

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON KLEIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

AUDREY KING, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-01440-MJS (PC)

ORDER:

**(1) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM,**

**(2) DIRECTING CLERK'S OFFICE TO
SEND HABEAS PETITION FORM, AND**

**(3) REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE
HABEAS PETITION OR NOTICE OF
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS**

(ECF NO. 1)

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 7.) No other parties have appeared in the action.

Plaintiff's complaint is before the Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if

1 the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which
2 relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

3 **II. PLEADING STANDARD**

4 Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,
5 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
6 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
7 Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for
8 vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94
9 (1989).

10 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:
11 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and
12 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state
13 law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d
14 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

15 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
16 the pleader is entitled to relief” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
17 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
18 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
19 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
20 Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
21 that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere
22 possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are
23 accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

24 **III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS**

25 Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”). He names as Defendants
26 the following persons in their official capacities: (1) Audrey King, Executive Director of
27 CSH, (2) Cliff Allenby, Director of California Department of State Hospitals, (3) Tom
28

1 Voss, Former Executive Director of CSH, (4) Pam Ahlan, Former Executive Director of
2 CSH, and (5) Stephen Mayberg, former Director of California Department of Mental
3 Health.

4 Plaintiff's allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

5 The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to California's
6 Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA") alleging that Plaintiff required mental health
7 treatment in an inpatient setting because Plaintiff was likely to commit sexually violent
8 predatorial offenses if released into the community. The Los Angeles County Superior
9 Court adjudicated the petition and ordered Plaintiff be prohibited from taking part in
10 outpatient treatment. Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital pursuant to the
11 Superior Court's order. Plaintiff has been in Defendants' custody pursuant to this order
12 since 2008.

13 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are aware his confinement is excessively
14 restrictive in relation to the purposes of the SVPA and that he has been irrationally
15 denied the benefits of outpatient treatment. Plaintiff contends that Defendants'
16 assessments of whether Plaintiff was likely to commit sexually violent predatorial
17 offenses if released into the community were based on an irrational and fraudulent
18 assessment scheme. He points to various research studies and other articles purporting
19 to demonstrate that recidivism rates for sexually violent predators are lower than
20 perceived, that the assessment tools used by the State of California are unreliable, and
21 that supervised release and outpatient treatment of sex offenders are as effective as, if
22 not more effective than, civil detention in ensuring such offenders do not recidivate.

23 Plaintiff alleges that the assessment scheme and denial of outpatient treatment
24 violate his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process,
25 adequate treatment, equal protection, and to be free from conditions that are excessively
26 restrictive in relation to their purported purposes.

1 Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing Defendants
2 from maintaining custody of individuals detained pursuant to the SVPA until Defendants
3 are able to provide them with outpatient treatment, as well as a declaration that the
4 assessment methodology used is “irrational contrary to the Procedural Due Process
5 rights within the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.”

6 **IV. ANALYSIS**

7 **A. Overview of Sexually Violent Predator Act**

8 The SVPA, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600 et seq., provides for the civil
9 commitment of “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against
10 one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a
11 danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in
12 sexually violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). The SVPA
13 codifies a process involving several administrative and judicial stages to determine
14 whether an individual meets the requirements for civil commitment.

15 First, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and
16 Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) screens inmates who may be sexually violent predators
17 at least six months prior to their scheduled release dates. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
18 § 6601(a)(1), (b). The screening is conducted in accordance with a structured screening
19 instrument developed by the State Department of State Hospitals (“SDSH”). Cal. Welf. &
20 Inst. Code § 6601(b). If CDCR and BPH determine that an individual “is likely to be a
21 sexually violent predator,” CDCR refers the individual to the SDSH for a full evaluation.
22 Id.

23 The SDSH employs a standardized assessment protocol to determine whether a
24 person is a sexually violent predator under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(c). If two
25 SDSH evaluators, or in some circumstances, two independent evaluators, determine that
26 the person has “a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts
27 of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody,” the Director of SDSH
28

1 forwards a request for a petition for commitment to the applicable county. Cal. Welf. &
2 Inst. Code § 6601(d)-(h).

3 If the county's designated counsel agrees with the request, a petition for
4 commitment is filed in Superior Court. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(i). "The filing of the
5 petition triggers a new round of proceedings" under the SVPA. People v. Superior Court
6 (*Ghilotti*), 27 Cal. 4th 888, 904 (Cal. 2002). The petition is reviewed by a superior court
7 judge to determine whether the petition "states or contains sufficient facts that, if true,
8 would constitute probable cause to believe that the individual named in the petition is
9 likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release."
10 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601.5. If so found, a probable cause hearing is conducted, at
11 which the alleged predator is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Cal. Welf. & Inst.
12 Code §§ 6601.5, 6602(a). If, at the hearing, no probable cause is found, the petition is
13 dismissed. Id. However, if probable cause is found, a trial is conducted. Id.

14 At trial, the individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel, to retain experts or
15 other professionals to perform an examination on his or her behalf, and to access all
16 relevant medical and psychological records and reports. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
17 § 6603(a). Either party may demand a jury trial. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6603(a)-(b).
18 The trier of fact must determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator beyond
19 a reasonable doubt. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604. "If the court or jury determines that
20 the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed for an
21 indeterminate term to the custody of [SDSH] for appropriate treatment and confinement
22 in a secure facility designated by the Director of State Hospitals." Id.

23 Once committed, sexually violent predators must be reevaluated at least annually.
24 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(a). The annual report must include consideration of
25 whether the person "currently meets the definition of a sexually violent predator and
26 whether conditional release to a less restrictive alternative, pursuant to Section 6608, or
27 an unconditional discharge, pursuant to 6605, is in the best interest of the person and
28

1 conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect the community.” Cal. Welf. &
2 Inst. Code § 6604.9(b). If SDSH has reason to believe the person is no longer a sexually
3 violent predator, it shall seek judicial review of the commitment. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
4 § 6605(c). If SDSH determines that conditional release or unconditional discharge is
5 appropriate, it shall authorize the committed person to petition the court for conditional
6 release or unconditional discharge. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(d). The committed
7 person also may petition the court for conditional release without the recommendation or
8 concurrence of SDSH. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a).

9 The court may deny a petition for conditional release without a hearing if it is
10 based on frivolous grounds. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a). If the petition is not based
11 on frivolous grounds, the court shall hold a hearing to determine “whether the person
12 committed would be a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he
13 or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior due to his or her diagnosed
14 mental disorder if under supervision and treatment in the community.” Cal. Welf. & Inst.
15 Code § 6608(g). The committed person has the right to counsel and the appointment of
16 experts for the hearing. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a), (g). The committed person
17 bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the SDSH’s
18 annual reevaluation determines that conditional release is appropriate, in which case the
19 State bears the burden of proof. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(k). If the court
20 determines that the committed person would not be a danger while under supervision
21 and treatment, the person shall be placed in a conditional release program for one year.
22 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(g). Thereafter, the committed person may petition the
23 court for unconditional discharge. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(m).

24 If, upon receiving a petition for unconditional discharge, the court finds probable
25 cause to believe that the committed person is not a danger to the health and safety of
26 others and is not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if discharged, a
27 hearing is conducted. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(a)(2). At the hearing, the committed
28

1 person is entitled to the same constitutional protections afforded at the initial trial. Cal.
2 Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(a)(3). Either party may demand a jury trial. Id. The state bears
3 the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the committed person remains a
4 danger to the health and safety of others and is likely to engage in sexually violent
5 criminal behavior if discharged. Id. If the petition is resolved in the committed person's
6 favor, he is unconditionally released and unconditionally discharged. Cal. Welf. & Inst.
7 Code § 6605(b).

8 **B. Claims Cognizable Only in Habeas Corpus**

9 The exclusive method for challenging the fact or duration of Plaintiff's confinement
10 is by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78
11 (2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Such claims may not be brought in a section 1983
12 action. Nor may Plaintiff seek to invalidate the fact or duration of his confinement
13 indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the
14 State's custody. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. A section 1983 action is barred, no matter the
15 relief sought, if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
16 confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994)
17 (unless and until favorable termination of the conviction or sentence, no cause of action
18 under section 1983 exists); Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.
19 2005) (applying Heck to SVPA detainees with access to habeas relief).

20 Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief seek his release from custody so that he may
21 participate in outpatient treatment in lieu of civil detention. While a claim for prospective
22 relief often does not call into question the validity of a plaintiff's confinement, see
23 Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997), Plaintiff's claims here directly challenge
24 his custody. He may not bring these claims in a section 1983 action. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
25 at 78.

26 Plaintiff's claim that he is subjected to excessively restrictive conditions in
27 violation of the Due Process clause also is barred. The excessively restrictive condition
28

1 he challenges is his confinement itself. He cannot be granted relief on this claim without
2 invalidating his detention. Thus, he may not bring this claim in a section 1983 action.
3 Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82.

4 Likewise, Plaintiff's allegation that he was denied outpatient treatment in violation
5 of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses clearly implicates the validity of his
6 confinement. He does not seek outpatient treatment as a stand-alone mental health care
7 claim; rather, he seeks outpatient treatment in lieu of civil detention. Again, success on
8 this claim would invalidate Plaintiff's confinement, and the claim therefore may not be
9 brought in a section 1983 action. Id.

10 Finally, Plaintiff's claim that the assessment methodology violated his Due
11 Process rights, and his request for a declaration to that effect, are barred on the same
12 ground. See Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141 (concluding that challenge to SVPA assessments
13 would imply invalidity of civil commitment and therefore could only be brought in habeas
14 corpus). To the extent his claims are based on the use of the assessments in his civil
15 commitment proceedings, they present a direct challenge to the validity of his
16 confinement, and may not be brought in this action. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. To the
17 extent he attempts to assert due process rights in this assessment process itself, any
18 claim as to the propriety of the assessments is so related to the civil commitment
19 proceeding that success thereon would imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's confinement:
20 absent the allegedly deficient assessments, no petition for commitment would have been
21 filed, and there would have been no basis for the Superior Court to proceed on the
22 petition to civilly commit Plaintiff under the SVPA. Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141.

23 In sum, until Plaintiff's civil detention has been "reversed on direct appeal,
24 expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
25 such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
26 habeas corpus," Plaintiff is barred from bringing his claims under section 1983. Heck,
27 512 U.S. at 487.

1 **C. Prospective Relief from Future Assessments**

2 Edwards leaves open the possibility for Plaintiff to seek prospective relief in a
3 section 1983 action to prevent future injury caused by future assessments. 520 U.S. at
4 648. However, Plaintiff has not specifically articulated such a claim. Moreover, even if he
5 wishes to do so, his allegations would fail to state a cognizable claim.

6 Plaintiff alleges the assessments violated his procedural and substantive Due
7 Process rights. However, Plaintiff does not identify any process due to him, under the
8 SVPA or otherwise, that was denied in the assessment process. Significantly, the
9 assessments are not determinative of whether Plaintiff's detention should continue.
10 Rather, Plaintiff may petition the court for conditional release without the
11 recommendation or concurrence of SDSH. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a). Plaintiff's
12 continued detention is determined by a judge at a hearing in which Plaintiff has the right
13 to counsel and to retain experts to rebut the State's assessments. Cal. Welf. & Inst.
14 Code § 6608. His ultimate release from commitment is determined by a judge or jury in a
15 proceeding in which Plaintiff maintains the right to counsel and to retain experts, and the
16 State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
17 § 6605. The SVPA provides sufficient procedural mechanisms for Plaintiff to challenge
18 the assessments, and to demonstrate that he no longer qualifies for civil detention.
19 These protections are such that any flaws in the assessment process do not rise to a
20 due process violation.

21 **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**

22 Plaintiff's claims, either directly or indirectly, challenge the validity of his
23 confinement, a challenge which may be brought only in a petition for a writ of habeas
24 corpus. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state any claims that are cognizable under section
25 1983. To the extent Plaintiff could amend to seek relief that is not so barred, his
26 allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for the reason stated. These deficiencies are
27
28

1 not capable of being cured through amendment. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-
2 13 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff will not be given leave to amend his section 1983 claims.

3 The Court will direct the Clerk's Office to provide Plaintiff with a habeas petition
4 form. Plaintiff may file a habeas petition setting forth facts supporting his challenge to the
5 fact and/or the duration of his confinement. Alternatively, if Plaintiff no longer wishes to
6 pursue this action, he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P.
7 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

8 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

- 9 1. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim
10 upon which relief can be granted;
- 11 2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a habeas petition form;
- 12 3. Within **thirty (30) days** of the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file
13 a habeas petition or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and
- 14 4. The failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal of this action for
15 failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

16
17 IT IS SO ORDERED.

18 Dated: February 10, 2015

19 /s/ Michael J. Seng
20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28