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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEBREN A. PIERCE and  
LEONARD E. HADLEY,  
  
Plaintiffs,  
  
vs.  
  
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,  
et al.,  
  
Defendants.

Case No. EDCV 05-866-AHM (JWJ)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER  
GRANTING DEFENDANTS'  
MOTION FOR SUMMARY  
JUDGMENT

I. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On September 20, 2005, plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed a Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("Complaint") against San Bernardino County, et al. On October 3, 2005, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. On October 28, 2005, this Court issued a "Memorandum And Order Dismissing Civil Rights Complaint With Prejudice In Part And With Leave To Amend In Part" ("Memorandum and Order"). On December 23, 2005, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. On February 26, 2006, plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint. On February 2, 2007, defendants filed a "Notice Of Motion And Motion For Summary Judgment" ("Motion for

1 Summary Judgment”).

2 On February 7, 2007, this Court issued “Civil Minutes” (“Minute  
3 Order”) ordering plaintiffs to file an Opposition or Notice of Non-Opposition  
4 to defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. On February 9, 2007,  
5 plaintiffs filed an “Affidavit” regarding their alleged denial of medical  
6 treatment. Plaintiffs attached to the affidavit requests for medical treatment  
7 and correspondence directed to Sheriff Penrod. On May 9, 2007, this Court  
8 issued an “Order to Show Cause Regarding Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply with  
9 Court Order” (“Order to Show Cause”) requiring plaintiffs to show cause  
10 within twenty-one (21) days of that date. On June 22, 2007, this Court issued  
11 a Report and Recommendation that this action be dismissed without  
12 prejudice.<sup>1</sup> On July 2, 2007, plaintiffs filed an “Amended Objection to  
13 Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” (“Amended Objection”)  
14 claiming that their affidavit and attached exhibits make it unnecessary to file  
15 an Opposition or Notice of Non-Opposition. This Court will thus construe the  
16 affidavit and attachments as a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment  
17 and evaluate the Motion for Summary Judgment accordingly.

18  
19 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

20 Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Hadley was arrested on or around  
21 September 18, 2002 and charged with rape by force, false imprisonment, and  
22 lewd acts with a minor. (Third Amended Complaint, p. 1 of Claim I.)  
23 Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Pierce was incarcerated on or around April 5,  
24

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25 <sup>1</sup> In the Report and Recommendation, this Court inadvertently referred to plaintiffs in the  
26 singular form. This Memorandum and Order clarifies that the dismissal applies to both  
27 plaintiffs. Since plaintiffs filed an “Amended Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Report and  
28 Recommendation” on July 2, 2007, they were clearly neither confused nor prejudiced by the  
singular “plaintiff” references in the report and recommendation. Therefore, plaintiffs will not  
receive an extension of time to make a reply.

1 2000 and charged with violating Penal Code §§ 288 and 290. (Id., p. 1 of  
2 Claim II.) Plaintiffs name San Bernardino County and Sheriff Gary Penrod in  
3 their individual capacities as defendants, (Id., p. 3.), and allege that defendants  
4 violated plaintiffs' first and fourth through fourteenth amendment rights under  
5 the United States Constitution. (Id., p. 5.) Both defendants San Bernardino  
6 County and Sheriff Gary Penrod are joined as defendants in the Motion for  
7 Summary Judgment. (MSJ, p. 1.)

### 8 9 III. DISCUSSION

#### 10 **A. Standard of Review**

11 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is  
12 proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and  
13 admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine  
14 issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment  
15 as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material issue of fact is one that  
16 affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the differing  
17 versions of the truth. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106  
18 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

19 The moving party has the initial burden of "identifying for the court  
20 those portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence  
21 of any genuine issue of material fact." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.  
22 Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v.  
23 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). All  
24 facts and inferences drawn must be viewed in the light most favorable to the  
25 responding party when determining whether a genuine issue of material fact  
26 exists for summary judgment purposes. See Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464,  
27 467, 82 S. Ct. 486, 7 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1962); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint  
28 Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995).

1           If the moving party meets its burden, the responding party may not  
2 defeat a motion for summary judgment “in the absence of any significant  
3 probative evidence tending to support his legal theory.” Commodity Futures  
4 Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 282 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1979). Summary  
5 judgment cannot be avoided solely on conclusory allegations; the responding  
6 party must bear his burden to produce factual evidence in support of his claim.  
7 Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989). Thus, the responding  
8 party cannot stand on his pleadings, nor can he simply assert that he will be  
9 able to discredit the movant's evidence at trial. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809  
10 F.2d at 630. Legal memoranda and oral argument are not evidence and do not  
11 create issues of fact capable of defeating an otherwise valid motion for  
12 summary judgment. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952  
13 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1978). However, a verified complaint may be used as an affidavit  
14 opposing summary judgment as long as it is based on personal knowledge and  
15 sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55  
16 F.3d 454, 460 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). A verified motion functions as an affidavit as  
17 well. See Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1400 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998).

18           Although a court may not grant a motion for summary judgment simply  
19 because the non-moving party does not file opposing material, a court may  
20 grant summary judgment when the unopposed moving papers are sufficient on  
21 their face and show that no issues of material fact exist. Henry v. Gill Indus.,  
22 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993).

23           Having reviewed defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the  
24 accompanying evidence, this Court finds that defendants have met their  
25 burden of demonstrating that no triable issues of fact exist.

## 26 **B. Inadequate Medical Treatment**

27           Plaintiffs allege that Deputy Bennett and Deputy Rios violated plaintiff  
28 Hadley’s constitutional rights by ignoring medical injuries plaintiff Hadley

1 sustained while deputies transported him to court. (Third Amended  
2 Complaint, pp. 6-9 of Claim III.) Specifically, plaintiffs allege as follows:  
3 Deputies Bennett and Rios conducted a cross cuffing procedure which cuffed  
4 plaintiff Hadley's left arm and hand to inmate Ramirez's right waist. (Id., pp.  
5 6-7.) The procedure caused Hadley to fall and injure his head because Hadley  
6 has a partially paralyzed left arm, hand, and leg. (Id., pp. 7-8.) Although  
7 Deputies Bennett and Rios were aware that the procedure would likely injure  
8 and actually did injure Hadley, the deputies ignored the risks and failed to  
9 provide adequate medical treatment. (Id., pp. 6-9.)

10       The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual  
11 punishments and "embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized  
12 standards, humanity and decency." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97  
13 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). "[A] prison official violates the  
14 Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the  
15 deprivation alleged must be, objectively, 'sufficiently serious'. . . The second  
16 requirement follows from the principle that 'only the unnecessary and wanton  
17 infliction of pain implicates the Eight Amendment.' To violate the Cruel and  
18 Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a 'sufficiently  
19 culpable state of mind.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct.  
20 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). This state of mind must rise to the level of  
21 "deliberate indifference." Id.

22       Defendants argue that the record contains no evidence that Sheriff  
23 Penrod was subjectively aware of plaintiffs' complaints or that Sheriff Penrod  
24 violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. (MSJ, p. 9.) The Third Amended  
25 Complaint fails to allege that Sheriff Penrod was aware of any of plaintiff  
26 Hadley's medical conditions, and no other evidence suggests that Sheriff  
27 Penrod had a "culpable state of mind." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834.  
28 Defendants have thus met their initial burden of identifying the absence of a

1 genuine issue of material fact.

2 Plaintiffs' affidavit in reply to the Motion for Summary Judgment simply  
3 states that Sheriff Penrod "was made aware of plaintiff's injury and of his  
4 denial of medical treatment." (Affidavit, p. 1.) Such a conclusory statement,  
5 however, is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d  
6 at 1045. Plaintiffs also attach a letter to the affidavit which describes how  
7 plaintiff Hadley was handcuffed to another inmate while in transit to court.  
8 (Affidavit, Exhibit A). The letter also appears to claim that human excrement  
9 is flushed into plaintiff Hadley's toilets on a daily basis. (Affidavit, Exhibit A.)  
10 Although plaintiff Hadley apparently wrote the letter to Sheriff Penrod,  
11 plaintiff Hadley does not indicate whether he actually mailed the letter to  
12 Sheriff Penrod, whether Sheriff Penrod read the letter, or whether Sheriff  
13 Penrod is at all aware of the medical conditions described in the letter.  
14 Plaintiffs have therefore failed to provide any "significant probative evidence"  
15 as to Sheriff Penrod's culpable mental state, Commodity Futures Trading  
16 Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d at 282, and have thus failed to meet their burden  
17 of producing factual evidence in support of their inadequate medical treatment  
18 claim as to defendant Sheriff Penrod. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d at 1045.  
19 Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted for defendant Sheriff Penrod  
20 as to the issue of inadequate medical treatment.

21 With regard to defendant San Bernardino County, [a] local  
22 governmental unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees  
23 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Collins v. City of Harker  
24 Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1992).  
25 Since municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not  
26 the actions of the employees of the municipality, a plaintiff must demonstrate  
27 that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the product of a policy or  
28 custom of the local governmental unit. See Board of County Comm'rs v.

1 Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997); Ortez  
2 v. Washington County, 88 F.3d 804, 811 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996). “Where a plaintiff  
3 claims that the municipality . . . has caused an employee to [violate plaintiff’s  
4 constitutional rights], rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be  
5 applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions  
6 of its employee.” Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 405.

7 A plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by demonstrating that  
8 the alleged constitutional violation was caused by a failure to train municipal  
9 employees adequately. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-91,  
10 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989); Henry v. County of Shasta, 132  
11 F.3d 512, 517 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997).

12 Defendants argue that the record contains no evidence linking San  
13 Bernardino County with a policy facilitating deliberate indifference to serious  
14 medical needs. (MSJ, p. 8.) The record contains no evidence that defendant  
15 San Bernardino County has a policy or custom of promoting deliberate  
16 indifference to serious medical needs, or that San Bernardino County failed to  
17 train municipal employees adequately. Plaintiffs’ affidavit in reply to the  
18 Motion for Summary Judgment also fails to provide evidence of such a policy,  
19 custom, or failure to adequately train. Plaintiffs have thus failed to meet their  
20 burden of producing factual evidence in support of their inadequate medical  
21 treatment claim as to San Bernardino County. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d at  
22 1045. Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted for defendant San  
23 Bernardino County as to the issue of inadequate medical treatment.

### 24 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

25 Plaintiffs appear to allege that defendants [sic] violated plaintiffs’  
26 constitutional rights by providing ineffective assistance of counsel. (Third  
27 Amended Complaint, pp. 1-4 of Claim I, pp. 1-4 of Claim II.) A claim that  
28 challenges the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement, however, should be

1 addressed by filing a habeas corpus petition, while a claim that challenges the  
2 conditions of confinement should be addressed by filing a civil rights action.  
3 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935  
4 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499-500, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed.  
5 2d 439 (1973). A civil rights claim implicating the validity of a conviction is  
6 not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction has been invalidated. Heck  
7 v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383  
8 (1994). Indeed, Heck generally bars claims challenging the validity of an  
9 arrest or prosecution or conviction. See Guerrero v. Gates, 357 F.3d 911, 918  
10 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004) (Heck barred plaintiff's claims of wrongful arrest, malicious  
11 prosecution and conspiracy among police officers to bring false charges against  
12 him); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998)  
13 (Heck barred plaintiff's false arrest and imprisonment claims until conviction  
14 was invalidated); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Heck  
15 barred plaintiff's claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him  
16 and brought unfounded criminal charges against him).

17 Plaintiffs challenge the validity of their confinements based on the  
18 alleged ineffectiveness of their counsel, and have offered no evidence that their  
19 confinements have been discontinued. Plaintiffs therefore cannot proceed on a  
20 civil rights theory based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
21 Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted as to the issue of ineffective  
22 assistance of counsel. Moreover, such claim would not give rise to liability by  
23 these defendants, who were not counsel nor the Court.

#### 24 **D. Illegal Search**

25 Plaintiffs appears to allege that Officer Aguilar and another officer (name  
26 unknown) conducted an illegal search of plaintiff Hadley's house. (Third  
27 Amended Complaint, pp. 1-5 of Claim III.) Plaintiffs challenge the validity of  
28 a confinement based on an alleged illegal search, and have offered no evidence



1 that plaintiff Hadley's confinement has been discontinued. Plaintiffs therefore  
2 cannot proceed on their illegal search claim. Accordingly, summary judgment  
3 must be granted as to the issue of an illegal search.


4 **E. Immunity**

5 Defendants argue that Sheriff Penrod is immune from liability for an  
6 injury to prisoners because he did not personally participate in violating  
7 plaintiffs' rights. (MSJ, pp. 9-10.) The Court does not address defendants'  
8 claims of immunity in light of the conclusions discussed above.


9  
10 **ORDER**

11 Accordingly, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that defendants' Motion for  
12 Summary Judgment be granted and that the Third Amended Complaint be  
13 dismissed with prejudice as to defendants San Bernardino County and Sheriff  
14 Gary Penrod.

15  
16 DATED: August 18, 2008

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20 A. HOWARD MATZ  
United States District Judge

21 Presented by:  
22 DATED: August 14, 2008

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25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 JEFFREY W. JOHNSON  
United States Magistrate Judge