SHANE MATTHEW MULVIHILL,

v.

DEAN BORDERS,

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

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### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

#### CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

) No. CV17-00079-MWF (AS)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

I.

#### INTRODUCTION

On December 23, 2016, Plaintiff Shane Matthew Mulvihill ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner at California Institution for Men ("CIM") in Chino, California, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket Entry No. 1). The Complaint names Dean Borders, Warden of CIM as the sole defendant ("Defendant"). (See Complaint ("Compl.") at 1).

Plaintiff alleges that, under § 1983 and California Code of Regulations ("CCR"), Title 15 § 3350(a), Defendant violated

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by acting deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. (Compl. at 2-5).

The Court has screened the Complaint as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. For reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 1

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### II.

#### ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied necessary medical treatment while housed at CIM. (Compl. at 2-5). On June 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a request for pain medication to treat "two herniated disks, [a] pinched nerve, arthritis, and degenerative disk disease." (Id. at 2). Plaintiff allegedly explained to Dr. W. Aqil D.O. that he had "fallen twice since arriving at [CIM]," and his back pain was "getting worse." (Id.). Plaintiff was prescribed 400 milligrams of Ibuprofen to be taken three times a day, but Plaintiff also alleges that "no new medical attention [was] rendered . . . " (id.).

On July 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a request, stating that "his back pain [was] getting worse and travelling to other parts of his body." (Id.). No new medical attention was rendered. On July 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint, stating that he was "refused"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Magistrate Judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval from the district judge. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

proper medical treatment/procedures for his back condition" and requested a MRI and an appointment with a specialist "to diagnose the severity of the problem." (Id.). Plaintiff's complaint was reviewed and denied because of "lack of medical history from both private hospitals and county jail." (Id.). On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Aqil and described "the ongoing medical problems he was having in regard to pain, movement, and mobility." (Id. at 3). On September 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a "second level appeal," which was allegedly denied on October 7, 2016, because there was "no supporting documents to justify further treatment." (Id. at 4). Plaintiff allegedly informed CIM that his medical records were located at the county jail that he was transferred from, but his request "was still denied." (Id.).

On August 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed an appeal, stating that "he [was] in need of being allowed to use a bowl during chow, due to having Gastric Bypass surgery and [could] only consume small meal[s] throughout the day." (Id.). On August 30, 2016, Plaintiff received notice that his appeal was "canceled" and was "advised to submit a Health Care appeal form," which he filed. (Id.). The appeal was denied because such a request was not a "healthcare services issue over which California Correctional Health Care Services ha[d] jurisdiction." (Id.). Plaintiff allegedly informed Dr. Aqil about the denial, and Dr. Aqil did not update Plaintiff's "Chrono" to state that Plaintiff needed to use a bowl during meal services. (Id.).

Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief in order to "receive proper medical care" and see a specialist; \$25,000 in

monetary damages; and for the Court to "issue a writ of habeas corpus." (Id. at 9).

#### III.

#### STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress mandates that district courts initially screen civil complaints filed by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A court may dismiss such a complaint, or any portion thereof, before service of process, if the court concludes that the complaint (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if a complaint fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff must provide more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of his claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the

[complaint] need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, a court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe all "factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable" to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, pro se pleadings are "to be liberally construed" and held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts' treatment of pro se filings; accordingly, we continue to se filings liberally when evaluating them under construe pro Iqbal."). Nevertheless, dismissal for failure to state a claim can be warranted based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). A complaint may also be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it discloses some fact or complete defense that will necessarily defeat the claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1984).

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#### IV.

#### DISCUSSION

The Complaint contains deficiencies warranting dismissal, although leave to amend will be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1).

#### Α. The Complaint Fails To Satisfy Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 8

currently pled, Plaintiff's allegations do not provide sufficient detail to assert a § 1983 claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8 requires, in relevant, part that a complaint contain "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). Rule 8 therefore requires more than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief; without some factual allegations in the complaint it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only fair notice of the nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Here, the Complaint does not comply with Rule 8 because it contains conclusory and confusing allegations. Plaintiff alleges that his requests for medications and doctors' appointments were denied, but Plaintiff also references seeing Dr. Aqil on several occasions and being prescribed Ibuprofen. (See Compl. at 2-5).

Moreover, Plaintiff generally asserts that his appeals were denied, but he fails to state what department denied his appeal or who was aware that Plaintiff's medical records were located at the county jail. A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if "one cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory." McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Chevalier v. Ray and Joan Kroc Corps. Cmty. Ctr., No. C-11-4891 SBA, 2012 WL 2088819, \*2 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2012) (complaint that did not "identify which wrongs were committed by which Defendant" violated Rule 8).

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Consequently, the Complaint does not show there are plausible grounds for relief, nor does it provide enough facts for the Defendant to properly respond to the Complaint. Cafasso, U.S. exrel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff fails to name what CIM personnel carried out the activities discussed in the Complaint, and Defendant cannot adequately respond to the Complaint without this basic information. Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed with leave in order to provide more facts to satisfy Rule 8.

## B. The Complaint Fails To State An Eighth Amendment Claim For Deliberate Indifference To Serious Medical Needs

In order to state a § 1983 claim for inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must allege acts or omissions by prison officials that are sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to an inmate's "serious medical needs." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A plaintiff can show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Farmer, 511 at 834; see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (examples of "serious medical needs" include "a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities," and "the existence of chronic and substantial pain") (citation omitted). Plaintiff's alleged back pain appears to satisfy the requirement that Plaintiff suffers from a "serious medical need." However, Plaintiff has not satisfied the subjective component of his claim.

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To be liable for "deliberate indifference," a jail official must "both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment." Id. at 838. Thus, inadequate treatment because of accident, mistake, inadvertence, or even gross negligence does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Even civil recklessness (failure to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm which is so obvious that it should be known) is insufficient to establish a violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37. Similarly, a showing of medical malpractice or negligence is also insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. See Toguchi

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference established only where defendant subjectively "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety."). An inmate's disagreement with his medical treatment or a difference of opinion over the type or course of treatment does not support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp. 2d 457, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

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Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim under these Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts establishing standards. that Defendant had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's serious medical needs and purposely decided to deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff alleges that he filed requests to see a specialist, have a MRI done, and be placed on a special meal plan, which were all denied. However, Plaintiff was prescribed Ibuprofen and seen by a doctor. (Compl. at 2-5). The mere failure to grant Plaintiff's requests or disagreement about the course of his treatment is not sufficient to satisfy Section 1983's stringent deliberate indifference standard. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that establish that Defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health or safety. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d at 1057. At best, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant acted negligently by failing to grant Plaintiff's requests, but mere negligence does not violate inmate's Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate, on the facts alleged, that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference by depriving Plaintiff of adequate medical care.

# C. Plaintiff's Claims For Damages Against Defendant In His Official Capacity Must Be Dismissed

Plaintiff requests \$25,000 in money damages from Defendant, as the "legal custodian" of Plaintiff.<sup>2</sup> (Compl. at 1). Plaintiff is advised that the Eleventh Amendment bars actions in federal court for money damages against state officers sued in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada System of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, any damages claims against Defendant in his official capacity must be dismissed.

# D. Plaintiff Fails To Adequately Allege Personal Participation By Defendant

Liability under § 1983 requires a defendant's personal participation. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

Plaintiff does not state whether Defendant is sued in his official or individual capacity. (See Compl. at 1).

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

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Defendant is the warden of CIM, and he is therefore a supervisory official. (Compl. at 1). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is the "legal custodian" of Plaintiff, but Plaintiff does not allege any other facts to demonstrate that Defendant was personally involved in the alleged acts. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant appear to be based on vicarious liability, which is inapplicable in a § 1983 action. Because "[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss," Ivey v. Bd. Of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997), Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant must be dismissed with leave to amend.

#### E. There Is No Private Right Of Action Under CCR, Title 15

Although Plaintiff alleges a claim under CCR, Title 15 § 3350(a) (Compl. at 6), the Court has found no authority that creates or acknowledges a private right of action under CCR, Title 15. The mere existence of regulations that govern the conduct of prison employees does not necessarily entitle Plaintiff to sue civilly to enforce these regulations. See e.g., Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (violation of "State departmental")

regulations do not establish a federal constitutional violation");

Spencer v. Brazelton, No. 1:14-CV-0707-MJS, 2015 WL 75141, at \*2

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015) ("The mere existence of the CCR and DOM does not create a civil cause of action for violation of their terms."). Because no independent claim for a violation of CCR, Title 15 exists, leave to amend Plaintiff's Title 15 claims would be futile, and is therefore denied.

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## F. Writ Of Habeas Corpus Relief Cannot Be Granted In A § 1983 Civil Rights Action

"[T]he exclusive federal remedy for a state prisoner seeking release from confinement is habeas corpus, with its attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies." Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Vill., 723 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 n. 14 (1973)). Habeas corpus relief is not an "appropriate or available remedy for damages claims" brought under § 1983, and the Court will deny any request for habeas corpus relief in a § 1983 action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) ("This Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge 'the fact or duration of his confinement.'").

Here, Plaintiff has filed claims under § 1983, but Plaintiff requests the Court to "[i]ssue a writ of habeas corpus" upon success on the merits of his claims. (Compl. at 9). Plaintiff is advised

that he is precluded from obtaining habeas corpus relief through this § 1983 action.

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#### ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he shall file a First Amended Complaint no later than 30 days from the date of this Order. The First Amended Complaint must cure the pleading defects discussed above and shall be complete in itself without reference to the original Complaint. See L.R. 15-2 ("Every amended pleading filed as a matter of right or allowed by order of the Court shall be complete including exhibits. The amended pleading shall not refer to the prior, superseding pleading."). This means that Plaintiff must allege and plead any viable claims in the original Complaint again.

In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify the nature of each separate legal claim and confine his allegations to those operative facts supporting each of his claims. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." However, Plaintiff is advised that the allegations in the First Amended Complaint should be consistent with the authorities discussed above. In addition, the First Amended Complaint may not include new Defendants or claims not reasonably related to the allegations in the previously filed complaints. Plaintiff is

strongly encouraged to once again utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached.

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Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file a First Amended Complaint, or failure to correct the deficiencies described above, may result in a recommendation that this action, or portions thereof, be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action in its entirety or with respect to particular Defendants or claims, he may voluntarily dismiss all or any part of this action by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

|Dated: February 21, 2017

\_\_\_\_\_\_/s/ ALKA SAGAR United States Magistrate Judge