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8	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
9	CENTRAL DISTRI	CT OF CALIFORNIA
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11	CORRISSA AURORA PEREZ,	CASE NO. CV 18-0330 SS
12	Plaintiff,	
13	V.	MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
14	NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social	
15	Security,	
16	Defendant.	
17		
18		Ι.
19	INTRO	DUCTION
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21	Corrissa Aurora Perez (	"Plaintiff") brings this action
22	seeking to overturn the decisi	on of the Acting Commissioner of
23	Social Security (the "Commiss:	ioner" or "Agency") denying her
24	application for Supplemental Sec	urity Income ("SSI"). The parties
25	consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C.	§ 636(c) to the jurisdiction of
26	the undersigned United States M	Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. Nos. 11-
27	13). For the reasons stated belo	w, the decision of the Commissioner
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is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further administrative 1 2 proceedings consistent with this decision. 3 II. 4 5 THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 6 7 qualify for disability benefits, a claimant То must 8 demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 9 that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a 10 11 continuous period of at least twelve months. Reddick v. Chater, 12 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). 13 The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing 14 work previously performed or any other substantial gainful 15 employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 16 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. 17 § 423(d)(2)(A)). 18 19 To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an 20 Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 21 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are: 22 23 Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful (1)24 activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If 25 not, proceed to step two. 26 (2)Is the claimant's impairment severe? If not, the 27 claimant is found not disabled. If so, proceed to step 28 three.

1	(3) Does the claimant's impairment meet or equal one of the	
2	specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,	
3	Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is found	
4	disabled. If not, proceed to step four.	
5	(4) Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If	
6	so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed	
7	to step five.	
8	(5) Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, the	
9	claimant is found disabled. If so, the claimant is found	
10	not disabled.	
11		
12	Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari,	
13	262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-	
14	(g) (1), 416.920 (b) - (g) (1).	
15		
16	The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four	
17	and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five.	
18	Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. Additionally, the ALJ has an	
19	affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record	
20	at every step of the inquiry. <u>Id.</u> at 954. If, at step four, the	
21	claimant meets his or her burden of establishing an inability to	
22	perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant	
23	can perform some other work that exists in "significant numbers"	
24	in the national economy, taking into account the claimant's	
25	residual functional capacity ("RFC"), age, education, and work	
26	experience. <u>Tackett</u> , 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; <u>Reddick</u> , 157 F.3d at	
27	721; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). The Commissioner	
28	may do so by the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") or by	
	3	

1	reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20
2	C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as "the
3	grids"). <u>Osenbrock v. Apfel</u> , 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001).
4	When a claimant has both exertional (strength-related) and non-
5	exertional limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must
6	take the testimony of a VE. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th
7	Cir. 2000) (citing <u>Burkhart v. Bowen</u> , 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir.
8	1988)).
9	
10	III.
11	THE ALJ'S DECISION
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13	Plaintiff was awarded SSI benefits as a child starting March
14	25, 2008. (AR 76). Under § 1614(a)(3)(H) of the Social Security
15	Act, Plaintiff's disability status was reconsidered under adult
16	standards upon turning eighteen. $^1$ Step one of the five-step
17	sequential evaluation process is not used for redetermining
18	disability at age eighteen. 20 C.F.R. § 416.987(b). At step two,
19	the ALJ found that Plaintiff's learning disorder and borderline
20	intellectual functioning are severe impairments. (AR 22). At step
21	three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an
22	impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically
23	equal the severity of any of the listings enumerated in the
24	regulations. (AR 22-23).
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27	Plaintiff turned eighteen on July 21, 2013. (AR 22).
28	reacher carned ergneeen on oury 21, 2013. (AK 22).
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1	The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's RFC and concluded that she
2	can perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with
3	the following nonexertional limitations: Plaintiff cannot perform
4	"work involving more than simple tasks; any work involving more
5	than occasional contact with coworkers; and any work involving
6	public contact." (AR 23). At step four, the ALJ found that
7	Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (AR 26). Based on Plaintiff's
8	RFC, age, education, work experience, and the VE's testimony, the
9	ALJ determined at step five that there are jobs that exist in
10	significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
11	perform, including factory helper, wall cleaner, and machine
12	feeder. (AR 26-27). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's
13	disability ended on November 1, 2013, and she has not been disabled
14	since that date. (AR 27).
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16	IV.
16 17	IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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17 18	STANDARD OF REVIEW
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. "[The] court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of benefits when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." <u>Aukland v. Massanari</u> , 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing <u>Tackett</u> , 180 F.3d at 1097); <u>see</u>
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. "[The] court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of benefits when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." <u>Aukland v. Massanari</u> , 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing <u>Tackett</u> , 180 F.3d at 1097); <u>see</u> <u>also Smolen v. Chater</u> , 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. "[The] court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of benefits when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." <u>Aukland v. Massanari</u> , 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing <u>Tackett</u> , 180 F.3d at 1097); <u>see</u> <u>also Smolen v. Chater</u> , 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> </ol>	Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. "[The] court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of benefits when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." <u>Aukland v. Massanari</u> , 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing <u>Tackett</u> , 180 F.3d at 1097); <u>see</u> <u>also Smolen v. Chater</u> , 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing

1	"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than
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2	a preponderance." <u>Reddick</u> , 157 F.3d at 720 (citing <u>Jamerson v.</u>
	<u>Chater</u> , 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). It is "relevant
4	evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
5	support a conclusion." ( <u>Id.</u> ). To determine whether substantial
6	evidence supports a finding, the court must "`consider the record
7	as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that
8	detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.'" <u>Aukland</u> , 257 F.3d
9	at 1035 (quoting <u>Penny v. Sullivan</u> , 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.
10	1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming
11	or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its
12	judgment for that of the Commissioner. <u>Reddick</u> , 157 F.3d at 720-
13	21 (citing <u>Flaten v. Sec'y of Health &amp; Human Servs.</u> , 44 F.3d 1453,
14	1457 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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10	v.
17	V. DISCUSSION
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17 18	DISCUSSION
17 18 19	DISCUSSION A. <u>The ALJ's Reasons for Discrediting Plaintiff's Subjective</u>
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17 18 19 20 21	DISCUSSION A. <u>The ALJ's Reasons for Discrediting Plaintiff's Subjective</u> <u>Symptom Testimony Were Not Supported By Substantial Evidence</u>
17 18 19 20 21 22	DISCUSSION A. <u>The ALJ's Reasons for Discrediting Plaintiff's Subjective</u> <u>Symptom Testimony Were Not Supported By Substantial Evidence</u> Plaintiff testified that she does not drive and cannot use
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	DISCUSSION         A.       The ALJ's Reasons for Discrediting Plaintiff's Subjective Symptom Testimony Were Not Supported By Substantial Evidence         Plaintiff testified that she does not drive and cannot use         public transportation by herself because she gets lost. (AR 45-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	DISCUSSION A. <u>The ALJ's Reasons for Discrediting Plaintiff's Subjective</u> <u>Symptom Testimony Were Not Supported By Substantial Evidence</u> Plaintiff testified that she does not drive and cannot use public transportation by herself because she gets lost. (AR 45- 46). She always goes outside with a family member. (AR 47).
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	DISCUSSION A. <u>The ALJ's Reasons for Discrediting Plaintiff's Subjective</u> <u>Symptom Testimony Were Not Supported By Substantial Evidence</u> Plaintiff testified that she does not drive and cannot use public transportation by herself because she gets lost. (AR 45- 46). She always goes outside with a family member. (AR 47). Plaintiff takes graphic arts classes at Pierce College but
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	DISCUSSION A. <u>The ALJ'S Reasons for Discrediting Plaintiff's Subjective</u> <u>Symptom Testimony Were Not Supported By Substantial Evidence</u> Plaintiff testified that she does not drive and cannot use public transportation by herself because she gets lost. (AR 45- 46). She always goes outside with a family member. (AR 47). Plaintiff takes graphic arts classes at Pierce College but frequently needs to go the office to direct or guide her around campus. (AR 46, 49). The College provides Plaintiff assistance

1 graphics software, guidance by counselors, and extra time to take 2 tests. (AR 46-47, 49, 51). Her parents need to help Plaintiff 3 open the emails sent by the College. (AR 50).

Plaintiff testified that she has trouble handling money. (AR
48). She has tried to learn how to order food and pay for things,
but it does not "sink in." (AR 48). She has problems even doing
simple chores at home without assistance. (AR 47, 49).

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10 When assessing a claimant's credibility regarding subjective 11 pain or intensity of symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). 12 13 First, the ALJ must determine if there is medical evidence of an 14 impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. 15 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). "In this 16 analysis, the claimant is not required to show that her impairment 17 could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom 18 she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have 19 caused some degree of the symptom." Id. (emphasis in original) 20 (citation omitted). "Nor must a claimant produce objective medical 21 evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof." 22 Id. (citation omitted).

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If the claimant satisfies this first step, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony about the symptom severity. <u>Trevizo</u>, 874 F.3d at 678 (citation omitted); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 ("[T]he ALJ may reject the

claimant's testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only 1 if he makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons 2 3 for doing so."); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering 4 based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an 5 applicant not credible by making specific findings 6 as to 7 credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each."). 8 "This is not an easy requirement to meet: The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases." 9 10 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted). 11 In discrediting the claimant's subjective symptom testimony, 12 13 the ALJ may consider the following: 14 15 (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such 16 claimant's reputation for the lying, prior as 17 inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and 18 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 19 candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained 20 failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed 21 course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily 22 activities. 23 24 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation 25 omitted). Inconsistencies between a claimant's testimony and 26 conduct, or internal contradictions in the claimant's testimony, 27 also may be relevant. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 28 8

1997). In addition, the ALJ may consider the observations of 1 treating and examining physicians regarding, among other matters, 2 3 the functional restrictions caused by the claimant's symptoms. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; accord Burrell, 775 F.3d at 1137. However, 4 5 it is improper for an ALJ to reject subjective testimony based "solely" on its inconsistencies with the objective medical evidence 6 7 presented. Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 8 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

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Further, the ALJ must make a credibility determination with 10 11 findings that are "sufficiently specific to permit the court to 12 conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant's testimony." <u>Tommasetti</u>v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 13 14 2008) (citation omitted); see Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 15 493 (9th Cir. 2015) ("A finding that a claimant's testimony is not 16 credible must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court 17 to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant's testimony on 18 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant's testimony regarding pain.") (citation omitted). Although an ALJ's 19 20 interpretation of a claimant's testimony may not be the only 21 reasonable one, if it is supported by substantial evidence, "it is 22 not [the court's] role to second-guess it." Rollins v. Massanari, 23 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

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The ALJ found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms," and the ALJ did not make a finding of malingering. (AR 28 26). Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's statements

were "not entirely credible." (AR 26). The ALJ found that 1 Plaintiff's "ability to take at least two classes per semester in 2 3 a college setting demonstrates an ability to perform simple repetitive tasks in a work setting." (AR 25). 4 "ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are 5 [subjective symptom testimony], because 6 inconsistent with 7 impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the 8 pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day." Garrison, 759 F.3d 9 at 1016. If a claimant's level of activity is inconsistent with 10 11 the claimant's asserted limitations, it has a bearing on 12 "Though inconsistent daily activities may credibility. Id. 13 provide a justification for rejecting symptom testimony, the mere 14 fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities does 15 not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall 16 disability." Revels, 874 F.3d at 667 (citation and alterations 17 omitted); see Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) 18 ("This court has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities does not in any 19 20 way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.") 21 (citation and alterations omitted). Indeed, a claimant "does not 22 need to be utterly incapacitated in order to be disabled." Benecke 23 v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

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Here, the ALJ fails to account for the assistance Plaintiff requires in order to attend college. Plaintiff is unable to drive and, without someone accompanying her, often has problems taking public transportation to school. (AR 45-46). She frequently gets lost on campus and her parents need to help her open the emails
 sent by the College. (AR 46, 49, 50).

- The ALJ also relied improperly on Plaintiff's admission "that 4 5 she is doing very well in school, with mostly A's and B's, and only sometimes C's in her graphic design classes." (AR 25). The College 6 7 provides Plaintiff with a dedicated note-taker, who also assists 8 Plaintiff open the graphics software required for in-class 9 learning, and Plaintiff is provided extra time to take tests.<sup>2</sup> (AR 46-47, 49, 51). "That [Plaintiff] could participate in some daily 10 11 activities does not contradict the evidence of otherwise severe 12 problems that [she] encountered in [her] daily life during the 13 relevant period." Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 643 (9th 14 Cir. 2017). Further, the ALJ did not explain how Plaintiff's daily 15 college activities, with considerable accommodations and 16 assistance, are transferable to a work setting. The ALJ "must make 17 specific findings relating to the daily activities and their 18 transferability to conclude that a claimant's daily activities warrant an adverse credibility determination." Orn, 495 F.3d at 19 20 639 (citation and alteration omitted). Here, the ALJ neither made 21 specific findings nor pointed to any record evidence to support her conclusion that 22 Plaintiff's college activities are 23 "transferable" to a work setting. See id.
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<sup>26 &</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The VE testified that someone who is not able to sustain work activity independent of others would not be able to perform the requirements of the factory helper, wall cleaner, or machine feeder occupations. (AR 61-62).

1	The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff "indicated a higher level of
2	functioning than portrayed in her testimony on a consultative
3	examination, [which] indicated that according to [Plaintiff]
4	was able to complete household chores, cook, run errands,
5	occasionally go to the movies, use the computer, and go to the
6	gym." (AR 25). However, Plaintiff did not testify that she was
7	unable to perform household chores. Instead, she stated that she
8	needs assistance to perform chores because she does not always
9	retain her parents' instructions. (AR 49).
10	
11	Finally, the ALJ emphasized erroneously that Plaintiff "denied
12	any current depressive and anxiety symptoms, and stated she was
13	not receiving any mental health services." (AR 25). Plaintiff's
14	alleged disability is caused by her learning disability and
15	borderline intellectual functioning, not depression and anxiety.
16	Indeed, the ALJ acknowledged that the severity of Plaintiff's
17	learning disability and borderline intellectual functioning "is
18	established by the objective medical evidence." (AR 22).
19	
20	In sum, the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing
21	reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting
22	Plaintiff's subjective symptoms. The matter is remanded for
23	further proceedings. On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate
24	Plaintiff's symptoms in accordance with the current version of the
25	agency's regulations and guidelines, taking account the full range
26	of medical evidence.
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## 1 B. The ALJ Did Not Provide Germane Reasons For Rejecting Lay 2 Testimony

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lay witnesses provided statements 4 Multiple that were 5 supportive of and consistent with Plaintiff's testimony and her 6 allegations of significant limitations caused by her borderline 7 intellectual functioning and learning disability. Karolanne K. Asmus-Kim, Ed.D., Plaintiff's high school special education 8 9 teacher, opined that Plaintiff has difficulty with self-help 10 abilities, abstract concepts, and conflict resolution. (AR 213). 11 Dr. Asmus-Kim concluded that Plaintiff "will need to have 12 assistance from others to live and manage daily tasks." (AR 213). 13 "Simple tasks such as cooking for herself, paying bills, keeping 14 employment, understanding right from wrong and several other daily 15 tasks will require assistance from others for [Plaintiff] to 16 maintain a good quality of life." (AR 213.

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18 Mirriam H. Gottlieb, a disabilities specialist at Pierce 19 College, reported that Plaintiff has been provided with a dedicated 20 note-taker because she "has difficulty keeping up with lectures 21 due to her problems with processing speed and comprehension." (AR 22 212). Ms. Gottlieb further opined that Plaintiff is unable to take 23 more than two courses each semester because Plaintiff needs more 24 time to process information due to her lack of comprehension 25 skills. (AR 216).

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27 Plaintiff's father, Manuel Perez, provided testimony at the28 hearing. (AR 52-59). Perez testified that his daughter has been

1 unable to master basic safety skills, like not crossing the street 2 on a red light, because she has difficulty paying attention and 3 focusing. (AR 54). He testified that Plaintiff is unable to 4 perform household chores without supervision and instruction. (AR 5 56-59).

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7 Plaintiff also provided statements from her brother and 8 mother. (AR 214-15). They stated that Plaintiff is unable to 9 complete simple tasks without reminders, supervision, and 10 assistance. (AR 214-15). Plaintiff has trouble controlling her 11 emotions and gets easily stressed. (AR 214-15).

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13 "Lay testimony as to a claimant's symptoms is competent 14 evidence that an ALJ must take into account, unless he or she 15 expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons 16 germane to each witness for doing so." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 17 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). "The fact that lay testimony and third-18 party function reports may offer a different perspective than medical records alone is precisely why such evidence is valuable 19 at a hearing." Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 640. 20

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Here, the ALJ briefly summarized Dr. Asmus-Kim's and Ms. Gottlieb's statements (AR 25), but failed to discuss the weight to be afforded to them. Merely summarizing their letters does not qualify as a "germane reason" for rejecting them.<sup>3</sup> Further, the

<sup>3</sup> Defendant does not address the ALJ's failure to provide germane reasons for rejecting Dr. Asmus-Kim's and Ms. Gottlieb's statements. (Dkt. No. 22 at 6-8). ALJ failed to acknowledge, discuss, or provide <u>any</u> reasoning for apparently rejecting the testimony and statements by Plaintiff's family members. To properly reject lay testimony, the ALJ is required to provide reasons that are "germane to each witness." Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511.

7 Defendant arques that Plaintiff's father's testimony 8 "conflicts with what Plaintiff told Dr. Shirokhi regarding her 9 ability to cook, do chores, and go out with friends and to the 10 gym." (Dkt. No. 22 at 7). However, the court is "constrained to 11 review the reasons the ALJ asserts." Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 12 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery 13 Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). The court "review[s] only the 14 reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and 15 may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." 16 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010. Here, the ALJ did not provide any 17 reason for apparently rejecting Mr. Perez's testimony.

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19 Defendant contends that the ALJ is not required "to discuss 20 every piece of evidence." (Dkt. No. 22 at 7). Even if this is 21 accurate, the ALJ is not permitted to reject all lay testimony 22 without expressly providing reasons "germane to each witness." 23 Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511. Finally, Defendant contends that the ALJ's 24 failure to "explain how the third-party testimony influenced the outcome of the decision" is harmless error because it was 25 26 "inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability determination." 27 (Dkt. No. 22 at 9). To the contrary, because the ALJ erred in 28 rejecting Plaintiff's subjective statements, as discussed above,

the ALJ's apparent rejection of the lay testimony, which supported Plaintiff's testimony, was not harmless error. In sum, the ALJ failed to provide germane reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for apparently rejecting lay testimony. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.<sup>4</sup> On remand, the ALJ shall fully evaluate the lay witness testimony and may disregard the lay statements only by providing reasons that are germane to each witness. Plaintiff also argues that in assessing her RFC, the ALJ failed to fully account for the limitations included in her testimony and the lay witnesses' statements. (Dkt. No. 21 at 23-25). However, it is unnecessary to reach Plaintiff's arguments on this ground, as the matter is remanded for the alternative reasons discussed at length in this Order. However, after reconsideration of the Plaintiff's testimony and the lay witness statements, it will likely be necessary for the ALJ to reconsider Plaintiff's RFC. 

1	VI.
2	CONCLUSION
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4	Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered REVERSING
5	the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for
6	further proceedings consistent with this decision. IT IS FURTHER
7	ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and
8	the Judgment on counsel for both parties.
9	
10	DATED: October 5, 2018
11	
12	/S/ SUZANNE H. SEGAL
13	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14	THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW,
15	LEXIS/NEXIS OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.
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