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Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).

Here, the ALJ presented at least three reasons in support of his credibility

determination.

First, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff reported three different years – 1990,

2000, and 2006 – as the last time she used drugs. (AR at 17, 379); see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (inconsistent statements may

properly discredit a claimant). Plaintiff mistakenly contends that these dates are

irrelevant because they all occurred well before the April 2008 onset date. (Joint

Stip. at 7.) Though disability is assessed from the alleged onset date, credibility is

subject to no such limitations. The inquiry is broad, simply concerning "the degree

to which the [claimant's] statements can be believed and accepted as true." Social

Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-7P, 1996 WL 374186, at *4. Thus, as to this point, the

ALJ made no error in his credibility determination.²/ 13

Second, the ALJ noted the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Kent Jordan, who found that Plaintiff appeared to "highly embellish' her psychiatric symptomatology." (AR at 16, 377); see Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (credibility may be assessed via physician reports that address "the nature, severity, and effect of" a claimant's alleged symptoms). According to Dr. Jordan, Plaintiff presented "a big discrepancy between [her alleged] psychiatric symptoms . . . and [the] reasons that [she] cannot work." (AR at 377.) These findings are significant, and weigh heavily against Plaintiff's veracity.

Third, the ALJ cited Plaintiff's sporadic work history before her alleged onset date as raising "a question as to whether [her] continuing unemployment is actually due to medical impairments." (AR at 18); see Strauss v. Apfel, 246 F.3d 676 (9th

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Plaintiff also hints, without any further explanation, that the ALJ relied upon an "isolated line of testimony" in observing her inconsistent statements. (Joint Stip. at 7.) This contention is without basis, as Plaintiff made these inconsistent statements on three different occasions. (See AR at 379.)

Cir. 2000) ("spotty work history" is a valid reason for discrediting a claimant). Remarkably, the Certified Earnings Report noted numerous "possible gaps" in Plaintiff's earnings, including from 1993 to 1996, and from 2001 to 2003. (*See* AR at 127.) No reason exists to upset the ALJ's determination here.

Thus, for the reasons stated above, the ALJ's credibility determination is valid.^{3/}

Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled. *See Mayes v. Massanari*, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001).

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered **AFFIRMING** the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits.

Dated: April 29, 2013

Hon. Jay C. Gandhi

Sout.

United States Magistrate Judge

The Court does, however, recognize that the ALJ erroneously found that Plaintiff's daily activities were "not limited to the extent one would expect, given [her] complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations." (AR at 17.) These activities included traveling by bus "every other day" and "walk[ing] for exercise." (*Id.*)

True, a claimant's credibility may be rejected when their daily activities are "inconsistent with [their] alleged symptoms." *Molina v. Astrue*, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). But the activities cited by the ALJ here are not so physically or mentally demanding that any inconsistencies are apparent. Indeed, under the "clear and convincing" standard, there must be some explanation as to how these activities undermine the specific limitations alleged by Plaintiff. *See Lester*, 81 F.3d at 834. Absent such a showing, this reason does not pass muster.

In any event, this error is harmless given the ALJ's other valid reasons discussed above. *See Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).