1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6	LINITED OT ATE	S DISTRICT COURT
7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
8	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
9	CHRISTOPHER I. SIMMONS,	CASE NO: 1:07-cv-01058-LJO-GBC (PC)
10	Plaintiff,	ORDER DISCHARGING THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FILED ON APRIL 27, 2011
11		(Doc. 27)
12 13	ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Defendant.	ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO SEND CORRECT IFP FORM
14		ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT CORRECT IFP FORM
15		THIRTY DAY DEADLINE
16	/	
17	Christopher Simmons ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding prose and in forma pauperis	
18	("IFP") in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 27, 2011, the Court	
19	issued an order to show cause as to why Plaintiff's IFP status should not be revoked pursuant to 28	
20	U.S.C. § 1915(g). (Doc. 27). After being granted three extensions of time, Plaintiff filed a response	
21	on September 6, 2011. (Docs, 35, 36, 37).	
22	Section 1915(g) provides that:	
23	[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the	
24		
25 26	grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.	
27		
28		
	1	
	1	

Dockets.Justia.com

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).¹ Plaintiff does not dispute the Court's finding that Plaintiff has "three strikes" 2 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), rather, Plaintiff argues that he falls within the imminent danger exception. (Doc. 27). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that he falls within the imminent danger 3 exception of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Prisoners qualify for the "imminent danger" exception in § 4 1915(g) "if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced 'imminent danger of serious physical injury' at the time of filing." Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th 6 Cir.2007). Moreover, the exception focuses on the risk presented in an "ongoing danger" that the conduct complained of threatens continuing or future injury. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 8 9 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir.2007) (adopting Eighth Circuit "ongoing danger" standard).

1

5

7

24

25

26

27

10 In his complaint and his response to the order to show cause, Plaintiff alleges that he is a disabled prisoner with hypertension and "medication that presents a high risk of a heat stroke from 11 high temperatures." (Doc. 27 at 1-3 and 6; Doc. 1 at 6, 8). Plaintiff further alleges that in addition 12 13 to his hypertension medication which presents severe health risks with prolonged exposure to heat, 14 Plaintiff suffers from a mental illness that requires medications that further present a high risk of heat stroke. (Doc. 27 at 1-3 and 6; Doc. 1 at 6, 8). Plaintiff alleges that there were heat waves during the 15 summer of 2007 and that: 1) his housing unit was in excess of 105 degrees; 2) there was no air 16 17 flowing from the ventilation; 3) the heat wave caused nineteen deaths in the region and the 18 temperature in the location of the prison climbs in excess of 110 and 118 degrees during the summer; 4) medical personnel were failing to monitor "heat risk patients" as required by providing ice, cold 19 20 showers and other remedies to protect against the risk of heat stroke; 5) at the time of filing the 21 complaint, Plaintiff was locked in the housing unit 85% of the time; and 6) prison officials measured the temperature in the morning and not during the peak heat time of day. (Doc. 27 at 6-8, 10; Doc. 22 1 at 6-8, 11). 23

A prisoner with an existing medical vulnerability to heat strokes, remaining in his cell 85 percent of the time, in a region prone to excessively hot summers combined with persistent problems

2

¹ "This subdivision is commonly known as the 'three strikes' provision. 'Strikes' are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were dismissed 'on the ground that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail] to state a claim' are generically referred to as 'strikes.' Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes 28 or more cannot proceed [in forma pauperis]." Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1(9th Cir. 2005).

with cooling and insufficient preventative medical response presents an ongoing danger and 1 2 therefore meets the imminent danger exception to § 1915(g). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 3 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir.2007).²

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint satisfied the imminent 4 danger exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) at the time he filed that complaint. However, as previously noted in the Court's order to show cause, in forma pauperis status was erroneously granted as a 6 habeas case without requiring payment of the filing fee. (Doc. 27). Therefore, Plaintiff must resubmit the correct in forma pauperis application. Therefore, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that: 8

- The Court's Order to Show Cause filed on April 27, 2011 is DISCHARGED; 1.
 - 2. The Clerk's Office is Directed to send Plaintiff the correct IFP form for § 1983 prisoner cases; and
 - Plaintiff has THIRTY (30) days from receiving service of this order to submit the 3. correct IFP form.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

November 3, 2011 Dated:

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

² Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to address the specific issue of whether potential to suffer from heat 25 stroke amounts to imminent danger, the Eighth Circuit in Martin v. Shelton, applied the "ongoing danger' standard to a claim similar to Plaintiffs. See Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1049-51 (8th Cir. 2003). In Martin v. Shelton, 26 the plaintiff alleged that prison staff forced the plaintiff to work for one day in humid 98-degree weather despite his high blood pressure condition and plaintiff quit working out of fear of suffering from a heat related stroke. Shelton, 27 319 F.3d at 1049-50. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the one time past misconduct of exposing plaintiff to the risk of heat stroke did not fall within the imminent danger exception. Shelton, 319 F.3d at 1050-51. The facts in this 28 action are distinguishable from those in Shelton.