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8	UNITED STATE	S DISTRICT COURT
9	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	CHARLES D. RIEL,	No. 2:01-cv-0507 MCE DB
12	Petitioner,	DEATH PENALTY CASE
13	V.	
14	WARDEN, San Quentin State Prison,	ORDER
15	Respondent.	
16		
17	On June 19, 2020, the undersigned held	d a status conference and heard argument on
18	petitioner's motion to vacate the order granting respondent the right to depose petitioner. Bob	
19	Bacon and Carrie Ward appeared for petitione	r. Heather Gimle appeared for the respondent. For
20	the reasons set forth below, the court will direct	ct the parties to submit a joint statement and deny
21	the motion to vacate.	
22	PETITIONER'S N	MOTION TO VACATE
23	I. Background	
24	In 2009, this action was proceeding to	ward an evidentiary hearing on claims 2, 5, 6, and 9
25	of petitioner's amended petition. In preparing for the hearing, respondent sought to depose	
26	petitioner. Petitioner was opposed to allowing	respondent to take Mr. Riel's deposition. The
27	magistrate judge then assigned to this action ruled that good cause existed for respondent to	
28	depose petitioner and left unresolved issues re	lated to petitioner's assertion of the Fifth
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Amendment, other anticipated objections, and proposals related to the conduct of the deposition.
 (ECF No. 252.)

Thereafter, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order granting petitioner the right to depose petitioner. (ECF No. 262.) The district judge then assigned to the case denied the motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 307.) Before the deposition took place, the Supreme Court issued rulings in <u>Harrington v. Richter</u>, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) and <u>Cullen v. Pinholster</u>, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).¹ The evidentiary hearing was put on hold while the parties filed briefing regarding the impact of Pinholster on petitioner's case.

Following the briefing, the magistrate then assigned to the case, issued Findings and
Recommendations recommending that petitioner me the requirements of § 2254(d) as to claim 2
and claim 5. (ECF No. 550.) Those recommendations were later adopted in full by Judge
England, the district judge presently assigned to the case. (ECF No. 568.) Now that the case is
again proceeding toward an evidentiary hearing, petitioner filed the instant motion to vacate the
court's giving respondent the right to depose petitioner. (ECF No. 590.)

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II. The Parties' Arguments

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A. Petitioner's Motion and Arguments

17It is petitioner's position that because the claims to be addressed in the evidentiary hearing18have been narrowed, that good cause no longer exists to depose petitioner. (ECF No. 590.)19During the hearing counsel strongly argued that Respondent has not shown a factual or legal basis20that supports the need to depose petitioner. Counsel also argued that his rights under the Fifth21Amendment could be violated during the deposition. Petitioner further argued that the22information sought by respondent can be obtained through review of various documentary and23other evidence already in respondent's possession. (ECF No. 593 at 5.)

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 ¹ The Court's decisions further reduced the ability of habeas petitioners to challenge state court decisions as unreasonable. Specifically, <u>Richter</u> held that if a state court issues a decision without explaining its reasoning the federal court must envision any reasonable rationale the state court might have applied and then defer to it. In <u>Pinholster</u> the court held that in determining whether a state court decision is reasonable, federal courts must limit their review to the evidence that was available to the state court.

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B. Respondent's Opposition and Arguments

It is respondent's position that good cause still exists to depose petitioner. Specifically,
respondent asserts that because petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to sufficiently investigate
and present evidence regarding petitioner's background, including his "Organic, Developmental,
Psychological, and Alcohol-Related impairments," that petitioner necessarily has relevant
information. (ECF No. 591.)

Respondent argued at the hearing that the other sources of information pointed to by
petitioner could contain authentication and hearsay issues. Respondent further claims that it
should be able to ask Mr. Riel about statements he made to his defense team and the various
experts.

11

III. Legal Standards

12 Parties in a habeas proceeding are not entitled to discovery as a matter of course. Bracy v. 13 Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Rather, "[a] party shall be entitled to invoke the processes of 14 discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if and to the extent that, the judge 15 in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not 16 otherwise." Rule 6, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Good cause is shown by the presentation of 17 "specific allegations" demonstrating the need for the discovery. Cf., Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09 18 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). The Ninth Circuit has held that discovery 19 is proper where essential to resolution of a claim. Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 20 2005); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997).

The scope and extent of the discovery permitted under Rule 6(a) is a matter confined to
the discretion of the district court. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909; see also McDowell v. Calderon,
197 F.3d 1253, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding the district court's imposition of a
protective order limiting the use of discovered materials should be upheld as not an abuse of
discretion).

The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings, Rule 6(c) "specifically recognizes the right of the respondent to take the deposition
of the petitioner." Good cause exists for allowing the deposition of a petitioner in a capital

1	habeas case where he has alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate his	
2	family background in preparation for the penalty phase. Bean v. Calderon, 166 F.R.D. 452, 456	
3	(E.D. Cal. 1996). Petitioner may invoke the Fifth Amendmendment during the deposition.	
4	"[H]owever, the court may draw an adverse inference from its invocation if the questions to	
5	which the privilege is asserted directly relate to an allegation made by petitioner in his verified	
6	petition, and the questions are not otherwise objectionable." Id. at 454. Before deciding whether	
7	a petitioner is entitled to discovery under Rule 6(a), the court must first identify the essential	
8	elements of the underlying claim. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904.	
9	IV. Discussion	
10	Upon review of the motions and the documents in support and opposition, as well as the	
11	parties' oral arguments, the court finds that good cause exists to allow respondent to depose	
12	petitioner, Mr. Riel.	
13	"The Supreme Court has on several occasions indicated that at an evidentiary hearing the	
14	actual information relayed by petitioner to his counsel is critical in habeas corpus actions." Bean,	
15	166 F.R.D. at 456-57.	
16	The reasonableness of counsel's action may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or action.	
10		
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"restrict the identity of those working for the state who may have access to the documents and
 prohibit the use of the documents on any retrial should the petitioner be successful on habeas."
 <u>Ervine v. Warden</u>, 214 F.Supp.3d 917, 920 (E.D. Cal. 2016).

Petitioner alleges in claim 2 that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
and present substantial evidence regarding petitioner's organic, developmental, psychological,
and alcohol-related impairments, and in failing to prepare and consult with qualified experts
about these issues. Because petitioner's background is at issue, he necessarily has information
that is relevant to this claim. <u>Bean</u>, 166 F.R.D. at 456. Additionally, statements made to counsel
and/or experts may be relevant to attain a proper assessment of trial counsel's litigation tactics.

Petitioner argued that statements made by Mr. Riel during the course of the deposition
could have a negative impact in any future state resentencing proceedings. This argument
supports the imposition of a protective order, but fails to defeat the showing of good cause. The
court will provide the parties with the opportunity to submit briefing regarding the issuance of a
protective order and any other issue regarding the conduct of the deposition, including the
scheduling of the deposition at a time when the undersigned is available by phone to issue rulings
on any objections that may arise during the deposition.

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STATUS CONFERENCE

18 After hearing argument on petitioner's motion to vacate, the court held a status 19 conference. The parties indicated that there are a number of issues yet to be resolved before the 20 evidentiary hearing takes place. Accordingly, the court will direct the parties to meet and confer 21 regarding the following issues: (1) identification of any issues that need to be resolved before the 22 evidentiary hearing; (2) taking testimony from out of state witnesses; (3) and rescheduling the 23 evidentiary hearing. Counsel shall file a joint statement reflecting their discussion, including 24 points of agreement and any disagreement on these matters. 25 ////

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1	CONCLUSION
2	Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
2	1. Petitioner's motion to vacate the order granting respondent's motion to depose petitioner
4	(ECF No. 590) is denied.
4 5	2. Within sixty days of the date of this order the parties may submit briefing on the issuance
6	of protective orders or any other objections anticipated during his deposition and any
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8	proposals for the conduct of the deposition.3. Within sixty days of the date of this order, the parties shall file a joint statement regarding
	3. Within sixty days of the date of this order, the parties shall file a joint statement regarding the three issues identified above.
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10 11	Dated: July 7, 2020
11	Kunnall
12	DEBORAH BARNES
13 14	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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22	DB:12
23	DB/orders-capital/riel.depo
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