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LEONCIO PALMA,

v.

KATTY ALLISON,

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF CHRITCHING

) 1:10-cv-02120-OWW-SKO-HC)) ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION

WITH LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED PETITION (DOC. 1)

DEADLINE: THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO SEND PETITIONER A BLANK PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 304. Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on November 15, 2010.

I. Screening the Petition

Petitioner,

Respondent.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Doc. 7

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court..." Habeas Rule 4; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. <u>Allison</u>, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n. 7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990).

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

A. Lack of Specificity

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Petitioner is an inmate of the California Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility (CSATF) at Corcoran, California, who is

serving a sentence of life with the possibility of parole imposed
in 1990 for a conviction of attempted murder in the San Diego

Superior Court. (Pet. 1.) Petitioner challenges a decision of

the "board" to deny his parole. (Pet. 4.) Petitioner claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the decision that he continues to pose an unreasonable threat, there was no individualized consideration of the appropriate factors, and the board failed to articulate a rational nexus between the factors and the conclusion that Petitioner is presently dangerous to society if released. Petitioner alleges that this violated the state and federal constitutions, and his continued incarceration is a violation of "due process." (Pet. 4, 5.)

Although Petitioner states that he has been denied parole on seven different occasions (pet. 4), he does not state the date or other identifying data in order to permit a respondent to understand precisely which decision is being challenged. Thus, Petitioner has not fully stated his claim, and it is not possible for a respondent to be able to respond intelligently to the petition.

Further, Petitioner does not identify the specific guarantee of the federal constitution that was violated or otherwise explain how the decision was in violation of federal law.

Because Petitioner fails to identify the decision being challenged and the precise federal constitutional provision or provisions violated, the petition is uncertain and must be dismissed.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. <u>Coleman v.</u>

<u>Thompson</u>, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); <u>Rose v. Lundy</u>, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); <u>Buffalo v. Sunn</u>, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1988).

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows:

In <u>Picard v. Connor</u>, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.

<u>Duncan</u>, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further in <u>Lyons v. Crawford</u>, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended by <u>Lyons v. Crawford</u>, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law. <u>See</u>, <u>Shumway v. Payne</u>, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in <u>Duncan</u>, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds, see, <u>e.g.</u>, <u>Hiivala v. Wood</u>, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d at 865.

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In <u>Johnson</u>, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is.

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Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001).

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In the petition before the Court, Petitioner states that he raised before the state courts the issue of an absence of

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evidence to support the board's denial (pet. 2); however, he does not state that he raised the other arguments or claims that he alleges in the petition before the Court. Further, he does not state that his claims concerned a denial of due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as distinct from protection by state law. Finally, he does not state what issues he raised before the California Supreme Court, or whether or not his appeal to the highest state court has been decided.

If the grounds are pending before the California Supreme Court, or if the grounds were not presented to the California Supreme Court, they are unexhausted, and the petition must be dismissed to provide Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22.

The instant petition must be dismissed for the reasons stated above. Petitioner will be given an opportunity to file a first amended petition to cure the deficiencies. Petitioner is advised that failure to file a petition in compliance with this order (i.e., a completed petition with specific, identifiable, cognizable federal claims clearly stated and with exhaustion of state remedies clearly stated) within the allotted time will result in a recommendation that the petition be dismissed and the action be terminated. Petitioner is advised that the amended petition should be entitled, "First Amended Petition," and it must refer to the case number in this action.

II. Disposition

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED with leave to amend; and

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- 2) Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order to file an amended petition in compliance with this order; and
- 3) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send Petitioner a form petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \S 2254.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2011 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE