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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	FOR THE EASTERN	DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11	JAMES E. WHITE,	Case No. 1:12-cv-00917-AWI-BAM (PC)
12	Plaintiff,	ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS TO
13	v.	REQUEST FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY USM
14	MARK N. PAZIN, et al.,	(ECF No. 32)
15	Defendants.	
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17	I. Introduction	
18	Plaintiff James E. White ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma	
19	pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.	
20	On November 6, 2014, the Court four	nd service of the first amended complaint against
21	Defendants Blake, Blodgett, Cavallero, Pazin	a, Scott, Thoreson, and the Merced County Sheriff's
22	Department Administration, was appropriate.	(ECF No. 23.) The Court directed Plaintiff to
23	submit the information necessary for the Unit	ted States Marshal to serve process on Defendants.
24	Id. Plaintiff indicated that all Defendants cou	ld be served at the Merced County Jail.
25	On December 2, 2014, the Court then	directed service of the first amended complaint by
26	the Marshal using the information Plaintiff pr	rovided. (ECF No. 25.) The Court directed the
27	Marshall to effect personal service of process	on each Defendant who failed to return a waiver
28	within sixty days. (Id. at $\P$ 4.)	
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Receiving no waivers or other responses by mail, the Marshal attempted personal service
 on the Defendants at the Merced County Jail. Thereafter, the Marshal submitted a "Process
 Receipt and Return" form for each Defendant, indicating that a receptionist accepted service for
 all Defendants, on June 2, 2015. (ECF No. 28.) The Marshal then requested reimbursement for
 the associated expenses. (ECF No. 29.)

6 On June 24, 2015, Defendants filed the instant objections to the request for 7 reimbursement, and submitted a declaration in support. (ECF No. 31.) The declaration is made by 8 the Chief Civil Litigator for the County of Merced, Office of the County Counsel, attorneys for 9 Defendants. (ECF No. 31-1.) Counsel declares that on June 8, 2015, he informed the Marshal 10 Service that four of the Defendants (Blake, Thoreson, Pazin and Scott) were retired from their 11 employment at the County, and thus personal service was not effective on them when it was made 12 at the Merced County Jail. Counsel declares that the representative of the Marshal responded that 13 he disagreed with counsel's assessment, and that service was good. (Id. at  $\P$  3.)

Defendants now contend that personal service was not effected on these four individual
Defendants, but they do not intend to bring any motion to dismiss for insufficient service of
process. Instead, counsel declares that, as a professional courtesy, he and his staff spoke with
Defendants Blake, Thoreson, Pazin, and Scott to obtain their consent to appear for them in this
action.<sup>1</sup>

However, Defendants nevertheless object to reimbursing the Marshal for the expenses for
serving these four individual Defendants. They contend that the County had good cause to decline
to accept service for them since they are former employees, and thus reimbursement should not
be ordered.

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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> On June 23, 2015, a motion to dismiss was filed by the Deputy County Counsel, for all Defendants. (ECF No. 30.)

1	I. Standards
2	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) provides:
3	(e) Serving an Individual Within a Judicial District of the United States.
4	Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individualother than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filedmay be
5	served in a judicial district of the United States by: (1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought
6	in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made; or
7	(2) doing any of the following:
8	(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;
9	(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and
10	discretion who resides there; or
11	(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
12	Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Under California Law, a summons may be served by personal delivery of a
13	copy of the summons and complaint. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.10. Personal delivery can be
14	made by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person's office or usual mailing
15	address with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, followed by mailing a copy of the
16	summons and complaint. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20.
17	III. Discussion
18	Defendants Blake, Thoreson, Pazin, and Scott no longer worked at the Merced County Jail
19	when the Marshal delivered the summons and amended complaint to the Merced County Jail.
20	However, instead of rejecting the summons and amended complaint for those parties, so that the
21	Marshal could return them as unexecuted on that basis, service was accepted. Following this,
22	although counsel contacted the Marshal to advise of the fact that these Defendants were not
23	currently working at the jail, counsel did not return the summons and amended complaint for
24	those Defendants to the Marshal. Instead, counsel obtained authority from each of those
25	Defendants to appear on behalf of them. This appearance has not been limited in nature, such as
26	for the purpose of raising a motion on the grounds of insufficient service of process. Counsel has
27	in fact declared that, permission having been obtained for representation, "the need for defense
28	motions regarding service was rendered moot." (ECF No. 31-1 $\P$ 7.)
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1	Thus, it appears that for the purposes of this case, the County Counsel is acting as	
2	Defendants' agent, and has acted as though authorized to accept service on their behalf, whether	
3	they are currently employed at the Merced County Jail or not. Counsel declares that these actions	
4	were also taken in good faith and with due regard and as a courtesy to the Court and the Marshal.	
5	Certainly, professionalism by counsel is much appreciated by the Court. Nevertheless, if service	
6	is not properly effected using the information provided by a plaintiff, courts will apply the Rules	
7	of Civil Procedure and employ the necessary procedures to effect service. See Spence v.	
8	Stambaugh, No. 2:14-cv-1170-WBS-AC-P, 2016 WL 2892571, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2016)	
9	(vacating order to defendants to reimburse the U.S. Marshal for attempts to effect personal	
10	service at Sherriff's Department when defendants were no longer employed there, and seeking	
11	additional information from plaintiff); see also Avery v. Allamby, No. 13-cv-3169-BTM-DHB,	
12	2015 WL 710695, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2015) (directing counsel to provide Marshal with	
13	confidential memorandum indicating forwarding address of retired employee for service	
14	purposes). The objections to reimbursement of the Marshal for expenses incurred for service are	
15	overruled.	
16	IV. Conclusion and Order	
17	For these reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that Defendants' objections to the U.S.	
18	Marshal Service's request for reimbursement (ECF No. 31) are overruled.	
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20	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
21	Dated: October 31, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe	
22	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
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