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8	UNITED STATE	ES DISTRICT COURT
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	ISSAM ELIE KNICKERBOCKER,	Case No.: 1:16-cv-01811 - DAD - JLT
12	Plaintiff,	ORDER DENYING STIPULATION TO AMEND
13	v.	CASE SCHEDULE
14	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF	(Doc. 73)
15	INTERIOR, et al.,	
16	Defendants.	
17	The parties have stipulated to amend the case schedule yet again. (Doc. 73) This is the third	
18	time (Docs. 65, 69, 73), the last of which was filed two weeks before the current one. The Court	
19	has been sympathetic to misfortunes that have befallen plaintiff's counsel, but these misfortunes	
20	can no longer be permitted to interfere with the prosecution of this case. Moreover, counsel offer	
21	no explanation why, when they filed their stipulation two weeks earlier, they failed to appreciate	
22	that they wanted to talk about settlement or that the plaintiff could not afford to pay experts. These	
23	are circumstances that should have been known to them from the inception of the case.	
24	Districts courts must enter scheduling orders in actions to "limit the time to join other	
25	parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). In	
26	addition, scheduling orders may "modify the timing of disclosures" and "modify the extent of	
27	discovery." Id. Once entered by the court, a scheduling order "controls the course of the action	
28	unless the court modifies it." Fed. R. Civ. P.	16(d). Scheduling orders are intended to alleviate

1	case management problems. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir.	
2	1992). As such, a scheduling order is "the heart of case management." Koplove v. Ford Motor	
3	<u>Co</u> ., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3rd Cir. 1986).	
4	A scheduling order is "not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly	
5	disregarded by counsel without peril." <u>Johnson</u> , 975 F.2d at 610. According to Fed. R. Civ. P.	
6	16(b)(3), a case schedule may be modified only for good cause and only with the judge's consent.	
7	Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). In Johnson, the Court explained,	
8	Rule 16(b)'s "good cause" standard primarily concerns the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule "if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee's notes (1983 amendment)[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.	
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12	Johnson, at 609. Parties must "diligently attempt to adhere to that schedule throughout the	
13	subsequent course of the litigation." <u>Jackson v. Laureate, Inc</u> ., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal.	
14	1999); see <u>Marcum v. Zimmer</u> , 163 F.R.D. 250, 254 (S.D. W.Va. 1995). In part, the "good cause"	
15	standard requires the parties to demonstrate that "noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred	
16	or will occur, notwithstanding her diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of	
17	matters which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16	
18	Scheduling conference" <u>Jackson</u> , 186 F.R.D. at 608, emphasis added. The stipulation utterly	
19	fails to demonstrate good cause. Thus, the Court ORDERS:	
20	1. The stipulation to amend the case schedule is DENIED .	
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22	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
23	Dated: April 11, 2019 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston	
24	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
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