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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES MYERS, 1:04-cv-05562-LJO-WMW (PC)
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
E. ALEMEDIA, et. al., (Doc. 20)
Defendants.

I. SCREENING ORDER

Charles Myers (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 13, 2004. (Doc. 1.) The Court screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend. (Doc. 16.) Plaintiff did not amend within the required time such that a Findings and Recommendation issued for the action to be dismissed. (Doc. 17.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint and objections to the Findings and Recommendations. (Docs. 20, 21.) The Court vacated the Findings and Recommendations of dismissal. (Doc. 23.) Thus, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is now before the Court for screening.

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

1 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are
2 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
3 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
4 § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
5 paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or
6 appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
7 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

8 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
9 exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534
10 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a
11 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” Fed. R.
12 Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
13 claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, “the
14 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams,
15 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not
16 supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union
17 Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268
18 (9th Cir. 1982)).

19 **B. Summary of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint**

20 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is one hundred sixty three (163) pages of documents
21 from which it is practically impossible to ascertain what constitutional claims Plaintiff is
22 attempting to state. Per the Court’s docket, Plaintiff is currently a state prisoner at California
23 Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (“SATF”) in Corcoran, California – which
24 is the same facility of incarceration listed for Plaintiff on his First Amended Complaint. On the
25 amended complaint form, Plaintiff fails to make any attempt to state the facts of his claims, or
26 the relief which he seeks. Rather, Plaintiff refers to an “attached complaint.” (Doc. 20, pg. 3.)
27 However, no complaint for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is attached. Plaintiff
28 did attach a petition for writ of habeas corpus with memorandum of points and authorities,

1 various inmate appeals and responses, work logs, medical records, and pharmacy records. If
2 Plaintiff intended to challenge the legality or duration of his confinement, he is advised that a
3 separate filing of a habeas corpus petition is the correct method for him to do so. Badea v. Cox,
4 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), *quoting*, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973);
5 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. However, if
6 Plaintiff intends to pursue issues raised in the attached petition for writ of habeas corpus as
7 constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then he must reformat his claims and their
8 factual basis to present them in the proper document form – i.e. as a complaint under § 1983,
9 presenting his factual basis for all alleged constitutional violations without requiring that his
10 allegations be gleaned from information stated in a habeas corpus petition. It appears from the
11 Court’s screening of the original Complaint, that Plaintiff might be intending to pursue claims for
12 deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff may be able to amend to correct
13 deficiencies in his pleading so as to state cognizable claims. Thus, he is once again given the
14 applicable standards and leave to file a second amended complaint. However, since these
15 standards were previously provided to Plaintiff, and this is his last opportunity he will be given to
16 state cognizable claims.

17 **C. Pleading Requirements**

18 **1. *Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)***

19 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
20 exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534
21 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a
22 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” Fed. R.
23 Civ. Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
24 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court
25 may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts
26 that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. ““The issue is not whether a
27 plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support
28 the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

1 unlikely but that is not the test.” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting
2 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171
3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . .
4 .”) (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001)). However, “the liberal
5 pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490
6 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply
7 essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,
8 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
9 1982)).

10 **2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a)**

11 “The controlling principle appears in Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) ‘A party asserting a claim to
12 relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as
13 independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has
14 against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A
15 against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated
16 claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of
17 morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners
18 pay the required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of
19 frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28
20 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

21 Plaintiff is advised that if he chooses to file an amended complaint, and fails to comply
22 with Rule 18(a), the Court will count all frivolous/noncognizable unrelated claims that are
23 dismissed therein as strikes such that he may be barred from filing in forma pauperis in the
24 future.

25 **3. Linkage Requirement**

26 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

27 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
28 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

1 Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
2 law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

3 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between
4 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See
5 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
6 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a
7 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates
8 in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that
9 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
10 Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named
11 defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff’s
12 federal rights.

13 **4. Exhibits**

14 Plaintiff is advised that the Court is not a repository for the parties’ evidence. Originals,
15 or copies of evidence (i.e., prison or medical records, witness affidavits, etc.) need not be
16 submitted until the course of litigation brings the evidence into question (for example, on a
17 motion for summary judgment, at trial, or when requested by the Court). At this point, the
18 submission of evidence is premature as Plaintiff is only required to state a prima facie claim for
19 relief. Thus, in amending his complaint, Plaintiff would do well to simply state the facts upon
20 which he alleges a defendant has violated his constitutional rights and refrain from submitting
21 exhibits.

22 If Plaintiff attaches exhibits to his second amended complaint, each exhibit must be
23 specifically referenced. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c). For example, Plaintiff must state “see Exhibit
24 A” or something similar in order to direct the Court to the specific exhibit Plaintiff is referencing.
25 Further, if the exhibit consists of more than one page, Plaintiff must reference the specific page
26 of the exhibit (i.e. “See Exhibit A, page 3”). Finally, the Court reminds Plaintiff that the Court
27 must assume that Plaintiff’s factual allegations are true. Therefore, it is generally unnecessary for
28 to submit exhibits in support of the allegations in a complaint.

1 **D. Claims for Relief**

2 **1. *Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs***

3 Where a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim is one of inadequate medical care, the
4 prisoner must allege and prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
5 indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Such a
6 claim has two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the
7 defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.1991). A
8 medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in further
9 significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at
10 1059 (*quoting Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include “the
11 presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” Id. at
12 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the
13 objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
14 825, 834 (1994).

15 If a prisoner establishes the existence of a serious medical need, he or she must then show
16 that prison officials responded to the serious medical need with deliberate indifference. Farmer,
17 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally
18 denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once
19 prescribed. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. “However, the officials’ conduct must constitute ‘ ‘
20 ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ ’ ’ before it violates the Eighth Amendment. Hallett
21 v. Morgan 296 F.3d 732, 745 (2002) *quoting Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 (*quoting*
22 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); *see also Frost v. Agnos*, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th
23 Cir.1998).

24 **2. *Supervisory Liability***

25 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their
26 employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a
27 supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must
28 be specifically alleged. *See* Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

1 Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim
2 for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some
3 facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the
4 alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent
5 them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation
6 of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v.
7 Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
8 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be
9 alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit,
10 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).

11 **II. CONCLUSION**

12 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is dismissed, with
13 leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of
14 time to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later
15 than thirty days from the date of service of this order.

16 Plaintiff must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of have
17 resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227
18 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is
19 involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or
20 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423
21 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588
22 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

23 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what
24 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal
25 rights. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2007). Although accepted as true, the
26 “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .
27 .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1555, 1565 (2007) (citations omitted).

28 Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

1 Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567
2 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded
3 pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an
4 original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d
5 at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord
6 Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

7 The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified
8 by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff
9 may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint.
10 George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

11 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

- 12 1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;
- 13 2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights amended complaint form;
- 14 3. Within **thirty (30) days** from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a
15 Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this
16 order; and
- 17 4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure
18 to state a claim.

19 IT IS SO ORDERED.

20 **Dated:** April 7, 2009

21 /s/ William M. Wunderlich
22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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