instant case, Petitioner now claims that he is entitled to relief based on the Supreme Court decision in <u>Johnson v. United States</u>, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Petitioner argues that <u>Johnson</u> holds that imposition of an enhanced sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") violates due process because the clause is too vague to provide adequate notice. <u>Id.</u> at 2557.

With regard to motions for reconsideration, Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

- (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
- (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Petitioner argues that <u>Johnson</u> affords him an argument previously unavailable, rendering his § 2255 remedy "inadequate or ineffective."

Since <u>Johnson</u> was decided by the Supreme Court on June 26, 2015, the circuit courts have split with regard to whether Johnson should be applied retroactively.

The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that <u>Johnson</u> should apply retroactively. They also found that petitioners in those cases made sufficient *prima facie* showings to allow them to proceed to seek relief based on <u>Johnson</u> in a second or successive petition with the district court. <u>Pakala v. United States</u>, 804 F.3d 139, 140 (1st Cir. 2015); <u>In re Watkins</u>, 810 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2015); <u>Swanson v. United States</u>, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21407 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2015); <u>Woods v. United States</u>, 805 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 2015).

However, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits came to the opposite conclusion and found that Johnson was not to be applied retroactively, and that it did not serve as a basis to

allow a second or successive petition to proceed. <u>In re Williams</u>, 806 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2015).

Petitioner was convicted in the Northern District of California which sits in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has yet to determine whether <u>Johnson</u> should apply retroactively.

The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari with respect to this issue. The Eleventh Circuit, rather than rule on the retroactivity of <u>Johnson</u>, held an application to file a second or successive petition in abeyance while the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue. <u>In re Johnson</u>, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3531 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2016) ("The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in <u>Welch v. United States</u>, 136 S. Ct. 790, 193 L. Ed. 2d 534, 2016 WL 90594 (U.S. 2016), to decide '[w]hether <u>Johnson v. United States</u>, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015), announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases that are on collateral review.")

Retroactivity therefore remains an open question as of the date of issuance of this order.

To the extent that Petitioner contends that <u>Johnson</u> announces a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to final convictions or sentences which are being challenged through collateral means, the Court finds that the present motion for reconsideration is not the proper vehicle for his claim. Reconsideration lies only to correct errors in this Court's judgment. Instead, Petitioner is presenting a new claim unrelated to his claims presented in his original petition.

However, Petitioner is not without remedy: he can pursue his challenge in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, the court which imposed his sentence, through the mechanism of a successive § 2255 motion. To proceed in that manner, Petitioner must first seek and obtain permission from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive § 2255 motion. If the Ninth Circuit interprets <u>Johnson</u> as a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases which have

1 become final. Petitioner can bring his retroactive Johnson sentencing challenge in the District of Hawaii where he was originally sentenced.<sup>1</sup> 2 3 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to reconsideration of the 4 denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 5 Accordingly, Petitioner's motions for reconsideration are DENIED. 6 **ORDER** 7 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion 8 to supplement the motion for reconsideration (Docs. 28-29) are DENIED. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: March 15, 2016 12 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 <sup>1</sup> For a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to be considered by a district court, a 24 panel of the appropriate court of appeals must first certify that the motion contains either "(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 25 establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant quilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 26 by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

On this requirement, "[A] new rule is not 'made retroactive to cases on collateral review' unless the

Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive." Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L. Ed. 2d

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632 (2001).