UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

		CIVIL MINUI	es - General		
Case No.	2:15-cv-000)41-SVW-PJW		Date	January 27, 2015
Title	CFM Prope	erties Management, LL	C v. Ella Avery Smot	thers	
		,	JS - 6		
Present: The Honorable	e	STEPHEN V. WILS	ON, U.S. DISTRICT	JUDO	JE
	Paul M. C	Cruz	N/A		
Deputy Clerk		lerk	Court Reporter / Recorder		
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:			Attorneys Present for Defendants:		
N/A			N/A		
Proceeding	s: IN CH [11]	AMBERS ORDER RE	EMANDING THE CA	ASE T	O STATE COURT
Defer Notice of Re inhere from the and Envtl. Quetainer action Therefore, the court. See, e	ndant Ella Sm moval). Acc he plaintiff's mality, 213 F. on governed be e Court lacks	crop Protection, Inc. v. burden of establishing nothers premised removed reduction or the well-pleat claims for relief. ARC 3d 1108, 113 (9th Cir. by California law, and a subject-matter jurisdiction of Inv., LLC v. Bloom, D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2015) (19)	val on federal question ded complaint rule, and 2000). This case, ho it raises no apparent in the control over this case and No. CV 15-15-150-S	on juris feder n, LLC wever assues and mu	Gaus, 980 F.2d at sdiction. (Doc. 1, al question must C v. Dept. of Health r, is an unlawful of federal law. 1st remand it to state PLA, 2015 U.S. Dist.
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CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Burbank Blvd. Apts. Owner LLC v. Cabessa, No. Sevil 49902 SVW (AJWx), 2015 US Dist. LEXIS 3602, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2015) (same). Instead of arguing that the complaint raises a federal question, Ms. Smothers submits tha she "intends to file a Complaint against Plaintiff in United States District Court against Plaintiff and other co-conspirators' [sic] for RICO remedies authorized by the federal statutes at 18 U.S.C. [§] 1961 et seq." (Doc. 1, Notice of Removal). First, her intent to file a federal lawsuit is immaterial: under the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts look at the well-pled complaint; they do not foray into the metaphysical world of a litigant's intent. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("[F]ederal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint."). Second, a separate civil suit, even if filed, would have no bearing on whether this case is removable. See id. Third, jurisdiction still would be improper if Ms. Smothers alleged a RICO violation as a counterclaim in this case. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) ("Nor can federal jurisdiction rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim."). And fourth, removal is improper to the extent Ms Smothers contends that her RICO allegations form some kind of defense. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) ("[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense."). Ms. Smothers failed to carry her burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court REMANDS this case to the California Superior Court for the County of Lo Angeles.¹ In its ex parte application, CFM Properties makes passing reference to an attorneys fee award. (Doc. 11). A court, in its discretion, may award fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). But CFM Properties' counsel failed to specify the fees incurred in moving to remand. Therefore, the Court denies CFM Properties request for fees.	Case No.	2:15-cv-00041-SVW-PJW	Date	January 27, 2015				
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