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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC AUSTON KINTZER,	)	No. ED CV 16-0279 AS
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
v.	)	<b>MEMORANDUM OPINION</b>
	)	
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,	)	
Acting Commissioner of Social	)	
Security,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	
_____	)	

**I. PROCEEDINGS**

On February 5, 2010, Plaintiff Eric Auston Kintzer ("Plaintiff") applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income alleging a disabling condition beginning July 22, 2009. (AR 106-112). On August 11, 2011, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Milan M. Dostal examined the records and heard testimony from Plaintiff and vocational expert ("V.E.") Lewis Moss. (AR 49-83). On October 3, 2011, ALJ Dostal denied Plaintiff benefits. (AR 11-18). The Appeals Council denied review of ALJ Dostal's decision. (AR 1-3).

1 On August 10, 2013, Plaintiff lodged a Complaint in this Court  
2 seeking review of ALJ Dostal's decision. (See Kintzer v. Colvin,  
3 EDCV 13-1411 AN, Docket Entry No. 1). On January 8, 2014, the Court  
4 approved the parties' stipulation to voluntarily remand the case for  
5 further administrative proceedings. (Kintzer v. Colvin, EDCV 13-1411  
6 AN, Docket Entry Nos. 14, 16, 17). Upon remand, the Appeals Council  
7 assigned the case to a different ALJ for further development of the  
8 record. (AR 354-55).

9  
10 On May 5, 2015, ALJ John Kays examined the records and heard  
11 testimony from Plaintiff and V.E. Alan Boroskin. (AR 290-313). On  
12 September 8, 2015, ALJ Kays heard further testimony from Plaintiff,  
13 V.E. Boroskin, and medical expert ("M.E.") John Morse. (AR 314-331).  
14 On October 8, 2015, ALJ Kays issued a partially favorable decision,  
15 ruling that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to his fifty-fifth  
16 birthday on June 26, 2014, but was disabled from that date until the  
17 date of ALJ Kays's order. (AR 276-85). The Appeals Council did not  
18 review ALJ Kays's order, and the order therefore became the final  
19 decision of the Agency. (Joint Stip. at 4); see also 20 C.F.R.  
20 § 404.984, § 416.1484.

21  
22 On February 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to  
23 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) alleging that the Social Security Administration  
24 erred to the extent that it denied benefits for the entire alleged  
25 disability period. (Docket Entry No. 1). On June 20, 2016,  
26 Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint, (Docket Entry No. 14),  
27 and the Certified Administrative Record ("AR"), (Docket Entry No.  
28 15). The parties have consented to proceed before a United States

1 Magistrate Judge. (Docket Entry Nos. 11, 12). On August 22, 2016,  
2 the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ("Joint Stip.") setting forth  
3 their respective positions on Plaintiff's claims. (Docket Entry No.  
4 16).

## 5 6 **II. SUMMARY OF ALJ KAYS'S DECISION**

7  
8 ALJ Kays applied the five-step process in evaluating Plaintiff's  
9 case. (AR 277-78). At step one, ALJ Kays determined that Plaintiff  
10 had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after the alleged  
11 onset date. (AR 278). At step two, ALJ Kays found that Plaintiff's  
12 severe impairments included insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus,  
13 hypertension, and diffuse arthralgias but no arthritis or other  
14 inflammatory disease. (AR 278). At step three, ALJ Kays found that  
15 Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal a listing found in 20  
16 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 279).

17  
18 Before proceeding to step four, ALJ Kays found that Plaintiff  
19 had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform less than a  
20 full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and  
21 § 416.967(b). (AR 279). ALJ Kays characterized Plaintiff's  
22 additional limitations as: "lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10  
23 pounds frequently; sit six hours in an eight-hour workday; stand/walk  
24 six hours in an eight-hour workday; push/pull unlimited other than  
25 shown for lift and carry; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;  
26 occasionally climb ramps and stairs; frequently balance, stoop,  
27 kneel, crouch, and crawl; and avoid concentrated exposure to extreme  
28 cold and extreme heat and hazards (machinery, heights, etc.)." (AR

1 279). In making his RFC finding, ALJ Kays ruled that Plaintiff's  
2 subjective statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and  
3 limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely credible. (AR  
4 280).

5  
6 At step four, ALJ Kays determined that Plaintiff was unable to  
7 perform any past relevant work. (AR 283). At step five, ALJ Kays  
8 first determined that, prior to Plaintiff's fifty-fifth birthday on  
9 June 26, 2014, Plaintiff was an "individual closely approaching  
10 advanced age," but, on and after that date, he was an "individual of  
11 advanced age" within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 and  
12 § 416.963. (AR 283). ALJ Kays then applied the Medical-Vocational  
13 Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, ("the  
14 Grids") and concluded that, prior to June 26, 2014, Plaintiff could  
15 have adjusted to other work, but after that date there were no jobs  
16 existing in significant numbers in the national economy that  
17 Plaintiff could have performed. (AR 283-84). In making this  
18 finding, ALJ Kays concluded that Plaintiff's non-exertional  
19 limitations "had little or no effect on the occupational base of  
20 unskilled light work." (AR 284). ALJ Kays therefore determined  
21 that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social  
22 Security Act before June 26, 2014, but he became disabled on that  
23 date and the disability continued through the date of ALJ Kays's  
24 decision. (AR 284-85).

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### III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if the decision is free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. See Brewes v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, "a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion." Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). As a result, "[i]f the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's conclusion, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ." Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).

### IV. PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff raises two grounds for relief. First, Plaintiff claims that ALJ Kays failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony as not fully credible. (Joint Stip. at 5-10). Second, Plaintiff claims that ALJ Kays erred at step five by failing to (1) provide substantial evidence for the conclusion that Plaintiff's non-exertional limitations did not meaningfully limit the work available to Plaintiff; and (2) properly account for Plaintiff's limited literacy. (Id. at 15-17).

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V. DISCUSSION

After reviewing the record, the Court finds that ALJ Kays did not materially err in evaluating Plaintiff's case.

**A. The ALJ Did Not Materially Err In Rejecting Plaintiff's Excess Pain Testimony**

A claimant initially must produce objective medical evidence establishing a medical impairment reasonably likely to be the cause of his subjective symptoms. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other symptoms alleged, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant's testimony regarding the severity of his pain and symptoms only by articulating specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). In this case, because there is no evidence of malingering, the "clear and convincing reasons" standard applies.

During supplemental hearings, Plaintiff testified that he had not taken insulin regularly because it had to be kept cold, which he was unable to do because he was homeless. (See AR 298). Plaintiff further testified that he was taking his insulin regularly at the time of the hearing because he was staying with family and was able

1 to keep his insulin cold. (AR 299-300). Plaintiff reported that  
2 there was never a time when his diabetes had not caused sores on his  
3 feet, and he did not know why his disability had gotten worse in  
4 2009, i.e., around the time of the alleged onset date. (AR 302).  
5 Plaintiff testified that he would be unable to perform work that  
6 would require him to stand at a bench or desk for eight hours. (AR  
7 303). Plaintiff also testified that his diabetes caused vision  
8 problems. (AR 305-06). Plaintiff claimed that, at some point during  
9 the five years prior to his testimony, he owned and lived in a car.  
10 (AR 329-30).

11  
12 On May 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a post-hearing brief addressing  
13 his homelessness. (AR 492-93). Therein, Plaintiff reiterated that  
14 he had been "essentially homeless" during "most of the duration of  
15 this claim." (AR 492). Plaintiff referenced instances in April 2012  
16 and April 2013 when his homelessness was substantiated in medical  
17 records. (AR 492). Plaintiff claimed that, at various times since  
18 2009, he had been homeless or unable to obtain transportation or pay  
19 money necessary to visit the doctor or obtain medications. (AR 493).

20  
21 ALJ Kays evaluated Plaintiff's credibility in the following  
22 excerpt:

23  
24 After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that  
25 [Plaintiff's] medically determinable impairments could  
26 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;  
27 however, [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity,  
28 persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

1 entirely credible for the reasons explained in this  
2 decision.

3  
4 One factor undermining [Plaintiff's] credibility is that  
5 the severity of his allegations is not supported by the  
6 objective medical evidence. [ . . . ]

7  
8 The record also reflects periods of noncompliance with  
9 medical advice that in turn further undermine [Plaintiff's]  
10 credibility. A failure to follow treatment regimen is  
11 properly considered in the credibility assessment.  
12 [Plaintiff] has medical conditions that respond to  
13 compliance with treatment. [Plaintiff] had not been  
14 compliant with his insulin resulting in periods of  
15 exacerbation due to not taking medication. The treatment  
16 records show [Plaintiff] failed to follow treatment  
17 recommendations. [ . . . ] [Plaintiff's] hyperglycemia  
18 resolved with treatment. This demonstrates a possible  
19 unwillingness to do that, [sic] which is necessary to  
20 improve his condition. It is also noted that he lives in  
21 penury and homelessness and may have difficulty seeing  
22 doctors or even making appointments without transportation  
23 or even a phone to schedule them.

24  
25 I note additional inconsistencies in the record that  
26 further undermine [Plaintiff's] credibility. [Plaintiff]  
27 did not stop working because of his medical condition but  
28 because of lack of work in November 2008. Although



1 [Plaintiff] has [diabetes] and hypertension, there is no  
2 evidence of end organ damage or abnormalities. Although  
3 [Plaintiff] testified that he could not see well, his  
4 visual acuity in October 2014 was 20/40 and 20/70. There  
5 was no diabetic retinopathy found. His visual acuity in  
6 November 2014, was 20/50 both eyes, without glasses.  
7 Although [Plaintiff] complained of neuropathy and numbness  
8 in his feet, the examination in November 2014, noted normal  
9 gait, good motor strength, and intact sensation in upper  
10 and lower extremities. There were no neurological  
11 deficits. In August 2014, [Plaintiff] presented to the  
12 emergency room due to complaint of whole body pain. He  
13 reported being compliant with medications, and then later  
14 admitted that he was missing several days of insulin.  
15 Therefore, I find that these inconsistencies further  
16 diminish [Plaintiff's] credibility.

17  
18 (AR 280-82 (citations omitted)).  
19

20 Plaintiff claims that ALJ Kays erred in rejecting his subjective  
21 complaints as not fully credible. (Joint Stip. at 5-10).  
22 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the "inconsistencies" identified  
23 by ALJ Kays were not "legitimate inconsistenc[ies]," (id. at 6),  
24 Plaintiff's failure to comply with his medication regimen was due to  
25 his homelessness and poverty, (id. at 6-8), and, given these  
26 deficiencies, ALJ Kays was not permitted to reject Plaintiff's  
27 complaints based on insufficient objective medical support, (id. at  
28 9).

1 Preliminarily, the Court agrees that, because several months  
2 passed between November 2008, when Plaintiff stopped working (for  
3 reasons unrelated to his disability), and his alleged onset date of  
4 July 22, 2009, the fact that Plaintiff left his most recent job for  
5 reasons other than disability does not meaningfully undermine his  
6 credibility. See, e.g., Quezada v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5743568 at \*3  
7 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (adverse credibility finding unwarranted where  
8 sixteen months passed between Plaintiff's termination from her last  
9 job and alleged onset date); McGowan v. Astrue, 2012 WL 5390337 at \*5  
10 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (same finding for gap of over a year); Shehan v.  
11 Astrue, 2009 WL 2524573 at \*3 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (same finding for gap  
12 of over a year); see also Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 826, 828  
13 (9th Cir. 2001) (adverse credibility finding warranted where  
14 termination date and alleged onset date were identical).

15  
16 The Court is more skeptical of Plaintiff's other contentions.  
17 An ALJ may properly rely on an "unexplained or inadequately explained  
18 failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of  
19 treatment" to discredit a claimant's subjective symptom testimony.  
20 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal  
21 quotation marks and citation omitted). However, an ALJ must not draw  
22 any inferences about an individual's symptoms and their functional  
23 effects from a failure to seek regular medical treatment without  
24 first considering any explanations that the individual may provide,  
25 or other information in the case record, that may explain infrequent  
26 or irregular medical visits or failure to seek medical treatment.  
27 SSR 96-07p, 1996 WL 374186, at \*7.

1 As Plaintiff correctly notes, a claimant's subjective complaints  
2 may not be rejected for lack of treatment where the record  
3 establishes that the claimant cannot afford the treatment.  
4 Regennitter v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294,  
5 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1999). In this case, however, ALJ Kays expressly  
6 noted both that Plaintiff's failure to take medication not only  
7 demonstrated a "possible unwillingness" to take steps to improve his  
8 condition, but also showed that Plaintiff "lives in penury and  
9 homelessness and may have difficulty seeing doctors or even making  
10 appointments without transportation or even a phone to schedule  
11 them." (AR 282). It therefore appears that, after evaluating  
12 Plaintiff's testimony and treatment history, ALJ Kays determined that  
13 although Plaintiff's failure to seek treatment was partially  
14 attributable to his homelessness and poverty, it evinced Plaintiff's  
15 reluctance to take steps necessary to control his disabilities. This  
16 ruling is consistent with record evidence that Plaintiff's compliance  
17 was mixed even when he had access to medication. (See, e.g., AR 240  
18 (Plaintiff did not check his blood glucose and did not know how much  
19 insulin he had injected)).

20  
21 Although Plaintiff consistently maintained that homelessness and  
22 poverty were the cause of his failure to follow a treatment plan,  
23 (Joint Stip. at 7-8), Plaintiff has not established that ALJ Kays was  
24 required to credit only that explanation in light of Plaintiff's  
25 treatment history. Instead, Plaintiff asks this Court to second-  
26 guess ALJ Kays's evaluation of the evidence. The Court, however,  
27 must defer to ALJ Kays. See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882; see also Burch  
28 v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may engage in

1 ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, including observation  
2 of inconsistencies in the claimant's testimony); Batson v. Comm'r of  
3 Soc. Sec'y Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (ALJ may make  
4 reasonable inferences from the evidence).

5  
6 Because ALJ Kays provided at least one legitimate reason for  
7 rejecting Plaintiff's testimony, ALJ Kays was also entitled to  
8 consider the lack of objective medical evidence in support of  
9 Plaintiff's alleged degree of impairment. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681  
10 (the ALJ may consider lack of medical evidence as "a factor" in  
11 discounting pain testimony). Because ALJ Kays provided legitimate  
12 reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's "excess pain" testimony, the  
13 Court cannot conclude that ALJ Kays "arbitrarily discredit[ed]" this  
14 testimony. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002);  
15 see also Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1163  
16 (9th Cir. 2008) (this standard applies even if some of an ALJ's  
17 grounds for discrediting a claimant's testimony were improper).

18  
19 **B. The ALJ Did Not Materially Err At Step Five**

20  
21 At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the burden  
22 shifts to the Commissioner to show that "the claimant can perform a  
23 significant number of other jobs in the national economy," taking  
24 into consideration a claimant's RFC, age, education and work  
25 experience. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007)  
26 (quoting Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002)). The  
27 Commissioner can show that there are a significant number of other  
28 jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform by relying

1 upon the testimony of a V.E. or by using the Grids. Tackett v.  
2 Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The  
3 Grids "consist of a matrix of [the four factors] and set forth rules  
4 that identify whether jobs requiring a specific combination of these  
5 factors exist in significant numbers in the national economy."  
6 Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1075 (alteration in original) (quoting Heckler v.  
7 Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461-62 (1983)).

8  
9 Where a claimant's qualifications correspond to the job  
10 requirements indicated by the Grids, the Grids "direct a conclusion  
11 as to whether work exists that the claimant could perform." Id.  
12 (quoting Heckler, 461 U.S. at 462). An ALJ can use the Grids when a  
13 claimant alleges a non-exertional limitation, but "the [G]rids are  
14 inapplicable when a claimant's non-exertional limitations are  
15 sufficiently severe so as to significantly limit the range of work  
16 permitted by the claimant's exertional limitations." Id. (quoting  
17 Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1998)).

18  
19 However, when non-exertional limitations exist that are not  
20 sufficiently severe to limit the claimant's range of work, reliance  
21 on the Grids is appropriate. See Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1076 (mild or  
22 moderate depression not sufficiently severe to preclude use of  
23 Grids); Razey v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir.), modified,  
24 794 F.2d 1348 (1986) (use of Grids acceptable where limitations from  
25 claimant's "generalized anxiety disorder" did not significantly  
26 affect the range of sedentary work otherwise available); Angulo v.  
27 Colvin, 577 F. App'x 686, 687 (9th Cir. 2014) (claimant's postural  
28 and environmental limitations were not sufficiently severe to prevent

1 reliance on Grids); Landa v. Astrue, 283 F. App'x 556, 558 (9th Cir.  
2 2008) (claimant's depression, which did not prevent claimant from  
3 housework, personal care, and shopping, was not sufficiently severe  
4 to prevent reliance on Grids).

5  
6 ALJ Kays limited Plaintiff to light work with the further  
7 restrictions that Plaintiff was unable to climb ladders, ropes, and  
8 scaffolds; was limited to "occasional[]" climbing of ramps or stairs;  
9 was limited to "frequent[]" balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching,  
10 or crawling; and was required to avoid concentrated exposure to  
11 extreme hazards such as machinery and heights. (AR 279). Plaintiff  
12 contends that ALJ Kays erred in concluding that Plaintiff's non-  
13 exertional limitations did not meaningfully limit the work available  
14 to Plaintiff. (Joint Stip. at 16). Plaintiff also claims that ALJ  
15 Kays erred in failing to include literacy limitations in the RFC and  
16 in applying the Grids. (Id. at 17).

17  
18 In an undated Adult Disability Report, Plaintiff reported that  
19 he had completed the twelfth grade with no special education classes,  
20 could "read and understand English," and could write "more than [his]  
21 name" in English. (AR 132, 134). During the first supplemental  
22 hearing, Plaintiff's attorney argued that Plaintiff did not know how  
23 to read or write, "other than probably very, very basic words." (AR  
24 294). Plaintiff testified that he had "almost" completed high  
25 school, but his wrestling coach "got [him] all of [his] grades." (AR  
26 306). Plaintiff stated that he had completed an audio exam to get a  
27 driver's license and would have difficulty reading a grocery list,  
28 although he recognized the words "milk" and "eggs." (AR 306).

1 During both supplemental hearings, ALJ Kays twice asked V.E. Boroskin  
2 whether a hypothetical individual whose limitations included  
3 illiteracy would be able to perform Plaintiff's past work, although  
4 this limitation was omitted from a third hypothetical. (AR 311,  
5 326).

6  
7 Plaintiff's argument regarding his non-exertional limitations is  
8 conclusory and is largely belied by Agency rulings. See SSR 83-14  
9 (1983) (light work generally limits a claimant to "occasional bending  
10 of the stooping type" and "there are nonexertional limitations or  
11 restrictions which have very little or no effect on the unskilled  
12 light occupational base. Examples are inability to ascend or descend  
13 scaffolding, poles, and ropes; inability to crawl on hands and knees;  
14 and inability to use the finger tips to sense the temperature or  
15 texture of an object. Environmental restrictions, such as the need to  
16 avoid exposure to feathers, would also not significantly affect the  
17 potential unskilled light occupational base."); SSR 85-15 (1985)  
18 (limitation to occasional stooping leaves sedentary and light  
19 occupational base "virtually intact," and limitations on ability to  
20 crawl or kneel are "of little significance in the broad world or  
21 work."). The Court cannot conclude that ALJ Kays materially erred in  
22 failing to erode the occupational base due to Plaintiff's non-  
23 exertional limitations.

24  
25 With respect to Plaintiff's alleged literacy limitations,  
26 Plaintiff's statements about his literacy were inconsistent, and the  
27 precise scope of his literacy was unproven. (See AR 132, 134, 306).  
28 Plaintiff has therefore not demonstrated that ALJ Kays was required

1 to include literacy limitations in the RFC or his step five analysis.  
2 Although ALJ Kays might have more clearly explained his reasons for  
3 not including literacy limitations in his RFC finding, the Court  
4 concludes that any such failure was harmless error. Molina v.  
5 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm'r  
6 Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[H]armless  
7 error principles apply in the Social Security . . . context.”)). The  
8 inclusion of literacy limitations in ALJ Kays’s hypotheticals to the  
9 V.E. is also not dispositive. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157,  
10 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ is not bound to accept restrictions set  
11 forth in a hypothetical question if the restrictions are unsupported  
12 by substantial evidence).

13  
14 **VI. CONCLUSION**

15  
16 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Administrative  
17 Law Judge is AFFIRMED. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

18  
19 Dated: October 3, 2016

20 \_\_\_\_\_/s/\_\_\_\_\_  
21 ALKA SAGAR  
22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
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