



1 amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by  
2 amendment. *Cato v. United States*, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

3 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the  
4 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not  
5 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere  
6 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing *Bell*  
7 *Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). Plaintiff must set  
8 forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”  
9 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 663 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations  
10 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. *Id.* at 678.

11 In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the  
12 allegations in the complaint as true, *Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital*, 425 U.S. 738, 740  
13 (1976), construe *pro se* pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, *Resnick v.*  
14 *Hayes*, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor. *Jenkins*  
15 *v. McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of *pro se* plaintiffs “must be held to less  
16 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Hebbe v. Pliler*, 627 F.3d 338, 342  
17 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that *pro se* complaints should continue to be liberally construed after  
18 *Iqbal*).

## 19 **II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS**

20 Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Deuel Vocational Institution in Tracy, California. The  
21 Complaint alleges that on March 30, 2016, Plaintiff was sentenced to two years in prison by  
22 Defendant for stealing money out of a church offering basket. He asks for relief in the form of an  
23 order releasing him from prison, as well as \$1 million to be given to him when he leaves the  
24 prison.

## 25 **III. DISCUSSION**

26 Plaintiff’s claim constitutes a challenge to the fact or duration of his confinement. As a  
27 result, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus and a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is  
28 inappropriate. *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973) (“Release from penal custody is

1 not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act”); *Young v. Kenny*, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th  
2 Cir. 1989) (“Where a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole  
3 federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”).

4 Moreover, a § 1983 claim is barred where a judgment in favor of a plaintiff “would  
5 necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” *Lockett v. Ericson*, 656 F.3d 892,  
6 896 (9th Cir. 2011), *quoting Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (“in order to recover  
7 damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by  
8 actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must  
9 prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive  
10 order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into  
11 question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”). Plaintiff explicitly requests  
12 relief invalidating his conviction and requiring his release. Plaintiff has not, however,  
13 demonstrated that his conviction has already been reversed, expunged, or otherwise called into  
14 question. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable and must be dismissed. *Heck*, 512 U.S. at  
15 487 (“A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has *not* been  
16 so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”).

17 Dismissal of a *pro se* complaint without leave to amend is appropriate where any  
18 opportunity to amend the complaint would be futile. *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th  
19 Cir. 2000) (“a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading  
20 was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of  
21 other facts.”). No additional facts could cure the deficiencies in the Complaint. The problem is  
22 not that it is missing important facts; it is that the requested relief is simply unavailable through a  
23 § 1983 lawsuit. Dismissal without leave to amend is thus appropriate.

#### 24 **IV. RECOMMENDATION**

25 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim  
26 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Complaint be  
27 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

28 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

1 assigned to this case pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code section  
2 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations,  
3 the parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned  
4 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that  
5 failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District  
6 Court’s order. *Turner v. Duncan*, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); *Martinez v. Ylst*, 951 F.2d  
7 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

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9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: October 31, 2016

/s/ Eric P. Gray  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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