

1 **II. Pleading Standards**

2 General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A
3 pleading must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of the
4 claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may
5 include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

6 A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and
7 succinct manner. *Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency*, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The
8 purpose of the complaint is to give the defendant fair notice of the claims against him, and the grounds
9 upon which the complaint stands. *Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.*, 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The
10 Supreme Court noted,

11 Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
12 unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
13 labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
14 not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further
15 factual enhancement.

16 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Vague
17 and conclusory allegations do not support a cause of action. *Ivey v. Board of Regents*, 673 F.2d 266,
268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

18 [A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim
19 to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when
20 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
21 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The
22 plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’

23 *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should
24 assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal
25 conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. *Id.* The Court may grant leave to amend a
26 complaint to the extent deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. *Lopez v. Smith*,
27 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

1 **III. Discussion and Analysis**

2 Plaintiff seeks review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying disability
3 benefits. (Doc. 4) The Court may have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides:

4 Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner made after a hearing to
5 which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of
6 such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of
7 such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner may allow. Such action
8 shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in
9 which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business . . . The court shall
10 have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
11 affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security,
12 with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.

13 *Id.* Except as provided by statute, “[n]o findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner shall be
14 reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).

15 Except as provided by statute, “[n]o findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner shall be
16 reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). The Supreme Court
17 noted the purpose of the legislation was “to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale eligibility
18 claims.” *Califano v. Sanders*, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977). Thus, the regulations operate as a statute of
19 limitations a claimant to appeal a final decision of the Commissioner. *Bowen v. City of New York*, 476
20 U.S. 467, 479 (1986); *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 328 n. 9 (1976)). Because the time limit is
21 “a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity,” it “must be strictly construed.” *Id.*

22 According to Plaintiff, the Appeals Council denied his request for review of the decision
23 rendered by the administrative law judge on March 27, 2017, at which time the decision became the
24 final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 4 at 2, ¶ 8) Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for review would
25 be due within sixty-five days of the date of Appeal’s Council’s notice, or no later than May 31, 2017.
26 *See* 42 U.S.C. §405(g) (noting that a claimant is “presumed” to have received the notice of denial
27 within “5 days after the date of such notice”). However, Plaintiff did not initiate this action until June
28 1, 2017. Thus, it appears the statute of limitations may have run on the request for review.

As the Ninth Circuit observed, “[a] petition to review a decision of the [Commissioner] must
be brought within the statutory time limit.” *Tate v. United States*, 437 F.2d 88, 89 (9th Cir. 1971).
Accordingly, courts have determined that where a claimant files an action even one day late, the
statute of limitations mandates a dismissal of the action. *See, e.g., Fletcher v. Apfel*, 210 F.3d 510 (5th

