(HC) Funtanilla v.	Clark I		Doo
(HC) Funtanilla v. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	UNITED STA EASTERN D GREGORIO C. FUNTANILLA, JR., Petitioner, V. KEN CLARK, Respondent. Petitioner is a state prisoner proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On November 4, 2008, the Magistr Recommendations recommending that the untimely. (Doc. 13). The Findings and Respondent any objections were to be filed	ATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 1:06-cv-01181-LJO TAG (HC) ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 13) ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1) ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT rate Judge assigned to the case filed Findings and petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED as ecommendations were served on all parties and contain within fifteen days from the date of service of that ord	ned ler.
	Respondent.	,	
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	Petitioner is a state prisoner procee	eding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus	
	pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.		
	On November 4, 2008, the Magistr	rate Judge assigned to the case filed Findings and	
	Recommendations recommending that the	petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED as	
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22	16).	ojections to the Findings and Recommendations. (Doc	<u>.</u>
23		of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted	a <i>de</i>
24	novo review of the case. Petitioner's object	etions raise a claim of equitable tolling. The limitation	1
25	period is subject to equitable tolling when	"extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's con	trol
26 27	make it impossible to file the petition on ti	ime." Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-109	00
28	(9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks an	nd citations omitted). "When external forces, rather the	han a
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petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).

"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005). "[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule."

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted). As a consequence, "equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases." Miles, 187 F. 3d at 1107.

In his objections, Petitioner claims that he is entitled to equitable tolling for a delay caused by a prison counselor in providing Petitioner with copies of state collateral proceedings. (Doc. 16, p. 5). Petitioner indicates that he would be entitled to such tolling "if his counselor testifies" that he was responsible for the delay. (Id.). Petitioner also contends that he was also delayed in filing his first state petition because his "property was stored at a prison while he went out to court." (Doc. 16, p. 4).

As to the counselor's hypothetical testimony, Petitioner has the burden of establishing an entitlement to equitable tolling, not merely the existence, subsequent to an evidentiary hearing, of a hypothetical possibility that a third party would testify that the third party caused a delay for which Petitioner was not responsible. Similarly, Petitioner's claim that while he was "out to court" his property was stored back at the prison is unavailing. Petitioner has not established that he could not have worked on his case while "out to court," nor has he established that such an inconvenience was the "but for" cause of his untimely petition.

Moreover, both of these claims of equitable tolling seek equitable tolling for time lost in attempting to file a prior state petition. This is a novel argument because Petitioner is not contending that circumstances beyond his control prevented him from filing his federal petition in a timely fashion, but rather than circumstances beyond his control prevented him from filing one of his state habeas petitions at an earlier date than the date on which he eventually filed that petition. According to Petitioner's logic, those delays in filing the state petition deprived him of the statutory tolling to

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