### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND D. CHESTER,

1:16-cv-01257-DAD-GSA-PC

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Plaintiff,

v.

AUDREY KING, et al.,

Defendants.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF Nos. 36, 43.)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS

#### I. **BACKGROUND**

Raymond D. Chester ("Plaintiff") is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, California, as a Sexually Violent Predator pursuant to California's Sexually Predator Act, Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code § 6604. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on August 25, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) This case now proceeds with Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed on August 31, 2017, against defendants Audrey King

(Executive Director), Jagsir Sandhu, M.D. (Chief Medical Officer), Bradley Powers, M.D. (Unit Physician), and Robert Withrow, M.D. (Medical Director of Coalinga State Hospital) for failing to provide adequate medical care to Plaintiff in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 10.)

Currently before the court are defendant Powers' and Plaintiff's cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 19, 2019, defendant Bradley Powers, M.D. ("Defendant") filed a motion for summary judgment.<sup>1</sup> (ECF No. 36.) On September 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 43.) On September 30, 2019, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff's cross-motion. (ECF No. 47.) The motion and cross-motion are deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(*l*).

For the reasons set forth below, the court recommends that defendant Powers' motion for summary judgment be granted and Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment be denied.

#### II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party's position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> On August 19, 2019, Defendant served Plaintiff with the requisite notice of the requirements for opposing the motion for summary judgment. <u>Woods v. Carey</u>, 684 F.3d 934, 939-41 (9th Cir. 2012); <u>Rand v. Rowland</u>, 154 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998). (ECF No. 38.)

Where parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court "evaluate[s] each motion separately, giving the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences." A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 790–91 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 674 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Cross-motions for summary judgment are evaluated separately under [the] same standard."). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, and to prevail on summary judgment, he must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for him. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and in moving for summary judgment, they need only prove an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's case. In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010).

In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, <u>Soremekun</u>, 509 F.3d at 984 (quotation marks and citation omitted), and it must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes entry of judgment, <u>Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach</u>, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court determines only whether there is a genuine issue for trial. <u>Thomas v. Ponder</u>, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Because this court must liberally construe *pro se* pleadings, the arguments and evidence submitted in support of Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment will be considered in tandem with, and as part of, Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

In arriving at these findings and recommendations, the court carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, objections, and other papers filed by the parties. Omission of reference to an argument, document, paper, or objection is not to be construed to the effect that this court did not consider the argument, document, paper, or objection. This court thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate.

#### III. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT<sup>2</sup>

Plaintiff is currently detained at Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, California, in the custody of the California Department of State Hospitals, where the events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred. Plaintiff brings claims against defendants Audrey King; Jagsir Sandhu, M.D.; Robert Withrow, M.D.; and Bradley Powers, M.D., for failing to provide adequate medical care to Plaintiff in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff's allegations follow, in their entirety:

Plaintiff has Hepatitis C. Hepatitis C is a fatal disease of the liver. Hepatitis C will destroy plaintiff's liver and kill plaintiff if it is not treated. However, there is a cure for Hepatitis C. This cure is a drug called Harvoni. Harvoni is the only available treatment that will cure plaintiff's Hepatitis C disease.

At least three times since July 31, 2015, plaintiff has requested Hepatitis C treatment, but no treatment has commenced over the past year. Plaintiff has been repeatedly told that "approval is needed" to treat plaintiff's Hepatitis C. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 10 at 4. As of December 29, 2015, "a referral for an infectious disease consultant [was] made to address treatment of [plaintiff's] Hepatitis C" by plaintiff's former primary care physician. Id. Nothing else has happened to actually provide plaintiff with Hepatitis C treatment. In fact, since his ascension into the position of plaintiff's Primary Care Physician in October 2016, defendant Bradley Powers has [refused] to pursue the critical medical treatment plaintiff needs with Harvoni to stay alive and regain his health.

Please see attached Administrative Grievances, wherein plaintiff complained about not receiving treatment for his Hepatitis C. It must be noted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is verified and his allegations constitute evidence where they are based on his personal knowledge of facts admissible in evidence. <u>Jones v. Blanas</u>, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004). The summarization of Plaintiff's claim in this section should not be viewed by the parties as a ruling that the allegations are admissible. The court will address, to the extent necessary, the admissibility of Plaintiff's evidence in the sections which follow.

19

20

21

222324

26

25

2728

that plaintiff is a patient in a state hospital with significant brain damage due to a previous motorcycle accident; it must be further noted that the "advocate specialists" handling plaintiff's administrative complaints did nothing to forward plaintiff's grievances to higher levels, preferring not to advocate for plaintiff, but to tell plaintiff to do it himself. Id. However, plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that due to his verbal inquiries, defendant Powers personally interfered with the former referral for Harvoni by withdrawing it; the matter was personally denied by defendant Dr. Sandhu (and also by Dr. Neubarth and Dr. Withrow). Upon personal inquiry to defendant King through a third party (and also by Dr. Price), plaintiff has learned two things: (1) he will be consistently denied Hepatitis C treatment with Harvoni, the only available treatment to cure Hepatitis C; and (2) At least four Hepatitis C patients at plaintiff's state hospital have requested Harvoni, and all four patients have been denied on the ground that they were not "sick enough" for Harvoni. In all four cases, plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the four patients denied treatment with Harvoni died of cirrhosis of the liver, and therefore liver failure. In these cases, Harvoni is ineffective because the defendants wait too long to initiate treatment.

Plaintiff requests preliminary injunctive relief and monetary damages.

#### IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT MEDICAL CLAIM

As a civil detainee, Plaintiff's right to medical care is protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. <u>Youngberg v. Romeo</u>, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982). A determination whether Plaintiff's rights were violated requires "balancing of his liberty interests against the relevant state interests." <u>Id.</u> at 321. The civil nature of Plaintiff's confinement provides an important gloss on the meaning of "punitive;" Plaintiff must be afforded "more considerate treatment" than even pretrial detainees, who are being criminally detained prior to trial. <u>Unknown Parties v. Nielsen</u>, No. CV-15-00250-TUC-DCB, 2020 WL 813774, at \*4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 19, 2020) (quoting Cf. <u>Estelle v. Gamble</u>, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251, (1976). However, the Constitution requires only that courts ensure that professional

specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made." <u>Id.</u> at 321. A "decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." <u>Id.</u> at 322-23.

judgment was exercised. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315. It is not appropriate for the courts to

Although claims by civil detainees properly fall under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard may still be used in such cases *to establish a floor for claims by civil detainees*. Irvin v. Baca, No. CV 03-2565-AHS (CW), 2011 WL 838915, at \*8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 03-2565-AHS CW, 2011 WL 835834 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011) (emphasis added). That is, a civil detainee who can show a violation under an Eighth Amendment standard can also satisfy a Fourteenth Amendment standard. Id. "[T]he Eighth Amendment still provides a floor for the level of protection that SVPs must receive . . . and because the contours of the Eighth Amendment are more defined, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence may provide helpful guidance as to the standards to be applied." Hubbs v. County of San Bernardino, 538 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1266 (C.D.Cal. 2008).

To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on the denial of medical care, a plaintiff must establish that he had a serious medical need and that the defendant's response to that need was deliberately indifferent. <u>Jett v. Penner</u>, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); <u>see also Estelle</u>, 429 U.S. at 106. A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat plaintiff's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. <u>Jett</u>, 439 F.3d at 1096. An officer has been deliberately indifferent if he was (a) subjectively aware of the serious medical need and (b) failed to adequately respond. <u>Farmer v. Brennan</u>, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which

prison physicians provide medical care." <u>Jett</u>, 439 F.3d at 1096. Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. <u>McGuckin v. Smith</u>, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by <u>WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller</u>, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing <u>Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs</u>, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).

Under both the "professional judgment" and the "deliberate indifference" standards, mere negligence or medical malpractice does not violate the Constitution. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 842–43 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying Youngberg "professional judgment" standard to a denial of medical care claim by a civilly committed psychiatric patient and holding that more than negligence is required). Also, a plaintiff's general disagreement with the treatment he received does not violate the Constitution. Id.; Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1996); Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, evidence that medical caregivers disagreed as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another is also insufficient, by itself, to establish deliberate indifference. Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. Rather, the plaintiff must show that defendants were aware of the risk of harm and that their response to the risk was medically unacceptable under the circumstances. Id.

18

///

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

19 ///

20 | ///

21 | | ///

22 | | ///

23 | ///

24 ///

25 ///

26 | ///

27 | 1///

28 | | ///

#### V. DEFENDANT'S UNDISPUTED FACTS (UMF)<sup>3</sup>

Defendant Powers submitted the following statement of undisputed material facts in support of his motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 36-2.)

Moving Party's Undisputed Material Facts	Supporting Evidence
1. Plaintiff's operative complaint is his First	Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
Amended Complaint.	("Plaintiff's FAC"), ECF No. 10.
2. Plaintiff asserts a sole cause of action for	Plaintiff's FAC, ECF No. 10.
violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth	
Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.	
§1983 against Defendants Audrey King,	
Jagsir Sandhu, Coalinga State Hospital, and	
Moving Defendant Bradley Powers.	
3. Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to	Plaintiff's FAC, ECF No. 10, pgs. 3-4.
properly treat his Hepatitis C by not	
prescribing Harvoni.	
4. Plaintiff alleges that at least three times	Plaintiff's FAC, ECF No. 10, pg. 4.
since July 31, 2015, Plaintiff requested	
Hepatitis C treatment but no treatment	
commenced over the last year.	
§1983 against Defendants Audrey King, Jagsir Sandhu, Coalinga State Hospital, and Moving Defendant Bradley Powers.  3. Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to properly treat his Hepatitis C by not prescribing Harvoni.  4. Plaintiff alleges that at least three times since July 31, 2015, Plaintiff requested Hepatitis C treatment but no treatment	

Plaintiff failed to properly address Defendant's statement of undisputed facts. Local Rule 260(b). Accordingly, the court may consider Defendant's assertions of fact as undisputed for purposes of this motion. <u>Id</u>; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Plaintiff did submit his own statement of undisputed facts. (ECF No. 44.) In light of the Ninth Circuit's directive that a document filed *pro se* is "to be liberally construed," <u>Estelle v. Gamble</u>, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, and Rule 8(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that "[p]leadings shall be construed so as to do justice," <u>see Erickson v. Pardus</u>, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007), the court shall strive to resolve this motion for summary judgment on the merits.

1	5. Plaintiff contends Dr. Powers personally	Plaintiff's FAC, ECF No. 10, pg. 4.
2	interfered with a former referral for Harvoni	
3	by his previous primary care physician by	
4	withdrawing it.	
5 6 7 8	6. Plaintiff is currently, and at all relevant times in this litigation, has been a resident of Department State Hospitals-Coalinga ("DSH-Coalinga").	Plaintiff's FAC, ECF No. 10.
10	7. Harvoni is a relatively new medication	Declaration of Bradley C. Powers, M.D.
11	that was approved by the FDA in or around	("Powers Decl.") at ¶ 7.
12	2014 to treat Hepatitis C.	
13 14 15 16 17	8. The Harvoni treatment consists of a daily pill taken for 8-24 weeks, depending on the patient's HCV genotype, amount of liver damage, and prior treatment history.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 7.
18	9. Harvoni requires patients to be diligent in taking the daily pill continuously.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 7.
20 21 22	10. Missing a dose can result in treatment being ineffective.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 7.
<ul><li>23</li><li>24</li><li>25</li><li>26</li><li>27</li></ul>	11. One potential side effect of Harvoni is a reactivation of a dormant Hepatitis B infection, which may cause serious liver problems, including liver failure and death.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 7.

1	12. The cost of Harvoni medication is	Powers Decl. at ¶ 7.
2	approximately \$ 90,000.	
3	13. Pursuant to the California Department of	Powers Decl. at ¶ 8; Ex. B to Declaration
4		of Anoush Holaday ("Holaday Decl.").
5		of finousii Holaday ( Holaday Deen ).
6	Hepatitis C Screening, Diagnosis and	
7	Management Guidelines ("CDMH Special	
8	Order") for Hepatitis C patients being treated	
9	in a Department of Mental Health facility,	
10	Hepatitis C treatment is recommended for	
11	patients with chronic Hepatitis C who are at	
12	the greatest risk for progressing to cirrhosis.	
13	14. Prior to initiating treatment, an	Powers Decl. at ¶ 8; Ex. B to Declaration
14	assessment is needed that considers the	of Anoush Holaday ("Holaday Decl.").
15	patient's likelihood of treatment compliance	
16	and personality traits that impair frustration	
17	tolerance and reduce the likelihood of	
18	treatment compliance.	
19	15. It is also footnoted that additional factors	Powers Decl. at ¶ 8; Ex. B to Declaration
20		of Anoush Holaday ("Holaday Decl.").
21	to consider include cognitive capacity and	of Anousii Holaday ("Holaday Deci.").
22	ability to understand and follow treatment	
23	directions, as well as Hepatitis B status.	
24		

16. For those patients who do not undergo	Powers Decl. at ¶ 8; Ex. B to Declaration
treatment for Hepatitis C, management of	of Anoush Holaday ("Holaday Decl.").
medical care includes monitoring ALT levels	
and CBC monthly and re-evaluation of	
patient if ALT levels increase above normal	
limits, monitoring for other signs/symptoms	
of liver disease every 4-6 months, and	
screening for hepatocellular carcinoma in	
patients with indicators of advanced liver	
disease.	
17. Plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis C	Plaintiff Raymond Chester's Deposition
in 1999 at Atascadero State Hospital.	("Chester Depo.") pg. 13:21-14:2; Ex. C to
	Holaday Decl.
18. Plaintiff did not seek any treatment for	Chester Depo. pg. 33: 18-21; Ex. C to
his Hepatitis C at this time.	Holaday Decl.
19. Plaintiff was admitted to Coalinga State	Powers Decl. at ¶ 9; Ex. D to Holaday
Hospital on 1/14/2009.	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000002
20. From 2011- 2015, Plaintiff was	Powers Decl. at ¶ 10; Ex. D to Holaday
episodically showing signs of liver	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
inflammation, a common course for Hepatitis	POWERS000007, POWERS000019,
C infection, but did not show signs of	POWERS000042, POWERS000056-57,
significant irreversible injury to the liver.	POWERS000071, POWERS000084,
	POWERS000091-98, POWERS000111-
	112, POWERS000236-242

1	21. Plaintiff had liver enzyme elevations	Powers Decl. at ¶ 10; Ex. D to Holaday
2	potentially related to ingestion of valproic	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
3	acid, a drug that was prescribed by the	POWERS000187, POWERS000236-242
4	psychiatry team to help with mood	
5	stabilization secondary to the patient's	
6	traumatic brain injury.	
7	22. Since Plaintiff was without significant	Powers Decl. at ¶ 11; Ex. D to Holaday
8	liver injury related to his Hepatitis C	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
9	infection, Plaintiff's course of treatment	POWERS000007, POWERS000019,
10	related to Hepatitis C consisted of monitoring	POWERS000042, POWERS000056-57,
11	Plaintiff periodically through lab tests and	POWERS000071, POWERS000084,
12	physical check ups, and observing for any	POWERS000091-98
13	worsening signs of Hepatitis C.	
14	22 On Oataban 12 2014 Plaintiff	Downeya Deal of #12. Ev. D to Heledov
15	23. On October 13, 2014, Plaintiff	Powers Decl. at ¶ 12; Ex. D to Holaday
16	underwent an abdominal ultrasound which	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000111
17	showed no liver mass, no bile duct dilatation	
18	and no evidence of enlargement of the liver.	
19	24 0 0 1 0 2015 Phi 155	
	24. On October 9, 2015, Plaintiff underwent	Powers Decl. at ¶ 13; Ex. D to Holaday
20	a CT of his abdomen/pelvis with contrast	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000112
21	using a liver protocol, which revealed no	
22	liver mass, no ascites, no portal vein	
23	thrombosis, nor fibrosis, and no changes	
24	suggesting the development of liver cirrhosis.	
25		

25. Despite being diagnosed since 1999,	Chester Depo. pg. 37: 7-11 and 19-23; Ex.
Plaintiff did not seek any treatment for his	C to Holaday Decl.
Hepatitis C until on or around fall 2015 from	
his former primary care physician, Dr. Arun	
Hatwalker.	
26. Dr. Hatwalker considered the Harvoni treatment for Plaintiff's Hepatitis C; however, he believed Plaintiff's Hepatitis B condition could reactivate because of the Harvoni treatment protocol.  27. On October 15, 2015, he noted to follow	Powers Decl. at ¶ 14; Ex. D to Holaday  Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000113  Powers Decl. at ¶ 14; Ex. D to Holaday
for Hepatitis C.	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000113
28. On October 30, 2015, Dr. Hatwalker	Powers Decl. at ¶ 15; Ex. D to Holaday
wrote an order for Plaintiff to be referred to	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000114
an infectious disease specialist for further	
evaluation and the possible treatment of his	
Hepatitis C in the face of concomitant	
Hepatitis B infection.	
29. There is no record of the infectious	Powers Decl. at ¶ 15.
disease consultation form in the patient's file.	
20. D. H	D D 1 4545
	Powers Decl. at ¶ 15.
day, for reasons unknown.	
	Plaintiff did not seek any treatment for his Hepatitis C until on or around fall 2015 from his former primary care physician, Dr. Arun Hatwalker.  26. Dr. Hatwalker considered the Harvoni treatment for Plaintiff's Hepatitis C; however, he believed Plaintiff's Hepatitis B condition could reactivate because of the Harvoni treatment protocol.  27. On October 15, 2015, he noted to follow up next week to go over possible treatment for Hepatitis C.  28. On October 30, 2015, Dr. Hatwalker wrote an order for Plaintiff to be referred to an infectious disease specialist for further evaluation and the possible treatment of his Hepatitis C in the face of concomitant Hepatitis B infection.  29. There is no record of the infectious

1	31. None of Plaintiff's prior primary care	Powers Decl. at ¶ 16.
2	physicians made a determination or referral	
3	that Harvoni was an appropriate course of	
4	treatment for Plaintiff's Hepatitis C as of the	
5	end of 2015.	
6 7	32. Dr. Powers began treating Plaintiff on November 10, 2015.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 17.
8	33. Plaintiff did not approach Dr. Powers, as	Powers Decl. at ¶ 17; Ex. D to Holaday
9	his new primary care physician, for treatment	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122
10	of his Hepatitis C until July of 2016.	
12	34. In the weeks following, as Dr. Powers	Powers Decl. at ¶ 18; Ex. D to Holaday
13	took over the care of the patient, it was noted	Decl. Bates-Stamped pg.
14	that Plaintiff had frequent emotional outbursts	POWERS000101-102, POWERS000194,
15	with mood lability, and refusals of medical	POWERS000198, POWERS000244-246
16	diagnosis and treatment.	
17 18	35. In December of 2015, Plaintiff refused	Powers Decl. at ¶ 18; Ex. D to Holaday
19	treatment for his hypertension and claimed	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000244
20	that he wanted to die soon because he didn't	
21	want to live at Coalinga State Hospital.	
22	36. In February 2016, he demanded that all	Powers Decl. at ¶ 18; Ex. D to Holaday
23	his medications be discontinued, and he	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000245
24	refused to take his medications	, 10
25	37. In May 2016 he again refused to accept	Powers Decl. at ¶ 18; Ex. D to Holaday
26	treatment for an acute medical condition, but	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000246
27	then changed his mind a few days later.	
28		

1	38. It was also noted that Plaintiff has a	Powers Decl. at ¶ 18; Ex. D to Holaday
2	history of refusing multiple recommended	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
3	medications that were prescribed for his	POWERS000187, POWERS000244-260
4	various conditions.	
5	39. On June 14, 2016, Plaintiff reported to	Powers Decl. at ¶ 19; Ex. D to Holaday
7	his Treatment Team, typically the	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000108
8	psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker and	
9	behavioral therapist, that he was interested in	
10	beginning Hepatitis C treatment.	
11	40. He was informed that his treating RN	Powers Decl. at ¶ 19; Ex. D to Holaday
12	would follow up with his request.	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000115
13	41. On June 29, 2016, his treating nurse,	Powers Decl. at ¶ 20; Ex. D to Holaday
14	Gerard Tiongson, evaluated his Hepatitis C	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
15	and noted that he was stable and	POWERS000116-121
16	asymptomatic.	
17	42. He was then referred to his primary care	Powers Decl. at ¶ 20.
18	physician.	
19		
20	43. On July 28, 2016, Plaintiff formally	Powers Decl. at ¶ 21; Ex. D to Holaday
21	requested treatment for his Hepatitis C from	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122
22	Dr. Powers.	
23	44. Dr. Powers informed him that	Powers Decl. at ¶ 21; Ex. D to Holaday
24	preliminary testing was required prior to	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122
25	beginning any treatment, which upset	
26	   Plaintiff.	
27		

1	45. Plaintiff initially refused to do testing.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 21; Ex. D to Holaday
2		Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122
3	46. Dr. Powers ordered the tests in case	Powers Decl. at ¶ 21; Ex. D to Holaday
4	Plaintiff changed his mind.	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122
5 6	47. On August 10, 2016, Plaintiff's blood	Powers Decl. at ¶ 22; Ex. D to Holaday
7	tests showed normal CBC, normal liver	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
8	function testing, except mild elevation of	POWERS000123-127
9	total bilirubin, and low viral load of hepatitis	
10	C infection. Thyroid testing was also within	
11	normal limits at that time.	
12	48. On August 23, 2016, Dr. Powers	Powers Decl. at ¶ 23; Ex. D to Holaday
13	approached Plaintiff regarding treating him	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122
14	for Hepatitis.	
15	49. Dr. Powers informed him that he needed	Powers Decl. at ¶ 23; Ex. D to Holaday
16	to be vaccinated against the Hepatitis B	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122
17	because he had no evidence of immunity, but	
18	did have evidence of prior Hepatitis B	
19	infection.	
20	50. Dr. Powers also noted that in order to	Powers Decl. at ¶ 23; Ex. D to Holaday
22	treat Plaintiff's Hepatitis C and to avoid any	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122
23	further liver damage or complications due to	
24	interactions between the newer Hepatitis C	
25	treatments—such as Harvoniand	
26	reactivation of a dormant Hepatitis B	
27	infection, a Hepatitis B vaccination was	
28	medically necessary.	

1	51. On August 24, 2016, Dr. Powers ordered	Powers Decl. at ¶ 24; Ex. D to Holaday
2	the Hepatitis B vaccination for Plaintiff.	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
3		POWERS000128, POWERS000141
<ul><li>4</li><li>5</li><li>6</li></ul>	52. On October 20, 2016, Dr. Powers ordered a fiber scan of Plaintiff's liver to	Powers Decl. at ¶ 25; Ex. D to Holaday Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000129
7	further evaluate Plaintiff's status of liver damage.	
9	53. On October 26, 2016 Plaintiff's	Powers Decl. at ¶ 25; Ex. D to Holaday
10	fibroscan results showed low inflammation	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
11	of the liver. At that time, FIB4 and APRI	POWERS000130-131
12	calculations also suggested low	
13	inflammation.	
14 15	54. From March 2016- October 2016,	Powers Decl. at ¶ 26; Ex. D to Holaday
16	routine check ups with his treating RN also	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
17	revealed Plaintiff did not demonstrate any	POWERS000132-140
18	signs or symptoms of liver impairment.	
19	55. Pursuant to the CDMH Special Order,	Powers Decl. at ¶ 27.
20	Dr. Powers performed an assessment to	
21	determine whether Harvoni was an	
22	appropriate course of treatment for Plaintiff's	
23	Hepatitis C.	
24		

1	56. Based on review of Plaintiff's medical	Powers Decl. at ¶ 28; Ex. D to Holaday
2	record, Plaintiff had a history of a severe	Decl. Bates-Stamped pg.
3	traumatic brain injury, which causes	POWERS000101-102, POWERS000169-
4	significant episodes of irrationality,	170, POWERS000173, POWERS000177-
5	irritability, lack of impulse control, low	179, POWERS000184-187,
6	frustration tolerance, poor decision making,	POWERS000191, POWERS000193-198,
7	and profound noncompliance with	POWERS000244-260
8	recommended medical treatment.	
9	57. Given these psychological issues, Dr.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 28.
10	Powers determined that Plaintiff's mental	
11	health issues could sabotage his ability to	
12	complete a course of treatment with Harvoni.	
13	59. Upon reviewing Plaintiff's multiple	Downer Deal of # 20
14	58. Upon reviewing Plaintiff's multiple	Powers Decl. at ¶ 29.
15	diagnostic tests, which were within normal	
16	range and did not show any impaired liver	
17	function, and considering Plaintiff's mental	
18	health issues, Dr. Powers determined that	
19	Plaintiff was not a good candidate for	
20	Harvoni at that time	
21	59. Based on his professional judgment, Dr.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 29.
22	Powers found that Plaintiff's Hepatitis C had	
23	not progressed to a level that necessitated	
	treatment with Harvoni.	
24		

1	60. Dr. Powers' plan at that time was to	Powers Decl. at ¶ 29.
2	continue to monitor Plaintiff's laboratory	
3	parameters, and to slowly build rapport with	
4	him so that he could help Plaintiff understand	
5	the absolute importance of completing the	
6	Harvoni treatment from the first day though	
7	the last due to Plaintiff's history of lack of	
8	cooperation with taking prescribed	
9	medication and concern that Plaintiff would	
10	not complete treatment even if he was a good	
11	candidate.	
12	61. Although it is true that chronic Hepatitis	Powers Decl. at ¶ 29
13	C infection frequently leads to liver cirrhosis	
14	and sometimes liver cancer over a period of	
15	10 to 30 years, at this juncture, there was no	
16	evidence of any of these more serious	
17	conditions nor was there evidence that the	
18	Plaintiff had significant inflammation in his	
19	liver.	
20		
21	62. Dr. Powers' recommended course of	Powers Decl. at ¶ 30.
22	treatment was to continue to monitor	
23	Plaintiff's Hepatitis C condition through	
24	routine lab tests, physical check ups and	
25	observe for any worsening signs of his	
26	conditions.	
27	63. On February 1, 2017, Plaintiff received	Powers Decl. at ¶ 31, Ex. D to Holaday
28	his third dose of the Hepatitis B vaccine.	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000161

1	64. Plaintiff remained asymptomatic for	Powers Decl. at ¶ 32; Ex. D to Holaday
2	clinical signs of hepatic dysfunction from	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
3	January 2017 through October 2017.	POWERS000142-160
5	65. On July 13, 2017, Dr. Powers ordered	Powers Decl. at ¶ 33; Ex. D to Holaday
6	further blood tests to assess Plaintiff's	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
7	Hepatitis B and C conditions; however,	POWERS000162-163
8	Plaintiff did not show up for his tests.	
9	66. On or around September 2017, Dr.	Powers Decl. at ¶ 34.
10	Powers was moved to a different unit and no	
11	longer was Plaintiff's primary care physician.	
12	67. On November 9, 2017, Plaintiff	Powers Decl. at ¶ 35; Ex. D to Holaday
13	underwent a fibrosis calculator which	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
14 15	showed low inflammation of the liver.	POWERS000164-165
16	68. On December 13, 2017, another	Powers Decl. at ¶ 36; Ex. D to Holaday
17	physician, Anthony Miller, M.D., prescribed	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000166
18	Plaintiff Harvoni.	
19	69. Plaintiff did not take two doses of	Powers Decl. at ¶ 37; Ex. D to Holaday
20	Harvoni, on January 16, 2018 and January	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
21	21, 2018.	POWERS000261-262
22	70. Plaintiff does not currently suffer from	Chester's Depo pg. 22:9-21; 41:4-11; Ex.
23	Hepatitis C and is cured of the condition.	C to Holaday Decl.
24	Trepantis C and is cured of the condition.	C to Holaday Deci.
25		Powers Decl. at ¶ 38; Ex. D to Holaday
26		Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
27		POWERS000199-234

1	71. Plaintiff did not suffer any injury caused	Chester's Depo. pg. 43:14-16; 49:6-9; Ex.
2	by a delay in receiving Harvoni.	C to Holaday Decl.
3		Powers Decl. at ¶ 39.
4	72. Plaintiff did not seek or receive any	Chester's Depo. pg. 43:23-44:3; Ex. C to
5	medical treatment for any injury caused by a	Holaday Decl.
6 7	delay in receiving Harvoni.	
8	73. As of November 2018, the results of	Powers Decl. at ¶ 39; Ex. D to Holaday
9	Plaintiff's laboratory testing show no	Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
10	evidence of infection due to Hepatitis C and	POWERS000199-234
11	normal liver function testing. Platelet count,	
12	another marker of chronic liver injury, also	
13	remains in the normal range.	
14 15	74. No act or omission by Dr. Powers	Powers Decl. at ¶ 39.
16	caused or contributed to Plaintiff's alleged	
17	injuries.	
18	75. Dr. Powers course of treatment was	Powers Decl. at ¶ 42.
19	appropriate in consideration of Plaintiff's	"
20	medical condition.	
21		
22	76. Dr. Powers complied with the standard	Powers Decl. at ¶ 42.
23	of care for family physicians and was not	
24	deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical	
25	needs.	
	L	ı

77. No physicians have informed Plaintiff that the delay in receiving Harvoni caused him any damage or medical complications.

Chester's Depo. pg. 43:14-16; Ex. C to Holaday Decl.

#### VI. DEFENDANT POWERS' POSITION<sup>4</sup>

Defendant's evidence includes Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 36-4), defendant Bradley Powers' declaration (ECF No. 36-8), California Department of Mental Health Special Order dated January 1, 2003 (ECF No. 36-5), Plaintiff's deposition testimony (ECF No. 36-6), and Plaintiff's medical records (ECF No. 56). Defendant Powers argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant failed to act with professional judgment when treating Plaintiff, or that Plaintiff was injured by Dr. Powers' conduct as required to meet the burden under the Fourteenth Amendment.

#### A. <u>Dr. Powers was not Deliberately Indifferent to Plaintiff's Medical Needs</u>

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has not established that he was denied constitutionally adequate medical care. Dr. Powers declares that he became Plaintiff's primary treating physician on November 10, 2015, (Defendant's Undisputed Material Facts (UMF) 32, Powers Decl., ECF No. 36-8 at 4 ¶ 17), but that Plaintiff did not approach him, as his new primary care physician, for treatment of his Hepatitis C until July of 2016, (UMF 33, Powers Decl. at 4 ¶ 17; Exh. D to Holaday Decl., ECF No. 56-1 at 122).

On July 28, 2016, Plaintiff formally requested treatment for his Hepatitis C from Dr. Powers, but Plaintiff initially refused to do any preliminary testing for an evaluation of Hepatitis C treatment. (UMF 43-45, Powers Decl. at 5 ¶ 21, Exh. D to Holaday Decl., ECF No. 56-1 at 122.) Once Plaintiff cooperated, Dr. Powers performed a medical evaluation of Plaintiff's fiber scan, blood test results, and RN progress notes, which all revealed normal liver functioning, with no signs or symptoms of liver impairment that would indicate that treatment was medically

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The court's references to page numbers in Defendant's Exhibit D to Holaday Decl. reflect the page numbers appearing after "POWERS000," which are Bates-stamped at the bottom of each page of the exhibit. (See ECF No. 56-1.) Otherwise, the page numbers cited herein are those assigned by the court's CM/ECF system.

necessary. (UMF Nos. 47, 52-54, Powers Decl. at ¶¶ 22, 25-26; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 123-127, 129, 130-140.)

In addition, based on review of Plaintiff's medical record, Plaintiff has a history of a severe traumatic brain injury, which causes significant episodes of irrationality, irritability, lack of impulse control, low frustration tolerance, poor decision making, and profound noncompliance with recommended medical treatment. (UMF No. 56, Powers Decl. at ¶ 28; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 101-102, 169-170, 173, 77-179, 184-187, 191, 93-198, 244-260.) It was also noted that Plaintiff has a history of refusing multiple recommended medications that were prescribed for his various conditions. (UMF Nos. 34-38, Powers Decl. at ¶ 18; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 101-102, 187, 194, 198, 244-260.) Given these psychological issues, Dr. Powers determined that Plaintiff's mental health issues could sabotage his ability to complete a course of treatment with Harvoni. (UMF No. 57, Powers Decl. at ¶ 28.) In fact, as Dr. Powers predicted, Plaintiff was non-compliant during the course of his Harvoni treatment and did not take two doses of the prescribed medication, on January 16, 2018 and January 21, 2018, thereby jeopardizing the efficacy of his treatment. (UMF No. 69, Powers Decl. at ¶ 37; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 261-262.)

Upon reviewing Plaintiff's multiple diagnostic tests, which were within normal range and did not show any impaired liver function, and considering Plaintiff's mental health issues, Dr. Powers determined that Plaintiff was not a good candidate for Harvoni at that time. (UMF No. 58, Powers Decl. at ¶ 29.) Based on his professional judgment, Plaintiff's Hepatitis C had not progressed to a level that necessitated treatment with Harvoni. (UMF Nos. 58-59, Powers Decl. at ¶ 29.) Dr. Powers' plan at that time was to continue to monitor Plaintiff's laboratory parameters, and to slowly build rapport with him so that he could help Plaintiff understand the absolute importance of completing the Harvoni treatment from the first day though the last due to Plaintiff's history of lack of cooperation with taking prescribed medication and concern that Plaintiff would not complete treatment even if he was a good candidate. (UMF No. 60, Powers Decl. at ¶ 29.) At that time, there was no evidence that Plaintiff's Hepatitis C infection would lead to liver cirrhosis or liver cancer. (UMF No. 61, Powers Decl. at ¶ 29.)

Given all the above, Dr. Powers determined that Plaintiff was not a good candidate for Harvoni at that time. (UMF Nos. 47, 52-61, Powers Decl. at ¶¶ 22, 25-29; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 101-102, 123-127, 129-140, 169-70, 173, 177-179, 184-187, 191, 193-198, 244-260.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a triable issue of material fact as Dr. Powers' treatment met the appropriate standard of care for a medical provider because a decision made by a professional is presumptively valid; liability may only be imposed when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such judgment; and more than negligence is required to show denial of a medical care claim by a civilly committed psychiatric patient.

Plaintiff contends his constitutional rights were violated when Dr. Powers "personally interfered with the former referral for Harvoni by withdrawing it." (UMF No. 5, First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 10 at 4.) However, Defendant provides evidence that none of Plaintiff's prior primary care physicians made a determination or referral that Harvoni was an appropriate treatment for Plaintiff's Hepatitis C prior to Dr. Powers becoming one of Plaintiff's primary treating physicians. (UMF No. 31, Powers Decl. at ¶ 16.) Dr. Powers argues that he did not deny or withdraw any treatment to Plaintiff, who was diagnosed with Hepatitis C a decade later. (UMF Nos. 17, 31, Plaintiff's Deposition, pg. 13:21-14:2; Ex. C to Holaday Decl., Powers Decl. at ¶ 16.)

Dr. Powers' recommended course of treatment consisted of monitoring Plaintiff's Hepatitis C condition through routine lab tests, physical check ups and observation for any worsening signs of his conditions. (UMF No. 62, Powers Decl. at ¶ 30.) Dr. Powers' plan at that time was to continue to monitor Plaintiff's laboratory parameters and to slowly build rapport with him so that he could help Plaintiff understand the absolute importance of completing the Harvoni treatment from the first day through the last due to Plaintiff's history of lack of cooperation with taking prescribed medication and concern that he would not complete treatment even if he was a good candidate. (UMF No. 60, Powers Decl. at ¶ 29.) Dr. Powers even treated Plaintiff's Hepatitis B in order to avoid any further liver damage or complications due to interactions

between the newer Hepatitis C treatments – such as Harvoni – and reactivation of a dormant Hepatitis B infection. (UMF Nos. 48-51, 63, Powers Decl. at ¶¶ 23, 24; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 122, 128, 141.) Defendant claims that overall, the undisputed facts demonstrate attentiveness to Plaintiff's medical needs, not deliberate indifference.

Defendant also contends that the fact that Dr. Powers prescribed a different course of treatment than the Harvoni medication requested by Plaintiff does not amount to deliberate indifference, and there is no evidence that the treatment provided was medically unsound. Dr. Powers performed an evaluation of Plaintiff's Hepatitis C condition pursuant to CDMH Special Order guidelines and given the lack of any signs or symptoms of liver impairment and low risk of progressing to cirrhosis, he determined that continued monitoring was medically appropriate. (UMF Nos. 47, 52-62, Powers Decl. at ¶¶ 22, 25-30; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 101-102, 123-127, 129-140, 169-170, 173, 177-179, 184-187, 191, 193-198, 244-260.)

Defendant concludes that he is entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant was deliberately indifferent.

#### B. <u>Plaintiff Cannot Prove Cause of Injury</u>

Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot prove the requisite level of causation or harm because Plaintiff did not suffer any permanent injury as he is completely cured of Hepatitis C and does not currently suffer from the condition. (UMF No. 70, Plaintiff's Deposition, pg. 22:9-21; 41:4-11; Ex. C to Holaday Decl.; Powers Decl. at ¶ 38; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 199-234.) As of November 2018, the results of Plaintiff's laboratory testing show no evidence of infection due to Hepatitis C and normal liver function testing. (UMF No. 73, Powers Decl. at ¶ 39; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 199-234.) Platelet count, another marker of chronic liver injury, also remained in the normal range. (Id.)

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff did not suffer any temporary injury due to a delay in receiving Harvoni. No physician has informed Plaintiff that the delay in receiving Harvoni caused him any damage or medical complications. (UMF Nos. 71-72, Plaintiff's Deposition, pg. 43:14-16; 43:23-44:3, 49:6-9; Ex. C to Holaday Decl.; Powers Decl. at ¶ 39.) In addition, Plaintiff remained asymptomatic for clinical signs of hepatic dysfunction from January 2017

thr
 Th
 the
 De
 cau

through October 2017. (UMF No. 64; Powers Decl. at ¶ 32; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 142-160.) There are no medical records that illustrate that Plaintiff suffered any damage in the interim from the time he requested Harvoni from Dr. Powers until the time he received the treatment, and Defendant argues that overall the undisputed facts show that no act or omission by Dr. Powers caused or contributed to Plaintiff's alleged injuries. (UMF Nos. 70-77, Plaintiff's Deposition at 22:9-21; 41:4-11, 43:14-16, 43:23-44:3, 49:6-9, Ex. C to Holaday Decl.; Powers Decl. at ¶ 38, 39, 42; Ex. D to Holaday Decl. at 199-234.)

To the extent that Plaintiff argues that he did suffer an injury from a delay in receiving Harvoni based on the way he felt, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's own opinion is insufficient to withstand summary judgment, and Plaintiff must have expert testimony regarding whether Dr. Powers' care actually caused an injury to him. Defendant asserts that under <u>Hansen v. United States</u>, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993), bare allegations unsupported by any factual data do not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact.

Defendant concludes that based on Dr. Powers' judgment as a medical professional, Plaintiff now has the burden to produce a declaration from a competent expert to the contrary as to causation, and in the absence of such a showing, Dr. Powers' declaration is controlling and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

#### VII. DEFENDANT'S BURDEN

Based on Defendant's arguments and evidence in support of his motion for summary judgment, the court finds that Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that he did not act with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, or fail to use his judgment as a medical professional. Therefore, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to produce evidence of a genuine material fact in dispute that would affect the final determination in this case.

#### VIII. PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS (SUF)

Plaintiff submitted the following undisputed facts in support of his motion. (ECF No. 41 at 19-26.) The court finds that while most of Plaintiff's facts are disputed, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial.

1		
2	Plaintiff's Undisputed Material Facts and	Response and Opposition of Defendant
3	<b>Supporting Evidence</b>	Bradley C. Powers, M.D.
4		
5	Plaintiff Raymond D. Chester, Jr. (Plaintiff)	1. Undisputed.
6	contracted Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) in 1997.	
7		
8	(Deposition of Raymond Chester, Exhibit	
9	C to Defendant Powers' Motion for	
10	Summary Judgment (Powers' MSJ), pp.	
11	13-14	
12		
13	2. Plaintiff received no treatment for HCV. <sup>5</sup>	2. Objection. Vague and ambiguous as to
14		time.
15	(Id., p. 14.)	
16		Undisputed that Plaintiff received no
17		treatment for Hepatitis C ("HCV") in 1999 at
18		Atascadero State Hospital because he did not
19		seek any treatment.
20		
21		Plaintiff Raymond Chester's Deposition
22		("Chester Depo.") pg. 33:18-21.
23		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> SUF No. 2. Defendant objects to this fact as vague and ambiguous as to time, but does not dispute Plaintiff's testimony at his deposition that in 1999 he received no treatment for Hepatitis C ("HCV") at Atascadero State Hospital because he did not seek any treatment at that time. Therefore, this fact, as it reflects Plaintiff's deposition testimony, is undisputed.

1	3. The medica	tion to cure HCV, Harvoni®,	3. Objection. Not authenticated.
2	was approved	for prescription use in the	
3	U.S.A. on Feb	ruary 10, 2014. <sup>6</sup>	Undisputed that Harvoni is a relatively new
4			medication that was approved by the FDA in
5	(U.S. Food an	d Drug Administration	or around 2014 to treat Hepatitis C.
6	Website.)		
7			Declaration of Bradley C. Powers, M.D.
8			("Powers Decl.") at ¶ 7.
9			
10	4. Plaintiff file	ed the operative complaint in	4. Undisputed.
11	this action on .	August 31, 2017	
12			
13	(Verified Firs	t Amended Complaint, ECF	
14	10.)		
15			
16			
17			

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> SUF No. 3. Defendant objects to this fact because it is not authenticated. Plaintiff attributes this fact to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Website without providing a proper cite for the website. Defendant has restated the fact to reflect defendant Powers' statement in his declaration. The restated fact is materially the same as Plaintiff's statement in SUF No. 3 and therefore is undisputed.

5. Plaintiff suffered extreme pain and suffering, physical and emotional.<sup>7</sup>

(Deposition of Raymond Chester, Exhibit C to Powers' MSJ, P. 41.) 5. Objection. Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to time and scope. Assumes facts. Lacks foundation. This purported "fact" is improper as it relates to scientific issues beyond knowledge of average juror and expert causation testimony required. *See Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances*, 950 F. Supp. 981, 985 (C.D. Cal. 1996).

Disputed as from 2011- 2015, Plaintiff was episodically showing signs of liver inflammation, a common course for Hepatitis C infection, but did not show signs of significant irreversible injury to the liver. Plaintiff further remained asymptomatic for clinical signs of hepatic dysfunction from January 2017 through October 2017.

Powers Decl. at ¶ 10, 32; Ex. D to Holaday Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.

POWERS000007, POWERS000019,

POWERS000042, POWERS000056-57,

POWERS000071, POWERS000084,

POWERS000091-98, POWERS000111
112, POWERS000142-160,

POWERS000236-242

6. Defendant Powers told Plaintiff to "just meditate" in lieu of treatment for HCV.<sup>8</sup>

6. Objection. This purported "fact" directly contradicts the record.

(*Id.*, p. 41.)

Disputed as Dr. Powers' recommended course of treatment was to continue to monitor Plaintiff's Hepatitis C condition through routine lab tests, physical check ups and observe for any worsening signs of his conditions, to build a rapport with Plaintiff, and to treat Plaintiff's Hepatitis B infection.

Powers Decl. at ¶ 23, 29-30; Exhibit D to Declaration of Anoush Holaday ("Holaday Decl."), Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000122

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> SUF No. 5. Defendant objects to this fact as conclusory, vague and ambiguous as to time and scope, lacking foundation, assuming facts, and constituting an improper lay opinion. Lay opinion may be offered by laymen under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence so long as the opinion is based on the witness's own perception, is helpful to understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue, and is not based on the kinds of specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Fed. R. Evid. 701. Plaintiff's statement that he experienced pain is rationally based on his perceptions, <u>id.</u> R. 701(a), and gives no opinion about the cause of his pain. However, because Plaintiff does not indicate when, or under what circumstances, he experienced pain, this fact, without more, is disputed as ambiguous as to time and scope. Furthermore, Plaintiff cites his deposition testimony on page 41 as evidence supporting this fact, but on page 41 Plaintiff does not testify that he suffered any physical pain. Therefore, the court finds that SUF No. 5 is disputed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> SUF No. 6. This fact contradicts Plaintiff's medical records and Dr. Powers' declaration, which both indicate that Dr. Powers had a plan to work with Plaintiff so Plaintiff would understand the testing and treatment he needed and that a Hepatitis B vaccination was medically necessary prior to treatment of his Hepatitis C. Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant told him to "just meditate" instead of treatment is not supported by the record and fails to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable juror could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."). Therefore, the court finds that this fact is disputed.

	[	
1	7. All Defendants herein knew of Plaintiff's	7. Objection. Vague and ambiguous.
2	HCV infection in 2011. <sup>9</sup>	Conclusory. This purported "fact" directly
3		contradicts the record.
4	(Id., Exhibit D, Wellness & Recovery Plan,	
5	pp 1-1 of 32.)	Disputed as Dr. Powers did not began
6		treating Plaintiff until November 10, 2015.
7		D D 4 (I 17)
8		Powers Decl. at ¶ 17.
9	8. Plaintiff received no treatment for HCV	8. Objection. Conclusory. Vague and
	infection at that time. <sup>10</sup>	ambiguous as to time. Assumes Facts.
10		
11		
12	(Id., Exhibit D.)	Undisputed as none of Plaintiff's prior
		primary care physicians made a
13		determination or referral that Harvoni was an
14		appropriate course of treatment for Plaintiff's
15		Hepatitis C as of the end of 2015.
16		ricpantis C as of the end of 2013.
17		
18		Powers Decl. at ¶ 16.
19		
20		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> SUF No. 7. This fact contradicts the record, which shows that Dr. Powers did not begin treating Plaintiff until November 10, 2015. Powers Decl. § 16 ("I became the primary treating physician for Plaintiff on November 10, 2015.") Therefore, it fails to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. <u>See Scott</u>, 550 U.S. 372. The court finds that this fact is disputed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> SUF 8. Defendant objects to this fact as conclusory, vague and ambiguous as to time and scope, lacking foundation, assuming facts, and contradicting the record. However, Defendant also find this fact to be undisputed "as of 2015." The court finds it undisputed that Plaintiff received no treatment for his HCV infection as of 2015.

9. Plaintiff experienced progressively worse HCV pain and symptoms.<sup>11</sup>

(*Id.*, Exhibit C, Wellness & Recovery Plan, 12/01/2014, p. 4 of 14.)

9. Objection. Conclusory. Vague and ambiguous as to time and scope. Assumes facts. This purported "fact" directly contradicts the record.

Disputed. Although not correctly identified, the record is Exhibit D to Holaday Decl.

Bates-Stamped pg. POWERS000084, which shows that Plaintiff was asymptomatic at the time.

From 2011- 2015, Plaintiff was episodically showing signs of liver inflammation, a common course for Hepatitis C infection, but did not show signs of significant irreversible injury to the liver. Plaintiff had liver enzyme elevations potentially related to ingestion of valproic acid, a drug that was prescribed by the psychiatry team to help with mood stabilization secondary to the patient's traumatic brain injury.

Powers Decl. at ¶ 10; Ex. D to Holaday Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.

POWERS000007, POWERS000019,

POWERS000042, POWERS000056-57,

POWERS000071, POWERS000084,

POWERS000091-98, POWERS000111-

1		112, POWERS000187, POWERS000236-
2		242
3		
4	10. Plaintiff still given no treatment for	10. Objection. Conclusory. Vague and
5	HCV infection. <sup>12</sup>	ambiguous as to time and scope. Assumes
6		facts.
7	(Id., Wellness & Recovery Plan,	
8	12/08/2015, p. 4 of 13.)	Undisputed to the extent that Plaintiff did not
9		request treatment from Dr. Powers until July
10		2016 and none of Plaintiff's prior primary
11		care physicians made a determination or
12		referral that Harvoni was an appropriate
13		course of treatment for Plaintiff's Hepatitis C
14		as of the end of 2015.
15		
16		Powers Decl. at ¶ 16, 17, 21; Ex. D to
17		Holaday Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
18		POWERS000122
19		
20		Although not correctly identified, the record

<sup>11</sup> SUF No. 9. Defendant objects to this fact as conclusory, vague and ambiguous as to time and scope, assuming facts, and contradicting the record. The medical record to which Plaintiff apparently refers, page 4 of 14 of his DHS Treatment Plan, reflects that on 12/01/2014, Plaintiff's "Hep C (HMC) [is] Asymptomatic." (ECF No. 56-1 at 91.) SUF 9 contradicts the medical record and is therefore disputed. Moreover, because he is a layman, Plaintiff cannot testify that any pain or distress he suffered was caused by Dr. Powers' course of treatment. (Fed. R. Evid. 701.)

scope, and assuming facts. However, Defendant also find this fact to be Undisputed to the extent that "Plaintiff did

not request treatment from Dr. Powers until July 2016 and none of Plaintiff's prior primary care physicians made a determination or referral that Harvoni was an appropriate course of treatment for Plaintiff's Hepatitis C as of the end

<sup>12</sup> SUF No. 10. Defendant objects to this fact as conclusory, vague and ambiguous as to time and

of 2015," which reflects the record, Dr. Powers' declaration and Plaintiff's medical record at ECF No. 156 at 129. The court finds this fact to be disputed as to time and scope.

26

27

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> SUF 11. Defendant disputes this fact, as it directly contradicts the record at ECF No. 56-1 at 115 which indicates that on 06/14/16 Plaintiff reported to his treatment team (which did not include Dr. Powers) that he was interested in beginning Hep C treatment but does not indicate that Plaintiff requested Harvoni treatment. The court finds this fact to be disputed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> SUF No. 13. Defendant disputes this fact because it directly contradicts the record, and because Plaintiff, as a layman, may not properly interpret the medical record to which he refers. The court finds this fact to be disputed.

27

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> SUF No. 14. Defendant states that Plaintiff has not correctly identified the record, which is found at ECF No. 56-1 (Exhibit D) at POWERS000150. The court finds this fact to be ambiguous as to whether there was a need for HCV medication which Defendant failed to acknowledge, or whether Defendant acknowledged that there was no need for medication. Therefore, the court finds this fact to be disputed.

- 11	T	
1	15. Defendant Powers ordered <u>Pre-</u> HCV	15. Undisputed to the extent that on July 13,
2	treatment on 7/13/2017. <sup>16</sup>	2017, Dr. Powers ordered further blood tests
3		to assess Plaintiff's Hepatitis B and C
4	( <i>Id.</i> , Physician's Orders, 7/23/2017.)	conditions; however, Plaintiff did not show
5		up for his tests.
6		Downey Dool of @ 22. Ev. D to Holodov
7		Powers Decl. at ¶ 33; Ex. D to Holaday
8		Decl., Bates-Stamped pg.
9		POWERS000162-163
10		
	16. Defendant Powers <u>finally</u> prescribes	16. Objection. This purported "fact" directly
11	Harvoni® to Plaintiff on 12/13/2017. 17	contradicts the record.
12		
13	( <i>Id.</i> , Physician's Notes, 12/13/2017.)	Disputed as on or around September 2017,
14		Dr. Powers was moved to a different unit and
15		no longer was Plaintiff's primary care
16		physician.
17		
18		Powers Decl. at ¶ 34
19	17. Plaintiff's HCV levels undetectable	17. Undisputed.
20	2/06/2018.	
21		
22	(Id., PIL [Lab] Test Reports, 2/07/2018,	
23	2/20/2018, 7/11/2018, and 11/29/2018.	

 $<sup>^{16}</sup>$  SUF No. 15. This fact is undisputed to the extent it indicates that on 7/13/17 Dr. Powers ordered blood tests to assess Plaintiff's Hepatitis B and C conditions.

 $<sup>^{17}</sup>$  SUF No. 16. This fact contradicts the record because Dr. Powers was no longer caring for Plaintiff on 12/13/17. Dr. Powers moved to a different unit on or about September 2017. The court find this fact to be disputed.

#### Ш

#### IX. ANALYSIS -- MEDICAL CLAIM AGAINST DR. BRADLEY C. POWERS

Plaintiff, a civil detainee at Coalinga State Hospital, brings a medical claim against defendant Dr. Bradley C. Powers for denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. For such a claim, as discussed above in this order, the Constitution requires only that courts ensure that professional judgment was exercised. <u>Youngberg</u>, 457 U.S. at 315. A "decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid [and] liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." <u>Id.</u> at 322-23.

Also discussed above is that courts have used the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard in such cases *to establish a floor for claims by civil detainees*. Irvin, 2011 WL 838915, at \*8 (emphasis added.) That is, a civil detainee who can show a violation under an Eighth Amendment standard can also satisfy a Fourteenth Amendment standard. Id. "[T]he Eighth Amendment still provides a floor for the level of protection that SVPs must receive . . . and because the contours of the Eighth Amendment are more defined, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence may provide helpful guidance as to the standards to be applied." Hubbs, 538 F.Supp.2d at 1266. Accordingly, the court begins this analysis with the deliberate indifference standard used for a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment.

#### A. <u>Objective Element – Existence of Serious Medical Need</u>

A "serious medical need" exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff presented with a serious medical need. Plaintiff alleges in the First Amended Complaint that he had Hepatitis C, a fatal disease of the liver that will kill him if not treated. (ECF No. 10 at 3.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff contracted Hepatitis C approximately in 1997 and found out he had the disease in 1999 at Atascadero State Hospital. (Pltf's Depo., ECF No. 36-6 at 4:22-5:4.) The parties do not dispute that failure to treat Plaintiff's disease could result in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Therefore, the first prong is satisfied in Plaintiff's favor.

# 234

## 45

### 6 7

8

# 9

### 12

11

14 15

13

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2627

28

#### B. <u>Subjective Element – Deliberate Indifference</u>

There is also no dispute that Dr. Powers knew about Plaintiff's serious medical need and knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm to his health without treatment for Hepatitis C.

Plaintiff claims that Dr. Powers was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because Defendant failed to provide the medication Harvoni for treatment of Plaintiff's Hepatitis C, as requested by Plaintiff, for more than a year. Plaintiff also claims that defendant Dr. Powers interfered with a former referral by a different doctor for Harvoni by withdrawing it.

Plaintiff alleges in the First Amended Complaint that at least three times since July 31, 2015, he requested Hepatitis C treatment, but a year later, no treatment had commenced. (First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 10 at 4.) He alleges that he was repeatedly told that approval was needed to treat his Hepatitis C. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that as of December 29, 2015, a referral for an infectious disease consultant was made by Plaintiff's former primary care physician to address treatment of Plaintiff's Hepatitis C, but nothing else had happened to provide Plaintiff with treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Dr. Powers refused to pursue the critical medical treatment with Harvoni that Plaintiff needed to stay alive and regain his health. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he learned that at least four Hepatitis C patients at the State Hospital had requested Harvoni, and all four patients were denied Harvoni on the ground they were not sick enough. (Id.) In all four cases, Plaintiff believes that the four patients denied treatment with Harvoni died of cirrhosis of the liver. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Harvoni is ineffective if defendants wait too long to initiate treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff provides evidence that he sent three complaints to the California Office of Patients' Rights, complaining that his right to medical care was being violated because his Hepatitis C was not being investigated. (Exhibits to First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 10 at 11-15.)

Even if all of these allegations are taken as true, Plaintiff has not shown that he was inappropriately treated for his Hepatitis C by Dr. Powers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff provides no evidence that Dr. Powers possessed the requisite state of mind to demonstrate deliberate indifference, a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" in denying proper

medical care, <u>Clement v. Gomez</u>, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002), citing <u>Wallace v. Baldwin</u>, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995), or that Dr. Powers failed to use professional judgment.

Plaintiff provides no evidence that Dr. Powers denied Plaintiff treatment for his Hepatitis C. "Denial of medical attention to prisoners constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation if the denial amounts to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of the prisoner." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. The evidence shows that Dr. Powers decided not to prescribe Harvoni to Plaintiff until after he had followed a treatment plan recommended by the Department of Health, including testing and monitoring of Plaintiff's condition to determine the best time to prescribe Harvoni. (Powers Declaration, ECF No. 36-8 ¶ 8.) Dr. Powers delayed prescribing Harvoni for Plaintiff while he treated Plaintiff's Hepatitis B and helped Plaintiff understand what it would be like to take an effective course of Harvoni. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 27-29.) Plaintiff's disagreement with Dr. Powers' treatment plan, without more, does not state a medical claim. Jackson, 90 F.3d at 331 ("To prevail under these principles, [the plaintiff] must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances.")

Plaintiff provides no evidence that Plaintiff's previous doctor, Dr. Hatwalker, made a referral for Plaintiff to be treated with Harvoni, and that Dr. Powers refused to follow this plan. The medical record instead shows that Dr. Hatwalker considered the Harvoni treatment for Plaintiff's Hepatitis C, but believed Plaintiff's Hepatitis B condition could reactivate because of the Harvoni treatment protocol. (Powers Declaration, ECF No. 36-8 ¶ 14.) The medical record shows that on October 30, 2015, Dr. Hatwalker wrote an order for Plaintiff to be referred to an infectious disese specialist for further evaluation and the possible treatment of his Hepatitis C in the face of concomitant Hepatitis B. infection. (Id. ¶ 15.) Even if Dr. Powers refused to follow any of Dr. Hatwalker's treatment plan, this refusal, without more, would not state a medical claim. Evidence that medical caregivers disagreed as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another is insufficient, by itself, to establish deliberate indifference. Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332.

16

14

15

17 18

19

2021

22

2324

26

25

2728

Plaintiff provides no evidence that Dr. Powers placed Plaintiff's health at risk because he refused to prescribe Harvoni for Plaintiff, the only cure for Hepatitis C, or that Dr. Powers' course of treatment did not follow accepted professional judgment. Evidence shows that Dr. Powers complied with the California Department of Mental Health's official guidelines for treating Hepatitis C Patients in a Department of Mental Health facility. (Powers Declaration, ECF No. 36-8 ¶ 8.) Following the guidelines, Defendant assessed Plaintiff for the likelihood of compliance with the requirements of a course of treatment with Harvoni considering Plaintiff's personality traits that reduced the likelihood of treatment compliance. (Id.) The medical record shows that Plaintiff was without significant liver injury related to his Hepatitis C infection, and that Plaintiff's course of treatment consisted of monitoring Plaintiff periodically through lab tests and physical check ups and observing for any worsening signs of Hepatitis C. (Id. ¶ 11.) Dr. Powers also treated plaintiff's Hepatitis B infection to avoid complications due to interactions between the newer Hepatitis C treatments – such as Harvoni – and reactivation of a Hepatitis B infection. (Id. ¶ 23, 24.) Plaintiff has not shown more than a disagreement with Dr. Powers' treatment plan, which does not state a medical claim. Jackson, 90 F.3d at 331.

Plaintiff provides no admissible evidence that Dr. Powers' treatment plan caused him any injury, or that any delay in Plaintiff's treatment with Harvoni resulted in further injury. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that during the time he was waiting to take Harvoni, his symptoms worsened.

- Q. From when you initially requested Harvoni to the time when you actually received it, did your symptoms get worse in between that time?
- A. Oh, yeah.
- Q. And how so?
- A. I just kept getting sicker and sicker. I threw up. I was confined to my bed. (Plaintiff's Deposition, ECF No. 36-6, page 41: 12-18.)

Plaintiff also testified that no doctor has said that the delay in treatment caused him injury.

Q. Has any doctor told you that the delay in treatment has caused you any sort of damage?

A. No.

(<u>Id.</u>, page 43:13-16.)

- Q. And has any doctor told you that the delay in receiving Harvoni caused you any sort of medical injury?
- A. Nobody's told me that, no.

(<u>Id.</u>, page 49:6-9.) Even if Plaintiff believed that he was injured because of Dr. Powers' treatment, as a layman Plaintiff cannot testify to his own medical opinion, interpret the meaning of medical notes, or testify that any pain or distress he claims he suffered was directly caused by Dr. Powers' course of treatment. Fed. R. Evid. 701.

#### X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In sum, the court finds no genuine dispute as to any material fact at issue in this case. Moreover, based on the foregoing, the court finds that defendant Dr. Powers has proven an absence of a triable issue of material fact that would support Plaintiff's medical claim, therefore Defendant Powers is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

#### Therefore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

- 1. Defendant Dr. Powers' motion for summary judgment, filed on August 19, 2019, be **GRANTED**;
- 2. Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, filed on September 9, 2019, be **DENIED**:
- 3. Summary judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Dr. Powers;
- 4. This case proceed with the First Amended Complaint against defendants Audrey King, Jagsir Sandhu, and Robert Withrow, on Plaintiff's medical claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; and
- 5. This case be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days from the date of service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to

Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after the date the objections are filed. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: **July 23, 2020** /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE