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8	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT	
9	CENTRAL DISTRIC	I OF CALIFORNIA	
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12	AVERY ARMANI,	) CV 17-07814-RSWL-FFM	
13	Plaintiff,	) ) ) ODDED may Districtive	
14		) ORDER re: Plaintiff's ) Motion to Dismiss ) Defendant's Counter-	
15	V.	Complaint [13]	
16	NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE		
17	INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation; DOES 1 through 10,		
18	10,		
19	Defendants.		
20		)	
21	Currently before the Cou	rt is Plaintiff/Counter	
22	Defendant Avery Armani's ("Plaintiff") Motion to		
23	Dismiss Defendant/Counter-Cl	aimant Northwestern Mutual	
24	Life Insurance Company's ("D	efendant") Counter-	
25	Complaint ("Motion") [13].	Having reviewed all papers	
26	submitted pertaining to this Motion, the Court <b>NOW</b>		
27	FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court DENIES		
28	Plaintiff's Motion.		
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#### I. BACKGROUND

## 2 A. Factual Background

3 Plaintiff began working full time at Renaissance Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Renaissance") as a controller 4 5 in November 2008. Def.'s Countercl. Against Pl. ("Countercl.") ¶ 6, ECF No. 10. Renaissance had an 6 7 "employee welfare benefit plan," which included a long 8 term disability ("LTD") policy. <u>Id.</u> ¶ 7. Defendant 9 issued the LTD policy to Renaissance, and Plaintiff was 10 a participant in this policy. <u>Id.</u> ¶¶ 7-8. Under the terms of the LTD policy, after an initial twenty-four 11 months of disability payments, a person is "disabled" 12 13 only if he is either (1) "[u]nable to perform with 14 reasonable continuity the material duties of any gainful occupation for which [he is] reasonably fitted 15 by education, training, and experience," or 16 (2) "[u]nable to earn more than 80% of [his] Indexed 17 18 Predisability Earnings." Id. ¶ 10. The policy 19 additionally states that any disability benefit will be 20 reduced by Income from Other Sources ("deductible income"), which is defined, in part, as "[o]ne-half the 21 amount of your earnings from work while LTD Benefits 22 are payable." Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Dismiss 23 ("Opp'n") 10:2-4, ECF No. 15. 24

In May 2011, Plaintiff submitted a claim for LTD benefits. <u>Id.</u> at 1:16-17. Defendant approved Plaintiff's claim in July 2011 and closed his claim in July 2013. <u>Id.</u> at 1:17-18. Subsequently, Plaintiff

sued Defendant, and this Court issued a judgment in 1 Plaintiff's favor on May 18, 2017. Countercl. ¶ 12. 2 The Court ordered Defendant to reinstate Plaintiff to 3 the LTD plan, pay Plaintiff all benefits and interest 4 5 owed from the date his claim was closed in July 2013 to the date of the judgment, and pay benefits going 6 7 forward until Plaintiff is no longer eligible to receive payments under the plan. Id. ¶ 13. 8

9 The day after the judgment, Defendant's counsel sent an email to Plaintiff's counsel requesting 10 documentation of Plaintiff's deductible income from 11 July 2013 to the present. Id., Ex. A. On May 24, 12 13 2017, Plaintiff's counsel responded to this email, 14 stating that Plaintiff had "not been employed since he became disabled." Id., Ex. D. Defendant's counsel 15 continued to follow up to request documentation 16 confirming this statement. Id. ¶ 19. On June 16, 17 18 2017, the attorneys spoke on the phone, and Plaintiff's 19 counsel again stated that Plaintiff had not earned any 20 income since filing his disability claim and refused to provide Plaintiff's tax returns. Id., Ex. E. 21

22 On June 19, 2017, after Defendant's counsel discovered that Plaintiff was employed as the Director 23 of Finance for Bolton & Company, Defendant's counsel 24 25 emailed Plaintiff's counsel requesting Plaintiff's tax returns from 2013 through 2016. Id., Ex. G. 26 In response, Plaintiff's counsel admitted that Plaintiff 27 had been employed since April 2017. Id., Ex. H. 28 In

light of the discovery that Plaintiff had been working, 1 Defendant's counsel expanded the scope of their 2 3 requests, asking for tax returns and accompanying schedules from 2010 through 2016 and year-to-date pay 4 5 stubs for 2017. Id., Ex. J. Plaintiff eventually provided his 2012 through 2016 tax returns and two 2017 6 7 pay stubs, but he did not provide year-to-date 2017 pay 8 information, 2010 through 2011 tax returns, or attachments such as W-2's and K-1's. Id.  $\P$  26, Ex. K. 9 The information Plaintiff did provide showed that he 10 had been earning income since at least 2012. 11 Id. ¶ 26.

On July 21, 2017, Defendant's counsel emailed 12 Plaintiff's counsel informing him of the deficiencies 13 in his document production, which prevented Defendant 14 from accurately calculating the LTD benefits owed to 15 16 Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 27. Defendant claims that Plaintiff's counsel did not respond. Id. ¶ 28. 17

18 Finally, on July 31, 2017, Defendant sent a letter 19 to Plaintiff's counsel stating that Defendant had 20 reopened Plaintiff's claim and, based on the documents Plaintiff provided, determined that Plaintiff was only 21 eligible for disability payments up to December 31, 22 Id., Ex. L. 23 2015. The letter further stated that Defendant had overpaid Plaintiff from July 2011 through July 2013 and Defendant had deducted such overpayment from the arrears payment, which covered July 2013 through December 2015. Id. 28 111

## 1 B. <u>Procedural Background</u>

2 On October 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1] seeking additional LTD benefits. Defendant 3 answered and filed a Counter-Complaint [10] on December 4 5 12, 2017, seeking relief under the theories of intentional misrepresentation, concealment, fraud, 6 7 negligent misrepresentation, and equitable restitution 8 under § 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income 9 Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). Plaintiff filed the instant Motion [13] on December 26, 10 2017, to which Defendant filed an Opposition [15] on 11 January 30, 2018. Plaintiff then filed his Reply [16] 12 13 on February 6, 2018.

### **II. DISCUSSION**

## A. <u>Legal Standard</u>

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) 16 allows a party to move for dismissal of one or more 17 claims if the pleading fails to state a claim upon 18 19 which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to 20 dismiss on 12(b)(6) grounds, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 21 claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 22 23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(internal quotation marks omitted). "Dismissal can be based on 24 25 [a] lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 26 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 27 theory." <u>Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't</u>, 901 F.2d 28 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

"In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may 1 2 generally consider only allegations contained in the 3 pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice." Swartz 4 v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). A 5 court must presume all factual allegations of the 6 7 complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. <u>Klarfeld v. United</u> 8 9 States, 944 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1991).

The question presented by a motion to dismiss is 10 not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but 11 12 whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual grounds to support a plausible claim to relief, thereby 13 14 entitling the plaintiff to offer evidence in support of Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Swierkiewicz v. 15 its claim. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). 16 While a complaint need not contain detailed factual 17 18 allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than "labels 19 and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of a cause 20 of action's elements." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citation omitted). 21 However, "[a] complaint should not be dismissed under 22 23 Rule 12(b)(6) 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 24 claim which would entitle him to relief.'" 25 Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 26 27 45-46 (1957)). 28 111

## B. <u>Discussion</u>

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# 1. <u>Intentional Misrepresentation, Negligent</u> Misrepresentation, and Fraud

"The essential elements of a count for intentional 4 5 misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, 6 (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce 7 reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage."<sup>1</sup> Chapman v. Skype Inc., 162 Cal. 8 Rptr. 3d 864, 875 (Ct. App. 2013)(citation omitted). 9 "The essential elements of a claim for negligent 10 misrepresentation are the same as for intentional 11 12 misrepresentations, except that it does not require knowledge of falsity, but instead requires a 13 14 misrepresentation of fact by a person who has no 15 reasonable grounds for believing it to be true." <u>Cisco</u> Sys., Inc. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 16 887, 897 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Plaintiff's Motion only 17 discusses the justifiable reliance and damages 18 19 elements, so the Court will limit its analysis to these 20 two elements.

a. Justifiable Reliance

In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that "it is

<sup>1</sup> Fraud claims share these same elements. <u>See Lazar v.</u> <u>Supreme Court</u>, 909 P.2d 981, 984 (Cal. 1996)(citation omitted).
Pursuant to Rule 9(b), to properly plead a fraud claim, a plaintiff must plead each element with particularity. <u>F.T.C. v.</u>
<u>Lights of Am., Inc.</u>, 760 F. Supp. 2d 848, 850 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
"This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which 'show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.'" <u>Stansfield v. Starkey</u>, 269 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345 (Ct. App. 1990)(citations omitted).

impossible for the defendant to have reasonably relied 1 2 on Mr. Armani's false statement of no employment." However, "the reasonableness of reliance on a 3 misrepresentation is ordinarily a question of fact." 4 5 Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 827 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Plaintiff essentially 6 7 treats his Motion as a motion for summary judgment, and, while this Action may be ripe for summary 8 9 judgment, such a motion is not currently before the 10 Court.

11 The Court "must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true." Klarfeld, 944 F.2d at 585. 12 Here, Defendant alleges that it "justifiably relied on 13 14 the representations made by [Plaintiff] regarding his work activity, earnings/income, and his inability to 15 work and/or perform certain related activities." 16 Countercl. ¶ 35. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's 17 18 counsel, on behalf of Plaintiff, made statements 19 regarding Plaintiff's employment status and the amount 20 of income Plaintiff earned during the time Plaintiff claims he was disabled. <u>Id.</u> ¶¶ 17, 20. Defendant then 21 took these statements into account when determining the 22 23 amount of LTD benefits to pay Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. After construing these allegations "in the light most 24 favorable" to Defendant, see Klarfeld, 944 F.2d at 585, 25 26 Defendant's allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 27

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## b. Resulting Damages

2 Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to 3 allege damages as a result of Plaintiff's misrepresentation. Mot. 3:1-2. However, Defendant's 4 5 Counter-Complaint alleges that it is damaged because "it paid LTD benefits to [Plaintiff] to which he was not entitled." Countercl. ¶ 36. At the pleading stage, Defendant merely must plead the fact of damages, and there is no requirement that Defendant allege the amount of damage. See Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002)("[I]t is important to distinguish between uncertainty in the fact of damage and in the amount of damage."). Because Defendant has alleged that Plaintiff's misrepresentations regarding his employment and income earned during the time Plaintiff claims he was disabled resulted in an overpayment, Defendant has sufficiently pleaded the damages element of his claims.

Defendant has sufficiently pleaded his intentional misrepresentation, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and concealment<sup>2</sup> claims, and the Court **DENIES** Plaintiff's Motion as to these claims.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Defendant's concealment claim is just another form of his fraud claim and is thus evaluated the same as Defendant's fraud claim for purposes of Plaintiff's Motion. <u>See Sung v. Hamilton</u>, 7 710 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047 (D. Haw. 2010)(treating a fraudulent concealment claim as fraud based on alleged failures to disclose information).

Equitable Restitution Under ERISA § 502(a)(3)
 ERISA § 502(a)(3), as codified in 29 U.S.C.
 § 1132(a)(3), is a catchall remedial provision that
 authorizes a civil action

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"by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan."

9 <u>Varity Corp. v. Howe</u>, 516 U.S. 489, 518 (1996)(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). ERISA § 502(a)(3) acts "as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy." <u>Id.</u> at 490.

14 "[T]o state a cause of action under [ERISA 15 § 502(a)(3)], an ERISA plan must 'demonstrate (1) that 16 it is an ERISA fiduciary, and (2) that it is seeking equitable, rather than legal, relief.'" Carpenters 17 18 Health & Welfare Tr. v. Vonderharr, 384 F.3d 667, 672 19 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff does not 20 dispute that Defendant is a fiduciary under ERISA. Thus, the only inquiry necessary to determine whether 21 Defendant has stated a claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) 22 is whether the relief that Defendant seeks is 23 "equitable." 24

25 "The law has evolved in the ERISA context to 26 support an equitable restitution claim to recover 27 benefits" paid due to fraud or wrongdoing-resulting in 28 ill-gotten gains. <u>Trs. ex rel. N. Cal. Gen. Teamsters</u>

1	Sec. Fund v. Fresno French Bread Bakery, Inc., No. CV F
2	12-0187 LJO BAM, 2012 WL 3062174, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July
3	25, 2012). "[T]o establish entitlement to the
4	restitution of the alleged `ill-gotten gains' in this
5	case, plaintiffs must establish each of the elements of
6	a common law fraud claim." <u>Med. Benefits Adm'rs of MD,</u>
7	<u>Inc. v. Sierra R. Co.</u> , No. CIV. S-06-2408 FCD D, 2009
8	WL 2868716, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2009). As noted
9	above, Defendant has properly alleged a claim for
10	fraud. At the pleading stage, that is sufficient to
11	proceed with Defendant's claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3).
12	Accordingly, the Court <b>DENIES</b> Plaintiff's Motion as to
13	Defendant's claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3).
14	III. CONCLUSION
15	Based on the foregoing, the Court <b>DENIES</b>
15 16	Based on the foregoing, the Court <b>DENIES</b> Plaintiff's Motion.
16	Plaintiff's Motion.
16 17	Plaintiff's Motion.
16 17 18	Plaintiff's Motion. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: March 21, 2018 /s/ Ronald S. W. Lew HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
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