1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 DAVID ESTRADA, Case No.: 1:15-cv-01292-AWI-SAB (PC) 9 Plaintiff. ORDER DENYING, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH MOTION FOR 10 v. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 11 TERESA MACIS, et al., [ECF No. 94] 12 Defendants. 13 Plaintiff David Estrada is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 14 15 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 16 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's fourth motion for appointment of counsel, filed May 17 25, 2017. 18 As Plaintiff was previously advised, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in this 19 action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require any 20 attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District 21 Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional 22 circumstances the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 23 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 24 Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek 25 volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether 26 "exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the

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merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the

legal issues involved." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does find that neither the interests of justice nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. <u>LaMere v. Risley</u>, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); <u>Terrell v. Brewer</u>, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff is proceeding on a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and the legal issues present in this action are not complex, and Plaintiff has thoroughly set forth his allegations in the complaint.

While a pro se litigant may be better served with the assistance of counsel, so long as a pro se litigant, such as Plaintiff in this instance, is able to "articulate his claims against the relative complexity of the matter," the "exceptional circumstances" which might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d at 1525 (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner "may well have fared better-particularly in the realm of discovery and the securing of expert testimony.") Based on the record in this case, Plaintiff is able to articulate his claims and litigate this action. Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of financial resources, lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. Plaintiff's arguments regarding discovery and litigation of this case are not exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel at this time. Accordingly, Plaintiff's fourth motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: **May 30, 2017**

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE