



1 the prisoner has not exhausted non-judicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without  
2 prejudice. Id.

3 The exhaustion requirement is rooted in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which  
4 provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this  
5 title, . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  
6 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) regulations provide administrative  
7 procedures in the form of one informal and three formal levels of review to address plaintiff’s claims.  
8 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1-3084.7. Administrative procedures generally are exhausted once  
9 a prisoner has received a “Director’s Level Decision,” or third-level review, with respect to his issues  
10 or claims. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5. Defendants bear the burden of proving plaintiff’s failure  
11 to exhaust. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1119.

12 Under CDCR regulations an inmate must file his prisoner grievance within fifteen days of the  
13 events grieved. If Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, by filing a late  
14 grievance, this case must be dismissed. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). Furthermore, all steps  
15 of the grievance process must be completed before a civil rights action is filed, unless a plaintiff  
16 demonstrates a step is unavailable to him. Prisoners must exhaust all “available” remedies, not just  
17 those that meet federal standards. Id. A “prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies even where  
18 the relief sought--monetary damages--cannot be granted by the administrative process.” Id. Exhaustion  
19 during the pendency of the litigation will not save an action from dismissal. McKinney v. Carey, 311  
20 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002).

21 **II. Analysis**

22 Defendant Volker contends that the matter should be dismissed as to him because Plaintiff failed  
23 to name him in his grievance. (Doc. 23) It appears undisputed, from reviewing Plaintiff’s appeal to the  
24 Director’s Level related to this grievance, that the only KVSP employee named by Plaintiff for  
25 misconduct was Defendant Brian. (Doc. 23, Ex A to Tarnoff Dec) However, Plaintiff indicates in his  
26 appeal that *both* Defendant Brian and “the control booth officer” “have it in for [him]” and that “the  
27 control booth officer” was Brian’s witness. Id. Notably, “the control booth officer” was Defendant  
28 Volker. (Doc. 1, report authored by Robert Volker)

1 On the other hand, the Director’s Level appeal makes clear that KSVP did not decide Plaintiff’s  
2 appeal *only* as to Defendant Brian but as to “staff.” The appeal noted,

3 You claim staff threatened you, harassed you, used profanity, and falsely accused you of  
4 Battery on a Peace Officer on July 2, 2007, while in B3-225L, when Correctional Officer  
5 T. Brian (B3-Floor #1 Officer) accused you of being a liar in the appeal complaint you  
6 filed regarding receiving cold food. You also claim staff threatened to write you up for  
7 being a liar in the cold food issue and acting like he would spray you for not coming to  
8 the door when ordered to do so. Staff also harassed you by standing at your door yelling  
9 your name and used profanity when he claimed you were so bitchy. **Furthermore, you  
10 claim staff falsely accused you of Battery on a Peace Officer and placed you in  
11 Administrative Segregation (Ad Seg).**

12 (Emphasis added.)

13 In any event, Plaintiff was not required to name every KVSP staff member that he believed  
14 played a role in the incident that forms the basis for his litigation. In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217  
15 (2007), the Court held, “The PLRA requires exhaustion of ‘such administrative remedies as are  
16 available,’ 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), but nothing in the statute imposes a ‘name all defendants’ requirement  
17 . . .” The Court continued,

18 In Woodford, we held that to properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must  
19 “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable  
20 procedural rules,” 548 U.S., at 88, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368, 377 –rules that  
21 are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself. Compliance with  
22 prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly  
23 exhaust.’ **The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance  
24 procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s  
25 requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.**

26 (Emphasis added.)

27 Here, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation requires only that, “Appellant  
28 shall . . . describe the problem and action requested.” (Doc. 23, Ex. A to Notice of Lodging § 3084.2)  
The Court has not located, in any of the documents submitted by Volker, nor did Volker cite to, any  
regulation that required Plaintiff to name every employee in his grievance as a prerequisite to suing the  
employees. This Court has rejected such an approach. Recently, in Womack v. Bakewell, 2010 U.S.  
Dist. LEXIS 93346 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2010), this Court held, “California regulations do not require an  
inmate to specifically identify a prison official in a grievance. Therefore a California inmate need not  
name a particular individual during the grievance process in order to name that person as a defendant  
and meet the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement by the time he files suit. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

1 218-219, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007); Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir.  
2 2005).”

3 Because there is no dispute that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the  
4 *incident*, he has satisfied his obligations under the PLRA as to all defendants named in the complaint.  
5 Therefore, the Court recommends that the motion to dismiss be **DENIED**.

6 **RECOMMENDATIONS**

7 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS as follows:

8 1. The motion to dismiss be **DENIED**.

9 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned  
10 to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of  
11 Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 14 days after being  
12 served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties.  
13 Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and  
14 Recommendation.” The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §  
15 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive  
16 the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 Dated: September 27, 2010

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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