



1 considered.

2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned  
3 U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (See Pet'r's  
4 Consent to Proceed Before U.S. Magis. Judge at 1, Feb. 13, 2017;  
5 Resp't's Consent to Proceed Before U.S. Magis. Judge at 1, May 3,  
6 2017.)

7 For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the  
8 Petition as untimely and dismisses this action with prejudice.

9 **BACKGROUND**

10 Petitioner pleaded no contest in Los Angeles County Superior  
11 Court on December 12, 2014, to making criminal threats and  
12 stalking. (Pet. at 2; Lodged Doc. 1.)<sup>2</sup> He was sentenced to 12  
13 years and four months in state prison. (Pet. at 2; Lodged Doc. 1  
14 at 1.) He filed a motion for a certificate of probable cause in  
15 the superior court on December 22, 2014 (Lodged Doc. 5; Lodged  
16 Doc. 6 at 2-3), which was denied on January 7, 2015 (Lodged Doc.  
17 6 at 1). Before that, he filed a notice of appeal on December  
18 30, 2014. (Lodged Doc. 3.) The appeal was dismissed on April  
19 29, 2015, because Petitioner had not obtained a certificate of  
20 probable cause, as required by Rule 8.304(b) of the California  
21 Rules of Court and Penal Code section 1237.5. (See Lodged Doc. 4  
22 (order to show cause)); Cal. App. Cts. Case Info., [http://  
23 appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/  
24 dockets.cfm?dist=2&doc\\_id=2098497&doc\\_no=B261515](http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=2&doc_id=2098497&doc_no=B261515) (last visited  
25 Nov. 13, 2017) (showing dismissal order filed).

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<sup>2</sup> Throughout, the Court uses the pagination provided by its  
Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system.

1 On January 29, 2015, an attorney with the California  
2 Appellate Project, unaware of Petitioner's incomplete December 30  
3 notice of appeal, filed a notice of appeal in the superior court  
4 on Petitioner's behalf. (See Lodged Doc. 9 at 28.) It was  
5 rejected as a "duplicate" on February 4, 2015. (See id. at 35-  
6 36.) On May 21, 2015, Petitioner filed another notice of appeal  
7 and request for certificate of probable cause in the superior  
8 court. (Lodged Doc. 7 at 4-11.) That court denied his request  
9 on June 2, 2015 (id. at 5, 11), and his notice of appeal was "not  
10 filed" on June 8 because it was "received after the expiration of  
11 the sixty (60) day period prescribed for filing a notice" (id. at  
12 11). On May 22, 2015, he filed a letter in the superior court  
13 stating that he "need[ed] to withdraw [his] plea and get back  
14 into court." (Req. to Amend at 12-13.) The court of appeal  
15 construed the letter as a petition for writ of mandate and  
16 request for rehearing, denying both on July 1, 2015, for failure  
17 "to state facts sufficient to warrant relief" or "provide a  
18 record adequate for review." (Id. at 14.) On June 8, 2015, he  
19 filed a motion for relief from default for filing a late notice  
20 (id. at 1-2), which the court of appeal construed as a "petition  
21 for writ of late notice of appeal" and denied on August 31  
22 (Lodged Doc. 8). On August 28, 2015, he filed a petition for a  
23 writ of mandate, which the court of appeal denied on September  
24 28. (Lodged Doc. 13.)<sup>3</sup> On September 4, 2015, he filed through  
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26 <sup>3</sup> Though the court of appeal's denial of this petition was  
27 lodged with the Court (see Lodged Doc. 13), a copy of the  
28 petition itself was not. But as explained in Section II.B.2, it  
apparently was not a collateral attack on his conviction.

1 counsel a motion for reconsideration of his application for  
2 relief from default (Lodged Doc. 9), which the appellate court  
3 denied on September 8 (Lodged Doc. 10).

4 Petitioner constructively filed a habeas petition in the  
5 state superior court on January 5, 2016, raising a single claim,  
6 ineffective assistance of trial counsel.<sup>4</sup> (Lodged Doc. 11 at 3,  
7 21.) He argued that his counsel was ineffective in two respects:  
8 counsel failed to check certain boxes on his felony advisement of  
9 rights, waiver, and plea form, and thus “[t]here is nothing . . .  
10 that shows [he] waived any of his constitutional rights” (id. at  
11 3-5); and counsel failed to “advise[ him] to accept [an] original  
12 plea offer of 4 years or at least to finish his trial so as to  
13 leave intact all of his appeal rights” (id. at 24).

14 On February 18, 2016, the superior court denied the petition  
15 for “fail[ure] to state [a] claim upon which relief can be  
16 granted.” (Pet., pt. 3 at 28.) Petitioner constructively filed  
17 a habeas petition in the court of appeal on April 5, 2016,  
18 raising the same claim (Lodged Doc. 14; see Lodged Doc. 18 at 8);  
19 the court summarily denied it on April 18 (Lodged Doc. 15). On  
20 October 11, 2016, now represented by counsel, Petitioner filed a  
21 habeas petition in the supreme court, adding more detail but  
22 still basing his ineffective-assistance claim on the same  
23 arguments and not raising any other claims. (See Lodged Doc.  
24 16.) The state supreme court summarily denied the petition on  
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26 <sup>4</sup> Though the petition was file-stamped on January 7,  
27 Petitioner gave it to prison officials on January 5. (See Lodged  
28 Doc. 18 at 7.) The mailbox rule applies to state habeas  
petitions. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th  
Cir. 2003).

1 December 14, 2016. (Lodged Doc. 17.)

2 Petitioner's federal Petition raises the same claim he  
3 raised in his state petitions.

4 **PETITIONER'S CLAIM**

5 Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of  
6 counsel during the plea process. (Pet. at 4, 15-17.)

7 **DISCUSSION**

8 **I. Applicable Law**

9 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act sets forth  
10 a one-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition  
11 and specifies that the period runs from the latest of the  
12 following dates:

13 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the  
14 conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time  
15 for seeking such review;

16 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an  
17 application created by State action in violation of the  
18 Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if  
19 the applicant was prevented from filing by such State  
20 action;

21 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted  
22 was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the  
23 right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and  
24 made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral  
25 review; or

26 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim  
27 or claims presented could have been discovered through  
28 the exercise of due diligence.

1 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

2 AEDPA includes a statutory tolling provision that suspends  
3 the limitation period for the time during which a properly filed  
4 application for postconviction or other collateral review is  
5 pending in state court. § 2244(d)(2); see Waldrip v. Hall, 548  
6 F.3d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 2008). An application is “pending” until  
7 it has achieved final resolution through the state’s  
8 postconviction procedures. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220  
9 (2002). In California, a state habeas petition remains pending  
10 between a lower court’s denial of it and the filing of a habeas  
11 petition in a higher state court as long as that period is  
12 “reasonable.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191-92 (2006).  
13 Periods of up to 60 days are generally presumptively reasonable.  
14 Cf. id. at 201 (holding unexplained six-month delay unreasonable  
15 compared to “short[er] periods of time,” such as 30 to 60 days,  
16 “that most States provide for filing an appeal to the state  
17 supreme court” (citation and alteration omitted)). Finally, the  
18 limitation period is not tolled between the time a decision  
19 becomes final on direct appeal and when a state collateral  
20 challenge is filed because no case is “pending” during that  
21 interval. Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2007).  
22 Likewise, the limitation period is not tolled between the time  
23 the last state habeas petition is denied and a federal habeas  
24 action is initiated. See id.

25 In addition to statutory tolling, federal habeas petitions  
26 are subject to equitable tolling of the one-year limitation  
27 period in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,  
28 645 (2010). Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted

1 is a fact-specific inquiry. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146  
2 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended). The petitioner must show that he  
3 has been pursuing his rights diligently and some extraordinary  
4 circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.  
5 Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. The Supreme Court has clarified that  
6 "reasonable diligence" is required for equitable tolling, not  
7 "maximum feasible diligence." Id. at 653 (citation omitted).

8 As to the second prong of the inquiry, courts have  
9 recognized several potentially extraordinary circumstances  
10 justifying equitable tolling. For instance, abandonment by an  
11 attorney might constitute an extraordinary circumstance. See  
12 Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 282-83 (2012). And a complete  
13 lack of access to legal files may warrant equitable tolling.  
14 Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). "The  
15 petitioner must show that the extraordinary circumstances were  
16 the cause of his untimeliness." Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952,  
17 959 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended) (citation omitted).

18 As to both statutory and equitable tolling, a petitioner  
19 bears the burden of demonstrating that AEDPA's limitation period  
20 was sufficiently tolled. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418  
21 (2005) (equitable tolling); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814  
22 (9th Cir. 2002) (as amended) (statutory tolling), abrogation on  
23 other grounds recognized by United States v. Davis, 508 F. App'x  
24 606, 610 (9th Cir. 2013).

## 25 **II. The Limitation Period**

### 26 A. Date Petitioner's Convictions Became Final

27 Petitioner was sentenced on December 12, 2014. (See Lodged  
28 Doc. 1.) Because his attempts to withdraw or appeal his plea

1 failed, his conviction and sentence became final 60 days later,  
2 on February 10, 2015, when the time to appeal expired. See  
3 § 2244(d)(1)(A) (judgment becomes final "by the conclusion of  
4 direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such  
5 review"); Cal. R. Ct. 8.308(a) (notice of appeal must be filed  
6 within 60 days of judgment); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565  
7 U.S. 134, 137 (2012) ("[F]or a state prisoner who does not seek  
8 review in a State's highest court, the judgment becomes 'final'  
9 on the date that the time for seeking such review expires.");  
10 Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting  
11 that petitioner pleaded no contest, "did not appeal[, and]  
12 therefore, his conviction became final . . . 60 days after the  
13 judgment of conviction").<sup>5</sup>

14 The one-year limitation period therefore began to run on  
15 February 11, 2015. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,  
16 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that limitation period begins to  
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19 <sup>5</sup> Respondent contends that Petitioner's conviction became  
20 final on January 7, 2015, when the superior court denied his  
21 motion for a certificate of probable cause. (Mot. Dismiss at 3.)  
22 In support, she cites Covarrubias v. Grounds, No. CV 12-2562-CAS  
23 (SH), 2012 WL 6811790, at \*3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012), accepted  
24 by 2013 WL 100158 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013), and Goodo v.  
25 Ambroselli, No. CV 12-0314-MLG, 2012 WL 1377049, at \*1 (C.D. Cal.  
26 Apr. 17, 2012). The facts of Goodo are distinguishable, however.  
27 There, the petitioner's request for a certificate of probable  
28 cause was not denied until after the 60-day period had expired,  
and the court used that later date when calculating when his  
conviction became final. See 2012 WL 1377049, at \*1.  
Covarrubias relied on Goodo to hold that the petitioner's  
conviction became final when the certificate of probable cause  
was denied, before the 60-day period had expired, see 2012 WL  
6811790, at \*3, but this Court assumes that a petitioner is  
entitled to at least the 60-day period.



1 run on day following triggering event).<sup>6</sup> Thus, absent tolling of  
2 some kind, Petitioner had until February 10, 2016, to file his  
3 federal petition. Because the Petition was constructively filed  
4 on January 25, 2017, it was ostensibly more than 11 months late.

5 B. Statutory Tolling

6 1. State habeas petitions

7 Petitioner's first state habeas petition was pending in the  
8 superior court from January 5 (Lodged Doc. 11) to February 18,  
9 2016 (Pet., pt. 3 at 28), and his second was pending in the state  
10 court of appeal from April 5 (Lodged Doc. 14) to April 18, 2016  
11 (Lodged Doc. 15). Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling  
12 for the time those state habeas petitions were pending, 59 days,  
13 and "gap tolling" for the 46 days between the denial of the first  
14 petition and the filing of the second, for a total of 105 days.  
15 See Evans, 546 U.S. at 191-92; see also Patterson, 251 F.3d at  
16 1247 (limitation period resumes running day after state court  
17 denies habeas petition). Accounting for those days of tolling,  
18 the AEDPA deadline was extended to May 25, 2016.

19 Petitioner is not entitled to gap tolling for the time  
20 between the denial of his second state habeas petition, on April  
21 18, 2016 (Lodged Doc. 15), and his filing of a third petition, on  
22 October 11, 2016, in the state supreme court (Lodged Doc. 16).  
23 First, the delay was substantial. That 175-day period greatly  
24 exceeds the 30 to 60 days the U.S. Supreme Court has identified  
25 as "reasonable" for gap tolling. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 201

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27 <sup>6</sup> Petitioner does not contend that he is entitled to a later  
28 trigger date under § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D), and the record  
discloses no basis for applying any of those provisions.

1 (refusing to toll unexplained six-month gap); see also Velasquez  
2 v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011) (91- and 81-day  
3 unexplained gaps unreasonable); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d  
4 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (115- and 101-day  
5 unexplained gaps unreasonable). Second, the justifications  
6 Petitioner offers for the delay are inadequate. He describes  
7 extensive efforts to obtain representation and multiple delays in  
8 withdrawing funds from his prison trust account to pay retained  
9 counsel. (See Opp'n at 6-7.) There is no right to counsel,  
10 however, when filing a habeas petition in a noncapital case. See  
11 Byrnes v. Kramer, 435 F. App'x 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing  
12 Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2002)).  
13 Thus, delay stemming from his attempts to retain counsel for  
14 postconviction proceedings does not justify his late filing in  
15 the state supreme court. Compare id. (pro se status and  
16 inability to access typewriter inadequate justification for  
17 statutory gap tolling), with Lima v. Kramer, 327 F. App'x 716,  
18 718 (9th Cir. 2009) (three and a half months of gap delay  
19 justified by lack of access to legal files while in  
20 administrative segregation), and Richardson v. Cate, No. C 09-  
21 02227 WHA, 2010 WL 1486476, at \*2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2010)  
22 (135-day gap delay justified partly because petitioner became  
23 suicidal and was placed in mental-health ward and administrative  
24 segregation); cf. also Haskins v. Schriro, No. CV 05-2352-PHX-MHM  
25 (JM), 2009 WL 3241836, at \*5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2009)  
26 (attempting to retain counsel not extraordinary circumstance  
27 warranting equitable tolling).

28 Third, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for

1 the time it took his counsel, once retained, to prepare his  
2 supreme-court petition. His supreme-court petition presented the  
3 same single claim and arguments as and was only marginally longer  
4 than his pro se petitions in the court of appeal and superior  
5 court. (Compare Lodged Docs. 11 and 14, with Lodged Doc. 16.)  
6 Thus, the revised petition does not justify statutory gap  
7 tolling. Compare Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 496-97 (9th Cir.  
8 2010) (time it took to go through voluminous records from new  
9 evidentiary hearing, conduct significant legal research, and  
10 rewrite petition, resulting in 160 pages, justified tolling), and  
11 Richardson, 2010 WL 1486476, at \*2 (tolling justified partly  
12 because petition addressed new evidence and was almost three  
13 times as long as prior petition), with Velasquez, 639 F.3d at 968  
14 (delay not excused when "each of [petitioner's] habeas petitions  
15 [was] nearly identical to the petition that came before it"); see  
16 also Hodge v. Lewis, No. CV 11-03237 CJC (SS), 2012 WL 7187679,  
17 at \*7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012) (no gap tolling when subsequent  
18 petition was "largely identical" and did not present new  
19 arguments, and petitioner "did not need to conduct new and  
20 extensive research or investigate additional evidence to raise  
21 his . . . claim"), accepted by 2013 WL 655240 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21,  
22 2013).<sup>7</sup>

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24 <sup>7</sup> Because the limitation period had already expired by the  
25 time Petitioner filed his supreme-court habeas petition, on  
26 October 11, 2016, he is not entitled to statutory tolling for the  
27 65 days it was pending. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,  
28 823 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the  
reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the  
state petition was filed." (citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d  
1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001))).

1 Finally, Petitioner complains of construction work lasting  
2 from April through October 2016 that allegedly limited his access  
3 to the law library. (See Opp'n at 6.) As further discussed in  
4 Section II.C, limited law-library access, absent a showing of how  
5 that allegedly inadequate access prevented timely filing, does  
6 not warrant tolling. See Bretado v. Woodford, No. CV 07-4612-CAS  
7 (AGR), 2008 WL 5099640, at \*2-3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2008) (noting  
8 that petitioner's requests for access to law library did "not  
9 establish that denial of access to the library prevented him from  
10 filing a timely petition" (emphasis in original)). Petitioner  
11 has not made such a showing: he apparently retained counsel  
12 during that period of alleged lack of access, and thus he  
13 presumably was not actively preparing his own supreme-court  
14 petition during much of that time. (See Opp'n at 6-7 (stating  
15 that he retained first habeas counsel on May 26, 2016).)  
16 Moreover, Petitioner does not allege (much less offer evidence)  
17 that the library was actually unavailable to him during that  
18 period. Rather, he contends simply that its hours were  
19 curtailed. That is not sufficient to justify gap tolling. See  
20 Fuschak v. Swarthout, 588 F. App'x 556, 556-57 (9th Cir. 2014)  
21 (limited access to prison law library of two hours per week did  
22 not justify delay between filing of petitions).

## 23 2. Other collateral review

24 Petitioner contends in his request for leave to amend his  
25 opposition that various filings he made in state court before his  
26 habeas petitions entitle him to statutory tolling. (See, e.g.,  
27 Req. to Amend at 1-3.) As explained below, they do not.

28 AEDPA's statutory-tolling provision suspends the limitation

1 period for the time during which a properly filed application for  
2 "other collateral review," not just a habeas petition, is pending  
3 in state court. § 2244(d)(2). "[C]ollateral review' of a  
4 judgment or claim means a judicial reexamination of a judgment or  
5 claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process."  
6 Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 553 (2011). To warrant tolling, the  
7 application must be "properly filed," which occurs "when its  
8 delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable  
9 laws and rules governing filings." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4,  
10 8 (2000) (emphasis omitted).

11 Between February 10, 2015, when his conviction became final,  
12 and January 5, 2016, when he filed his first habeas petition,  
13 Petitioner filed a notice of appeal (see Lodged Doc. 7 at 3-11);  
14 an application for relief from default, which was construed as a  
15 "petition for writ of late notice of appeal" (see Lodged Doc. 7  
16 at 1-2; Lodged Doc. 8); a motion for reconsideration of his  
17 application for relief from default (see Lodged Docs. 9, 10); and  
18 two petitions for writs of mandate (see Lodged Doc. 13; Req. to  
19 Amend at 12-14). He also filed two notices of appeal before his  
20 conviction became final. (See Lodged Doc. 3 at 1-4; Lodged Doc.  
21 9 at 28.) None of Petitioner's notices of appeal warrant tolling  
22 because they were not properly filed,<sup>8</sup> nor were they applications  
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24 <sup>8</sup> Petitioner's December 30, 2014 notice of appeal was not  
25 properly filed because, without a certificate of probable cause,  
26 it did not comply with Rule 8.304(b) of the California Rules of  
27 Court and Penal Code section 1237.5. See Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8-9  
28 (noting that noncompliance with filing requirements such as those  
'conditioning the taking of an appeal on the issuance of a  
'certificate of appealability'' cause an application to not be  
properly filed). Though the superior court "mistakenly accepted"

1 for collateral review.<sup>9</sup> His "petition for writ of late notice of  
2 appeal" and motion for reconsideration do not warrant tolling  
3 because they sought to "reinstate the appeal" and thus are not  
4 "outside of the direct review process." See Wall, 562 U.S. at  
5 553.

6 Petitioner's second petition for writ of mandate also does  
7 not statutorily toll the limitation period. Though a copy has  
8 not been lodged, a handwritten notation – presumably by  
9 Petitioner – beside the petition's appellate-court docket entry  
10 attached to his request to amend states that the filing "was for  
11 transcripts of Dec. 2, 2014 Dept I [Judge] Stuarts 4 year offer."  
12 (Req. to Amend at 17.) This request, then, was apparently not  
13 "an application for State post-conviction or other collateral  
14 review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim."

15 § 2244(d)(2); see Nelson v. Sisto, No. C-11-0313 EMC (pr), 2012  
16 WL 465443, at \*5-6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012) (holding that  
17 petitioner's writ of mandate trying to obtain files from  
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19  
20 this "incomplete notice of appeal" for filing (See Lodged Doc. 9  
21 at 10), the appeal was taken from a nonappealable judgment and  
22 its erroneous acceptance does not indicate proper filing. See  
23 Artuz, 531 U.S. at 9 (when "an application is erroneously  
24 accepted by the clerk of a court lacking jurisdiction . . . it  
25 will be pending, but not properly filed" (emphasis in original)).  
26 The notice of appeal counsel filed for Petitioner was rejected as  
27 a duplicate, and Petitioner's May 21, 2015 notice of appeal was  
28 received after the expiration of the applicable 60-day period and  
thus was not filed. (See Lodged Doc. 7 at 11.) Hence, none of  
Petitioner's notices of appeal were properly filed.

<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, two of the notices of appeal were filed  
before his conviction became final and thus do not warrant  
tolling for that reason as well. See Torlucci v. Evans, 364 F.  
App'x 338, 339 (9th Cir. 2010).

1 attorneys did not warrant statutory tolling (citing Wall, 562  
2 U.S. at 553)); see also Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 999-1000 (no  
3 statutory tolling for discovery motions because they did not  
4 challenge conviction and instead sought material petitioner  
5 claimed might be of help in later state proceedings).<sup>10</sup>

6 Petitioner's first petition for writ of mandate, however,  
7 seems to have sought collateral review of his plea process. (See  
8 Req. to Amend at 12-13 (letter to court seeking in part to  
9 "withdraw [his] plea" based on alleged ineffective assistance of  
10 counsel, among other things).) Because the petition apparently  
11 called for "judicial reexamination" of his trial proceedings and  
12 was "not part of the direct review process," it likely qualifies  
13 as an "application for 'collateral review' that triggers AEDPA's  
14 [statutory] tolling provision." Wall, 562 U.S. at 555-56; see  
15 § 2244(d)(2). Therefore, the Court assumes that Petitioner is  
16 entitled to tolling for the 41 days it was pending in the court  
17 of appeal, from May 22 to July 1, 2015.

18 Accounting for all applicable statutory tolling, the AEDPA  
19 deadline was extended by 146 days, to July 5, 2016. Absent  
20 equitable tolling, the Petition is untimely because it was not  
21 constructively filed until January 25, 2017, 204 days after the  
22 limitation period had expired.

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26 <sup>10</sup> Even if Petitioner did raise collateral-review claims in  
27 his second petition for writ of mandate, the 32 days of  
28 additional tolling it would warrant him would not make his  
Petition timely.

1 C. Equitable Tolling

2 Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling  
3 based on his lack of legal counsel and limited law-library  
4 access. (Opp'n at 1-7.) Even if Petitioner acted diligently,  
5 the Court cannot find that any extraordinary circumstances  
6 prevented his timely filing.

7 As to his lack of counsel, he states that he was "abandoned  
8 by [his trial counsel] and left on his own to file his own  
9 appeal." (Id. at 3.) That occurred, however, before his  
10 conviction became final and the limitation period began to run  
11 and thus cannot support tolling. See Torlucci v. Evans, 364 F.  
12 App'x 338, 339 (9th Cir. 2010) (statute of limitations incapable  
13 of being tolled before petitioner's conviction was final).

14 Petitioner was notified on June 1, 2015, that an attorney had  
15 been appointed to assist him with his efforts to reverse his  
16 guilty plea, only to learn on July 7 that the lawyer was  
17 "informed by the court that he was not to act as petitioner's  
18 attorney." (Opp'n at 4.) Petitioner states that he "contacted  
19 over 19 attorneys and several lawyer referral services seeking  
20 representation" and experienced delays in withdrawing funds to  
21 pay the attorneys he ultimately retained to prepare his state  
22 supreme-court habeas petition. (Id. at 5-7.)

23 Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling for the 37 days  
24 during which he believed he was represented by court-appointed  
25 counsel, as he cannot have been expected to work on his own  
26 petition while under the impression he had counsel to do that for  
27 him. The court's appointing and withdrawing of counsel for  
28 Petitioner was an "external force" contributing to his



1 untimeliness. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,  
2 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n external force must cause the  
3 untimeliness, rather than . . . merely oversight, miscalculation  
4 or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part.” (second alteration in  
5 original) (citation omitted)); cf. Maples, 565 U.S. at 281-82  
6 (attorney abandonment sufficient to establish extraordinary  
7 circumstances beyond petitioner’s control). Because the Court  
8 has already granted statutory tolling from May 22, 2015, when he  
9 filed his first petition for writ of mandate, to July 1, when  
10 that petition was denied, however, equitable tolling is available  
11 only for when those two periods did not overlap – from July 2 to  
12 7, 2015. See Valenzuela v. Small, No. CV 10-02428-DSF (DFM),  
13 2015 WL 7971087, at \*9 n.8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) (noting that  
14 court cannot apply both types of tolling to same time period),  
15 accepted by 2015 WL 8022548 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015), vacated on  
16 other grounds, 692 F. App’x 409 (9th Cir. 2017); Ammons v.  
17 Walker, No. CV 07-08136-AHM (JC), 2011 WL 844965, at \*1 (C.D.  
18 Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (refusing to “double count” requested period  
19 of equitable tolling because the court afforded statutory tolling  
20 for the period). Petitioner is thus entitled to six days of  
21 equitable tolling, extending the deadline for him to file a  
22 federal petition to July 11, 2016.

23 His general attempts to obtain counsel do not entitle him to  
24 equitable tolling. A petitioner’s pro se status or unsuccessful  
25 search for counsel does not excuse the filing of an untimely  
26 petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.  
27 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is  
28 not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting

1 equitable tolling."); see also Naff v. Kramer, No. CV 07-4417-PSG  
2 (PLA), 2008 WL 821538, at \*5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008)  
3 (collecting cases).<sup>11</sup> This is particularly so here, when  
4 Petitioner had already filed two petitions on his own before he  
5 retained counsel, and his lawyer's petition was not much  
6 different from the ones he had written. Clearly, Petitioner did  
7 not need counsel to make his claims. See Haskins, 2009 WL  
8 3241836, at \*5. Nor is lack of funds "extraordinary," as it  
9 applies to almost all prisoners. See, e.g., Pozo v. Hedgpeth,  
10 No. CV 10-7847-PA (AGR), 2011 WL 3420437, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Mar.  
11 10, 2011) ("Petitioner's contention that he could not afford to  
12 hire a private investigator to find a witness . . . which relates  
13 to his insufficiency of the evidence claim and his ineffective  
14 assistance claim, does not entitle him to equitable tolling."),  
15 accepted by 2011 WL 3418241 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).

16 Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to equitable  
17 tolling because he lacked sufficient access to the prison law  
18 library. (See Opp'n at 4, 6-7.) He alleges that "[b]etween  
19 January 26, 2015 and August 6, 2015 [he] was granted access to  
20 [the] law library 2 times for 45 minutes each time." (Id. at  
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22 <sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the prison's alleged refusal to timely  
23 release funds to him to retain counsel (see Opp'n at 6-7) does  
24 not constitute an extraordinary circumstance entitling him to  
25 equitable tolling. Although delays caused by the prison trust  
26 office have been recognized as extraordinary when the funds were  
27 "required in order to file a federal habeas petition," see Grant  
28 v. Swarthout, 862 F.3d 914, 917, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2017) (delay in  
processing petitioner's request for prison account certificate,  
which was necessary to file federal habeas petition in forma  
pauperis, entitled him to equitable tolling), here Petitioner  
requested his funds to pay counsel, which was not required for  
filing.

1 4.)<sup>12</sup> He also claims that from April through October 2016,  
2 remodeling work in the prison caused the law library to be  
3 "closed for 1-2 weeks at a time giving Petitioner little access."  
4 (Id. at 6.) He further states that the law library had "no  
5 typewriters," had "outdated legal material," was "short  
6 librarians," and was "open 1-2 days per week at most and some  
7 weeks not open at all." (Id.)

8 Nothing indicates that these were extraordinary  
9 circumstances preventing him from submitting a timely petition.  
10 See Frye, 273 F.3d at 1146 (lack of access to library materials  
11 does not automatically qualify as basis for equitable tolling,  
12 and court must conduct fact-specific inquiry); Chaffer, 592 F.3d  
13 at 1049 (rejecting petitioner's claim to equitable tolling based  
14 on "his pro se status, a prison library that was missing a  
15 handful of reporter volumes, and reliance on helpers who were  
16 transferred or too busy to attend to his petitions" because  
17 "these circumstances are hardly extraordinary given the  
18 vicissitudes of prison life"); Byrnes, 435 F. App'x at 622  
19 (holding that "an inmate has no right to use of a typewriter" and  
20 inability to access one not extraordinary circumstance). As an  
21 initial matter, and as previously discussed, Petitioner is not  
22 entitled to tolling of the 2016 period during which the law  
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24 <sup>12</sup> One of the requests to use the law library that  
25 Petitioner attached to his opposition indicates that he was given  
26 a form to fill out and submit to gain access to the library, "but  
27 it ha[d] not been returned" nine days later. (Opp'n at 44.)  
28 Another document indicates that Petitioner "was ducated to the  
library on March 23, 2015 and refused to attend." (Id. at 48.)  
Someone – apparently Petitioner – handwrote next to that, "called  
to medical that day" (id.), but no evidence exists of that.

1 library allegedly had limited hours because he was represented by  
2 counsel during most of that period. Similarly, he has already  
3 been granted tolling for some of the challenged period in 2015.  
4 As to the rest of the time in 2015, though he alleges instances  
5 of limited access to the library, he does not allege complete  
6 lack of access. “[N]ormal delays or restrictions on law library  
7 access . . . are not considered ‘extraordinary’ for purposes of  
8 establishing equitable tolling.” Thao v. Ducart, \_\_ F. App’x \_\_,  
9 No. 15-17400, 2017 WL 3722837, at \*1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017)  
10 (quoting Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998).

11 Moreover, all of his “inmate requests to use law library”  
12 attached to his opposition are from 2015, when he was still  
13 attempting to withdraw his plea or challenge it on direct appeal.  
14 (See Opp’n at 39-52.) The record shows no 2016 requests to use  
15 the law library other than one May 25, 2016 complaint about the  
16 allegedly limited materials available (id. at 68), calling into  
17 question how the law library’s curtailed availability could have  
18 prevented his timely federal habeas filing. See Scott v. Carey,  
19 415 F. App’x 821, 822 (9th Cir. 2011) (no equitable tolling based  
20 on limited library access absent showing that it caused untimely  
21 filing of federal petition); Brown v. McDonald, No. CIV S-10-1720  
22 LKK DAD P, 2012 WL 1574799, at \*6 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2012)  
23 (equitable tolling based on allegedly inadequate law library  
24 unwarranted when petitioner “failed to explain how the alleged  
25 [inadequacy] prevented him from filing a timely federal habeas  
26 petition” and collecting cases), accepted by No. CIV S-10-1720

1 LKK DAD P (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2012).<sup>13</sup>

2 Finally, even if the Court tolled the period in 2015 when he  
3 complains of limited library access – omitting the times before  
4 his convictions became final and for which he has already  
5 received tolling – his Petition would still have been more than  
6 two months late.<sup>14</sup>

7 Thus, Petitioner’s remaining arguments do not satisfy his  
8 “heavy burden” for equitable tolling. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at  
9 1048. Accounting for all applicable equitable tolling, the AEDPA  
10 deadline was extended by six days, to July 11, 2016.

11 **III. Conclusion**

12 For all these reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated that  
13 he is entitled to tolling of the limitation period sufficient to  
14 render his January 25, 2017 Petition timely. In fact, it was

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16 <sup>13</sup> Petitioner also complains that the “first time [he] had a  
17 chance to look at his case file was on August 25, 2015.” (Opp’n  
18 at 5.) Although a petitioner’s complete lack of access to his  
19 legal files can support equitable tolling, see Ramirez, 571 F.3d  
20 at 998, Petitioner did not request a copy of his case file from  
21 his trial counsel until August 4, 2015 (Opp’n at 5, 17-18), six  
22 months after his conviction became final. He received it on  
23 August 21 (id. at 5, 19), only three weeks later and with nearly  
24 a year left until his AEDPA limitation period expired. Even with  
25 equitable tolling for that three-week period, the Petition would  
26 still be six months late.

27 <sup>14</sup> Accounting for this additional tolling, the AEDPA  
28 deadline would be extended by 130 days, to November 18, 2016.  
The Court calculated this period by subtracting the 47 days of  
tolling Petitioner has already received in 2015 (representing 41  
days of statutory tolling while his first writ of mandate was  
pending and six days of equitable tolling when he thought he was  
represented by appointed counsel) from the 177 days between  
February 10, 2015, when his conviction became final, and August  
6, when he claims the alleged period of lack of access to the  
prison law library ended (see Opp’n at 4).

1 more than six months late.


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**ORDER**

3 IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered granting  
4 Respondent's motion to dismiss and dismissing the Petition with  
5 prejudice.<sup>15</sup>

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7 DATED: November 15, 2017

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
JEAN ROSENBLUTH  
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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28 <sup>15</sup> With this Order, Petitioner's Request for Expedited  
Treatment filed September 28, 2017, is moot.