(HC) Chavez v. Miller			
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7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
8	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
9	BARBARA LYNN CHAVEZ,	1:12-cv-00567-LJO-DLB (HC)	
10	Petitioner,	FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION	
11	v.	REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	
12		[Doc. 1]	
13	WALTER MILLER, Respondent. /		
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15	Datitionar is presenting are so with a natition for whit of helpes as well as 20		
16	Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28		
17	U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 11, 2012.		
18	Petitioner challenges a 1999 conviction of first degree murder, second degree burglary, attempted		
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20	robbery, and conspiracy. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without the possibility		
21	of parole. Petitioner has previously filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on May 13, 2005 in 1:05 ov 00400 OWW DLP (HC), shallonging the same 1000 conviction. The		
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23	13, 2005 in 1:05-cv-00490-OWW-DLB (HC), challenging the same 1999 conviction. The		
24	petition was dismissed as untimely on January 11, 2007. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals		
25	affirmed the dismissal on June 18, 2010. Recover the surrent notition was filed after April 24, 1006, the provisions of the		
26	Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the		
27	Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current		
28	petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). A federal court must dismiss a second or		
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successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or successive petition.

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words, Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or successive petition. Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v.

Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v.

United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

A second or successive petition for habeas corpus is not considered "successive" if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for a technical or procedural reason versus on the merits.

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-87 (2000) (holding that a second habeas petition is not successive if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust); Stewart v.

Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1998) (a second habeas petition is not successive if the claim raised in the first petition was dismissed by the district court as premature.)

As previous stated, the prior petition in 1:05-cv-00490-OWW-DLB (HC) was dismissed as untimely and judgment was entered. A petition that is dismissed as time-barred constitutes an adjudication on the merits for successive purposes. McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Quezada v. Smith, 624 F.3d 514, 518 (2d Cir. 2010); Altman v. Benik, 337

F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2003). Because the prior petition was adjudicated "on the merits," the 1 2 instant petition is a "second or successive petition" under § 2244(b) that must be dismissed to re-3 filing if Petitioner seeks and obtains approval in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a second or successive petition. 4 5 RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 6 7 1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED; and 2. 8 The Clerk of Court be directed to terminate this action. 9 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 10 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 11 Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with 12 13 the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Replies to the objections shall be served 14 and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The Court will then review the 15 Magistrate Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that 16 17 failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 18 Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: <u>April 17, 2012</u> /s/ Dennis L. Beck 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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