1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	
11	ANGELICA R.,) NO. CV 19-4191-E
12	Plaintiff,
13	V. () MEMORANDUM OPINION
14	ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of) AND ORDER OF REMAND Social Security,)
15	Defendant.
16)
17	
18	Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section $405(g)$, IT IS
19	HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary
20	judgment are denied, and this matter is remanded for further
21	administrative action consistent with this Opinion.
22	
23	PROCEEDINGS
24	
25	Plaintiff filed a complaint on May 14, 2019, seeking review of
26	the Commissioner's denial of benefits. The parties consented to
27	proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on June 7, 2019.
28	Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2019.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on October 28, 2019. 1 The Court has taken the motions under submission without oral 2 argument. See L.R. 7-15; "Order," filed May 16, 2019. 3 4 BACKGROUND 5 6 7 Plaintiff asserts disability since November 29, 2009, based on allegations of, inter alia, fibromyalgia, herniated discs, anxiety, 8 depression, panic attacks, "ADHD" (attention deficit hyperactivity 9 disorder), and chronic pain in her right hand, wrists, ankles, back, 10 hips, right knee, legs and right foot (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 11 12 37, 46-47, 222, 226, 246, 304). Rheumatologist and Qualified Medical 13 Examiner ("QME") Dr. Allen I. Salick diagnosed fibromyalgia syndrome 14 based on the 2010 American College of Rheumatology criteria for diagnosis (A.R. 483). Dr. Salick opined that Plaintiff cannot sit for 15 more than 10-15 minutes at a time or stand/walk for more than 30 16 minutes at a time without pain, has difficulty grasping, gripping, 17 lifting, carrying, twisting, bending, stooping and squatting, and 18 19 cannot be in an air conditioned room (A.R. 487; see also A.R. 474-75). 20 Other workers compensation treating and examining doctors also found Plaintiff incapable of performing light work. See A.R. 356-57 21 (chiropractor/QME Henry Kan's opinion); 452-53 (treating orthopedic 22 surgeon Dr. Bal Rajagopalan's opinion); 645-46 (orthopedic surgeon/QME 23 Dr. Daniel M. Silver's opinion); see also A.R. 573 (treating spine 24 25 surgeon Dr. Sam Bakshian's opinion, which included a 25 pound lifting capacity, but with profound restrictions on standing, walking and 26 other activities). 27 28 ///

An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") reviewed the record and heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert (A.R. 33-81). The ALJ found that Plaintiff has "severe" degenerative disc disease, lumbar spine arthritis, history of lumbar strain/sprain and anxiety disorder (A.R. 20). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's alleged fibromyalgia was not a medically determinable impairment (A.R. 20).¹

The ALJ deemed Plaintiff capable of performing a range of light 8 work, limited to: (1) frequent climbing of ramps and stairs; 9 (2) occasional climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds; 10 (3) occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling and 11 12 overhead reaching with the right upper extremity; and (4) avoidance of environmental irritants and temperature extremes. The ALJ found that 13 14 Plaintiff is capable of "performing simple and routine tasks and complex tasks," interacting and responding appropriately with 15 supervisors, co-workers and the public, and adjusting to routine 16 changes in the workplace. See A.R. 21-26 (adopting consultative 17 examiners' functional capacity determinations at A.R. 600-01 and 608, 18 19 which are slightly more restrictive than the State agency physician's residual functional capacity determination on initial review at A.R. 20 The ALJ identified certain light jobs Plaintiff assertedly 91-92). 21 could perform, and, on that basis, denied disability benefits (A.R. 22 26-27 (adopting vocational expert testimony at A.R. 75-77)). 23 The 24 Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-4).

25 ///

26

7

^{27 &}lt;sup>1</sup> The ALJ failed to discuss why the ALJ also found that Plaintiff's alleged depression and chronic pain were not "severe" 28 impairments. <u>See</u> A.R. 20.

STANDARD	OF	REVIEW
----------	----	--------

23Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the4Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's5findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the6Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v.7Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue,8499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner,9682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such10relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to11support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 40112(1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v.13Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).14151617181919191019191019101010191010101111121314151516161718191919101011111213141515161617	1	STANDARD OF REVIEW
 Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u>, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); <u>see also Widmark v.</u> <u>Barnhart</u>, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 	2	
 findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u>, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. <u>Barnhart</u>, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). /// /// /// 	3	Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the
Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); <u>Hoopai v. Astrue</u> , 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); <u>see also Brewes v. Commissioner</u> , 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u> , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); <u>see also Widmark v.</u> <u>Barnhart</u> , 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). /// ///	4	Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's
<pre>7 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 8 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 9 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such 10 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 11 support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u>, 402 U.S. 389, 401 12 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); <u>see also Widmark v.</u> 13 <u>Barnhart</u>, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 14 15 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 16 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the 17 Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by 18 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 19 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 20 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 21 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 22 23 <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u>, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///</pre>	5	findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the
8 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u> , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); <u>see also Widmark v.</u> <u>Barnhart</u> , 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). /// // ///	6	Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v.
 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u>, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); <u>see also Widmark v.</u> <u>Barnhart</u>, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u>, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). /// /// /// 	7	Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); <u>Hoopai v. Astrue</u> ,
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u> , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); <u>see also Widmark v.</u> <u>Barnhart</u> , 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). ///	8	499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner,
support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u> , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); <u>see also Widmark v.</u> <u>Barnhart</u> , 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). /// ///	9	682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "such
(1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Image: Constraint of the ALJ. But the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Image: Constraint of the ALJ. But the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Image: Constraint of the ALJ. But the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Image: Constraint of the ALJ. But the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Image: Constraint of the ALJ. But the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Image: Constraint of the ALJ. But the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that support and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion.	10	relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
13 Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 14 15 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may 16 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the 17 Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by 18 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 19 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 20 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 21 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 22 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///	11	support a conclusion." <u>Richardson v. Perales</u> , 402 U.S. 389, 401
1415If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may16not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the17Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by18isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.19Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole,20weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that21detracts from the [administrative] conclusion.2223Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and24quotations omitted).25///26///27///	12	(1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v.
If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). ///	13	<u>Barnhart</u> , 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). ///	14	
17 Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by 18 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 19 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 22 23 <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///	15	If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may
18 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. 19 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, 20 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 21 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 22 23 <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///	16	not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the
19 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 22 23 <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///	17	Commissioner's decision cannot be affirmed simply by
<pre>20 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that 21 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 22 23 <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u>, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///</pre>	18	isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.
detracts from the [administrative] conclusion. 22 23 <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///	19	Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole,
22 23 <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///	20	weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that
23 <u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and 24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///	21	detracts from the [administrative] conclusion.
<pre>24 quotations omitted). 25 /// 26 /// 27 ///</pre>	22	
25 /// 26 /// 27 ///	23	<u>Tackett v. Apfel</u> , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and
26 /// 27 ///	24	quotations omitted).
27 ///	25	///
	26	///
28 ///	27	///
	28	///

1	DISCUSSION
2	
3	Plaintiff contends, inter alia: (1) the ALJ erred in the
4	evaluation of opinions from the workers compensation treating and
5	examining physicians; and (2) the ALJ erred in finding that
6	Plaintiff's alleged fibromyalgia is not a "medically determinable
7	impairment" and in failing to consider limitations from fibromyalgia
8	in assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. The Court
9	agrees.
10	
11	I. Summary of the Relevant Medical Record
12	
13	As detailed below, several workers compensation physicians
14	treated or evaluated Plaintiff for various medical conditions
15	throughout the period of alleged disability. With one arguable
16	exception (QME Dr. Mitchell U. Silverman, discussed <u>infra</u> at footnote
17	7), all of the treating and examining physicians who opined regarding
18	Plaintiff's capacity appeared to believe that, in one respect or
19	another, Plaintiff has a lesser functional capacity than the ALJ
20	assessed. ²
21	
22	² The record appears to be missing treatment notes from
23	several of Plaintiff's providers and contains incomplete records
24	from other providers (including Dr. Silverman). <u>See</u> A.R. 323-24 (attorney letter listing providers). Plaintiff's counsel
25	informed the ALJ at the administrative hearing that counsel did not have records from rheumatologist Dr. Ellis Assuta or Mid-
26	Valley Pain Management, which assertedly were "critical" for
27	Plaintiff's "biggest issue," her alleged fibromyalgia (A.R. 37, 43-44). The ALJ agreed to keep the medical record open for 14
28	days (A.R. 44). Even so, the record still contains no treatment records from Dr. Ellis Assuta or from Mid-Valley Pain Management

2

A. Plaintiff's Injury and Initial Treatment

Plaintiff suffered a work related injury on November 29, 2009. 3 4 The record does not contain any provider's notes from Plaintiff's initial treatment immediately following this injury. The Court's 5 summary is gleaned from later providers' treatment notes. Plaintiff 6 7 was injured while working as a grocery stocker when a pallet fell on her right knee, twisting her right ankle and knocking her back into 8 9 another pallet, which she held up with her right elbow and wrist while calling for help (A.R. 386). Her employer's doctor examined Plaintiff 10 on December 2, 2009, and in January of 2010 prescribed medication, 11 12 crutches, a knee brace and physical therapy, and ordered her off work for three weeks to be followed by only "light duty" (i.e., lifting, 13 14 pushing and pulling up to 25 pounds with use of a splint) (A.R. 387, 539). However, Plaintiff reportedly was fired when she returned to 15 work on December 24, 2009 (A.R. 387). 16

- 17
- 18

B. Plaintiff's Workers Compensation Treatment Records

19

20 21

1. <u>Dr. Tepper's Records</u>

In February of 2010, Plaintiff consulted workers compensation treating physician and orthopedic surgeon Dr. Gil Tepper, who prescribed medications and physical therapy and ordered Plaintiff off work for four weeks (A.R. 539). In March of 2010, Dr. Tepper continued Plaintiff's disability for four more weeks (A.R. 538). ///

A progress report from Dr. Tepper dated April 20, 2010, states 1 2 that Plaintiff's disability should continue for four additional weeks 3 (A.R. 326-29). Plaintiff reported that physical therapy helped her have less pain, but her low back/right knee pain persisted (i.e., she 4 complained of constant moderate lumbar spine pain radiating to her 5 right buttock with numbness and tingling in the right foot, 6 7 intermittent moderate right wrist pain radiating to the fingers with numbness and tingling, constant moderate right knee pain and popping 8 worsened by standing and walking, and intermittent headaches and 9 insomnia (A.R. 326-27). On examination, Plaintiff reportedly had a 10 slow, cautious gait, limited lumbar spine range of motion, positive 11 12 straight leg raising, positive right Braggard's test, "hypertonicity to lumbar para vertebral muscles," limited right knee range of motion, 13 14 positive right knee McMurray test and right knee medial joint line tenderness (A.R. 327). Dr. Tepper diagnosed sprain/strain in the 15 right ankle, right knee, right wrist and lumbar spine, and headaches 16 and insomnia secondary to injuries, for which Dr. Tepper continued 17 Plaintiff's medications and physical therapy (A.R. 327-28). 18 Dr. 19 Tepper also requested approval for lumbar spine and right knee MRIs to 20 rule out disc protrusion and internal derangement (A.R. 327-28).

- 21
- 22

23

2. Dr. Rajagopalan's Records

Orthopedic surgeon Dr. Bal Rajagopalan treated Plaintiff from May of 2010 through at least September of 2012 (A.R. 386-471, 617-36). Over the course this treatment, Plaintiff complained of, <u>inter alia</u>, right knee pain and low back pain radiating down to her right foot (A.R. 406, 409, 420, 446, 467, 617, 620, 623, 626, 631, 634), headache

(A.R. 409, 467), insomnia (A.R. 409, 446, 467, 631), right lower 1 extremity numbness and tingling (A.R. 631), and right knee "giving 2 out" and "locking" (A.R. 467, 634). On initial examination in May of 3 2010, Plaintiff reportedly had tenderness to palpation of the lumbar 4 spine and right knee, positive straight leg raising and positive 5 McMurray tests (A.R. 388-89). Dr. Rajagopalan diagnosed lumbar disc 6 disease with right leg sciatica, right knee internal derangement and 7 insomnia (A.R. 389). Dr. Rajagopalan prescribed Naprosyn, Vicodin and 8 a knee brace, ordered physical therapy and extended Plaintiff's 9 disability for six weeks (A.R. 389). Dr. Rajagopalan also requested 10 approval for MRIs of the lumbar spine and right knee (A.R. 389).³ 11

In June of 2010, Dr. Rajagopalan reviewed the MRI studies and 13 14 diagnosed lumbar disc disease and right knee fibromas, prescribed Naprosyn, ordered chiropractic treatment and extended Plaintiff's 15 disability for six weeks (A.R. 618). In August of 2010, Plaintiff 16 reported improvement from chiropractic treatment (A.R. 620). 17 Dr. Rajagopalan continued Plaintiff's chiropractic treatment and 18 19 medications, and extended Plaintiff's disability for six weeks (A.R. 621). In September of 2010, after finishing chiropractic treatment, 20 Plaintiff reported slight improvement in her low back, but no 21 improvement in her right knee (A.R. 623). Dr. Rajagopalan ordered 22

12

A May, 2010 lumbar spine MRI showed, <u>inter alia</u>, a 2millimeter disc protrusion at L4-L5 with facet arthropathy, and a
4-millimeter disc protrusion at L5-S1 abutting the left S1 nerve
root (A.R. 396-97). A May, 2010 right knee MRI showed no
evidence of internal derangement, and a suspected nonossified
fibroma or fibrous cortical defect in the posterolateral tibia
metadiaphysis (A.R. 398). From these studies, Dr. Tepper
diagnosed herniated nucleus pulposus at L4-L5, L5-S1 and right
lower extremity radiculitis (A.R. 615).

²³

more physical therapy, prescribed Vicodin, and extended Plaintiff's 1 2 disability for one month (A.R. 624). In December of 2010, Plaintiff 3 reported continued low back pain with no improvement (A.R. 406). Dr. 4 Rajagopalan ordered more chiropractic treatment, continued Plaintiff's medications (adding Tizanidine), and extended Plaintiff's disability 5 for two months (A.R. 407). Dr. Rajagopalan indicated that he was 6 awaiting authorization for a referral to a spine surgery specialist 7 (A.R. 407). 8

9

17

In February of 2011, Plaintiff complained of headaches and insomnia in addition to low back pain, reporting that she had seen a spine surgeon who had not recommended surgery (A.R. 409).⁴ Her lumbar spine reportedly was tender on examination (A.R. 409-10). Dr. Rajagopalan diagnosed lumbar disc disease, insomnia and headaches, continued Plaintiff's Vicodin, requested further evaluation by a spine specialist, a pain management specialist and an internist (A.R. 410).

Orthopedic surgeon and QME Dr. Daniel M. Silver 18 examined Plaintiff in November of 2010, reviewed medical records 19 including nerve conduction studies, and prepared a report dated March 11, 2011 (A.R. 643-58). Dr. Silver opined that the studies 20 suggest bilateral chronic active L5-S1 radiculopathy, bilateral nerve root impingement at L4-L5 and L5-S1, and right carpal 21 tunnel syndrome (A.R. 643-44). Dr. Silver diagnosed right wrist sprain/strain plus carpal tunnel syndrome, herniated nucleus 22 pulposus at L5-S1 with bilateral radiculopathy, a 2-millimeter 23 disc bulge at L4-L5, and right knee fat pad syndrome without meniscal tear but with generalized synovitis sprain/strain (A.R. 24 645). Dr. Silver opined that Plaintiff was "permanent and stationary," and should have work restrictions of no lifting more 25 than 15 pounds, no vigorous or repetitive gripping or grasping with the right upper extremity and no repetitive bending or 26 stooping, no prolonged standing, squatting, kneeling, stair climbing or ladder climbing (A.R. 645-46; see also A.R. 659-70 27 (May, 2011 supplemental report reaching same conclusion upon 28 review of additional medical records)).

1 Dr. Rajagopalan also extended Plaintiff's disability for eight weeks2 (A.R. 410).

In April of 2011, Plaintiff reported increased, intense pain at 4 8/10 (A.R. 420). Dr. Rajagopalan continued Plaintiff's Vicodin, 5 extended Plaintiff's disability for eight weeks, and noted that 6 7 Plaintiff was still awaiting approval for evaluation by specialists (A.R. 421).⁵ In June of 2011, Plaintiff complained of low back pain 8 9 with no change, despite having received a lumbar epidural steroid injection (A.R. 626). Dr. Rajagopalan prescribed Vicodin, Naprosyn, 10 Omeprazole and Soma, and extended Plaintiff's disability for eight 11 12 weeks (A.R. 627). In August of 2011, Plaintiff reported that she was using a TENS unit and attending aquatic therapy with noted improvement 13 14 (A.R. 440). Dr. Rajagopalan ordered more physical therapy, continued Plaintiff's medications, and referred Plaintiff for a functional 15 /// 16 111 17 111 18

19 ///

20

Internal medicine specialist and QME Dr. Arthur E. 21 Lipper examined Plaintiff in May of 2011, reviewed medical records, apparently prepared an initial report dated May 12, 2011 22 (which is not included in the record), and, upon review of additional medical records, prepared a supplemental report dated 23 June 3, 2011 (A.R. 431-39). Plaintiff complained of headaches 24 and insomnia with daytime fatigue and sleepiness, as well as pain in the shoulders radiating to the neck (A.R. 431). Dr. Lipper 25 diagnosed cervicogenic/muscle contraction headaches and insomnia related to Plaintiff's injuries (A.R. 432). In a further 26 supplemental report dated March 20, 2012, Dr. Lipper reported that Plaintiff's sleep habits had improved and opined that there 27 was no evidence of a current sleep disorder based on Plaintiff's 28 Epworth score and symptom complex (A.R. 456).

1 capacity examination (A.R. 441).⁶

Dr. Rajagopalan prepared a permanent and stationary report dated November 22, 2011, upon review of Kan's functional capacity evaluation (A.R. 444-53). Plaintiff complained of radiating low back pain at 7/10, and difficulty sleeping due to pain (A.R. 446). Dr. Rajagopalan reported Kan's examination results (A.R. 444, 446-49; <u>compare</u> A.R. 339-56), and adopted Kan's functional capacity evaluation (<u>i.e.</u>, that Plaintiff was capable of less than light work) (A.R. 452-53).

10

16

2

In June of 2012, Plaintiff complained of low back pain at 7/10 radiating down both legs (A.R. 465). Dr. Rajagopalan prescribed Medrol, requested authorization for referral to a pain management specialist for possible epidural injections and extended Plaintiff's disability for six weeks (A.R. 465). In July of 2012, Plaintiff had

6 Chiropractor and QME Henry Kan examined Plaintiff, 17 reviewed medical records, and prepared a functional capacity evaluation dated November 3, 2011 (A.R. 336-60). Plaintiff 18 described her low back, right leq and right foot pain as at 7/1019 on average (A.R. 338). Plaintiff reported that she had trouble sleeping due to severe stabbing back pain (A.R. 338). On 20 examination, Plaintiff had an antalgic gait, limited range of motion in the right upper extremity, reduced right grip strength, 21 reduced strength due to severe low back pain, and tenderness to palpation of the lumbar spine with "loss of spinal rhythm" (A.R. 22 339-52). Kan diagnosed lumbar disc disease, insomnia and 23 headaches for which he considered Plaintiff permanent and stationary (A.R. 353). Kan opined that Plaintiff could: (1) lift 24 up to 15 pounds occasionally and 8 pounds frequently; (2) stand up to four hours per day, sit less than eight hours per day; 25 (3) occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl and twist; and (4) frequently reach, handle, finger, feel, see, hear 26 and speak (A.R. 356-58). Kan precluded Plaintiff from working on slippery surfaces, right power gripping, repetitive firm gripping 27 and grasping, and "prolonged fine finger manipulation of over 10 28 minutes continuously" (A.R. 357).

positive right foot plantar fasciitis, positive bilateral straight leg raising, and limited range of motion in the lumbar spine on examination (A.R. 631-32). Dr. Rajagopalan ordered a home exercise program, prescribed Ambien and Vicodin, again referred Plaintiff to a pain management specialist and an internal medicine specialist and extended Plaintiff's disability for four weeks (A.R. 632).

In August of 2012, Plaintiff reported that she had not had 8 physical therapy since 2011, had not had any lumbar spine epidural 9 injections but had received one knee injection (A.R. 467). 10 On examination, Plaintiff had reduced right hand grip strength and 11 12 tenderness in her knee with pain on flexion and positive McMurray test (A.R. 468). Dr. Rajagopalan diagnosed a right knee meniscal tear, 13 14 lumbar disc syndrome, insomnia and headaches (A.R. 469). Dr. Rajagopalan gave Plaintiff a steroid shot in her right knee, ordered a 15 knee brace and physical therapy, continued Plaintiff's Vicodin, and 16 17 again referred Plaintiff to specialists (A.R. 469). During a September, 2012 examination, Plaintiff had tenderness and spasm and 18 19 limited range of motion in the lumbar spine and right knee, with a positive McMurray test (A.R. 634-35). Dr. Rajagopalan diagnosed 20 21 lumbar disc syndrome, right knee internal derangement and insomnia, prescribed Vicodin, Restoril and Mobic, referred Plaintiff to 22 specialists, requested a right knee MRI, and extended Plaintiff's 23 24 disability for six weeks (A.R. 635).

25 ///

7

- 26 ///
- 27 ///
- 28 ///

3. Dr. Bakshian's Records

The next available treatment records are from spine surgeon Dr. 3 4 Sam Bakshian from February of 2013 through January of 2014 (A.R. 522-74, 637-42). Dr. Bakshian evaluated Plaintiff, reviewed the medical 5 record and prepared an initial report dated February 25, 2013 (A.R. 6 7 525-50). Plaintiff complained of intermittent sharp right shoulder pain at 7/10 radiating to her lower back with numbness, intermittent 8 9 sharp right arm pain at 7/10 radiating to her hands/fingers with numbness and tingling in her right hand, occasional moderate stabbing 10 pain in the right wrist at 5/10, constant severe low back pain at 9/1011 12 radiating to her hips and down her right leg to the foot with numbness, constant sharp right leg pain at 9/10 radiating to her toes 13 14 with numbness in the right leg and foot, intermittent sharp stabbing pain in the right knee at 9/10 radiating to her right foot, anxiety 15 and depression, insomnia and occasional headaches at 7/10 (A.R. 527-16 On examination, Plaintiff had tenderness to palpation of the 17 28). cervical and lumbar spine and limited range of motion, a "wide-based" 18 19 limp, decreased motor strength in the right side, positive L'Hermite 20 and Spurling tests, no deep tendon reflexes in the biceps, quadriceps or Achilles, tenderness to palpation of the right shoulder, right 21 wrist, right knee and right hip with reduced strength in the right hip 22 (A.R. 540-48). X-rays showed mild cervical straightening and disc 23 24 space narrowing at L5-S1 with early spondylosis at L5-S1 (A.R. 548). 25 Dr. Bakshian diagnosed lumbosacral sprain/strain, disc dessication and bulging at L5-S1, right knee contusion, right ankle pain, right 26 shoulder pain, probable myofascial pain syndrome with overlay, sleep 27 disturbance, a "pysch disturbance no new anxiety and depression," and 28

1 cervicogenic headaches (A.R. 548). Dr. Bakshian opined that Plaintiff 2 presented with myofascial pain syndrome and should be evaluated by a 3 pain management specialist and a pain psychologist, noting that 4 Plaintiff has a "presumptive diagnosis of fibromyalgia" and therefore 5 should be evaluated by a rheumatologist (A.R. 549). Dr. Bakshian 6 ordered continued physical therapy and requested authorization for 7 evaluation by a rheumatologist (A.R. 549).

8

22

In April of 2013, Plaintiff complained of ongoing low back pain, 9 but indicated she was feeling better in her wrists, shoulders and 10 knees (A.R. 522). The right side of Plaintiff's lower back was tender 11 12 on examination (A.R. 522). Dr. Bakshian recommended a trigger point injection, as to which Plaintiff was reluctant to proceed, so Dr. 13 14 Bakshian referred Plaintiff for physical therapy and a rheumatology evaluation and ordered Plaintiff to remain off work (A.R. 523). 15 In June of 2013, Plaintiff complained of ongoing pain in her low back, 16 hips, knee, foot and ankle (A.R. 637). On examination, she was 17 tender, but with motor strength intact (A.R. 637). Dr. Bakshian again 18 19 noted that he suspected Plaintiff's pain has a myofascial origin, 20 recommended continued pain management, and extended her disability for two months (A.R. 638).⁷ 21

23 Orthopedic surgeon and QME Dr. Mitchel U. Silverman examined Plaintiff in May of 2013, reviewed the medical record 24 and apparently prepared an initial report dated May 9, 2013 (which is not a part of the record), and also prepared 25 supplemental reports dated June 19, 2013 and February 5, 2014, upon review of additional medical records (A.R. 575-95). Dr. 26 Silverman's initial work restrictions are not detailed in the 27 supplemental reports but are incorporated by reference (A.R. 583, 592-93). Dr. Silverman opined that Plaintiff could return to 28 (continued...)

In August of 2013, Plaintiff reported that she had been in 1 2 physical therapy, which improved her back, but that she was still having pain in her right hip and knee (A.R. 639). Plaintiff was 3 tender on examination, with positive Faber test, limited range of 4 motion and tightness in her hips (A.R. 639). Dr. Bakshian continued 5 Plaintiff's medications, recommended a right knee brace, a right hip 6 7 MRI and evaluation by an orthopedic specialist (A.R. 640-41). Dr. Bakshian extended Plaintiff's disability to her next appointment, and 8 noted that he was waiting on a rheumatologist report (A.R. 640-41).8 9

10

11

⁷(...continued)

work with preclusion from heavy lifting (A.R. 583). Dr. 12 Silverman stated it was "medically probable that [Plaintiff] did not require any work restrictions whatsoever" since Plaintiff 13 completed training to be a physical therapy aid during the 14 disability period (A.R. 593). However, in the latest report, Dr. Silverman also acknowledged Dr. Salick's finding (discussed 15 infra) that Plaintiff has fibromyalgia syndrome, and Dr. Silverman indicated that he would defer to a QME-level 16 rheumatologist, because rheumatological diagnoses are outside Dr. Silverman's expertise (A.R. 592). 17

Rheumatologist and QME Dr. Allen I. Salick evaluated 18 Plaintiff on August 7, 2013, and prepared a permanent and 19 stationary report (A.R. 472-90). Plaintiff reported a history of total body pain onset in December of 2009, with joint stiffness 20 and swelling, muscle aches, weakness, anxiety, depression, headaches, heartburn, acid reflux, sleep disorder and fatique 21 (A.R. 474). Plaintiff complained of pain in her entire body, pain from the neck radiating to the shoulders, pain in her arms, 22 elbows, wrist and hands, upper, mid and lower back pain radiating to her hips, buttocks and down both legs, pain in her knees, 23 ankles and feet, tingling in her hands and fingers, burning 24 sensation in her low back, shoulders and right knee, swelling in her joints, locking and sensitivity to touch in her right knee 25 and right hip, stiffness in her joints with swelling/tightness, mild hair loss, sensitivity to sunlight, dry eyes and mouth, 26 differences in her senses, restless legs and spasms, nonrestorative sleep, sensitivity to cold, fatigue, depression, 27 anxiety, loss of concentration, difficulty sleeping due to pain 28 (continued...) In September of 2013, Plaintiff reported ongoing pain,
accelerating the need for a right hip MRI (A.R. 551). Plaintiff
reportedly was being treated by a pain management specialist (A.R.
551). Dr. Bakshian noted that he was waiting for the right hip MRI
and recommendations from the pain specialist, and Dr. Bakshian ordered
Plaintiff to remain off work (A.R. 552).⁹

8 In January of 2014, Dr. Bakshian prepared a permanent and
9 stationary report (A.R. 559-74). Plaintiff complained of pain,
10 headaches, anxiety, depression and insomnia (A.R. 562-63). On

7

11

⁸(...continued) 12 and difficulty getting out of bed due to pain and stiffness (A.R. 474-75, 477). Plaintiff reportedly walked with an uneven gait 13 and had muscle spasms in the neck and upper back (A.R. 477). 14 Plaintiff reported difficulty with her activities of daily living due to her pain and fatique, an inability to sit for more than 15 15 minutes or stand more than 30 minutes, difficulty grasping, gripping, lifting, carrying, twisting, bending, stooping and 16 squatting, and difficulty with driving, self-care and performing tasks (A.R. 477-78). 17

On examination, Plaintiff reportedly had a normal gait but problems toe walking due to pain, reduced range of motion in the cervical and lumbar spine, 10/20 fibromyalgia tender points, and normal electrodiagnostic and laboratory studies (which ruled out inflammatory processes, radiculopathy, arthritis and other potential causes of Plaintiff's symptoms) (A.R. 480-82, 491-94). Dr. Salick diagnosed fibromyalgia syndrome according to the 2010 American College of Rheumatology criteria (A.R. 483, 486).

23 Dr. Rajan M. Patel evaluated Plaintiff for her hip pain on November 22, 2013 (A.R. 553-58). Plaintiff complained of 24 constant severe pain in her lower back at 9/10 radiating to her right hip and down to her foot with numbness and some popping and 25 grinding in her hip (A.R. 555). On examination, Plaintiff had positive Labral and Faber tests, and her MRI showed some 26 narrowing of the anterior labrum (A.R. 556-57). Dr. Patel 27 diagnosed right hip pain secondary to a degenerative labral tear and recommended that Plaintiff try a cortisone injection to her 28 right hip (A.R. 557).

examination, Plaintiff had tenderness to palpation of the cervical and 1 lumbar spine with limited range of motion, tenderness to palpation of 2 3 the right shoulder with pain on testing, tenderness to palpation of the right wrist and right knee, and positive Labral and Faber tests 4 (A.R. 563-69). Dr. Bakshian added a diagnosis of right hip pain 5 secondary to degenerative labral tear per Dr. Patel and indicated that 6 7 Plaintiff was permanent and stationary (A.R. 570-71). Dr. Bakshian opined that Plaintiff is precluded from lifting 25 pounds and from 8 "walking back and forth" (A.R. 573). Dr. Bakshian also stated that 9 Plaintiff should avoid any work requiring pushing, pulling, climbing 10 ladders, bending, stooping, reaching above her head, standing or 11 12 walking (A.R. 573).

- 13
- 14

15

4. Treatment by Sharp Imaging Medical Group, Inc.

Meanwhile, in November of 2013, Plaintiff presented to an 16 orthopedist at the Sharp Imaging Medical Group, either Dr. Steven N. 17 Brourman or Norman A. Linder, 10 asking the doctor to serve as her 18 19 primary care physician (A.R. 496-521). Plaintiff complained of 20 frequent pain in her right wrist and hand with tingling and numbness, worsened with repetitive use and eased with rest and medications, 21 intermittent aching, sharp middle and low back pain radiating to her 22 legs with numbness and tingling, worsened with prolonged sitting, 23 24 standing, bending, lifting and carrying and eased with rest and

25

26

¹⁰ The report from this evaluation appears to be only a partial copy; the report does not contain a signature page to identify the doctor who treated Plaintiff. <u>See</u> A.R. 521 (last available page of the report).

medications, continuous pain in the right knee, frequent pain in the right ankle worsened by standing/walking, depression and difficulty sleeping (A.R. 499-500, 502). Plaintiff reportedly was taking Vicodin and anti-inflammatory medication (A.R. 501). Plaintiff claimed that the pain severely limited her activities of daily living (A.R. 503-04 (detailing same)).

On examination, Plaintiff had positive Neer's and Hawkins-Kennedy 8 9 impingement tests, tenderness in the right scaphoid or lunate carpal bones and right wrist, positive Phalen's and Durkan's median 10 compression tests, classic patterns of right carpal tunnel syndrome, 11 12 increasing pain toward terminal range of motion in the thoracic and lumbar spines, right knee patellofemoral crepitus and patellofemoral 13 and medial joint line tenderness, positive McMurray test, and 14 decreased sensation in the right median nerve distribution (A.R. 505-15 The doctor diagnosed lumbar spine spondylosis (rule out lumbar 16 16). radiculopathy), rule out right carpal tunnel syndrome, right shoulder 17 subacromial impingement syndrome (rule out rotator cuff tear), right 18 19 knee chondromalacia patella (rule out medial meniscal tear), and rule 20 out intercarpal ligament tear right wrist (A.R. 517). The doctor requested authorization for nerve conduction studies, MRIs of the 21 right shoulder, wrist, ankle and foot, and prescribed 800 milligram 22 Motrin, Vicodin, Prilosec, and "extracorpeal shockwave therapy" for 23 Plaintiff's right shoulder, knee and ankle (A.R. 518-19). 24 The doctor 25 found Plaintiff temporarily totally disabled (A.R. 518-19).

26 ///

7

- 27 ///
- 28 ///

C. <u>Opinions of Consultative Examiners and State Agency</u> <u>Physicians</u>

Orthopedic surgeon Dr. H. Harlan Bleecker examined Plaintiff and 4 prepared a Complete Orthopedic Evaluation dated July 1, 2015 (A.R. 5 Plaintiff complained of pain in the right side of her neck, 6 604-09). 7 right shoulder radiating down her right arm to all of the fingers, and low back radiating down the right leg to the big toe, aggravated by 8 looking down, reaching, sitting, standing, walking, bending and 9 lifting (A.R. 604). Plaintiff also complained of right knee swelling, 10 reporting that her knee buckles and gives away, for which she wears a 11 12 knee brace (A.R. 604). Plaintiff reported a history of asthma, anxiety, panic attacks, depression and fibromyalgia (A.R. 604). 13 On 14 examination, she had an antalgic gait on the right side, could not walk on tiptoes or heels on the right side, had limited range of 15 motion in her neck, back (with a catch on extension), right shoulder 16 and right knee, reduced grip strength in her right hand, and "stocking 17 hypalgesia" in the right upper and lower extremities (A.R. 605-07). 18 19 Dr. Bleecker reviewed medical records, including imaging studies, and Dr. Bakshian's January, 2014 permanent and stationary report (A.R. 20 607-08). Dr. Bleecker diagnosed right shoulder impingement syndrome, 21 degenerative disc disease, lumbar spine degenerative arthritis and 22 internal derangement of the right knee (A.R. 608). Dr. Bleecker 23 opined that Plaintiff is capable of light work with occasional 24 25 kneeling, squatting, bending and reaching overhead with the right upper extremity (A.R. 608). 26 27 111

28 ///

1

2

Psychiatrist Dr. Maged Botros examined Plaintiff and prepared a 1 2 Complete Psychiatric Evaluation dated May 28, 2015 (A.R. 597-601). 3 Dr. Botros reviewed no medical records (A.R. 597). Plaintiff complained of panic attacks five to 10 times a day, lasting up to 10 4 minutes each, which assertedly have resulted in Plaintiff staying home 5 "all the time" (A.R. 598). Plaintiff reportedly denied any current or 6 prior symptoms of depression, mania or psychosis, and reported having 7 no treatment by a psychiatrist or therapist (A.R. 598). 8 Plaintiff 9 apparently stated that she could dress and bathe herself, but does no household chores and cannot go places by herself (A.R. 599). 10 On examination, Plaintiff had psychomotor agitation, an "okay" mood, 11 12 anxious affect and she was able to recall three of five items in five minutes, with "fair" insight and judgment (A.R. 599-600). Dr. Botros 13 14 diagnosed anxiety disorder (not otherwise specified), rule out panic disorder with agoraphobia (A.R. 600-01). Dr. Botros opined that 15 Plaintiff has mild limitations in all areas of functioning, and that 16 she had a possibility of improvement within 12 months, if treated 17 (A.R. 600-01). 18

19

In July of 2015, State agency physicians reviewed the available record and found limitations similar to the limitations found by Drs. Bleecker and Botros (A.R. 82-94).

23

24 II. <u>The ALJ's Erred in the Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence.</u> 25

In determining Plaintiff's physical residual functional capacity, the ALJ summarized the opinion evidence from Drs. Rajagopalan, Silver, Botros, Bleecker and Kan, but not the opinion evidence from Dr.

Bakshian (A.R. 23-24). The ALJ purportedly gave "partial" weight to the workers compensation treating and examining physicians' opinions, stating:

[The opinions] are somewhat consistent with the evidence at 5 However, the more recent evidence shows some the time. 6 7 [Citing Dr. Bleecker's July, 2015 consultative improvement. opinion at A.R. 604-13, Dr. Silver's, 2011 reports at A.R. 8 9 643-84, and Dr. Silverman's February, 2014 report at A.R. 685-96]. I afford little weight to the opinions of her 10 physicians that she is disabled under the workers' 11 12 compensation guidelines or that she is temporarily disabled. [Citations omitted]. The determination of disability is an 13 14 issue reserved for the Commissioner. These opinions are not entitled to controlling weight or given special 15 significance. Further, the evidence shows improvement in 16 her physical condition. The objective imaging shows no more 17 than mild degenerative changes. She reports pain and she 18 19 exhibits an antalgic gait, but she does not exhibit any severe physical limitations upon examination. 20 [Citing Dr. Bleecker's consultative examination at A.R. 604-13]. 21 The evidence establishes that the claimant is capable of 22 activities at the light exertional level, with additional 23 24 limitations.

25

4

26 (A.R. 25-26).

27 ///

28 ///

A treating physician's conclusions "must be given substantial 1 2 weight." Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988); see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989) ("the ALJ must 3 give sufficient weight to the subjective aspects of a doctor's 4 opinion. . . . This is especially true when the opinion is that of a 5 treating physician") (citation omitted); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 6 7 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing deference owed to the opinions of treating and examining physicians). Even where the 8 treating physician's opinions are contradicted, as here, "if the ALJ 9 wishes to disregard the opinion[s] of the treating physician he . . . 10 must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for 11 12 doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record." Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation, 13 14 quotations and brackets omitted); see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d at 762 ("The ALJ may disregard the treating physician's opinion, but only 15 by setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so, and this 16 decision must itself be based on substantial evidence") (citation and 17 quotations omitted). 18

19

The reasons the ALJ stated for rejecting the treating physicians' 20 opinions do not comport with these authorities. First, the ALJ's 21 reasoning is insufficiently specific. For the most part, the ALJ 22 lumped together the multiple opinions of the workers compensation 23 24 treating physicians, and the ALJ failed even to acknowledge Dr. 25 Bakshian's opinions. See, e.g., Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1038 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007) (an ALJ cannot avoid the specificity 26 requirements for rejecting treating physician's opinion by not 27 mentioning the opinion and making findings contrary to it). 28

Second, while the ALJ stated that the workers compensation 1 2 opinions were "somewhat consistent" with the evidence at the time, the ALJ inferred from more recent medical records that Plaintiff's 3 condition had significantly improved. This lay inference from medical 4 records cannot constitute a specific, legitimate reason for 5 discounting the physicians' opinions. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 6 7 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (an "ALJ cannot arbitrarily substitute his own judgment for competent medical opinion") (internal quotation marks and 8 citation omitted); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) 9 ("ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make 10 their own independent medical findings"); Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 11 12 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (an ALJ is forbidden from making his or her own medical assessment beyond that demonstrated by the record). 13 14 Neither the ALJ nor this Court possesses the medical expertise to 15 determine whether test results or fluctuating symptom reports demonstrated that Plaintiff's conditions significantly improved so as 16 17 to undercut the earlier opinion evidence. The presence of a fibromyalgia diagnosis renders any such determination by a lay person 18 19 particularly perilous.

20

As indicated above, essentially all the workers compensation treating and examining physicians who gave detailed opinions regarding Plaintiff's abilities found that she is more limited than the ALJ's /// 25 /// 26 ///

- 27 ///
- 28 ///

assessment.¹¹ Plaintiff has diagnoses of, inter alia, fibromyalgia, 1 lumbar disc syndrome, right knee internal derangement, headaches, 2 3 insomnia, right ankle pain, right shoulder pain/impingement syndrome, right hip pain secondary to a degenerative labral tear, and anxiety 4 disorder. Plaintiff has received, inter alia, injections, 5 chiropractic treatment, physical therapy, and narcotic pain relievers. 6 The ALJ did not discuss with any specificity the extent to which the 7 diagnosed conditions do or do not support the limitations the 8 physicians found to exist. 9

10

In sum, without a medical expert to interpret the record evidence, the ALJ's lay inference of significant improvement cannot furnish a specific, legitimate reason to discount the treating physicians' opinions.

15

The ALJ also erred in concluding that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia is 16 not a medically determinable impairment. "[T]here are no laboratory 17 tests to confirm the diagnosis [of fibromyalgia]." Benecke v. 18 19 Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Revels v. 20 Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 666 (9th Cir. 2017) (observing that fibromyalgia is diagnosed in part by evidence showing that another 21 condition does not account for a patient's symptoms). Consequently, 22 the presence of assertedly "mild" findings and snapshot evaluations of 23

The Court does not have Dr. Silverman's initial report, which may have found lesser limitations. The Court only has Dr. Silverman's follow up reports suggesting that Plaintiff might not have any work restrictions, but also indicating that he would defer to a QME rheumatologist concerning Plaintiff's fibromyalgia (A.R. 592-93).

Plaintiff's physical abilities, (which are inconsistent with other 1 snapshot evaluations), cannot properly impugn medical opinions 2 regarding fibromyalgia. See Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d at 657 3 ("SSR 12-2p recognizes that the symptoms of fibromyalgia 'wax and 4 wane' and that a person may have 'bad days and good days'") (citation 5 omitted); Johnson v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 409, 410 (1st Cir. 2009) ("the 6 7 musculoskeletal and neurological examinations are normal in fibromyalgia patients, and there are no laboratory abnormalities") 8 (quoting Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine at 2056 (16th ed. 9 2005)); McCormick v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3972700, at *15 (N.D. Iowa 10 July 26, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 4401853 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 14, 2013) 11 12 ("Because [fibromyalgia] is a rheumatic disease, it is not diagnosed through the type of objective findings utilized with neurological 13 orthopedic disorders. . . . In short, the fact that McCormick had 14 relatively normal MRI findings and lacked other objective findings 15 that would suggest neurological or orthopedic impairments does not 16 provide a good reason for discounting Dr. Luft's opinions"); Reliford 17 v. Barnhart, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1190-91 (N.D. Ala. 2006) 18 19 ("Fibromyalgia is not diagnosed by MRI or x-rays. . . . The negative MRI and x-ray scans are meaningless in fibromyalgia cases"); Curtis v. 20 Astrue, 623 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (S.D. Ind. 2009) ("The ALJ's 21 conclusion that Plaintiff's normal MRI and normal neurological results 22 were inconsistent with her diagnosis of fibromyalgia misunderstands 23 the nature of fibromyalgia"); cf. Coleman v. Astrue, 423 Fed. App'x 24 25 754, 755 (9th Cir. 2011) (the ALJ erred by "rel[ying] on the absence of objective physical symptoms of severe pain as a basis for 26 27 disbelieving [claimant's] testimony regarding" effects of fibromyalgia 28 symptoms).

The ALJ's cursory rejection of Dr. Salick's fibromyalgia 1 2 diagnosis is not supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Salick's diagnosis followed Dr. Bakshian's opinion that Plaintiff may have 3 The ALJ postulated that fibromyalgia is not a medically 4 fibromyalqia. determinable impairment because Plaintiff supposedly did not have the 5 symptoms required under Social Security Ruling 12-2p (A.R. 20). 6 То 7 the contrary, as Dr. Salick explained (and as detailed in Social Security Ruling 12-2p), a person suffers from fibromyalgia if she has: 8 (1) widespread pain that has lasted at least three months; 9 (2) repeated manifestations of six or more fibromyalgia symptoms, 10 signs or co-occurring conditions (e.g., muscle pain, fatigue or 11 12 tiredness, headache, numbness or tingling, insomnia, depression, and anxiety disorder); and (3) other causes of symptoms have been 13 14 excluded. See A.R. 483, 486; Social Security Ruling 12-2p. According to the medical records, Plaintiff (often and for years) had complained 15 of widespread muscle pain (A.R. 326, 338, 446, 474-79, 499-500, 527-16 28, 555, 562, 631), fatigue (A.R. 431, 474, 479), headache (A.R. 326, 17 409, 431, 467, 528, 563), numbness or tingling (A.R. 326, 499, 527-28, 18 19 555, 562, 631), insomnia (A.R. 326, 338, 409, 431, 467, 502, 563, 631), depression (A.R. 502, 528, 562, 604) and anxiety (A.R. 528, 562, 20 604). No other rheumatologist evaluated Plaintiff. No examining or 21 treating doctor disagreed with Dr. Salick's diagnosis of fibromyalgia 22 diagnosis. On the present record, substantial evidence fails to 23 support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's alleged fibromyalgia was 24 25 not a medically determinable impairment. Accordingly, the ALJ erred by failing to consider any fibromyalgia-related limitations in 26 assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. See Revels v. 27 111 28

1 Berryhill, 874 F.3d at 662.¹²

III. The Court is Unable to Deem the Errors Harmless; Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings is Appropriate.

The Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ's errors were 6 7 See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) harmless. (even though the district court had stated "persuasive reasons" why 8 9 the ALJ's failure to mention the treating physician's opinion was harmless, the Ninth Circuit remanded because "we cannot 'confidently 10 conclude' that the error was harmless"); Treichler v. Commissioner, 11 12 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Where, as in this case, an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the 13 14 proper approach is to remand the case to the agency"); see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (an error "is harmless 15 where it is inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability 16 determination") (citations and quotations omitted); McLeod v. Astrue, 17 640 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2011) (error not harmless where "the 18 19 reviewing court can determine from the 'circumstances of the case' that further administrative review is needed to determine whether 20 there was prejudice from the error"). 21

22

2

3

4

5

23

24

25

26

Defendant appears to contend that the ALJ's failure to find Plaintiff's fibromyalgia to be a medically determinable impairment

¹² Defendant appears to suggest that, even if Plaintiff suffers from fibromyalgia, the disease has not resulted in any limitations. The record does not support this suggestion with any degree of certainty.

necessarily was harmless, relying on Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 1 682 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Burch") and Taylor v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2773337, 2 at **2-3 (D. Or. July 12, 2010) ("Taylor"). Defendant thereby appears 3 to confuse a failure to find that an alleged impairment is medically 4 determinable (the present circumstance) with a failure to find that a 5 medically determinable impairment is severe (the circumstance in 6 7 Burch and Taylor). In assessing residual functional capacity, the Administration must consider all medically determinable impairments, 8 even those deemed not severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). 9 However, in assessing residual functional capacity, the Administration 10 considers only medically determinable impairments. See id.; Butler v. 11 12 Colvin, 2016 WL 8232243, at *4-5 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2016) ("the ALJ found Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was not medically determinable. . . . 13 14 Consequently, the ALJ did not incorporate Plaintiff's alleged limitations from her fibromyalqia into the RFC [residual functional 15 capacity] finding. . . . [B]y classifying Plaintiff's fibromyalgia as 16 a non-medically determinable impairment - rather than a severe or 17 non-severe impairment - the ALJ excluded the effects of this condition 18 19 when formulating Plaintiff's RFC, rendering the ALJ's RFC finding suspect") (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, the ALJ did 20 not consider the effects of Plaintiff's fibromyalgia when defining 21 Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. See id. Accordingly (and 22 unlike the circumstance in Burch and Taylor), the Court is unable to 23 conclude that the ALJ's error was harmless.¹³ 24

25 ///

26

The Court also observes that the Ninth Circuit reversed
 the <u>Taylor</u> decision more than eight years ago. <u>See Taylor v.</u>
 <u>Commissioner</u>, 659 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2011).

Remand is appropriate because the circumstances of this case 1 suggest that further administrative review could remedy the ALJ's 2 3 errors. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d at 888; see also INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon reversal of an administrative 4 5 determination, the proper course is remand for additional agency investigation or explanation, except in rare circumstances); Dominguez 6 v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Unless the district 7 court concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no 8 useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide 9 benefits"); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d at 1101 n.5 (remand 10 for further administrative proceedings is the proper remedy "in all 11 12 but the rarest cases"); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (court will credit-as-true medical opinion evidence only 13 14 where, inter alia, "the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose"); Harman v. 15 Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038 16 17 (2000) (remand for further proceedings rather than for the immediate payment of benefits is appropriate where there are "sufficient 18 19 unanswered questions in the record"). There remain significant unanswered questions in the present record. Cf. Marsh v. Colvin, 792 20 F.3d at 1173 (remanding for further administrative proceedings to 21 allow the ALJ to "comment on" the treating physician's opinion). 22 111 23 24 111 25 /// /// 26 111 27 28 111

1	CONCLUSION
2	
3	For all of the foregoing reasons, ¹⁴ Plaintiff's and Defendant's
4	motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded
5	for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.
6	
7	LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
8	
9	DATED: October 31, 2019.
10	
11	/s/
12	CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	¹⁴ The Court has not reached any other issue raised by Plaintiff except insofar as to determine that reversal with a
28	directive for the immediate payment of benefits would not be appropriate at this time.