopsy or the subsequent antibiotic treatment. The medical evidence shows that Defendant requested consultation with an orthopedist on 4 April 29, 2013, that a request approved on April 30, 2013, and that 5 Dr. Kowall examined Plaintiff a month later, on May 29, 2013. 6 The 7 record does not indicate the reason for the month-long delay before Plaintiff saw Dr. Kowall, but Plaintiff has submitted no evidence 8 9 suggesting that this delay was attributable to any act or omission by Defendant. 10

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Dr. Kowall did not have the MRI report or films when he examined Plaintiff on May 29. However, the undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Kowall did have the MRI report and the bone scan report (if not the films) without significant delay. Dr. Kowall had these reports by the time of the June 12, 2013 examination of Plaintiff.

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It is true that the bone scan, first ordered by Defendant on 18 19 February 22, did not occur until April 18. However, Plaintiff has produced no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that 20 Defendant was responsible for this delay. Although Defendant ordered 21 the bone biopsy on July 24 and the biopsy did not occur until 22 September 6, the evidence shows that the bone biopsy was delayed for a 23 24 medically legitimate reason: Plaintiff needed to finish a course of 25 antibiotics and wait for six weeks thereafter before the biopsy could Thus, there is no evidence from which it could be reasonably 26 occur. inferred that Defendant was responsible for the delay in Plaintiff's 27 receipt of either the bone scan or the bone biopsy. 28

Moreover, according to Dr. Kowall, while MRI images and reports 1 generally are helpful in the diagnosis of orthopedic conditions and 2 3 injuries, an MRI does not provide a definitive diagnosis of a bacterial bone infection (Kowall Dec., \P 9). Dr. Kowall states that, 4 as the bone biopsy revealed, Plaintiff had a bacterial infection, for 5 which a course of oral antibiotics was the appropriate treatment, not 6 7 surgical intervention (id.). Dr. Kowall states that, even if Dr. Kowall had received the actual MRI images to review during his initial 8 evaluations of Plaintiff, Dr. Kowall would not have been able to 9 diagnose the bacterial infection and recommend an appropriate course 10 of treatment without the bone biopsy (id.). Therefore, Dr. Kowall's 11 12 inability to review the MRI images and report during his first evaluation of Plaintiff, and his inability to review the MRI images 13 during his second evaluation of Plaintiff, did not delay Plaintiff's 14 diagnosis or the treatment of the bacterial infection (id.). 15 According to Dr. Kowall, the definitive diagnosis, and the treatment, 16 had to await the results of the bone biopsy (id.). Plaintiff has not 17 submitted any evidence to controvert the content of Dr. Kowall's 18 19 declaration.

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In sum, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to 21 raise a genuine issue of fact concerning his allegation that 22 Defendant, with deliberate indifference, materially delayed the 23 transmittal to Dr. Kowall of the MRI results or other medical records. 24 25 Plaintiff also has failed to produce evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiff suffered any harm as 26 a result of any such delay. Any evidence purportedly showing medical 27 negligence committed by Defendant is insufficient to show 28

unconstitutional deliberate indifference. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1131. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claim of alleged delay in medical treatment. In light of this conclusion, the Court need not, and does not, reach the issue of qualified immunity. RECOMMENDATION For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) accepting and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant; and (3) dismissing the action with prejudice. DATED: April 24, 2017. ′s/ EICK CHARLES ਸ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1 NOTICE

Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No notice of appeal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of the judgment of the District Court.