FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

THE COURT: This matter is before the Court for a bench trial on Mark Rome's claim against SmithKline Beecham Corporation, which has commonly been referred to in this case as GSK, on two claims. One, a claim of violation of Section 12940 of the California government code for age discrimination, 12940(a), and a separate and distinct claim for retaliation under 12940(h) of the government code.

In coming to my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I have considered the evidence presented at trial, including the deposition evidence. I have considered the parties' memoranda of contentions of law and fact, and I have also considered the parties' proposed findings.

I think the most appropriate place to start with is with the parties' pretrial conference order, which I believe provides a very good basic factual framework for the case. So I am going to recite and adopt the facts stated in the pretrial conference order. I find that the record supports by a preponderance of the evidence each of the following facts which the parties have stipulated to:

Mark Rome was born on September 9, 1953. Rome was hired in 1977 by GSK's predecessor. At the time of his

termination in 2003, Rome was 49 years old. In October 2003, Ruth Christ was hired to replace Rome. Christ was 34 years old. Malia Owens, Rome's supervisor, was 36 years old when Rome was terminated by GSK.

In 2003, GSK had a progressive discipline policy.

In 2003, Rome held the position with GSK of senior executive sales representative in the Southern California Medical Group Team. Rome's direct supervisor was Malia Owens.

In 2003, Owens held the position of medical group development manager. In June 2003, GSK awarded La Vida Foundation two educational grants in the amount of \$2,500 each.

Rome was terminated from his employment with GSK on August 14, 2003. The reason given Rome for the termination of his employment and set out in the separation notice provided Rome that day was that he had, quote, "violated GSK's employee conduct policy, specifically GSK's grants policy and procedure, Section 6.3, procedure for approving and processing grants," close quote.

In 2003, GSK's grants policy and procedure was set forth in Chapter 6 of the GSK Commercial Policies and Procedures Manual. In 2003, Section 6.3 of GSK's grants policy and procedure stated, quote, "do not, single quote, 'promise,' close single quote, "a grant to a customer or sign any agreement before a grant is fully processed and

approved through the GSK Grants Department, " close quote.

In 2003, GSK's grants policy and procedure also stated, quote, "Only expenses for meals for a specific event are reimbursed, and the expenses are included in the entire amount of the grants," close quote.

On June 11, 2003, a memo was distributed via e-mail to GSK's field personnel and forwarded by Malia Owens to Mark Rome and/or the members of the medical group which stated, quote, in all caps, "Never promise a grant before it has been approved by the Grants Department," closed quote.

In 2003, GSK's employee conduct policy provided that, quote, "Certain violations of company regulations are so serious that they may call for immediate discharge or other appropriate action. Such actions include, but are not limited to: No. 28, violation of commercial policies and practices," closed quote.

On July 21, 2003, Owens met with Rome regarding Dr. Richards' complaint. On July 22, 2003, Rome called GSK's Employee Response Center to make a complaint about Malia Owens. On July 31, 2003, Rome completed two California Department of Fair Employment and Housing Complaint of Discrimination Forms.

On July 31, complaints of discrimination were received by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, DFEH, on August 11, 2003, in its Sacramento office. The

only written notice of the July 31, 2003, complaints of discrimination issued to GSK were a Notice of Filing of Discrimination Complaint and a Notice of Case Closure, both of which were sent to GSK by the DFEH on August 20, 2003.

2.

On August 15, 2003, GSK completed an Amended DFEH Complaint of Discrimination Form, which GSK also received notice of in correspondence dated August 20, 2003.

Between July 2002 and August 2003, Rome applied for seven different positions within GSK -- four oncology account manager positions and three HIV clinical specialist positions. Rome was not offered any of these seven positions.

In 2003, GSK maintained an equal opportunity policy. In 2003, GSK maintained a harassment-free workplace policy which, among other things, provided retaliation against an employee by his supervisor or another employee for bringing a complaint is prohibited.

It's conceded by all parties that with respect to the DFEH discrimination claim, plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. I am not going to recite the elements of the prima facie case, but once a prima facie case has been made, a burden shifting occurs under principles announced in in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S., 792, and in Guz v. Bechtel International, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th, 317, 2000.

Basically once the plaintiff has established a

prima facie case, it then becomes the burden of the employer to establish a nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken. If the employer comes forward with that, the ultimate burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff has been discriminated against on an unlawful basis. In this case, age.

I find that with respect to the discrimination claim, plaintiff has made a prima facie case, and for reasons which I will elaborate in a moment, GSK has come forward with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the actions taken, which under the discrimination count include termination, failure to offer him certain employment opportunities, and alleged harassment.

With respect to the second claim, retaliation for making a complaint with regard to conduct prohibited by the DFEH, the parties concede that with the exception of one element plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. That element is whether the complaint which Mr. Rome made to the GSK Human Resources Department on January 22, 2003, was in fact a claim of age discrimination or conduct otherwise protected under the statute.

Exhibit 66 is the Human Resources employee relations intake sheet which records the complaint that Mr. Rome made at the end of the day on July 22, 2003. He says

in part the reason for his call today is that he wants to find out what his rights are as far as not feeling harassed to find another job.

He also stated many times during the conversation
-- that is, with Ms. Owens -- he is afraid of retaliation,
that he's being harassed and discriminated against.

He also states on page 2 according to the report, he said that she -- again referring to Owens -- makes comments about how much money he makes, and this makes him feel like she wants to get someone younger that would not be paid as much.

Taking the entire context of this document, I believe that a prima facie showing of having made a complaint for discrimination on the basis of age and harassment on the basis of age is made out. I believe that the showing is weak, but I believe that one reading this would come away with the view that Mr. Rome had reported that adverse actions were being taken against him at least in part on the basis of his age.

So for that reason, all other elements of the claim for retaliation with respect to prima facie having been conceded, I find that plaintiff has made a prima facie case of retaliation. I specifically find, although the showing is weak, that the claim made in Exhibit 65 is a claim of discrimination and other conduct violative of the

DFEH statute.

2.1

Again, I find that GSK has come forward with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the negative action which it took following this complaint, namely, his termination. I believe that the record establishes that discipline for violation of the grants policy is a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for taking disciplinary action.

Because the grants policy figures so prominently in this case, I think it's worthwhile, although I noted those in the summary, to discuss in more detail the relevant corporate policies. Exhibit 21 is GSK's corporate conduct policy. That policy points out in paragraph A:

"Certain violations of company regulations are so serious that they may call for immediate discharge or other appropriate disciplinary action. Such actions include, but are not limited to, No. 28, his violation of commercial policies and practices."

Although GSK had a progressive discipline policy, it was clear from the employee conduct policy that there was certain conduct that fell outside the progressive discipline policy and in and of itself warranted termination as a sanction.

The grants policy is repeated in a number of places in the record, including Exhibit 18, Commercial

Practices and Policies Resource Manual for U.S. Pharma. At page GSK 0774, the following appears: "1. Do not 'promise' a grant to the customer or sign any agreement before a grant is fully processed and approved through the GSK grants policy."

Arjun Rajaratnam gave testimony about the reasons behind the policy and the seriousness of the policy. I find Mr. Rajaratnam, who is the U.S. compliance officer based in Chicago, to be credible and honest and knowledgeable in this subject area. He explained in paragraph 7 of his direct declaration the kickbacks were a potential problem, potential significant problem for a pharmaceutical company such as GSK.

He pointed out that depending on how grants were given and in what manner, they could potentially violate 42 USC, Section 320a-7B(b). Violation of that statute held the potential for a violator being excluded from federal health care programs, which I find to be a significant potential problem to a company such as GSK.

He also alluded to two specifics litigations which were recently current in 2003 which resulted in major fines being paid by pharmaceutical companies. One case involved Tap Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and resulted in a payment of \$875,000 to resolve civil and criminal charges. He also recited another matter in June 2003 involving AstraZeneca

Pharmaceuticals, which resulted in a payment of \$355 million.

In each case, part of the alleged improper conduct involved grants abuses. I find that enforcement of the grants policy for the reasons stated by Mr. Rajaratnam constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy in terms of the DFEH law.

It's probably worthwhile to go back and review Mr. Rome's career. He began in 1977. He had a limited number of promotions -- or 1973. He had a limited number of promotions through the '70s and '80s. The trial testimony of his supervisor immediately prior to going to the medical sciences group was favorable to him. Greg Dial praised his efforts. He gave him good reviews in his performance appraisals for 1997, 1998, and 1999 -- those being Exhibits 199, 200, and 202.

In fact, at the age of approximately 44 or 45, an age that would put him in the protected class for age discrimination, he in fact received a promotion from GSK.

In 2000, the Medical Sciences Group was formed, and he was hired into that group at the age of approximately 46. That hiring decision was made directly by Malia Owens. That decision suggests at least at the time he was hired into that group that there was no pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of age.

The nature of the activity in the medical sciences group differed from the previous sales positions which Mr.

Rome had held in that he was now working with groups and coordinating with other groups outside his own medical services group. That activity required different skills that he had engaged in in his prior activities.

2.2

As he continued from 2000 to 2003, it became clear that there were from time to time problems with his performance, problems with coordinating with other salesmen, problems with coordinating with clients. At the same time, he received praise from time to time from Owens, including praise in written reviews or written reports in 2003, April through July 2003, including Exhibits 215, 216, and 217.

The plaintiff has characterized this as a roller coaster experience. On the contrary, I find that Owens was a fair manager, demanding, who praised when she thought praise was due and demanded improvement when she thought improvement was due.

Her overall ratings for the year 2001 and 2002 were average as the scheme worked out in the 2001 report and M or middle for the scheme used in the 2002 report. In each instance, he was given the middle ranking of five possible rankings.

The April 2003 dinner meeting is the genesis for much of the dispute in this case. That meeting was attended

by Cassandra Richards, a consultant working as an independent contractor for La Vida; Mr. Miller; and Niki Guluchi.

2.

2.2

Cassandra Richards testified in this court that Mr. Rome made certain promises of grants. She testified that he had made a promise of a grant in the amount of \$20,000 to \$50,000, and it caused her to believe that \$20,000 was the minimum amount. Ms. Richards was evasive; she was combative and was one of the poorer witnesses to appear before me in almost 10 years on the bench.

Having said that, there may have been a reason for her definite lack of chemistry, if not antipathy, toward plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Scott, given that she had been sued for defamation and other alleged misconduct.

Notwithstanding her evasive manner, I find that in words or actions Mr. Rome caused her to come away from the meeting that she had a commitment of grant funds. Mr.

Miller testified that there were no mention of any grant commitment in his presence. Mr. Miller wasn't present the whole time, but I can infer that he was present for the majority of the meeting. And I can also infer that he was knowledgeable of the grants program and would have recognized and testified to a grants violation had one in fact occurred in his presence.

Richards also came away from that meeting

understanding that Mr. Rome could provide, in addition to
educational grants, payment for food in addition to grants.

As Mr. Rome clearly testified, he understood that the policy
prohibited making any promises of a grant. As he testified
at page 57 of the morning August 12th session at -beginning at line 6:

"Ouestion: And you can't suggest in any way to a

"Question: And you can't suggest in any way to a customer that you can get them a grant; isn't that true?

"Answer: You can't tell them it would be successful, no.

2.2

"Question: Am I right in saying you can't say anything that would imply in any way that you could get them a grant? Is that true?

"Answer: If you could get them, no, you can't."

My conclusion is that Mr. Rome took actions at that meeting that violated his clear understanding of the policy either by making an express promise of a grant or by causing Dr. Richards to believe that he had made a commitment by implying such support.

Nothing further in terms of this dispute of significance occurs until July 18 when Mr. Rome contacts his supervisor, Malia Owens, to tell her that Dr. Richards is concerned and wants to talk to his supervisor. I am not clear on the record whether Mr. Rome gave Ms. Richards Ms. Owens' telephone number or Ms. Owens called Dr. Richards. I

have seen it two ways in the evidence.

My suspicion from her notes is that Ms. Owens called Dr. Richards. In that conversation, Dr. Richards clearly made the allegation that a firm commitment of a grant of at least \$20,000 had been made during the course of the meeting, and she also indicated that a commitment for food over and above grants had been made.

I believe Ms. Owens was entitled to regard that communication as credible. Dr. Richards was acknowledged within GSK to be a thought leader, and she was already a speaker in programs for GSK.

Now, I asked Ms. Owens whether she gave those two factors any weight in evaluating the statements of Dr. Richards, and she said she did not. But it clearly indicates to me that Dr. Richards was no stranger and that there was no reason to distrust the allegations she made.

Ms. Owens also testified that she called Niki
Guluchi on the same day -- July 18th, 2003. Ms. Guluchi
according to Ms. Owens also confirmed that a promise had
been made of food outside of the amount of the grants. I
believe that Ms. Owens was entitled to take that as
corroborative evidence. She was aware -- I am not clear
whether she was aware of Ms. Guluchi's position, but I think
she was entitled to take that as corroborative evidence.
She had no reason, I believe and find, to doubt either

Richards or to doubt Guluchi.

In the days that followed, there were several interactions between Mr. Rome and Ms. Owens. Those interactions cause me to believe that in those conversations Mr. Rome at least admitted in part a grants violation. I believe that the manner in which Mr. Rome described the nature of the complaint indicates that he understood that the complaint was for making the promise.

On July 21, as reflected in Exhibit 22, Ms. Owens counseled Mr. Rome with respect to the proper manner in which to deal in grants. She again had a session with him in Exhibit 64, a document called GSK coaching report. The document reflects that she counseled Mr. Rome and discussed grants policy.

On page GSK 1048, a portion of the form is filled out by Mr. Rome. Ms. Owens testified that the manner of preparation -- namely, that the document was generated off a laptop with both Mr. Rome and Ms. Owens sitting side by side and Mr. Rome keying input. One entry which he made is "make no promise anymore except to look into customer's requests." I believe on the basis of the testimony of Malia Owens that the only discussion of promises in that meeting related to grants, that Mr. Rome in fact did make an admission that he had violated the policy and committed to do it no more.

There were inconsistencies in Mr. Rome's

recitation to Ms. Owens at various points as to what went on at the April meeting. At one point, during the course of their discussions he admitted that there had been discussion of grants. At others, he denied that there had been any discussion of grants at that meeting.

1.7

I believe that on the basis of Malia Owens' discussions with Mr. Rome, the two telephone conversations with Dr. Richards and Ms. Guluchi, that she had a reasonable basis for concluding that the grants policy was violated. I make that finding separate and apart from a finding that Mr. Rome in fact said something or did something at the April meeting to cause Dr. Richards to believe that she had been made a commitment, a promise of a grant in some form or another.

I think the key point for the analysis of GSK's conduct is not necessarily whether misconduct in fact occurred, but was a credible report made? I find that a credible report was made, even if in fact the alleged conduct did not occur, because I believe that Ms. Owens was entitled to believe Dr. Richards for the reasons I have indicated she was entitled to believe Dr. Richards, and I believe she also had the admissions of Mr. Rome.

On July 22 at the end of the day, as I indicated, Mr. Rome made a report to HR stating his complaints. I find significant in that report that he did not state that he was

being set up for termination for a false violation of the grants policy or that there was anything awry with regard to his discussions on the 18th and the 21st with Ms. Owens.

It seems to me that if he thought he was being dealt with unfairly by Malia Owens it would have figured in his complaint on the 22nd. I also find somewhat suspect the timing of the complaint, but in a sense, that's not relevant here for reasons I will mention.

He had worked for almost four years for Ms. Owens and had made no formal complaint to this point. Yet he finds himself in the situation the day before where there is a potential for some significant disciplinary action. That may cause me to question the accuracy of the complaint. But for purposes of the retaliation claim, the question is was he retaliated for making the claim, whether the claim was right or wrong?

I also note in his dealings with Ms. Stellings following up on his complaint, he again had an opportunity to raise the issue of whether he was being set up for an inaccurate or misleading set of discipline based on violation of the grants claim. There is no mention of that in Exhibit 56, Ms. Stellings' notes, of the conversation with him.

From this point, the examination of the grants violation claim within GSK took a number of different

directions. First of all, Ms. Stellings reported it to Mr. Rajaratnam. It is true that Compliance didn't do any fact finding on its own. Mr. Rajaratnam accepted the level of fact finding as it had been conveyed to him by Ms. Stellings.

1.0

2.0

I don't believe he did anything inappropriate. I think for his purposes he was asked what the appropriate form of discipline was, and he indicated in his declaration here at trial that he found that a violation of the grants policy in 2003 was sufficient to appropriately apply the sanction of termination.

He also acknowledges that there could have been other sanctions. He does not specifically recommend what advice he conveyed back through Ms. Stellings. It appears that there was discussion of both termination and sanctioning him with a reprimand and a reduction in incentive compensation. It's clear, I believe, in the record that Ms. Stellings identified those two possibilities as well.

The net of Mr. Rajaratnam's view was conveyed to Mr. Romanowski. At that point, Mr. Romanowski was the acting regional vice-president and the direct superior of Malia Owens. I find that the decision to terminate Mr. Rome was made by Mr. Romanowski with the input of a number of different people: one, with the input of Malia Owens; two,

with the input of Ms. Stellings; three, with the input of Mr. Rajaratnam; and potentially with the input of the senior vice-president for HR, Mr. Sun.

2.1

The decision-making process was, I believe, fair and had a factual basis. I also find that there were imperfections in the decision-making process, and it could have been a better one in a number of different ways. One, Paul Miller was never interviewed. Two, conceivably Compliance might have conducted its own factual investigation. But it's clear to me that Mr. Rajaratnam felt that he had the facts. HR might have contacted Mr. Miller, or there might have been independent contact with Ms. Guluchi and Dr. Richards, neither of which occurred.

But the issue in this case is not whether a perfect disciplinary process was engaged in but rather whether it was so flawed as to be incredible. I find it flawed but not so flawed as to be incredible. As recognized by Guz at 24 Cal. 4th, 358, if the employer's true reasons for -- the employer's true reasons need not necessarily have been wise or correct. While the objective soundness of an employer's proper reason supports their credibility, the ultimate issue is simply whether the employer acted with a motive to discriminate illegally.

The level of investigation here does not rise in my view to the point where it undermines the credibility and

believability of the stated reason -- violation of a grants policy.

The facts as presented indicated that most of the decision makers did not know what the subject matter of Mr. Rome's complaint was. I believe when the complete passage from Mr. Owens' testimony was read, it's clear that she did not know that the claim was allegedly for one of discrimination rather than harassment.

I find that even with a policy of confidentiality, it was legitimate to inform her, because she was the alleged harasser of the complaint, so that she would desist from further alleged harassing conduct.

I also find it was appropriate for Ms. Stellings to know, and I also find that from her notes that she was aware of the complaint but not the nature.

I find that HR in fact received the notes which Ms. Owens took on July 19 of her discussions, telephone calls with -- July 18 of her telephone calls with Mr. Rome, Dr. Richards, and Guluchi. I find that she did convey to HR through the transmittal of that memo and her coaching memos the essential facts, including the presence of Paul Miller.

While Paul Miller was not contacted, there wasn't an effort to cover up the fact of his presence or to discourage anyone from doing that on an independent basis.

So I find that the decision to terminate was not

pretextual, that it was supported by a good-faith determination that Mr. Rome had violated the grants policy. So I reject the claim for retaliatory termination.

2.0

There is other conduct that is alleged in this case to support a DFEH violation. That principle rests on how Mr. Rome was treated during the course of the number of interviews he had for jobs in 2003. It was clear that by March of 2003 he was looking for another job. He and Malia Owens had had that discussion.

He talked with Eric Kimbro about regional oncology positions. There were three positions available, none of which went to Mr. Rome.

Mr. Kimbro testified that among his reasons for not giving one of those positions to Mr. Rome was that the others were more qualified. He also took into account the commuting that Mr. Rome would have to engage in if he took over territories in Glendale, Long Beach, or the hospital region. He also noted that Mr. Rome was not familiar with these territories. He testified that he had direct personal knowledge of the capabilities of all three of the individuals he hired.

Steve Rooney was in his mid 30s. However, Ms.

Janice Kerns, was 42 years old, in other words, an
individual in the protected class for age discrimination.

Moreover, Mr. Rome testified that she had the same

qualifications as he did. The third individual placed in the Hospital Division, Daniel Dinnett (phonetic), was 53.

I find that no age discrimination occurred in these hiring decisions, that no hiring decision occurred when individuals in the protected class were hired, which was the case in two out of three instances; and I find that the reasons given for hiring Mr. Rooney and the criticisms of Mr. Rome's qualifications for these particular jobs were not pretextual.

Richard Esparza testified to three available HIV positions. Mr. Esparza interviewed Mr. Rome for the first position in Orange County. He testified that Mr. Rome did not have a strong science background, he was not located in the territory, and that he did not have a strong interest in the subject matter of HIV although he had previously worked in positions where he was selling HIV drugs. Mr. Esparza stressed the need for a strong interest in the science because of the rapidly evolving nature of the science for treating HIV.

I find that these were nonpretextual reasons and nondiscriminatory reasons for not offering that first position to Mr. Rome. The position went to Crystal Robb, who was in her 30s. Because of his evaluation of Mr. Rome's capabilities, Mr. Esparza testified that he did not consider him for the -- that he did not interview him for the

subsequent two positions -- an HIV position that came open in the spring of 2003 in Los Angeles and another one that became open in August 2003 in Los Angeles. Those positions went to younger people.

2.2

The second L.A. position went to David Joe Palazzio. Among the factors in hiring him were diversity. Mr. Esparza testified that Mr. Palazzio was either in his late 30s or early 40s. For the first L.A. position, June Alphonso was offered the position, in his 30s, a premed with a biology background, and brought diversity to the job. He subsequently declined the job. The job was then offered to Doleta Minix in her 30s.

I find that none of these hiring positions were made adversely to Mr. Rome on the basis of age. I find that the reasons offered for the reasons not to hire him and the reasons to hire the individuals in fact hired were legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonpretextual.

Mr. Rome was also considered by Scott Barnes in June 2003 for a position, another oncology position, this one in the San Diego territory. He did not interview Mr. Rome. He testified that he had had an unfavorable exposure to Mr. Rome while working for a competitor. He found that -- he believed that Mr. Rome had poor work ethics and did not participate and come to important lunches with doctors.

I think the evidence in this case is made clear

that one of the chief vehicles for getting to know doctors is to go to lunches that are set up based around their schedules or for dinner meetings. To me that goes as a significant criticism based on this record.

Mr. Barnes also noted that Mr. Rome did not live in the territory. The actual job went to Nancy Morrison, a 53-year-old who was doing the same job in another territory. Mr. Barnes testified that there would be absolutely no startup time since Ms. Morrison would perform the same duties she had been performing.

I find that the reasons offered and the decision made with respect to the San Diego position were not pretextual and that the reasons offered were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.

There is also testimony that Mr. Rome may have been considered or mentioned for a possible position working in David Cohen's group. Mr. Cohen testified that he couldn't understand why Mr. Rome would be interested in a lateral, basically downward, move. I believe he expressed concerns about the reason and the motivation for an individual wanting to take a lesser significant job. That job offer was in fact extended to Natalie Hallet, a woman in her mid 20s.

There is some indication that Mr. Rome never actually applied for the job which Mr. Cohen had in the

Inland Empire. If you review the hiring decisions, including the Inland Empire decision which may or may not have involved an actual request for a job, one finds that there was a wide variety of ages of individuals who received the job. Hallet was in her mid 20s. Rooney was in his mid 30s. Robb was in her mid 30s. Alphonso was in his mid 30s. Kerns was 42. Dinnett was 53. Morrison was 53. Palazzio was in his mid 30s to early 40s.

This does not demonstrate to me a pattern of disparate treatment of elderly people. It in fact reflects that a range of people of different ages were hired for various positions that were available in 2003.

I have already found that the reasons given for the individual hiring decisions were neither pretextual nor discriminatory. But apart from those individual decisions, there is no basis on this record to infer disparate treatment from the pattern of hiring decisions. I find no basis of discrimination under the statute on the basis of hiring discrimination.

There was other conduct alleged that's supposedly reflective of discrimination on the basis of age.

Supposedly, Mr. Rome was criticized by Malia Owens in a manner that put in question his age and criticized his age. However, the only one that testified to such conduct at trial was Mr. Rome.

Jason Shoup, an individual in the group, never saw Owens demean Mr. Rome. Millie Reyes and Jason Shoup never heard the comment by Malia Owens that Mr. Rome was getting paid twice as much and he should be working twice as hard. And one would expect that to -- at least someone to have heard that.

2.2

In his direct testimony, Mr. Rome states that those statements were made at district meetings. On the afternoon of August 12th, at page 28, he testifies that that statement was made at district meetings. Yet there is no corroborative evidence.

I find to the extent that any statements were in fact made with regard to Mr. Rome's age that they were sporadic and did not rise to the level of harassment or discrimination.

With respect to the several comments that were corroborated about Ms. Owens having an old team, I find those states innocuous. Apparently at a meeting, a lunch meeting in Georgia, Ms. Owens said something to the effect that her team was getting old because they weren't going to go out that night. There is no evidence that anyone was singled out for that claim, and there is no evidence of anything other than a hard-working group of salesmen who were wanting to get a good night's sleep and not go out.

A similar comment was made to the team in

San Francisco. It was reported in the testimony of Millie Reyes. And the testimony was to the same effect -- Malia Owens saying that her team was getting older, and she would understand if they didn't want to go out after dinner. I don't find that either of those amount to any form of discrimination or harassment on the basis of age.

2.

I believe that the harassment that Mr. Rome principally referred to was captured in the part of his deposition that was read into the record; namely, harassment in the form of Ms. Owens being a demanding supervisor.

This passage from Mr. Rome's deposition was read in during his examination at 423, beginning at line 21:

"Question: But the harassment you're complaining of related to the performance of your job duties?

"Answer: The performance of my job duties and specifically in pushing me since, like I said, the year before, 'Mark, it's obvious that we're not getting along, and what do you think about moving to a different manager?' I said, 'Absolutely.' I was all for it."

The remark that Mr. Rome states is a remark he's attributing to Ms. Owens in context. I don't believe this record establishes that he was subjected to any harassment violative of the DFEH statute.

I believe that in some instances there was reason to question the veracity and credibility of Mr. Rome. Great

inflation or resume padding may be a small thing, but at trial, Mr. Rome was confronted with at least three instances in which he was representing himself contemporaneously to this litigation with accomplishments that were belied by his college transcript, which is in the record. As I say, I found his explanations not credible. And while these are small things, they cause me to question his truthfulness.

I also note that he was impeached a number of times during his testimony, including on the question of whether Owens told him that the allegation was a promise.

So in sum, as far as my factual findings go, I find that he was not terminated as an act of retaliation for making a protected complaint for age discrimination. I find that he was not discriminated against in hiring decisions, and I find that he was not harassed or discriminated on the basis of age.

With regard to one additional episode brought out of supposed discrimination -- namely, he wasn't given the trip to Hawaii -- I think the record is clear that a number of factors went into that decision and that others contributed accomplishments other than simply sales.

A few other additional points. I find on this record that there was a motive for Mr. Rome to make a promise or a commitment of grants. It is clear that he was interested in developing a relationship with La Vida. It is

indicated in Exhibit 164 that La Vida was becoming increasingly important with its upcoming merger with Prairie.

2.0

I also find that this record establishes that he wasn't the only one who was terminated for grants violations. Mr. Romanowski testified that he was aware of others, although a number of district managers and other managers testified that they weren't aware of anyone else being terminated.

With regard to conclusions of law, number one, I find that the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 USC Section 1332. The parties are different citizenships, and the amount in controversy is clearly more than \$75,000.

I find that a prima facie case of age discrimination was made out. I find that the burden having shifted to GSK to provide a nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason for the actions it took that Mr. Rome thereafter failed to carry his ultimate burden to establish that the actions taken against him were on the basis of age.

With respect to the retaliation claim, I find that Mr. Rome made out a prima facie case in each of the elements, although weakly I believe on whether Exhibit 64 was in fact a protected complaint, but the burden having shifted to GSK under McDonnell Douglas, I find that Mr. Rome did not carry his burden to ultimately demonstrate that he

was retaliated against on the basis of the complaint that he 1 2 made. I find that GSK is entitled to judgment, and I ask 3 counsel to submit a form of judgment within 10 days. 4 Anything further? 5 MS. WILSON: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 6 MR. SCOTT: No, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Let me add one concluding word. 8 Although I have not found for Mr. Rome, from my experience 9 in practicing in the bench, I am deeply aware of the 10 importance in this society of a job to an individual, not 11 only in terms of their ability to support themselves but in 12 terms of how they define themselves in life. 13 I have no doubt that Mr. Rome has sustained 14 I have no doubt, although I need not make economic harm. 1.5 any findings about the degree, that he has sustained some 16 emotional and psychological harm. I am appreciative of 17 those facts. I simply find at the end of the day that I 18 cannot attribute that harm to any unlawful conduct on the 19 part of GSK. 20 Anything further? 21 MR. SCOTT: No, Your Honor. 22 MS. WILSON: No, Your Honor. 23 The argument was long today, but it THE COURT: 24

was helpful.

25

I believe that I had a full and complete

canvass of the evidence from both sides. Given that this trial was relatively short and I took detailed notes, I felt with that detailed canvass of the evidence that I was in a position to enter my findings of fact and conclusions of law from the bench, and for that reason, I have done so. Thank you. (Thereupon, the proceeding was concluded.) -000-Deled: September 12, 2008 James V. Serns United Somes Desmus Line