```
1
2
3
4
5
6
                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
                     EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 8
9
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                  ) 1:08-cv-1570-OWW-SMS
10
                  Plaintiff,
                                   ORDER VACATING HEARING ON
11
                                   PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR
        v.
                                   DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND DEEMING
12
  Approximately $20,000.00 in
                                   MATTER SUBMITTED FOR DECISION
   U.S. Currency, et al.,
                                    (DOC. 29)
13
                  Defendants.
                                   Vacated hearing date:
14
                                   October 30, 2009
                                    Time: 9:30 a.m.
15
                                    FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE:
16
                                    PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR
                                    DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DOC. 29)
17
18
        Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.
19
  Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for default
20
  judgment, filed on August 14, 2009. The matter has been referred
21
  to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local
22
  Rule 72-302(c)(19).
23
        Plaintiff previously filed a motion for default judgment on
24
  April 21, 2009, and then withdrew the motion after the Court had
25
  fully considered the motion and had prepared and filed findings
26
  and recommendations to deny the motion. (Docs. 21, 25, 26.)
27
        I. Vacating the Hearing on the Motion
28
        Pursuant to Rule 78-230(h) of the Local Rules of Practice
```

1 for the United States District Court, Eastern District of 2 California, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's ex parte motion for default judgment is a matter that may appropriately be submitted upon the record and briefs, including the Plaintiffs' motion, supporting memorandum of points and authorities, and declaration of Elisa Rodriguez filed on August 14, 2009.

Accordingly, the hearing on the motion, presently set for October 30, 2009, IS VACATED, and the motion IS DEEMED SUBMITTED to the Court for decision.

## II. Default Judgment

6

7

10

11

12

22

A court has the discretion to enter a default judgment against one who is not an infant, incompetent, or member of the armed services where the claim is for an amount that is not 14 certain on the face of the claim and where (1) the defendant has been served with the claim; (2) the defendant's default has been 16 entered for failure to appear; (3) if the defendant has appeared 17 in the action, the defendant has been served with written notice 18 of the application for judgment at least three days before the hearing on the application; and, (4) the court has undertaken any 20 | necessary and proper investigation or hearing in order to enter judgment or carry it into effect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988). Factors that may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the entry of a default judgment and as to setting aside a default include the nature and extent of 26 the delay, Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-925 (9th Cir. 1986); the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, Eitel v. 28 McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986); the merits of

1 plaintiff's substantive claim, id.; the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to support judgment, Alan Neuman Productions, Inc., 862 F.2d at 1392; the amount in controversy, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1471-1472; the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, id.; whether the default was due to excusable neglect, id.; and, the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that favors decisions on the merits, id.

3

4

7

8

11

With respect to default judgments in proceedings that are in rem actions for forfeiture, both the general Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty 12 and Maritime Claims (Supp. R.) apply, but the latter rules 13 prevail if there is an inconsistency. Supp. R. A(1). Supp. R. G(1) provides that the rule governs a forfeiture action in rem arising from a federal statute; to the extent that Rule G does 16 not address an issue, Supp. Rules C and E also apply. 17 Supplemental Rule G, which took effect on December 1, 2006, 18 incorporates a common-sense approach to notice grounded in defined and recognized principles of due process of law. Supp. 20 Rule G, Adv. Comm. Note on 2006 Adoption. The Advisory Committee Note indicates that the rule was added to bring together the central procedures governing civil forfeiture actions; it also states that the rule generally applies to actions governed by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) as well as those excluded from it; thus, the intended scope of application 26 is very broad. The rule permits flexibility as to the time of service of any warrant and supplemental process. Id. The 28 provisions for notice incorporate the traditional means of

1 publication and adopt the general principle that notice should be effectuated by means reasonably calculated to reach potential claimants at a cost reasonable in the circumstances, and actual notice precludes a challenge to the government's failure to comply with the specific requirements of the rule set forth in Rule G(4)(b). Id.

## III. Notice

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

11

15

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

#### A. Publication

Supplemental Rule G(4)(a) provides that a judgment of forfeiture may be entered only if the government has published notice of the action within a reasonable time after filing the 12 complaint or at a time the court orders. The rule sets forth the required contents of the notice, frequency of publication, and means of publication.

Here, the amended declaration of publication of paralegal 16 Elisa M. Rodriguez filed on July 9, 2009 (Doc. 28) establishes that a notice with the required contents was published on the official government internet site for thirty consecutive calendar days. Thus, the Plaintiff has demonstrated publication that is sufficient pursuant to Supplemental Rule G(4)(a).

## B. Notice to Known Potential Claimants

Supplemental Rule G(4) (b) provides that the government must send notice of the action and the complaint to any person who reasonably appears to be a potential claimant; the rule specifies the content, means, and time of the notice, and it expressly 26 provides that a potential claimant who had actual notice of a forfeiture action may not oppose or seek relief from forfeiture 28 because of the government's failure to send the required notice.

Here, pursuant to a warrant of arrest, the Defendant currencies were arrested on or about November 3, 2008. (Docs. 4, [6-7.)

1

3

4

7

14

23

24

26

The Marshal's certifications establish that Rafael C. Rivera and Mario Chavez Cabrera were personally served with the pertinent documents on November 13, 2008. (Doc. 8.)

Four attempts at personal service were made with respect to Peter Halamandaris, and an ineffectual attempt at substituted service was also made. Thereafter, Halamandaris received actual notice by receiving the requisite documents by certified mail on or about January 13, 2009. (Decl. of Elisa Rodriguez in support 12 of request to clerk for entry of default against Peter Halamandaris [Doc. 17, attchmt. 2], ¶7, Ex. C.)

With respect to the notice required by Local Rule A-540, the complaint reveals that although a cashier's check from 16 Halamandaris was given to a confidential source for cocaine, the 17 check was in the custody of Rivera, who gave it to the 18 confidential source in the presence of Cabrera; Halamandaris was not present. (Doc. 1,  $\P$  11.) Therefore, pursuant to Local Rule A-20 540(a)(4), Halamandaris was not a person who had custody of the property prior to its possession by law enforcement agents. Therefore, notice to Halamandaris by certified mail, return receipt requested, was sufficient. Local Rule A-540(a)(4).

Accordingly, it appears that the three individuals received actual notice of the proceeding.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated that it has given notice by publication and the notice required to be 28 given to potential claimants by Rule G(4).

# C. <u>Notice of Judgment Sought and of Motion for</u> Default Judgment

#### 1. <u>Judgment Sought</u>

The Court concludes that the notice given of the judgment sought satisfied Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d) and 54(c), which require that a judgment by default shall not be different in kind from the relief sought, or exceed in amount that prayed for, in the demand for judgment. Plaintiff expressly sought in the complaint the types of relief sought by the instant application for default judgment, including a judgment of forfeiture of the Defendant currency and check to the Plaintiff United States. (Cmplt. p. 5, 11. 20-21.)

## 2. Motion for Default Judgment

The application for default judgment before the Court was filed on an ex parte basis and thus was not served on the Defendant property or on any persons who might reasonably appear to be potential claimants.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) requires written notice of an application for default judgment be served at least three days prior to the hearing on a defaulting party, or a representative thereof, who has appeared in the action. An appearance for the purpose of Rule 55 need not be a formal one and may consist even of informal contacts made by the defaulting party where the defaulting party demonstrates a clear purpose to defend the suit. In re Roxford Foods v. Ford, 12 F.3d 875, 879-81 (9th Cir. 1993).

Here, the declarations reveal no indicia of any formal appearance or of informal contacts by anyone who might reasonably appear to be a potential claimant. Accordingly, no notice is

1 2

necessary.

1

2

3

4

7

11

12

13

14

23

24

## IV. Default and Entry of Default

The declarations and the Court's docket demonstrate that no person or entity made a claim or answered the complaint within the requisite thirty-day period for filing a claim of 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) and Supp. R. G(5), and/or within the twenty-day period set forth in Supp. R. G(5) for filing an answer thereafter. Therefore, the Clerk appropriately entered the defaults of potential claimants Rafael C. Rivera and Mario Chavez Cabrera on December 31, 2008, and of potential claimant Peter Halamandaris on February 25, 2009.

## V. <u>Legal Sufficiency of the Complaint</u>

## A. <u>Legal Standards</u>

A default judgment generally bars the defaulting party from disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, but the defaulting 16 party may argue that the facts as alleged do not state a claim. 17 Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392. Thus, well pleaded factual allegations, except as to damages, are taken as true; however, necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default. Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992); Tel<u>eVideo Systems, Inc. v.</u> Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 ( $9^{th}$  Cir. 1987). Under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), which

applies to this case, the government must prove by a 26 preponderance of evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Further, if the government's 28 theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense. \$ 983(c)(3).

Supp. Rule G(2) requires that the complaint in a forfeiture action in rem arising from a federal statute be verified; state the grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction over the Defendant property, and venue; describe the property with reasonable particularity; identify the statute under which the forfeiture action is brought; and state sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.

## B. The Complaint

3

4

5

7

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

22

23

24

25

26

27

The complaint filed in this action was verified. (Cmplt. p. 6.)

The bases for jurisdiction are identified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1355 (jurisdiction of civil proceedings commenced by the United States or an agency or officer thereof, and of actions to recover or enforce penalties or forfeitures under acts of Congress, respectively) and 21 U.S.C. § 881 (subjecting to forfeiture all controlled substances manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of the subchapter, as well as all money used or intended to facilitate any violation or furnished in exchange therefor or constituting proceeds traceable thereto). (Cmplt.  $\P\P$  1, 3.)

The bases of venue are identified as 28 U.S.C. § 1395 (placing venue for a civil forfeiture proceeding where the 28 property is found) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(j) (placing venue where 1 there is found the owner of property who is charged with a violation that is the basis for forfeiture of the property or where the criminal prosecution is brought). (Cmplt.  $\P$  4.)

3

4

5

7

11

13

The property is described with reasonable particularity.

It is stated that the Plaintiff United States proceeds pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), and that the Defendant currency and check, seized in June 2008 in Fresno, California, constitute money or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance of listed chemical, proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and/or money used or intended to be used to facilitate one or more violations 12 of 21 U.S.C. § 841 <u>et seq.</u> (Cmplt. ¶¶ 1-2.)

In the complaint there are alleged sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government would be able to meet its burden of proof at trial. It is alleged that the 16 Defendant assets were taken in to the custody of United States 17 Marshals on June 24, 2008, during a pre-arranged, attempted 18 purchase of cocaine by the known potential claimants, Rivera, Cabrera, and Halamandaris, from a confidential source who was cooperating with the government. (Cmplt.  $\P$  2.) The \$20,000 in currency was given to the confidential source by Rivera, who authorized the confidential source to take it from a vehicle that Rivera and Cabrera had traveled in to reach the locus of the transaction. A cashier's check from Halamandaris for \$20,000.00 was handed by Rivera to the confidential source as well. (Complt.  $26 \parallel \P 11.)$  About two weeks before the planned exchange, the confidential source had shown a substantial amount of cocaine to 28 Rivera, and Rivera had sent the confidential source text messages 1 to the effect that Rivera had \$50,000.00 to buy three kilograms of cocaine, and that Halamandaris was ready to sign a loan document against a club he owned for the purchase of an additional sixty kilograms of cocaine. (Cmplt.  $\P\P$  8-9.)

3

4

5

7

11

12

13

15

16

18

26

27

These facts support a reasonable inference that the large sum of cash and the cashier's check were subject to forfeiture as proceeds, as money intended to be exchanged for controlled substances, and/or as money used or intended to be used to facilitate other violations involving controlled substances. Because of the amount of funds involved and the context of the negotiations demonstrated by the evidence, Plaintiff has shown a substantial connection between the property and the offenses of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it.

## VI. Status of Potential Claimants and Discretionary Factors

Here, no one has claimed an interest in the Defendant 17 property or otherwise responded to the complaint despite adequate notice. It does not appear that there is any risk of mistake or excusable neglect on the part of anyone with a potential interest in the property or of a dispute as to a material fact essential to the government's case. No just cause for delay appears. It is apparent from the declarations submitted to the Court that none of the potential claimants is an infant, incompetent, or member of the armed services. There does not appear to be any reason why the general policy in favor of a decision on the merits would warrant refusing to enter the requested default judgment.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown its entitlement to a default judgment of forfeiture.

## VII. Form of the Judgment

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

15

20

23

24

26

A successful plaintiff in a forfeiture action is entitled to a judgment against the property, Waterloo Distilling Corp. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931), affecting the interests of all persons in the property, Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).

## VIII. Recommendation

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

- 1. Plaintiff's motion for default judgment be GRANTED;
- 2. Plaintiff is entitled to, and the Clerk be directed to enter, a judgment that:
- (a) The interest/s of Rafael C. Rivera, Mario Chavez Cabrera, and Peter Halamandaris in the Defendant property are CONDEMNED and FORFEITED to the United States of America; and
- (b) The right, title, and interest of all potential 16 claimants in the Defendant property, including but not limited to 17 Rafael C. Rivera, Mario Chavez Cabrera, and Peter Halamandaris, are FORFEITED to the United States of America pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), and are VESTED in the United States; and,
  - (c) All persons claiming any right, title, or interest in or to the Defendant property have DEFAULTED and no longer have any right, title, or interest in the Defendant property whatsoever; and,
  - 3. The Clerk of Court ENTER final judgment of forfeiture for Plaintiff United States of America.

These findings and recommendation are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to 28 the provisions of 28 U.S.C.  $\S$  636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,
Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after
being served with a copy, any party may file written objections
with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document
should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings
and Recommendation." Replies to the objections shall be served
and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served
by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then
review the Magistrate Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b) (1) (C). The parties are advised that failure to file
objections within the specified time may waive the right to
appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d
1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 Dated: October 22, 2009 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE