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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCELLUS ALEXANDER GREENE,

Petitioner,

v.

C E DURCART,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00137-BAM-HC

ORDER VACATING ORDER RE: CONSENT (DOC. 10)

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES (DOC. 4), DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DIRECTING THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE CASE

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California on or about January 21, 2015, and transferred to this Court on January 27, 2015.

I. Order Vacating Order to Petitioner to Inform the Court regarding Petitioner's Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), Petitioner has previously manifested his consent to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case,

1 including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting his voluntary
2 consent in a signed writing filed on January 21, 2015 (doc. 5), when
3 the case was pending in the Central District. When the case was
4 transferred here, another order to Petitioner regarding consent to
5 Magistrate Judge jurisdiction issued and was mailed to Petitioner on
6 January 21, 2015. (Doc. 10.) However, the order regarding consent
7 that issued to Petitioner on that day was unnecessary and
8 duplicative because Petitioner had already opted to consent to
9 Magistrate Judge jurisdiction.
10 Accordingly, the portion of the Court's order of January 21,
11 2015, which directed Petitioner to indicate his choice regarding
12 Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, is VACATED.
13 II. Screening the Petition
14 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States
15 District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a
16 preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The
17 Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears
18 from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is
19 not entitled to relief in the district court...." Habeas Rule 4;
20 O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
21 Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule
22 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief
23 available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each
24 ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not
25 sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a
26 real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory
27 Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420
28 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)).

Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Here, Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the Pelican Bay State Prison serving a sentence imposed on August 30, 2012, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Kings, for a violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 314(1). (Pet., doc. 4 at 1-2.) Petitioner appears to challenge his conviction on the ground that reports of law enforcement officers do not constitute sufficient proof of his guilt of a crime because they are hearsay. (Id. at 18.)

III. Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1988).

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows:

> In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

> ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001), stating:

> Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law. See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d at 865.
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> ...
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> In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001).

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine, the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th

Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, Petitioner indicates that he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the Kings County Superior Court, which was denied without prejudice in December 2014 as unintelligible. (Pet., doc. 4 at pp. 3-8, 13-14.) However, Petitioner admits that he did not appeal and did not file any petitions in the California Supreme Court. (Id. at 1-6.) Thus, Petitioner admits that he has not exhausted state court remedies as to any of the claims stated in the petition before the Court.

A search of the official website of the California Supreme Court reflects no information that would tend to show that Petitioner has presented his claims to the California Supreme Court.[1]

Although non-exhaustion of state court remedies has been viewed as an affirmative defense, it is established that it is the petitioner's burden to prove that state judicial remedies were properly exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 218-19 (1950), overruled in part on other grounds in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). If available state court remedies have not been exhausted as to all claims, a district court must dismiss a

[1] The Court takes judicial notice of the absence of any pending proceeding posted on the official website pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the dockets of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010). The address of the official website of the California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov.

petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982).

Here, Petitioner's petition is premature because Petitioner admits that he has not submitted his claim or claims to the California Supreme Court for a ruling.

Therefore, it is concluded that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to establish exhaustion of state court remedies.

Accordingly, the petition will be dismissed without prejudice [2] because Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies as to any of the claims in the petition.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336

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[2] A dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a dismissal on the merits, and Petitioner will not be barred by the prohibition against filing second habeas petitions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) from returning to federal court after Petitioner exhausts available state remedies. See, In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

> [I]n the habeas corpus context is would be appropriate for an order dismissing a mixed petition to instruct an applicant that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). Once the petitioner is made aware of the exhaustion requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all potential claims before returning to federal court. The failure to comply with an order of the court is grounds for dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).

Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal court and files a mixed petition of both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the petition may be dismissed with prejudice.

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Accordingly, the Court will decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

V. Disposition

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that:

1) The petition is DISMISSED without prejudice for Petitioner's failure to exhaust state court remedies; and

2) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability; and

3) The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case because dismissal will terminate the proceeding in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: **January 28, 2015**

/s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE