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8	UNITED STA	TES DISTRICT COURT
9	CENTRAL DIS	TRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11	LAWRENCE KALANTARI AND) YVETTE KALANTARI,	Case No. EDCV 14-02580-VAP (SPx)
12	Plaintiffs,	ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
13	v. ()	JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 18)
14	UNITED STATES OF	[Motion filed on June 19, 2015]
15	AMERICA,	
16	Defendant.	
17	10 0015 -	
18		efendant United States of America
		y Judgment against Plaintiffs
20 21		rette Kalantari ("Motion" or
21 22		After consideration of the of, and in opposition to, the
		guments advanced at the Motion
24		Defendant's motion for summary
25	judgment.	Derendante 5 moeron for Sammary
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I. BACKGROUND

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2	Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant	
3	United States of America on December 17, 2014. (Doc. No.	
4	1.) Plaintiffs seek a federal income tax refund of	
5	\$644,243.28 for the year 1998. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff	
6	Kalantari was a partner in the Yucaipa Companies, a	
7	partnership audited for the 1998 tax year. (Id. ¶ 7.)	
8	The partnership entered into a settlement with the	
9	Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in 2008. (<u>Id.</u>) As the	
10	result of the settlement agreement Plaintiffs' 1998	
11	income was adjusted. (<u>Id.</u> ¶ 9.)	
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13	On November 4, 2008, Mr. Kalantari paid the IRS	
14	\$620,000 based on an estimate of his tax liability from	
15	the settlement agreement. (Id. \P 8.) On July 14, 2010,	
16	the IRS made an assessment of \$531,762 in additional	
17	taxes due for the year 1998. The income tax deficiency	
18	assessment for the year 1998 is not in dispute. (Id. \P	
19	9.) In addition to the tax deficiency assessment,	
20	Plaintiffs were assessed a delinquency penalty and	
21	interest in the amounts of \$79,764.40 and \$564,478.88,	
22	respectively. (<u>Id.</u>) On January 4, 2011, Plaintiffs	
23	filed Form 843, Claim for Refund and Request for	
24	Abatement. (Id. \P 11.) The IRS denied the claim on the	
25	grounds that Plaintiffs did not file their 1998 income	
26	tax return on time. (<u>Id.</u> ¶ 12.)	
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II. LEGAL STANDARD

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2	A court shall grant a motion for summary judgment
3	when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
4	and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
5	of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); <u>Anderson v. Liberty</u>
6	Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving
7	party must show that "under the governing law, there can
8	be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict."
9	<u>Anderson</u> , 477 U.S. at 250.
10	
11	Where the non-moving party has the burden at trial,
12	the moving party need not produce evidence negating or
13	disproving every essential element of the non-moving
14	party's case. <u>Celotex Corp. v. Catrett</u> , 477 U.S. 317,
15	325 (1986). Instead, the moving party's burden is met by
16	pointing out that there is an absence of evidence
17	supporting the non-moving party's case. <u>Id.</u> The burden
18	then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is
19	a genuine dispute of material fact that must be resolved
20	at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); <u>Celotex</u> , 477 U.S. at
21	324; <u>Anderson</u> , 477 U.S. at 256. The non-moving party
22	must make an affirmative showing on all matters placed in
23	issue by the motion as to which it has the burden of
24	proof at trial. <u>Celotex</u> , 477 U.S. at 322; <u>Anderson</u> , 477
25	U.S. at 252. <u>See also</u> William W. Schwarzer, A. Wallace
26	Tashima & James M. Wagstaffe, <u>Federal Civil Procedure</u>
27	<u>Before Trial</u> § 14:144.

A genuine issue of material fact will exist "if the 1 2 evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 3 verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 4 248. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the 5 non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 6 7 380 (2007); <u>Barlow v. Ground</u>, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991); T.W. Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Pac. Elec. 8 Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). 9 10

III. FACTS

12 A. Uncontroverted Facts

13 Both parties cite facts that are not relevant to 14 resolution of the Motion. To the extent certain facts are not mentioned in this Order, the Court has not relied 15 16 on them in reaching its decision. The Court finds the 17 following material facts are supported adequately by 18 admissible evidence and are uncontroverted. They are 19 "admitted to exist without controversy" for the purposes 20 of this Motion. L.R. 56-3; see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 56.

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Plaintiffs Lawrence and Yvette Kalantari seek a tax refund for the year 1998 in the amount of \$644,243.28 from Defendant United States of America. (Doc. No. 19, Statement of Uncontroverted Facts ("SUF") No. 1; Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff Lawrence Kalantari was a partner in a

partnership which was audited by the IRS for the tax year 1 2 1998. (SUF No. 3; Compl. ¶ 7.) The audit was resolved 3 in 2008 when the partnership and its partners agreed to certain tax adjustments. (SUF No. 4; Compl. ¶ 7.) On 4 November 4, 2008, Mr. Kalantari paid the IRS \$620,000 5 based on an estimate of his tax liability from the 6 7 settlement agreement resolving the audit. (SUF No. 5; Compl. ¶ 8.) On July 14, 2010, the IRS assessed 8 Plaintiffs \$531,762 in additional taxes due for the year 9 1998. In addition to the tax deficiency assessment, on 10 11 July 14, 2010, Plaintiffs were also assessed a 12 delinguency penalty and interest in the amounts of 13 \$79,764.40 and \$564,478.88, respectively. (SUF No. 6; 14 Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.)

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16 B. Disputed Facts

The parties here dispute whether: (1) Plaintiffs filed their 1998 federal income tax return timely; (2) settlement of the partnership audit included interest suspension and a waiver of assessment of penalties against Plaintiffs; and (3) Plaintiffs are entitled to interest suspension pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6404(g). (See Mot at 4.)

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IV. DISCUSSION

2 In a refund suit, the taxpayer must prove that he or she is entitled to the refund amount. See United States 3 v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 439-440 (1976) ("In a refund 4 suit, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the amount 5 he is entitled to recover."); Wall v. United States, 133 6 7 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998) (In a conventional refund action, "the taxpayer bears the burden of proving 8 9 the amount he is entitled to recover."). Moreover, "[w]hen reviewing the assessment of taxes and penalties, 10 11 '[t]he ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue enjoys a presumption of correctness and a taxpayer bears 12 13 the burden of proving it to be wrong.'" Id. Hence, to 14 get a refund, Plaintiffs must prove that they filed their 1998 income tax return on time. 15

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17 A. Did Plaintiffs file their 1998 federal income tax 18 return on time?

19 The filing of calendar year federal income tax 20 returns must be made before April 15th after the close of the preceding calendar year. 26 U.S.C. § 6072(a). 21 By 22 filing Form 4868 ("Application for Automatic Extension of 23 Time to File U.S. Individual Income Tax Return"), on or before the April 15 deadline, taxpayers may receive an 24 automatic four-month extension to file their return. 25 26 U.S.C. § 6081; Treas. Regs., 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6081-4(a) and 26 27 (b)(1)-(4). If taxpayers require an additional extension 28

1 of time to file, they may file Form 2688 ("Application 2 for Additional Extension of Time to File U.S. Individual 3 Income Tax Return"), which is not automatic, but 4 discretionary, and may be granted for "good cause." 5

Form 2688's instructions specifically advise 6 7 taxpayers that they must show good cause for requesting an additional delay beyond the automatic extension and 8 that the additional extension request should be filed 9 early so that if denied, taxpayers can still file their 10 Torres v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1998-230, 11 return on time. 12 *1, fn.4, 1998 WL 341024 (U.S. Tax Court), at *2; 13 <u>Bergersen v. Comm'r</u>, T.C. Memo. 1995-424, *27, 1995 WL 510012 (U.S. Tax Court); Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.6081-14 15 1(b)(ii).

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Hence, to show that their 1998 return was filed timely, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) they filed an application for an additional extension with the IRS; (2) they showed good cause why they could not file the return by August 15, 1999; and (3) the IRS granted the additional extension of time.

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Here, Plaintiffs' 1998 federal income tax return was due April 15, 1999, but they filed a timely application for an automatic extension. (Exh. A to Compl., date "4-15-1999"; "Extension of Time to File"; and "subsequent 28

1 payment [\$]1,278,476.00".) Plaintiffs' timely filing 2 extended the due date to August 15, 1999. (Exh. A to 3 Compl., "Ext. Date 08-15-1999".) To gain an additional 4 extension, Plaintiffs were required to file Form 2688 by 5 August 15, 1999 showing good cause. The IRS official 6 record does not show that Plaintiffs filed Form 2688 for 7 an additional extension or that the IRS granted a 8 request. (Mot. at 5.)

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Plaintiffs contend they did file a timely Form 2688 10 11 and reasonably believed the IRS granted the additional 12 extension as it had done in the past. (See generally, 13 Doc. No. 20-1, Declaration of Joseph Mannino ("Mannino Decl."); Doc. No. 20-2, Declaration of Lawrence Kalantari 14 ("Kalantari Decl.").) To support this contention, 15 16 Plaintiffs point to the general business practices of 17 Joseph Mannino, Plaintiffs' CPA, who prepared their 1998 18 tax return and extension requests, and Lawrence 19 Kalantari. (Mannino Decl. ¶ 9; Kalantari Decl. ¶ 4.)

21 It was Mr. Mannino's business practice to file all tax returns and applicable extensions, including Form 22 23 2688, on behalf of clients like Plaintiffs. (Mannino Decl. ¶ 8-10.) Moreover, Mr. Mannino recalls, and it is 24 his present belief that, Form 2688 was prepared timely 25 26 $(\underline{Id}, \P 12)$, and filed by his office or the sent to 27 Plaintiffs with filing instructions. (Id. ¶ 11.) Mr. 28

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Kalantari would have immediately reviewed and completed
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   the filing according to Mr. Mannino's instructions.
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   (Kalantari Decl. ¶ 6.)
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       Mr. Kalantari declares that it has been his practice,
   for the past 20 years, to request an additional extension
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   (Kalantari Decl. \P 4), and recalls requesting an
   additional extension for the tax year 1998 (Id. \P 5.)
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   Mr. Kalantari has a history of filing for extensions
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   timely and filing his returns timely. (<u>Id.</u> ¶ 9.)
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       Defendant argues that the IRS enjoys the presumption
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   of "administrative regularity" with respect to the
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   processing of payments and assessments. (Pltf Supp. at 3
   (Doc. No. 24).) According to the doctrine of
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   "administrative regularity," courts presume that IRS
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   officials "discharge their duties" properly, in the
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   absence of clear evidence to the contrary. See United
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   States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 786-786 (8th Cir. 1976);
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   see also Donaldson v. United States, 264 F.2d 804, 807
   (6th Cir. 1959), citing, <u>United States v. Chemical</u>
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   Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).
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24
       Plaintiffs concede that the IRS enjoys a presumption
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   of administrative regularity and try to rebut the
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   presumption by claiming "it is not unheard of that the
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   IRS may well lose, destroy or misfile a document."
                                                         (Deft
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Supp. at 2 (Doc. No. 23).) Relying on Lee Brick & Tile
Co. v. United States, 132 F.R.D. 414 (M.D.N.C. 1990),
Plaintiffs argue that the IRS transcript indicating Form
2688 was not filed is insufficient evidence to support
the presumption, in light of Plaintiffs' evidence that
the claim was mailed. (Deft Supp. at 3.)

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These argument are unpersuasive for two reasons. 8 9 First, speculation that the IRS sometimes loses documents 10 is not enough to rebut the presumption because Plaintiffs 11 must show irregularity of administrative procedures. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. at 14-15, 47. 12 13 Second, when a non-moving party relies on its own 14 affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on 15 conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact. Hansen v. United 16 States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs have 17 18 not provided "factual data" that Form 2688 was mailed on 19 time. Moreover, their supporting declarations do not 20 conclusively describe how they allegedly mailed the form. Mr. Mannino, says it is his "general business practice" 21 22 to mail such forms or send them to Mr. Kalantari to mail. (Mannino Decl. ¶ 8-10.) Mr. Kalantari states it is his 23 "regular practice" to have his secretary mail extension 24 25 forms. (Kalantari Decl. ¶ 4.) These statements alone are 26 insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Hansen, 7 F.3d at 138. Hence, Plaintiffs have not 27

1 provided affirmative evidence rebutting the presumption 2 that if they had filed Form 2688 on time, the form would 3 have been processed, and the filing would have been 4 reflected in the IRS official records.

Finally, even if Plaintiffs filed Form 2688 on time 6 7 they cannot show the application was granted. The "Notice to Applicant" section of Form 2688 has five possible 8 responses to an application for an additional extension 9 10 of time. (See Form 2688, Exh. C: grant, deny, return 11 Application, etc.) Neither Mr. Mannino or Mr. Kalantari 12 tried to verify the application was received after not 13 getting one of the five possible responses to the 14 application. Plaintiffs offer no evidence, other than their stated belief, that their application was granted. 15 (Mannino Decl. ¶ 9; Kalantari Decl. ¶ 4.) 16

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot show that their application for an additional extension of time was filed on time or granted. Since Plaintiffs did not file their 1998 tax return by August 15, 1999, it was late, and they are not entailed to a refund.

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B. Did the settlement of the partnership audit include
 interest suspension and a waiver of assessment of
 penalties against Plaintiffs?

As part of the settlement with the IRS over their 4 5 disputed tax liability for the year 1999, Plaintiffs allege that the IRS agreed they were entitled to interest 6 7 suspension and that no penalties would be assessed. (Compl. ¶ 13(B).) The settlement agreement (Form 870) 8 states, "IRC Section 6651 failure to file penalty applies 9 to any late filed (or non-filed) returns that are 10 required to report the partnership items adjustments." 11 12 (Exh. D to Mot. at 1.) Moreover, in the "Schedule of 13 Adjustments" to the settlement agreement, the "Remarks" 14 section outlines four penalties. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs do not address this issue in their opposition. 15 16 Accordingly, Plaintiffs concede this ground for recovery.

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C. Are Plaintiffs entitled to interest suspension pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6404(g)?

20 Interest on unpaid taxes is mandated by statute. See 26 U.S.C. § 6601. Section 6601 requires a negligent 21 22 taxpayer to pay interest from the tax deadline until the 23 outstanding amount is paid. See Holland v. United <u>States</u>, 873 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The tax 24 25 code does not contemplate the interest free use of government funds."). Here, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate 26 27 that interest on their unpaid 1998 tax obligation was 28

1 "suspended" by the settlement agreement because the 2 agreement does not waive or suspend interest. (See Exh. 3 D to Mot.)

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5 Plaintiffs further allege they are entitled to interest suspension under 26 U.S.C. § 6404(g) because the 6 7 IRS failed to provide notice of delinquency. (Compl. ¶ 13(A).) While § 6404(g) requires interest suspension if 8 the IRS does not provide notice to the taxpayer 9 10 identifying the particular amount due and the basis for 11 the liability, the suspension applies only to returns 12 filed timely. Since Plaintiffs did not file their 1998 13 tax return timely, section 640(g) does not apply to them. 14 15 Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled to interest 16 suspension for the 1998 tax year under the settlement

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendant United States of America.

agreement or section 6404(q).

Dated: September 3, 2015

VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS United States District Judge

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