

1 § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
2 paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or
3 appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

4 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

5 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
6 pleader is entitled to relief” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
7 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing
9 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient
10 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting
11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are
12 not. Id.

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14 To state a claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in
15 the deprivation of his rights. Id. at 1949. This requires the presentation of factual allegations
16 sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret
17 Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of
18 meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

19 **B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS**

20 On July 7, 2010, at approximately 10:45 a.m., Plaintiff was admitted to KVSP Facility B
21 Medical after he was assaulted. Plaintiff was soaked with pepper spray and had deep cuts on his
22 left hand, lower back and both knees, and had two black eyes. He alleges that he was forced to
23 stand naked in a holding cell from 10:45 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., in front of numerous inmates, female
24 medical staff and correctional staff members. The pepper spray was burning his open wounds
25 and genitals. Staff members laughed at his suffering and provided no medical treatment.
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1 At around 1:15 p.m., a full scale riot broke out involving at least 100 inmates. At about
2 1:30 p.m., Plaintiff was informed that staff needed room in Medical and that they would have to
3 get Plaintiff out. Defendant Triesch then “hastily” cleared Plaintiff to be sent back to the yard,
4 without medical treatment. Plaintiff received a pair of ill-fitting boxer shorts and was cuffed and
5 escorted, bare-footed, over 200 yards on 96 degree pavement.

6 On July 8, 2010, Plaintiff asked the Building Officer for medical treatment. Medical
7 treatment was denied because Plaintiff was not supposed to be housed in Facility B and because
8 staff were busy because of the riot.

9 On July 9, 2010, Plaintiff asked a Correctional Officer for a Medical Form and medical
10 treatment. Plaintiff’s wounds were open and leaking, and getting infected. Plaintiff never
11 received the form.

12 On July 10, 2010, Plaintiff was moved to Facility A and told the Correctional Officer that
13 he needed to be taken to Medical for wound treatment. The Correctional Officer told Plaintiff
14 that he would get him a Medical Form to fill out, but he never did. Plaintiff’s cell mate had to
15 obtain the form because Plaintiff was on orientation status and wasn’t cleared to leave his cell.
16 Plaintiff filled out the Medical Form and sent it in.

17 On July 12, 2010, Plaintiff’s Medical Form was received by Facility A’s medical team
18 and processed.

19 On July 13, 2010, around 12:30 p.m., Plaintiff received his first medical treatment from
20 R. N. Edwards. Plaintiff was given pain medication and sent back to his housing unit with
21 instructions to return on July 16, 2010, for follow-up.

22 Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
23 in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Doe CMO is
24 responsible for making sure that Plaintiff received immediate medical attention and training
25 staff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harrington contributed to the state of inmate overcrowding
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1 and therefore failed to provide a facility that could provide adequate health care. Plaintiff
2 contends that Defendant Cate has “overwhelming proven knowledge” of the medical problems
3 within CDCR and knew that overcrowding was causing the issues. Plaintiff alleges that all
4 Defendants acted in concert with one another to guarantee that Plaintiff would fall victim to
5 “CDC&R’s Medical Neglection System.” Compl. 8.

6 **C. ANALYSIS**

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8 Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food,
9 clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th
10 Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains
11 while in prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks
12 omitted). To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, inmates must show deliberate indifference
13 to a substantial risk of harm to their health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v.
14 Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th
15 Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,
16 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

17 For claims arising out of medical care in prison, Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious
18 medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further
19 significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s
20 response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122
21 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)).

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23 Here, Plaintiff has stated a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
24 against Defendant Triesch. Plaintiff will be instructed on service by separate order.

25 Plaintiff fails to state a claim, however, against the remaining Defendants. Defendants
26 Doe CMO, Harrington and Cate are in supervisory roles. Liability may not be imposed on
27 supervisory personnel under the theory of *respondeat superior*, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77, 129
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1 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235; Jones, 297 F.3d at
2 934, and as administrators, these Defendants may only be held liable if they “participated in or
3 directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them,” Taylor v.
4 List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir.
5 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir.
6 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir.
7 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Some culpable action or
8 inaction must be attributable to Defendants and while the creation or enforcement of, or
9 acquiescence in, an unconstitutional policy, may support a claim, the policy must have been the
10 moving force behind the violation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205; Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895,
11 914-15 (9th Cir. 2001); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir.
12 1991); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989).

14 Plaintiff attempts to establish liability against Defendants Doe CMO, Harrington and
15 Cate based on their knowledge of the overcrowded prison system, which Plaintiff contends led to
16 the failure of CDCR’s health care system. He uses this knowledge to try and establish a direct
17 link between their actions or inactions, and Plaintiff’s medical treatment. Any such link is
18 tenuous, however, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated that these Defendants participated in,
19 directed, or knew of Plaintiff’s medical claims and failed to prevent them. In other words,
20 although it may be true that these supervisory Defendants were aware of an issue with CDCR
21 medical treatment, liability in this instance must be based on personal participation in *Plaintiff’s*
22 alleged deprivations.

24 **D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

25 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims against Defendant
26 Triesch for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on her deliberate indifference to a serious
27 medical need. It does not, however, state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Doe
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1 CMO, Harrington or Cate. This deficiency cannot be cured. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
2 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). As explained
3 above, Plaintiff will be instructed on service in a separate order.

4 Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants Doe CMO, Harrington
5 and Cate be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim against
6 them under section 1983.

7 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
8 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
9 **thirty (30) days** after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file
10 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
11 Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections
12 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v.
13 Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 Dated: April 10, 2013

/s/ Dennis L. Beck
18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE