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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA EXPANDED METAL PRODUCTS COMPANY, ET AL.,)	Case No. CV 16-05968 DDP (MRWx)
)	
Plaintiff,)	ORDER RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
)	
v.)	
)	
JAMES A. KLEIN, ET AL.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
)	
)	

This matter comes before the court on the court's Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction. Having considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court enters a preliminary injunction against Defendants and adopts the following Order.

I. Background

The history of this case is well known to the parties and described in detail in this Court's prior Orders. In brief, Defendant James Klein ("Klein") assigned various building material-related patents to a company he helped form, Defendant BlazeFrame Industries, Ltd. ("BlazeFrame"). Klein, BlazeFrame, and Plaintiffs

1 California Expanded Metal Products Company ("CEMCO") and
2 ClarkWestern Dietrich Building Systems LLC ("Clark") litigated
3 several questions regarding the ownership, licensing, and alleged
4 infringement of the patents in a prior case before this court. See
5 No. CV 12-10791-DDP(MRWx) ("the prior case").

6 The parties settled all claims in the prior case. The
7 transcript of a settlement conference constitutes the Settlement
8 Agreement.¹ BlazeFrame agreed to transfer the patents to CEMCO,
9 which would then license the patents to Clark and to BlazeFrame.
10 Among the material provisions of the Settlement Agreement were
11 terms related to ownership and maintenance of safety
12 certifications, or listings, issued by nonparty Underwriters
13 Laboratories ("UL"). Many architects and contractors will not
14 utilize products that are not UL-approved. At the settlement
15 conference, Clark's counsel asked whether "CEMCO will be
16 maintaining all the UL files" BlazeFrame's counsel
17 responded, "No." Clark's counsel then said, "Let me ask it a
18 different way. There will be a provision that all the UL files
19 will be maintained - and - by someone, so - such that Clark
20 Dietrich will have the benefit of them as it currently does."
21 BlazeFrame's counsel replied, "I think that's correct." Clark's
22 counsel clarified that she was "actually talking about the[] UL
23 approvals that are related to the products." BlazeFrame's counsel
24 then stated, "Yes, that's correct. Those are not being transferred
25

26
27 ¹ The parties agreed to the terms of a settlement at the
28 settlement conference and further agreed that if they failed to
agree on a memorialization of those terms, the transcript of the
settlement conference would constitute the Settlement Agreement.

1 and neither is the trademark, but yes, that's all going to be
2 maintained."

3 In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
4 breached the Settlement Agreement and infringed upon the patents.
5 On February 3, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Application for
6 a Temporary Restraining Order, asserting that BlazeFrame had
7 threatened to drop Clark from the UL listings for the licensed
8 products. (Dkt. 53.) At hearing, Defendants agreed to take no
9 further action to de-list Clark, and represented that they would do
10 everything in their power to ensure that Clark either remained
11 listed on the UL certifications or, in the event UL had already de-
12 listed Clark, to reinstate Clark's UL listings. On the basis of
13 that representation, the court vacated Plaintiffs' application for
14 a TRO. (Dkt. 63.)

15 Shortly after the February 7 hearing, UL revealed new testing
16 standards, and indicated that the licensed products at issue here
17 will need to demonstrate compliance with the new standards by
18 August 2017. UL further required that listing entities submit new
19 testing plans to UL no later than May 31, 2017. Plaintiffs assert
20 that the parties were aware of impending changes to UL's testing
21 requirements prior to the October 2015 settlement conference that
22 resulted in the Settlement Agreement.

23 On May 5, 2017, Plaintiffs filed another Application for A
24 Temporary Restraining Order. (Dkt. 100.) Plaintiffs contended
25 that, despite the representations made at the February 7 TRO
26 hearing, Defendants were once again threatening to "dump" Clark
27 from the UL listings. Indeed, Defendants' counsel represented to
28 Plaintiffs that that "BlazeFrame has no duties to ClarkDietrich

1 whatsover.” (Declaration of Anne G. Schoen in Support of TRO, Ex.
2 5.) Defendants did not oppose Plaintiffs’ application. On May 9,
3 2017, this Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
4 Defendants from taking, or failing to take, any action that would
5 result in Clark’s removal from any UL listing and requiring
6 Defendants to mitigate the effects of any such actions that had
7 already been taken. The court also ordered Defendants to show
8 cause why a preliminary injunction along similar lines should not
9 be entered. Defendants submitted a written opposition to the entry
10 of a preliminary injunction and all parties appeared before the
11 court on May 22, 2017.

12 **II. Legal Standard**

13 A private party seeking a preliminary injunction must show
14 that: (i) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (ii) it will
15 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (iii)
16 the balancing of the hardships and equities between the parties
17 that would result from the issuance or denial of the injunction
18 tips in its favor; and (iv) an injunction will be in the public
19 interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Counsel, 555 U.S. 7, 20
20 (2008). Preliminary relief may be warranted where a party: (i)
21 shows a combination of probable success on the merits and the
22 possibility of irreparable harm; or (ii) raises serious questions
23 on such matters and shows that the balance of hardships tips in
24 favor of an injunction. See Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines,
25 Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987). “These two formulations
26 represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required
27 degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success
28 decreases.” Id. Under both formulations, the party must

1 demonstrate a "fair chance of success on the merits" and a
2 "significant threat of irreparable injury" absent the issuance of
3 the requested injunctive relief.² Id.

4 **III. Discussion**

5 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

6 Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to succeed
7 on the merits of their UL listing-related claims. The Settlement
8 Agreement clearly states that the UL listings will be "maintained"
9 in such manner "that Clark[] will have the benefit of them"
10 BlazeFrame was very clear that it would retain those listings, and
11 would not transfer them to CEMCO along with the patents. Thus,
12 notwithstanding BlazeFrame's counsel's representation that
13 "BlazeFrame has no duties to ClarkDietrich whatsoever," it appears
14 beyond dispute that BlazeFrame agreed to "maintain" the listings
15 for Clark's use.

16 Defendants' opposition does not dispute that Defendants
17 threatened and intend to drop Clark from the current UL listing,
18 and have no intention of including Clark in any re-testing, re-
19 certification, or updated listing to UL's revised standards.
20 Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed
21 on the merits because (1) Clark is manufacturing defective products
22 and (2) Clark has the resources to conduct its own product testing
23 and obtain its own UL listings at its own expense. These arguments
24 are not persuasive.

25
26 ² Even under the "serious interests" sliding scale test, a
27 plaintiff must satisfy the four Winter factors and demonstrate
28 "that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the
injunction is in the public interest." Alliance for the Wild
Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).

1 First, Defendants raised the same manufacturing defect
2 arguments in response to Plaintiffs' February 3 application for a
3 TRO. Although not briefed or supported in comparable detail by
4 either party in connection with the current application, Defendants
5 essentially argue that Clark's packaging methods do not
6 sufficiently protect the licensed products during transport. As
7 discussed at the prior hearing, Plaintiffs dispute not only
8 Defendants' characterization of Clark's products and packaging, but
9 also Defendants' methods of evidence gathering and the authenticity
10 of the samples examined by Defendants. The court need not resolve
11 this evidentiary dispute, however, as there has been no significant
12 change in the evidence or arguments since the time of the first
13 hearing, at which Defendants agreed to leave Clark's UL
14 designations undisturbed. Furthermore, Defendants'
15 characterization does not appear to comport with the UL's own
16 determination that Clark's products are sufficiently identical to
17 BlazeFrame's to merit UL certification.³

18 As for Defendants' suggestion that Clark can easily bear the
19 expense of independent testing, and therefore obtain its own UL
20 certification without Defendants' assistance, that contention is
21 irrelevant. Whether Clark has the financial wherewithal to conduct
22 its own testing has no bearing on the question whether Defendants
23 agreed to maintain UL listings for Clark's benefit. The Settlement
24 Agreement appears to leave little doubt that BlazeFrame did so

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26 ³ Even if Defendants' factual contentions are ultimately borne
27 out, it is not clear to the court that defects in Clark's packaging
28 would excuse Defendants from the obligations they agreed to
undertake in the Settlement Agreement.

1 agree. Plaintiffs have adequately shown, at this stage, that
2 Defendants' renewed threats to drop Clark from the current UL
3 listings and stated intent not to assist Clark in any way with
4 respect to the revised testing requirements violate the Settlement
5 Agreement.

6 B. Irreparable Harm

7 "Price erosion, loss of goodwill, damage to reputation, and
8 loss of business opportunities are all valid grounds for finding
9 irreparable harm." Advanced Transit Dynamics, Inc. v. Ridge Corp.,
10 No. CV 15-1877 BRO (MANx), 2015 WL 12516692 at *24 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
11 24, 2015) (quoting Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664
12 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 There appears to be no dispute that, should Clark lose UL-certified
14 status for Clark's licensed products, Clark will suffer severe
15 damage to its reputation. There is no dispute that architectural
16 plans generally specify that only UL-certified components be used.
17 Clark therefore faces the prospect of a drastically reduced, if not
18 completely foreclosed, market, as well as the specter of wide-scale
19 product returns and disputes over completed orders. Furthermore,
20 were Clark to lose the benefit of the UL listings, the pernicious
21 reputational effects of being known as a seller of "unsafe"
22 products would likely extend beyond the licensed products here to
23 Clark's entire, varied line of building products.

24 Defendants nevertheless maintain that Clark would not be
25 irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction because Clark is
26 free to conduct independent testing of its version of the licensed
27 products and obtain its own UL listings at a cost of approximately
28 \$98,000. (Opposition at 20-21.) As an initial matter, that

1 approach would, at best, only insulate Clark from irreparable harm
2 at some point in the future. Defendants have, however, renewed
3 their threat to drop Clark from even the current UL listings. Were
4 Defendants to carry out that threat, no future independent
5 certification would undo the harm that Clark would suffer from
6 having lacked UL certification in the interim.

7 Furthermore, and even looking solely to Clark's ability to
8 meet the revised UL standards come August, Defendant's narrow focus
9 on the financial cost of independent testing significantly
10 understates the challenges facing Clark. Defendants acknowledge
11 that they have exclusive control over data files related to
12 BlazeFrame's testing of the licensed products to the current
13 standard. Clark played no role in that testing, and enjoys UL
14 certification only as a "multiple listee" under BlazeFrame's
15 certification. Thus, Clark has no information about the product
16 configurations, methodology, or other testing circumstances that
17 enabled BlazeFrame to satisfy the UL's current requirements.
18 Without BlazeFrame's assistance, Clark might theoretically be able
19 to start from scratch and design an adequate testing plan, obtain
20 its own data, and satisfy the current UL standard. Only then it
21 could it proceed to re-evaluate its products and procedures in
22 light of the revised standard. It is undisputed, however, that any
23 party hoping to obtain certification under the new standard must
24 submit a testing plan to UL by May 31, 2017. It is extremely
25 unlikely that Clark will be able to formulate and implement a
26 testing regimen that would yield data and results roughly
27 equivalent to that already in Klein's possession and then use that
28 data to construct an even more stringent testing plan prior to UL's

1 May 31 and August deadlines. Clark would then face the same
2 prospect of de-listing, with all of its concomitant, irreparable
3 harms.⁴

4 C. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest

5 Defendants reiterate that Clark has greater financial
6 resources than BlazeFrame to argue that the balance of hardships
7 favors the latter. These arguments ring hollow. As Plaintiffs
8 point out, BlazeFrame itself must conduct additional testing to
9 satisfy UL's revised standards. It would cost BlazeFrame no
10 additional time, energy, or money to continue to designate Clark as
11 a "multiple listee" of the BlazeFrame listing. Nevertheless, and
12 with an eye toward obviating future disputes of this nature, Clark
13 proposed that it and BlazeFrame collaborate to design and carry out
14 new tests in light of the revised UL standards, with Clark bearing
15 half of the cost of such testing and each party receiving a copy of
16 the resulting data. BlazeFrame rejected this proposal.⁵

17 Now, for the first time, BlazeFrame asserts that it intends to
18 completely abandon the licensed products at issue here, and
19 suggests that it will not seek to maintain or update UL listings
20

21 ⁴ Furthermore, as discussed by this Court in a prior Order
22 (Dkt. 106), BlazeFrame may be judgment-proof, limiting the
23 deterrent effect of money damages. See, e.g., Aviara Parkway
24 Farms, Inc. v. Agropecuaria La Finca, S.P.R. de R.L., No. 08 CV
25 2301 JM (CAB), 2009 WL 249790 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009); Wang
26 Laboratories Inc. v. Chip Merchant Inc., No. 93-893-K (POR), 1993
27 WL 42820 at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1993). Indeed, Defendants'
28 course of conduct in this litigation appears to be somewhat
untethered from increased risk of additional, significant monetary
liability.

⁵ As is evident from the discussion herein, and by the very
number of motions filed in this case, Plaintiffs and Defendants are
largely incapable of effective cooperation. The court is thus
reluctant to order any relief requiring the parties to collaborate
in good faith.

1 for the licensed products even for BlazeFrame's own benefit. That
2 being the case, Clark asks that this court order Defendants to
3 provide Clark with existing, UL testing-related data files, in
4 order to afford Clark a realistic opportunity to develop and
5 conduct its own tests and obtain its own UL listing within UL's
6 looming deadlines. BlazeFrame, in response, contends that it would
7 be inequitable to require it to turn over proprietary data to
8 Clark.

9 As discussed above, it appears highly likely that BlazeFrame
10 bears the obligation to "maintain" UL listings for Clark's benefit,
11 notwithstanding Defendants' stated position to the contrary.
12 Defendant nevertheless argues that it would be unduly burdensome to
13 (1) require BlazeFrame to continue to list Clark as a multiple
14 listee, at no additional cost to BlazeFrame above its own testing
15 costs, (2) require BlazeFrame to bear even fifty percent of the
16 cost of additional testing, or (3) share existing data already in
17 BlazeFrame's control. In other words, Defendants not only refuse
18 to take any affirmative action to themselves "maintain" the UL
19 listings, but also contend that they should not be required to help
20 Clark obtain its own listings.

21 Defendants cannot have it both ways. As discussed above,
22 Clark's "vast" financial resources do not insulate it from the
23 significant hardships it faces as a result of Defendants'
24 decisions. Defendants have rejected any proposal that requires
25 them to bear any testing costs whatsoever. It would cost
26 BlazeFrame nothing, however, to share existing UL testing data with
27 Clark. Any hardship to Defendants, therefore, is negligible or, at
28

1 worst, remediable by money at a later date.⁶ The balance of
2 hardships weighs heavily in Plaintiffs' favor.

3 Nor is the court persuaded by Defendants' one-sentence
4 argument that "the public interest sharply favors BlazeFrame
5 because the risks associated with selling a life safety product
6 that has never been fire tested is simply too great." (Opp. at
7 21.) This argument is predicated on the conclusion that
8 BlazeFrame's products and Clark's products are materially
9 divergent. As discussed above, the evidence on record does not
10 support any such conclusion at this stage, and this Court takes no
11 position on the efficacy of any party's products. As noted above,
12 however, UL itself appears to make no distinction between
13 BlazeFrame-manufactured products, which have been tested, and
14 Clark-manufactured versions. UL remains free to grant or withhold
15 its approval as it sees fit. The possibility that UL would deny
16 its approval to Clark products, however, in no way justifies
17 Defendants' efforts to impede Clark from maintaining or seeking it.

18 **IV. Conclusion**

19 For the reasons stated above, the court hereby orders that:
20

- 21 1. Defendants and their Agents are enjoined and prohibited
22 from taking or engaging in any action or conduct that
23 would cause, or is likely, or intended by Defendants, to
24 cause, Clark to be removed from any listing of
25 Underwriters Laboratory (UL) or any other third party
26 certifying entity (collectively, "UL listings") for any

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28 ⁶ Although Defendants refuse to turn over existing UL testing data to Clark, Defendants are willing to sell Clark that data.

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intumescent-tape bearing products or any fire stopping products; and

2 In the event Defendants or their Agents have taken any action or engaged in any conduct that would cause, or is likely, or intended by Defendants, to cause, Clark to be removed from any UL listings, Defendants are directed and ordered to immediately take all actions necessary to reinstate or maintain Clark's listing as approved on all UL listings for any intumescent-tape bearing products or any fire stopping products; and

3. Defendants shall, by May 25, 2017, provide, or otherwise make available to ClarkDietrich, any and all UL files for licensed products, including testing and data files; and

4. ClarkDietrich shall use such files and data for the sole purpose of obtaining its own UL certifications; and

5. ClarkDietrich shall post a bond of \$100,000 in connection with this Order.

Failure to comply with this Order may result in sanctions, including the striking of the Answer and any Counterclaims, monetary sanctions, and imprisonment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 23, 2017


DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge