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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	CATAMOUNT PROPERTIES 2018, LLC,	No. 1:19-cv-01414-DAD-EPG
12	Plaintiff,	
13	V.	ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING
14	MARVIN R. WENNEKAMP,	ACTION TO STANISLAUS COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
15	Defendant.	
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18	This is an unlawful detainer action brought under California state law by plaintiff	
19	Catamount Properties 2018, LLC against defendant Marvin R. Wennekamp. On October 7, 2019,	
20	defendant removed this case to this federal cou	art from the Stanislaus County Superior Court.
21	(Doc. No. 1.) Defendant appears to assert two	bases for removal: (1) diversity jurisdiction; and
22	(2) "Denial of due process in Unlawful Detain	er: Eviction after foreclosure and/or rental lease
23	and ejectment, in that the rules of evidence and	d civil procedure are applied without equal
24	protection." (Id. at 2.) For the reasons that for	llow, however, the court remands this action back
25	to the superior court.	
26	DIS	CUSSION
27	A district court has "a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action	
28	sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue	e or not." United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell
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1	& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is
2	strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka,
3	559 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582
4	F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of
5	the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
6	jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 559 F.3d at 1106–07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582
7	F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, "the existence of federal jurisdiction depends solely
8	on the plaintiff's claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims." ARCO Envtl.
9	Remediation, LLC v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000).
10	"The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction" means that "the court resolves all
11	ambiguity in favor of remand to state court." Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980
12	F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case "must be rejected
13	if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Geographic Expeditions, 559
14	F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. "If
15	at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
16	case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th
17	Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) "is mandatory, not discretionary." Bruns v.
18	NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see also California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc.,
19	375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Where it appears, as it does here, that the district court lacks
20	subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, "the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C.
21	§ 1447(c).
22	Defendant first seeks removal of this action to this court based on diversity jurisdiction
23	pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction when the parties
24	are in complete diversity, <i>i.e.</i> that citizenship of each plaintiff is different from that of each
25	defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000. See Hunter v. Philip Morris USA,
26	582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089,
27	1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). "Absent unusual circumstances, a party
28	seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege affirmatively the actual
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citizenship of the relevant parties." *Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.*, 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir.
 2002). Where it is "not facially evident from the complaint that more than \$75,000 is in
 controversy," defendants in the state action are required to prove, "by a preponderance of the
 evidence, that the amount in controversy [met] the jurisdictional threshold." *Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, defendant does not properly invoke this court's diversity jurisdiction. Having
reviewed defendant's notice of removal, the court concludes that defendant has: (1) failed to
allege that the parties are in complete diversity; and (2) failed to provide facts necessary to
establish the requisite amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence, *Valdez*, 372
F.3d at 1117. Accordingly, the court concludes that defendant cannot remove this action to this
court based on diversity jurisdiction.

12 Next, defendant seeks removal of this action to this court by relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1443. 13 A party removing an action under § 1443 must satisfy the following two-part test: (1) the court 14 must determine that the right allegedly being denied the removal petitioner in state court arises 15 under a federal law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of equality; and (2) the court 16 must determine that the removal petitioner cannot enforce the specified federal right in state 17 court. Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 220 (1975); Georgia v. Rachel, 383 U.S. 780, 792, 18 794–99 (1966). "The ground for removal under section 1443] is both specific and extremely 19 narrow." Deo v. Guzman, No. 2:15-cv-1824-TLN-KJN, 2015 WL 5330445, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 20 Sept. 11, 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

21 Here, defendant contends that plaintiff and its counsel "are not proceeding in the manner 22 required by the [California] Code of Civil Procedure, and particularly the rules in evidence." 23 (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Defendant argues that he "is, therefore, being denied his due process rights and 24 equal protection under the 14th Amendment." (Id. at 3.) Defendant also contends in conclusory 25 fashion that plaintiff violated his civil rights. (Id.) These allegations are insufficient to meet the first prong of the applicable test because defendant has (1) failed to allege specific facts 26 27 substantiating his claims that his federal rights have been violated and (2) failed to identify the 28 explicit statutory enactment that is violated by the state court's action(s). Moreover, even if

1	defendant could satisfy the first prong of the test, he cannot meet the second. A defendant has no
2	inherent right to a federal forum to adjudicate a federal right absent exclusive federal jurisdiction.
3	Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1983).
4	courts except in the rare situations where it can clearly be predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state law or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act
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7	City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828 (1966). This showing normally requires that
8	"the denial be manifest in a formal expression of state law." Rachel, 384 U.S. at 803; see also
9	Johnson, 421 U.S. at 220. Here, defendant has not demonstrated that he will be denied his rights
10	under federal law if this matter remains in state court. Indeed, state courts are bound to uphold
11	the federal constitution, and defendant has presented no reason to doubt that the state court in this
12	matter will do so. Accordingly, the court concludes that defendant also cannot remove this action
13	to this federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443.
14	CONCLUSION
15	For the reasons set forth above,
16	1. This action is remanded forthwith to the Stanislaus County Superior Court,
17	pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and
18	2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
19	IT IS SO ORDERED.
20	Dated: October 8, 2019 Jale A. Dagd
21	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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