

1 outside the Force Clause because the statutory elements of the conviction include
2 conduct falling outside the Force Clause’s definition of a “crime of violence” — must
3 be vacated. *See Juan Becerra-Perez v. United States*, No. 2:16-cv-07046-TJH (C.D.
4 Cal. Feb. 15, 2017). The Force Clause defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that
5 “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
6 the person or property of another[.]” § 924(c)(3)(A).

7 Sections 2113 (a) and (d) are crimes of violence under the Force Clause defined
8 in § 924(c)(3)(A). *United States v. Wright*, 215 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000).
9 Since *Wright*, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed that armed bank robbery qualifies as a
10 crime of violence under the Force Clause. *United States v. Pritchard*, No. 15-50278,
11 2017 WL 2219005, at *1 (9th Cir. May 18, 2017). Subsection (a) provides for a felony
12 conviction for bank robberies and incidental crimes committed “by force and violence,
13 or by *intimidation*.” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has
14 defined intimidation under § 2113 to mean “wilfully to take, or attempt to take, in such
15 a way that would put an ordinary, reasonable person in fear of bodily harm,” which
16 comports with the requirement of a “threatened use of physical force” contained in the
17 Force Clause. *United States v. Selfa*, 918 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990).

18 Similarly, subsection (d) includes “putting in jeopardy the life of any person by
19 the use of a dangerous weapon or device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). As such, even the
20 most innocent conduct penalized under this section would qualify as a crime of
21 violence. *See United States v. Watson*, No. 14-00751 01 DKW, 2016 WL 866298, at
22 *7 (D. Haw. Mar. 2, 2016). Therefore, both subsections (a) and (d) fall within the
23 definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). *Watson*, 2016 WL
24 866298, at *7. This conclusion is, further, supported by decisions in this Circuit
25 reaching the same result. *See, e.g., McFarland v. United States*, No. CV 16-7166,
26 2017 WL 810267, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017); *United States v. Salinas*, No. 1:08
27 CR 0338 LJO SKO, 2017 WL 2671059, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 21, 2017).

28 A district court may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has


1 made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2 2253(c)(2). Such a showing requires the petitioner to “demonstrate that the issues are
3 debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different
4 manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
5 further.” *Lambright v. Stewart*, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (alterations in
6 original, emphasis omitted). Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial
7 of a constitutional right under any of the above bases.

8
9 Accordingly,

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11 **It is Ordered** that the motion to vacate Petitioner’s sentence under 18 U.S.C.
12 § 924(c) be, and hereby is, **Denied**.

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14 **It is Further Ordered** that Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability
15 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) be, and hereby is, **Denied**.

16
17 Date: July 27, 2017

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19 
20 **Terry J. Hatter, Jr.**
21 **Senior United States District Judge**