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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
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11	STEVEN GRIFFITHS,	Case No. 1:15-cv-01226-LJO-BAM (PC)	
12	Plaintiff,	FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	
13	v.	REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS	
14	R. TOLSON, et al.,	(ECF Nos. 19, 20)	
15	Defendants.	FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE	
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17		endations Following Screening	
18	I. Background		
19	Plaintiff Steven Griffiths ("Plaintiff")	is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma	
20	pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action on		
21	August 10, 2015. (ECF No. 1.)		
22	On May 25, 2017, the Court screened Plaintiff's second amended complaint under 28		
23	U.S.C. § 1915A, and found that it stated cognizable claims for failure to protect in violation of the		
24	Eighth Amendment against Defendant Ramirez, but failed to state a cognizable claim against any		
25	other defendants. The Court provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a third amended		
26	complaint or notify the Court of his willingness to proceed only on his cognizable claims. (ECF		
27	No. 20.)		
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On June 22, 2017, Plaintiff notified the Court of his willingness to proceed only on his
 cognizable claims. (ECF No. 21.) Accordingly, the Court issues the following Findings and
 Recommendations.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." <u>Ashcroft v. Iqbal</u>, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing <u>Bell</u>
<u>Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</u>, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken
as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." <u>Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores</u>,
<u>Inc.</u>, 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires
sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. <u>Iqbal</u>, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); <u>Moss v. U.S.</u>
<u>Secret Serv.</u>, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted
unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the
plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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II. Plaintiff's Allegations

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility. The events in the
complaint are alleged to have occurred at Kern Valley State Prison and California Substance
Abuse Treatment facility and State Prison (CSTAF/SP). Plaintiff names the following
defendants: (1) Acting Chief Deputy Warden R. Tolson; and (2) Acting Captain, K. Ramirez.
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Plaintiff alleges as follows:

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2	On July 31, 2013, Plaintiff was seen by the classification committee to determine		
3	Plaintiff's safety issues. The warden had granted/modified an appeal and directed staff to		
4	convene a committee hearing to determine Plaintiff's single cell needs. Defendants were		
5	committee members. Defendant K. Ramirez had interviewed Plaintiff before the committee		
6	meeting, on four occasions, concerning the history of in cell assaults. Plaintiff provided the		
7	names of four cellmates who had previously assaulted Plaintiff in his cell and gave Defendant		
8	Ramirez the injury reports from the assaults. Plaintiff provided Defendant Ramirez		
9	documentation from other inmates about intolerable conditions within Plaintiff's cell due to		
10	Plaintiff's colostomy and urinary catheterizations. (ECF No. 19, p. 4.) The committee		
11	incorrectly and falsely stated that in cell assaults has not occurred and continued to double cell		
12	Plaintiff. Plaintiff was subjected to further in cell abuse and injury from inmates who were forced		
13	into Plaintiff's cell.		
14	III. Discussion		
15	A. Rule 8		
16	Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain "a short and plain		
17	statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).		
18	Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause		
19	of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678		
20	(citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a		
21	claim to relief that is plausible on its face." <u>Iqbal</u> , 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting <u>Twombly</u> , 550 U.S.		
22	at 570). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also		
23	<u>Twombly</u> , 550 U.S. at 556–57.		
24	Plaintiff's amended complaint is short, but fails to set forth the necessary facts to state a		
25	claim that is plausible on its face. Plaintiff fails to link Defendant Tolson to any conduct other		
26	than granting the appeal and participating in the committee.		
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1	B. Supervisory Liability and Linkage	
2	As a threshold issue, under § 1983, Plaintiff must link the named defendants to the	
3	participation in the violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609	
4	F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir.	
5	2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).	
6	The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:	
7	Every person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.	
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10	42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between	
11	the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See	
12	Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The	
13	Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional	
14	right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's	
15	affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the	
16	deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).	
17	Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat	
18	superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235, and administrators may only be held	
19	liable if they "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act	
20	to prevent them," <u>Taylor v. List</u> , 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); <u>accord Starr v. Baca</u> , 652	
21	F.3d 1202, 1205–08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009);	
22	Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v.	
23	Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Some culpable action or inaction must be	
24	attributable to defendants and while the creation or enforcement of, or acquiescence in, an	
25	unconstitutional policy may support a claim, the policy must have been the moving force behind	
26	the violation. <u>Starr</u> , 652 F.3d at 1205; <u>Jeffers v. Gomez</u> , 267 F.3d 895, 914–15 (9th Cir. 2001);	
27	Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Black, 885	
28	F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989).	
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Plaintiff has not alleged any facts linking Defendant Tolson to acts or omissions showing
 that the defendant participated in or directed the violation of any of his constitutional rights, or
 that this defendant knew of the violations and failed to prevent them. <u>Iqbal</u>, 556 U.S. at 677;
 <u>Ewing</u>, 588 F.3d at 1235. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to hold any defendant liable based
 solely on a position of authority, he cannot do so.

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C. Deliberate Indifference

7 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege an Eighth Amendment claim, the Eighth 8 Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane 9 conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2005). Prison 10 officials must provide prisoners with medical care and personal safety and must take reasonable 11 measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 12 (1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth 13 Amendment to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners because being 14 violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their 15 offenses against society. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833–34 (quotation marks omitted); Clem v. Lomeli, 16 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005).

17 However, prison officials are liable under the Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate 18 deliberate indifference to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it 19 is well settled that deliberate indifference occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his 20 knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841 (quotations 21 omitted); Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040. Where the failure to protect is 22 alleged, the defendant must knowingly fail to protect plaintiff from a serious risk of conditions of 23 confinement where defendant had reasonable opportunity to intervene. Orwat v. Maloney, 360 24 F.Supp.2d 146, 155 (D. Mass. 2005), citing Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 25 207 n.3 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 2006) (defendant's deliberate indifference must effectively condone the attack by allowing it to happen); 26 accord, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34 (if deliberate indifference by prison officials effectively 27 28 condones the attack by allowing it to happen, those officials can be held liable to the injured

victim). "Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question
 of fact subject to demonstrating in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial
 evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the
 very fact that the risk was obvious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.

Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendant Ramirez. Plaintiff told Ramirez of
prior assaults from cellmates because of Plaintiff's medical condition, and presented other
documentation of the assaults to Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ramirez knew that
Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm, yet Defendant Ramirez assigned Plaintiff to be double
celled and Plaintiff was again assaulted. However, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient factual
detail to state a claim for the deliberate indifference against Acting Chief Deputy Warden Tolson.

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IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Ramirez for failure to protect in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court therefore recommends that Plaintiff's remaining
claims and Defendant Tolson be dismissed from this action. Plaintiff was provided with an
opportunity to file a third amended complaint, but opted to proceed on the cognizable claims. As
such, the Court does not recommend granting further leave to amend.

17 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

This action proceed on Plaintiff's second amended complaint, filed on January 5,
 2017, against Defendant Ramirez for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth
 Amendment;

2. Plaintiff's remaining claims be dismissed from this action; and

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3. Defendant Tolson be dismissed from this action.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within **fourteen (14) days** after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the "right to challenge the

1	magistrate's factual findings" on appeal. <u>Wilkerson v. Wheeler</u> , 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir.	
2	2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).	
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4	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
5	Dated: June 23, 2017 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe	
6	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
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