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8	8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	FOR THE EASTERN DIS	STRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11	JOSUE VILCHIS,	) Case No.: 1:10-cv-00893 JLT
12	Plaintiff,	) ORDER DENYING REQUEST TO MODIFY ) THE SCHEDULING ORDER
13	V.	) ) (Doc. 26)
14	CITY OF BAKERSFIELD; JUSTIN LEWIS; D. BARTHELMES, and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,	
15	Defendants.	
16		) Gethere he dell'as ender to ender d the des divers
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20	8	scheduling order in this case. In it, the Court
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23	1. The foregoing order represents the best	Estimate of the court and counsel as to the
24	agenda most suitable to bring this case to r specifically reserved for this case. If the pa	esolution. The trial date reserved is
25	schedule outlined in this order cannot be n immediately of that fact so that adjustment	net, counsel are ordered to notify the court
26	subsequent scheduling conference.	
27	they are accompanied by affidavits or decl	
28	exhibits, which establish good cause for gr	anting the relief requested.

1	3. Failure to comply with this order may result in the imposition of sanctions.	
2	(Doc. 12 at 14.) Since the time of the scheduling order, on August 17, 2011, the Court granted the	
3	stipulation to extend the deadlines for expert disclosure and expert discovery. (Doc. 14) The basis	
4	for this extension was to allow time for the experts "to review important deposition transcripts that	
5	have not yet been received from court reporters." (Doc. 13 at 2) On October 18, 2011, the Court	
6	again granted an extension of time for the disclosure of experts and the deadline to complete expert	
7	discovery. (Doc. 20) At that time, the stated reason for the extension was to allow the parties to	
8	obtain Plaintiff's records from the VA. (Doc. 19 at 1)	
9	Now, the parties report that these same VA records have not yet been received and they	
10	report that they have no anticipated date by which they will receive them. (Doc. 26 at1-2) They seek	
11	approximately 30-days extension of time for each of the remaining deadlines, including the dates	
12	associated with dispositive motions. Notably, each of these extensions are needed, the parties	
13	stipulate, because of the anticipated need to provide supplemental expert reports.	
14	For the reasons set forth below, the stipulation to amend the scheduling order is <b>DENIED</b> .	
15	II. Analysis	
15 16	II. Analysis         A. There is no good cause shown to modify the case schedule	
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not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 Scheduling conference . .
 ." Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608.

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In the current request, counsel agree that the VA records are important documents for the experts to consider and after this consideration, provide supplementation of their reports, if necessary. When evaluating the parties' request, it is important to understand what harm they seek to avoid. From the context of the stipulation, it seems clear that the parties are not concerned about providing rebuttal disclosures but are concerned about providing supplementation of the already produced expert reports, if review the VA records requires it.

9 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(e), the parties have the duty to "supplement or correct its disclosure" when the party learns that, in a material respect, the disclosure is incomplete 10 11 or incorrect, and the additional or corrective information is unknown to the other parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). After the deadline for simultaneous expert disclosure, a "supplemental 12 disclosure deadline" does not permit the designation of a new expert: "[A] party may not use a 13 supplement to extend the discovery deadline and introduce [a] new opinion, nor may a party simply 14 15 use an existing expert's disclosure as a placeholder to spring a supplemental opinion in the eleventh 16 hour." North View Estates, GP v. Yreka Holdings, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57800, at \*3 (E.D. Cal. 17 Jan. 13, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), accord; Keener v. United States, 181 18 F.R.D. 639, 641 (D. Mont. 1998); see also Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 19 320 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The purpose of supplementary disclosures is just that—to supplement. Such 20 disclosures are not intended to provide an extension of the expert designation and report production 21 deadline"). "[D]esignation of 'supplemental' experts[, therefore,] is an ongoing obligation of the 22 parties to correct earlier opinions disclosed by an expert. It does not refer to the disclosure of a new 23 expert" once the court-ordered deadline for simultaneous initial disclosure of experts has expired. 24 United States v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., Case No. 1:01-CV-5167 OWW DLB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24592, at \*8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005) (quoting Hampton v. Schimpff, 188 F.R.D. 589, 590 25 (D. Mont. 1999)). 26

In the Court's scheduling order, it appears that the terms "rebuttal" and "supplemental" wereused inartfully, to refer to the same thing; disclosure of experts who would be used to counter the

opinions of previously disclosed experts.<sup>1</sup> Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D). (Doc. 12 at 9) Thus, the
current schedule in this case required any rebuttal expert to be disclosed by November 14, 2011. On
the other hand, supplementation is permitted *and required* under the Rule until the filing of the
pretrial statements are filed. Given this, the Court does not find that the stipulation demonstrates
good cause to amend the scheduling order.

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## The proposed extended dates for dispositive motions are unworkable

In addition, the Court would be required to deny the request to amend the case schedule
regarding the filing of dispositive motions. The proposed filing deadline of January 4, 2012 with a
hearing date of February 8, 2012, would provide the Court insufficient time to hear the matter,
consider the arguments and issue a ruling before the pretrial conference. Indeed, there would be
insufficient time for the Court to decide dispositive motions before trial.

As counsel is aware (Doc. 15), this Court is facing an extreme judicial shortage which was exacerbated by the retirement of Judge Wanger, the judge previously assigned to this case. To address this judicial shortage, the Court <u>must</u> insist on deadlines that are reasonably set to allow sufficient time for the Court to receive and consider dispositive motions *before* the time for the filing pretrial documents, the pretrial conference and trial. Any other schedule would risk that the Court expend its extremely limited and precious judicial resources on matters that later become moot or unnecessary. In this time of crisis, the Court simply cannot permit this.

## 19 III. Conclusion

1.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court **ORDERS**:

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2. Any rebuttal experts **SHALL** be disclosed no later than November 25, 2011;

The stipulation to amend the scheduling conference order is **DENIED**;.

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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Any other interpretation would yield nonsensical results. If these terms were not used interchangeably in the Court's order then any rebuttal expert would be excused from compliance with Rule 26's requirement that supplementation occurred until the time that the pretrial documents are filed. This cannot have been the intention of the Court.

1	3. Supplementation of expert opinions <b>SHALL</b> occur consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P.
2	26(e)(2).
3	IT IS SO ORDERED.
4	Dated:November 21, 2011/s/ Jennifer L. ThurstonUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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