2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	225 West Washington Street, Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 Telephone: 312.460.4200 Facsimile: 312.460.4288  Ira Gould (appearing Pro Hac Vice) gould@igouldlaw.com Ryan L. Greely (appearing Pro Hac Vice) rgreely@igouldlaw.com GOULD LAW GROUP 120 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2750 Chicago, IL 60602 Telephone: 312.781.0680 Facsimile: 312.726.1328  George L. Hampton IV (State Bar No. 144433) ghampton@hamptonholley.com Colin C. Holley (State Bar No. 191999) cholley@hamptonholley.com			
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18 19	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
20	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SOUTHERN DIVISION			
21	BRYAN PRINGLE, an individual,	Case No. SACV 10-1656 JST(RZx)		
22	Plaintiff,	) PLAINTIFF BRYAN PRINGLE'S		
23	V.	OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT RISTER EDITIONS' MOTION TO		
	WILLIAM ADAMS, JR.; STACY	) DISMISS BASED UPON ) IMPROPER SERVICE		
25	WILLIAM ADAMS, JR.; STACY FERGUSON; ALLAN PINEDA; and JAIME GOMEZ, all individually and	)		
26	collectively as the music group The Black Eyed Peas, <i>et al.</i> ,	) DATE: April 25, 2011 ) TIME: 10:00 a.m.		
27	Defendants.	) CTRM: 10A )		
28		)		

# I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Defendant Rister Editions' motion should be recognized for what it really is—a blatant attempt to avoid having this case determined on the merits. Rister Editions' gamesmanship in this regard is particularly evident from the fact that although Rule 4(m) only provides for potential dismissal of a complaint *without* prejudice, Rister Editons' proposed order provides for a dismissal *with* prejudice.

Rister Editions' temerity aside, this is not the only example of Rister Editions' intentional misrepresentation of the pertinent facts and the law relevant to the Court's determination of Rister Editions' motion. Contrary to Rister Editions' misrepresentations: the service of the summons and First Amended Complaint on March 16, 2011 was not effected in exactly the same way as previous attempts at service; plaintiff Bryan Pringle ("Pringle") does not claim that the summons and First Amended Complaint were served pursuant to Rule 3a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"); the Court's January 27, 2011 Order is not dispositive as to the issue of service on Shapiro Bernstein as Rister Editions' agent; and the (120) one hundred twenty day time limit articulated in Rule 4(m) would not apply if Pringle were to serve Rister Editions in France pursuant to the Hague Convention.

Although Rister Editions states that Shapiro Bernstein did not have express authorization to accept service of the summons and First Amended Complaint on its behalf, the law is clear that such authorization may nevertheless be implied where, as in this case, Shapiro Bernstein holds itself out as the managing agent and United States representative of Rister Editions. Accordingly, the Court should exercise its discretion and find good cause to extend the time for service by (19) nineteen days to encompass the service of the summons and First Amended Complaint on March 16, 2011. Such a short extension of time is particularly appropriate in this case because Rister Editions has not argued, let alone demonstrated, that it will suffer any prejudice as a result of being served (139) one hundred thirty-nine days after the

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1 filing of the Complaint and (117) one hundred seventeen days after filing of the First Amended Complaint.

Even assuming, however, that Shapiro Bernstein did not have the implied authority to accept service on Rister Editions' behalf, the Court should still deny the motion because Rister Editions may still be served pursuant to the Hague Convention and will not be prejudiced by any delay in service. As discussed below, the preferred procedure in such cases is not to dismiss the case, but rather to simply quash service of the summons and complaint and give the plaintiff additional time to complete service pursuant to the Hague Convention, as the (120) one hundred twenty day time limit articulated in FRCP Rule 4(m) would no longer apply.

Rister Editions' request for sanctions should also be denied. Notwithstanding 12 Rister Editons' representations to the contrary, Pringle did not simply effect service 13 of the summons in the same manner that had been previously rejected by the Court. 14 The proof of service for the summons served on March 16, 2011, unlike the previous 15 proofs of service, specifically states that the summons was served on Shapiro 16 Bernstein in its capacity as "the agent, United States representative for and United States administrator of Rister Editions."

Nor did Pringle purport to serve the summons pursuant to FRCP Rule 3a. The proof of service's reference to "3.a." in connection with "Manner of Service" is a reference to section 3.a. of United States District Court for the Central District of California Form CV-01 ("Form CV-01"), not a reference to FRCP Rule 3a, which does not exist.

The Court should reject each of Rister Editions' arguments and order that the case proceed without further delay.

### II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action was filed on October 28, 2010. [ECF Docket Entry Number ("Doc.") #1].

2	served on defendant Shapiro Bernstein. [Doc. #40]. The proof of service for the			
3	November 5, 2010 service on Rister Editions did not indicate the relationship			
4	between Shapiro Bernstein and Rister Editions and did not specify the capacity in			
5	which Shapiro Bernstein was served with Rister Editions' summons and complaint.			
6	[See Doc. #40].			
7	On November 19, 2010, Pringle filed the First Amended Complaint in this			
8	action. [Doc. #9].			
9	On December 1, 2010, the summons and First Amended Complaint for Rister			
10	Editions were served on Shapiro Bernstein. [Doc. #50]. The proof of service for the			
11	December 1, 2010 service on Rister Editions did not indicate the relationship			
12	between Shapiro Bernstein and Rister Editions and did not specify the capacity in			
13	which Shapiro Bernstein was served with Rister Editions' summons and First			
14	Amended Complaint [See Doc. #50].			
15	On December 13, 2010, Rister Editions filed a motion to dismiss based on			
16	improper service. [Docs. #53 and #58]. On January 27, 2011, the Court issued an			
17	order denying Rister Editions' motion to dismiss. [Doc. #95]. In ruling on Rister's			
18	motion to dismiss, the Court expressly noted that:			
19	Plaintiff's proofs of service on Rister state that			
20	service was made not on any employee or service agent of			
21	Rister, but rather on Defendant Shapiro. (Shapiro et al.			
22	Mot. at 8; see Docs. 40 & 50.)			
23	[Doc. #95 at page 16].			
24	On March 16, 2011, Pringle served a copy of the summons and First Amended			
25	Complaint on Rister Editions by personally serving a copy of the summons and Firs			
26	Amended Complaint on Shapiro Bernstein.			
27	The proof of service for the March 16, 2011 service on Rister Editions			

On November 5, 2010, the summons and complaint for Rister Editions were

28 indicates that Shapiro Bernstein was served as "the agent, United States

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1 representative for and United States administrator of Rister Editions." [Doc. # 117 at page 3].

#### III. **ARGUMENT**

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### Shapiro Bernstein Has the Implied Authority to Accept Service on Α. **Behalf of Rister Editions**

The FRCP authorize service of process by delivering a copy of the summons and operative complaint "to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process." FRCP 4(e)(2). Service on a foreign entity's managing agent is also proper. FRCP(h)(1). Under FRCP 4(e)(2), an agent may have the implied 10 authority to accept service of process on behalf of a foreign entity. See United States 11 v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("An agent's 12 authority to accept service may be implied in fact"). See also Volkswagenwerk 13 | Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 706–707, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 100 L. Ed. 2d 14 | 722 (1988) (upholding service on an implied agent of a foreign corporation); 4A 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 16 \ 1097, at 84-85 (2d ed. 1987) ("Although authority to accept process need not be 17 explicit, it must either be express or implied from the type of relationship between defendant and the alleged agent.")

Under the facts of this case, Shapiro Bernstein has the implied authority to accept service on Rister Editions' behalf pursuant to FRCP Rule 4(e)(2). Shapiro Bernstein holds itself out as Rister Editions' United States representative and United States administrator, as evidenced in content posted on Shapiro Bernstein's website and in the liner notes for The Black Eyed Peas album *The End. See* Declaration of Jeremy T. Katz ("Katz Declaration") at ¶¶ 2-3 & Exhs. A-D.

Similarly, Shapiro Bernstein may be deemed Rister Editions' "managing 26 agent" under FRCP 4(h)(1) because, as their representative in the United States, Shapiro has substantial responsibility for Rister Editions' business affairs. Under 28 FRCP 4(h)(1), "service is sufficient when made upon an individual who stands in

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1 such a position as to render it fair, reasonable and just to imply the authority on his part to receive service." Montclair Electronics, Inc. v. Electra/Midland Corp., 326 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also American Football League v. National Football League, 27 F.R.D. 264, 269 (D. Md. 1961) (ruling that a football coach is a managing agent for the team because "each coach was in charge of the activities which rendered his employer amenable to suit in this district").

According to Shapiro Bernstein's press release and the Black Eyed Peas, Shapiro Bernstein is in charge of, and represents, Rister Editions in connection with Rister Editions' business activities in the United States. Accordingly and because 10 these business activities are the basis for naming Rister Editions as a defendant and 11 make Rister Editions amenable to suit in the Central District of California., Shapiro 12 Bernstein may be deemed to be a managing agent for purposes of effecting service on Rister Editions. *Montclair Electronics*, 326 F. Supp. at 842; *American Football* League, 27 F.R.D. at 269.

Rister Editions has failed to submit any admissible evidence to properly contest Shapiro Bernstein's implied authority to accept service on its behalf. As explained in McKinney v. Law Office of James Duncan, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18 | 14589, at \*8-\*9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010), unless some defect in service is shown on the face of the return of service, a Rule 12 motion to dismiss for improper service must be supported by declaration or other admissible evidence establishing the improper service. Where the validity of service is properly contested in a motion to dismiss, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish validity of service or to create an issue of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing to resolve. See Aetna Business Credit, Inc. v. Universal Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir. 1981); Naufahu v. City of San Mateo, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53633, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. May 26 | 14, 2008) (relying on *Aetna Business Credit*). A plaintiff normally meets this burden by producing the process server's return of service, which is generally accepted as prima facie evidence that service was effected, and of the manner in which it was

1	effected. See, e.g., Blair v. City of Worcester, 522 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2008); see
2	also S.E.C. v. Internet Solutions for Business Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir.
3	2007) (signed return of service constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service in
4	context of default judgment). Rister Editions' failure to offer any admissible
5	evidence to properly contest Pringle's prima facie evidence of proper service is fatal
6	to its motion.
7	The cases upon which Rister Editions attempts to rely to refute Shapiro

Bernstein's implied authority to accept service on Rister Edition's behalf are inapposite. Rister Editions cites *Thomas v. Furness Pac. Ltd.*, 171 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1949) for the proposition that service may be quashed when not on a managing agent. But in *Thomas*, the plaintiff produced no evidence to controvert testimony that the person on whom process was served was not the defendant's officer, agent, general manager, or authorized to accept service of process for the defendant. Here, Shapiro Bernstein holds itself out as Rister Editions' United States representative and United States administrator. *See* Katz Declaration at ¶¶ 2-3 & Exhs. A-D. Therefore, Shapiro Bernstein's own statements refute Rister Editions' argument that Shapiro Bernstein did not have the implied authority to accept service of process.

Similarly, Rister Editions cites *Saez Rivera v. Nissan Mfg. Co.*, 788 F.2d 819, 821 (1st Cir. 1986) for the proposition that service is invalid when the "recipient lacked actual authority, even though he claimed to be a presiding officer." *See* Motion to Dismiss at 5:13-15. But again, the plaintiff in *Saez Rivera* offered no proof beyond the process server's declaration that the person served could accept service of process. Here, Pringle presents Shapiro Bernstein's statements in which Shapiro Bernstein holds itself out as the United States representative for, and United States administrator of, Rister Editions' business interests.

Rister Editions next cites *Direct Mail Specialists*, *Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Technologies*, *Inc.*, 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988), but ignores its central holding that service is proper when the recipient has the implied authority to accept the

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service of process. <i>Id.</i> at 688. In fact, the court in <i>Direct Mail Specialists</i> upheld		
service on the non-employee receptionist in a shared office because the recipient		
demonstrated apparent authority. Id. at 689 (citing 2 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK &		
C. Thompson, Moore's Federal Practice $\P\P$ 4-201 through 22[2], at 4-205 (2d ed		
1987)). As discussed by the court, "[d]espite the language of the Rule, service of		
process is not limited solely to officially designated officers, managing agents, or		
agents appointed by law for the receipt of process." Id. In other words and contrary		
to Rister Editions' argument, Shapiro Bernstein can properly receive service for		
Rister Editions even if Rister Editons has not expressly designated Shapiro as its		
agent for service of process.		

Rister Editions cites Kourkene v. American BBR, Inc., 313 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1963) for the proposition that a mere licensee is not an agent for service of process. But Shapiro Bernstein does not stand in the same shoes as the person who 14 received service in *Kourkene*. In *Kourkene*, the foreign defendants created a Pennsylvania corporation named BBR to "act as their representative and agent in the United States in connection with" the foreign defendants' intellectual property. *Id.* at 16 771. In turn, BBR granted Ryerson a non-exclusive oral license to use the defendants' intellectual property. *Id.* The plaintiff served Ryerson as the foreign defendants' agent and the Kourkene court quashed the service because Ryerson was "a mere licensee" and not the foreign defendants' agent. *Id.* at 772.

Here, Shapiro Bernstein is more akin to BBR than Ryerson. While Ryerson was two-steps removed from the foreign defendants in *Kourkene*, Shapiro Bernstein is only one-step removed from Rister Editions. While Ryerson was a non-exclusive licensee, Shapiro Bernstein is the United States representative for, and United States administrator of Rister Editions' business. Unlike in *Kourkene*, where Ryerson was 26 as non-exclusive sub-licensees, Shapiro Bernstein is the sole conduit by which Rister Editions conducts business in the United States. Therefore, Rister Editions' reliance on Kourkene is misplaced. Likewise, Rister Editions' reliance on Lopinsky v. Hertz

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1 | Drive-Ur-Self Systems, 194 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1951) (quashing service effectuated on one of the "hundreds of local individuals and corporations throughout the United States and Canada" who license intellectual property from Hertz) is also misplaced.

## В. Alternatively, the Court Should Quash Service of the Summons and **Allow Service Pursuant to the Hague Convention**

When a court determines that service of process is insufficient, it has broad discretion to either dismiss the action without prejudice or retain the case but quash the service of process. Oyama v. Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2001); see 10 also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1354, at 585-11 86 (1969). A court should generally quash service of process instead of dismissing 12 the action when there is a reasonable prospect that the plaintiff ultimately will be 13 able to serve the defendant properly. *Brockmeyer*, 383 F.3d at 801 *McKinney v*. 14 | Apollo Group, Inc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56324, at \*16-\*17 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 15 2008)

As explained in Motley v. Parks, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12479, at \*17-\*19 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2001)

> The Ninth Circuit has found it "unnecessary . . . to articulate a specific test that a court must apply in exercising its discretion under Rule 4(m)," and has "noted only that, under the terms of the rule, the court's discretion is broad." In re Sheehan, supra, 253 F.3d 507, 2001 WL 682453. District courts in the Ninth Circuit have exercised their discretion to extend the time for service where defendants "have not suffered any prejudice resulting from the delay" and where the extension will give plaintiffs "an opportunity to litigate the merits of this action, a desirable

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goal." Matasareanu v. Williams, 183 F.R.D. 242, 247 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

In *Motley*, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and extended the time for service because the defendants had failed to demonstrate they would suffer prejudice if the time for service was extended. Here, Rister Editions has failed to argue, let alone demonstrate, that it would suffer any prejudice if the time for service is extended. Discovery has only recently begun and ample time remains for Rister Editions to prepare for trial. Accordingly, the time for service should be extended so that this case may be litigated on its merits.

It should be noted that if the Court requires Pringle to serve Rister Editions pursuant to the Hague Convention, the (120) one hundred twenty day time limit set forth in Rule 4(m) would not apply by its express terms.

#### C. **Sanctions are Not Warranted**

Notwithstanding Rister Editions' protestations to the contrary, the service of the summons and First Amended Complaint was not unreasonable, vexatious or done 16 in bad faith. Pringle's service of the summons and First Amended Complaint on Shapiro Bernstein was based upon Shapiro Bernstein's implied authority to accept service on Rister Editions' behalf, and Pringle has never claimed any reliance on Rule 3.a. of the FRCP.

As set forth on the proof of service filed with the Court, the summons and First Amended Complaint were personally served on Shapiro Bernstein on March 16, 22 2011. The proof of service, unlike the previous proofs of service, shows that Shapiro Bernstein was served as the agent for Rister Editions. The proof of service also simply states that the manner of service was the FRCP. No specific rule is cited. The proof of service's reference to "3.a." in connection with "Manner of Service" is 26 a reference to section 3.a. of the Court's Form CV-01, not a reference to FRCP Rule 3a, which does not exist. See Katz Declaration at ¶ 4 & Exh. E.

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1	Although service on F	Rister Editions was completed (19) nineteen days after	
2	the time prescribed in Rule 4	4(m). The Court has discretion to extend the deadline so	
3	cases may be heard on their merits rather than dismissed without prejudice and re-		
4	filed at a later time. In any event and as discussed above, if Pringle is required to		
5	serve Rister Editions in France pursuant to the Hague Convention, the time limit set		
6	forth in Rule 4(m) is of no consequence.		
7	IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>		
8	Based upon the foregoing Pringle respectfully requests that the Court deny		
9	Rister Editions' motion to dismiss in its entirety. Alternatively, Pringle requests that		
10	the Court quash service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint and allow		
11	Pringle to serve the complaint on Rister Editions pursuant to the Hague Convention.		
12			
13	Dated: April 4, 2011	Dean A. Dickie (appearing <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> ) Kathleen E. Koppenhoefer (appearing <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> ) MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK AND STONE,	
14		MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK AND STONE, P.L.C.	
15			
16		Ira Gould (appearing <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> ) Ryan L. Greely (appearing <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> ) GOULD LAW GROUP	
17			
18		George L. Hampton IV (State Bar No. 144433) Colin C. Holley (State Bar No. 191999) HAMPTONHOLLEY LLP	
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20		By: <u>/s/ George L. Hampton IV</u> George L. Hampton IV	
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22		Attorneys for Plaintiff BRYAN PRINGLE	
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