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DATED: December 27, 2016

section 1192.7 because that section was not enacted until June 9, 1982," whereas Petitioner's prior convictions occurred on March 26, 1982. (*Id.* at 5.)

Petitioner argues that his Petition is not untimely because it is based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which was later held retroactive in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). The Johnson decision held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 ("ACCA") – which defined a "violent felony" as any felony that "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" – "both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges" and "denies due process of law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555, 2557. The Report and Recommendation rejected Petitioner's argument because the residual clause in the ACCA does not have a counterpart in the Three Strikes law, and the language at issue in *Johnson* does not appear anywhere in the Three Strikes law. Cal. Penal Code §§ 667.5(c) (defining "violent felony"), 1192.7(c) (defining "serious felony"); see Report at 5 (noting petitioner "was not sentenced under the ACCA or even any state equivalent"); Renteria v. Lizarraga, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119305, *16-*17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016). Petitioner makes a conclusory argument that the ACCA's residual clause and the Three Strikes law "are without doubt synonyms of each other." (Objections at 3.) However, Petitioner does not identify any language in the Three Strikes Law that is comparable to the ACCA's residual clause and has not identified any way in which the *Johnson* decision could apply to his ground for relief.

IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that judgment be entered denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as untimely.

ANDREW J. GUILFORD United States District Judge