

1 succinct manner. *Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency*, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, a
2 plaintiff must identify the grounds upon which the complaint stands. *Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.*, 534
3 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

4 Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
5 unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
6 labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.

7 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

8 Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. *Ivey v. Board of Regents*, 673 F.2d
9 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

10 [A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim
11 to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when
12 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
13 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The
14 plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”

15 *Iqbal*, 566 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should
16 assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal
17 conclusions in the pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. *Id.*

18 The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim,
19 “notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court
20 “may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a
21 claim.” See *Wong v. Bell*, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, *Federal*
22 *Practice and Procedure*, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). However, leave to amend a complaint may be granted
23 to the extent deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d
24 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

25 **II. Factual Allegations**

26 Plaintiff alleges that on August 4, 2010, he “was arrested and charged with murder and sent to
27 jail.” (Doc. 1 at 1) David Wilson, with the Kern County District Attorney’s Office, prosecuted the
28 action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff was convicted by a jury of first degree murder in January 2013 and sentenced to

1 serve “26 years to life.” (*Id.* at 1-2) Plaintiff appealed this conviction. (*Id.* at 2)

2 Plaintiff’s conviction of first degree murder was “reversed on account of prejudicial
3 prosecutorial error.” *See People v. Hardin*, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5231 at *83 (July 15, 2016).
4 Plaintiff alleges the reversal was due to “prosecuting attorney David Wilson misstating a law / rule on
5 insanity, violating court rules and regulations.” (Doc. 1 at 2) According to Plaintiff, this demonstrates
6 “vindictive prosecutorial misconduct.” (*Id.*)

7 Plaintiff reports that on November 9, 2016, he “was transferred back to Lerdo Detention Facility
8 in Kern County Superior Court Jurisdiction in Case Number BF133303A.” (Doc. 1 at 2) Plaintiff’s
9 case is now awaiting a new trial.¹

10 **III. Discussion and Analysis**

11 **A. Younger abstention**

12 In general, federal courts are required to abstain from interfering on ongoing state criminal
13 matters. *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). This abstention doctrine applies if four
14 conditions are met: “(1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important
15 state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the
16 state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical
17 effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that *Younger* disapproves.”
18 *San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose*, 546 F.3d
19 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.2008).

20 First, it is clear the state criminal proceedings are ongoing, and Plaintiff is in the custody of the
21 state. Second, the state criminal proceedings implicate important state interests. Indeed, in *Kelly v.*
22 *Robinson*, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986), the Court held, “This Court has recognized that the States’ interest in
23 administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful
24 of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Likewise, in
25

26 ¹ The Court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
27 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); *United States v. Bernal-Obeso*, 989 F.2d 331, 333
28 (9th Cir. 1993). The accuracy of state court records cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of
court records. *Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct.*, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); *Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp.*,
80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), *aff’d* 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981); *see also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil*, 887
F.2d 1236m 1239 (4th Cir. 1989). Therefore, judicial notice is taken of the docket in Case No. BF133303A.

1 *Younger*, the Supreme Court held, “Since the beginning of this country’s history Congress has, subject
2 to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by
3 federal courts.” *Younger*, 401 U.S. at 43.

4 Plaintiff clearly challenged the actions of the prosecutor by appealing the action in state court,
5 which resulted in the new trial. Thus, he has a full and fair opportunity to raise the federal claims in
6 state court. *Commc’ns Telesys. Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n*, 196 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1999).
7 Finally, it appears Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to insert the federal court into the ordinary course of state
8 criminal proceedings and, if permitted, would threaten the autonomy of the state court.

9 **B. Prosecutorial Immunity**

10 As a deputy district attorney, Mr. Wilson enjoys absolute immunity when acting in the scope of
11 his duties in the investigation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. See *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S.
12 409, 430-31 (1976); *Botello v. Gammick*, 413 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2005) (it is “well established that
13 a prosecutor has absolute immunity for the decision to prosecute a particular case”); *Demery v.*
14 *Kupperman*, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir.1984) (prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil
15 liability for post-litigation as well as pre-litigation handling of case).

16 “Functions for which absolute prosecutorial immunity have been granted include the lawyerly
17 functions of organizing and analyzing evidence and law, and then presenting evidence and analysis to
18 the courts and grand juries on behalf of the government; they also include internal decisions and
19 processes that determine how those functions will be carried out.” *Lacey v. Maricopa County*, 693 F.3d
20 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing *Buckley v. Fitzsimmons*, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). Significantly, as the
21 Ninth Circuit explained, “[p]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for the consequences of
22 their advocacy, *however inept or malicious*, because it is filtered through a neutral and detached judicial
23 body...” *Id.* (emphasis added). Thus, though Plaintiff believes the prosecutor in his action acted in a
24 vindictive manner through erroneously stating the law to the jury, he remains immune to suit.
25 Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff believes the evidence did not support his original conviction, the
26 prosecutor is immune from suit for the decision to pursue a conviction for first degree murder.

27 **IV. Findings and Recommendations**

28 Based upon the facts alleged, it does not appear the deficiencies can be cured by amendment,

1 and leave to amend would be futile. *See Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1130; *See Noll v. Carlson*, 809 F.2d 1446,
2 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff is unable to proceed on his claim for malicious prosecution in this
3 Court in light of the *Younger* abstention doctrine and prosecutorial immunity that is enjoyed by the
4 deputy district attorney and Kern County District Attorney's Office. Accordingly, the Court

5 **RECOMMENDS:**

- 6 1. Plaintiff's complaint be **DISMISSED** without prejudice;
- 7 2. The Clerk of Court be **DIRECTED** to close this action.

8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the
9 case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of
10 Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within fourteen days after
11 being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the
12 court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and
13 Recommendations." Plaintiff is advised failure to file objections within the specified time may waive
14 the right to appeal the District Court's order. *Martinez v. Ylst*, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991);
15 *Wilkerson v. Wheeler*, 772 F.3d 834, 834 (9th Cir. 2014).

16
17 IT IS SO ORDERED.

18 Dated: February 12, 2018

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE